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Preface 
This thesis is an attempt to disrupt the boundaries of how we tend to think about 
"organisation" and "embodiment". Whilst this effort is the result of an ongoing quest 
to think about the body within and without the boundaries of organisation theory, I 
have done my best to follow the style and format currently used in this field. I have 
sought to keep footnotes at a manageable level. I have separated lengthy quotes from 
the rest of the text by indentation. Shorter sections omitted from quotes are indicated 
by [ ... ] and longer sections omitted from quotes are indicated by [ .... ]. For the sake of 
consistency, in some cases I have modified the format of quotation marks used in 
some of the sources quoted here. The bibliography at the back includes in most cases 
the original publication dates of works later translated and published in English (e.g. 
Deleuze, Gilles (1994/1968)). I have tried to avoid gendered language where possible, 
and I am responsible for translating the quotes borrowed from the Norwegian public 
health material invoked in chapter 2. 
I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to a number of people, who all helped 
me in the writing of this thesis. Some of them are still at the University of Warwick, 
others have moved on since I first met them there. Yet others I know from elsewhere. 
Professor Gibson Burrell, my supervisor at the University of Warwick, gave me help 
and support, inspiration and guidance, both personally and intellectually prior to and 
all throughout the four years of this doctoral project. Intellectually, it is to him that I 
owe the most. Dr Martin Corbett assisted as supervisor and asked important questions, 
which later helped me clarify and focus my ideas to a more manageable research 
project. Dr Karen Dale first inspired me to start thinking about the body in 
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organisation theory. Through her own research she continues to be a major source of 
intellectual inspiration and guidance. 
Steffen Bohm, Martin Brigham, Campbell Jones and Jacob Thommesen, friends and 
fellow doctoral researchers all contributed in their own way through lengthy 
conversations about theory, philosophy and the study of organisation. And my friend 
the sociologist Svein Hammer engaged me in stimulating and lengthy email 
discussions and coffee chats in Trondheim, Norway - about theory, method and 
Foucault. My friend the medical historian Dr Jonathan Reinarz read and gave rigorous 
comments on what I had to say about public health and medicine and directed me to 
significant texts and events in medical history. Dr Stephen Cummings, who is a 
crucial source of personal and intellectual support for a number of doctoral 
researchers at Warwick Business School, gave friendship and a serious quest for 
clarity and focus. He helped me through many frustrating stages of this project by 
making me step out of and systematise my own thinking. Professor Keith Ansell 
Pearson at the Philosophy Department at Warwick helped me get to grips with 
Deleuze. In addition to his highly instructive books and articles, he gave generously of 
his time and knowledge, in email correspondence and conversations, and he made 
very helpful comments on what I have written about Deleuze. 
All throughout this doctoral project, my parents and my brother have been a 
tremendous support, always unconditional in their love and always showing genuine 
interest in what I was doing. Finally, I could never go on without Louise - her love, 
support and companionship - and her constant questions and challenges to me, to my 
own body, and to my body of thought. 
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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to disrupt the boundaries of how we think about organisation and 
embodiment. From an investigation into five organisational regimes of Western public 
health, it argues that the body is a problem for organisation. The body does not come 
ready organised, but is a nonorganisational, messy and carnal matter of flesh and 
blood, pains and pleasures, habits and desires. Although modem discourses and 
institutions seek to organise how we live with our bodies in everyday life, they never 
do so fully and completely. Bodies are powerful, creative and unpredictable and 
disrupt the boundaries of organisation. 
Asking how organisation theory deals with the problem of the body, the thesis seeks 
to take the discipline further by developing an approach to how it should deal with the 
body, and by identifying what implications this might have for our thinking about 
organisation. Utilising the conceptualist philosophy of Canguilhem, Foucault and 
Deleuze, this is done by analysing the concept of "organisation" and the concept of 
the "body" across organisation theory and related fields. 
Five ways of dealing with the body are identified: (i) not dealing with it at all, which 
is mostly the case with mainstream research on formal organisations and more radical 
research on organisational processes; (ii) reducing the body to an organismic 
metaphor, which is what much classical and some contemporary mainstream research 
does; (iii) studying how embodiment enables the successful management of formal 
organisations; (iv) studying how bodies are organised within and without formal 
organisations; and (v) studying nonorganisational embodiment, i.e. how bodies 
disrupt and exist independently of organisation. Whereas the third and fourth themes 
have been investigated in some organisation theory, little attempt has been made to 
think about nonorganisational embodiment. Using material in Deleuze, Foucault, 
feminism and current organisation theory, this thesis appreciates the ways in which 
bodies disrupt the boundaries of organisation and the ways in which bodies live under 
the conditions imposed by these boundaries. From this perspective, organisation is 
less powerful, less stable and more fragile than we often think, and bodies are more 
powerful, more dynamic and more creative. 
This conceptualist interest in organisation, nonorganisation and the body gives rise to 
a theory and philosophy of organisation that might provide the underpinnings of a 
radical approach to everyday problems of organisation and embodiment, such as 
aesthetic labour and impression management; virtual organisations; culture, 
subcultures and resistance at work and in public space; health and safety; and gender, 
race and sexuality. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The Body: A Problem for Organisation Theory? 
Let me begin to whet your appetite for the task ahead by speaking of human 
excretion. Throughout the history of human societies, organisations of production 
have dealt with issues related to the body, to bodily organs and to bodily remnants and 
waste products. In his history of smell, the French nineteenth century historian Alain 
Corbin (1994) tells us that in 1844 the political economist Clement Joseph Gamier 
dreamt of constructing an ammoniapolis, a large industrial complex for the treatment 
of urine. We know little in detail about Gamier's ammoniapolis, but it is possible to 
imagine that the plan was for a vast network of sewage canals which would transport 
urine and faeces from the private houses and hotels, the schools, businesses and 
hospitals of French urban centres, out to ammoniapolises located outside the cities. 
Thus, the ammoniapolis would not only remove the stench and filth of human excreta 
from urban space and clean up the places where people lived and worked. It would 
also put that same matter to effective use in the industrial production of ammonia. 
Although Gamier's dream was never realised, there were several facilities of a smaller 
scale in France at the time which were involved in the processing of human and 
animal waste and excreta into ammonia. For example, there was a factory producing 
ammonia near the refuse dump at Bondy near Paris. And there was a thriving industry 
of cesspool-clearing companies, which supplied ammonia factories with excreta 
collected from the cesspools of private dwellings and hotels. Nitrogen is crucial to the 
production of ammonia, and experts were worried that the flushing of cesspools with 
water and the replacing of cesspools with main drainage systems would undennine 
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the nitrogen content of excrement. The importance of nitrogen was common 
knowledge amongst cesspool-clearing companies, which valued the excreta of the 
poor above the diluted excreta of the rich and for this reason lobbied French 
politicians and public officials against the installation of main drainage systems. 
Material collected from the premises of the masses was not mixed with water and had 
a nitrogen content of 9 kilograms per cubic meter. In comparison, the cesspool of the 
Grand Hotel in Paris had a nitrogen content of 270 grams per cubic meter (Corbin 
1994: 265n39). 
The commercial value of waste, excreta and rotting matter also affected the French 
knackery and slaughterhouse business in the early nineteenth century. In 1812 the 
chemists Payen, Barbier and the Pluvinet brothers were given pennission to produce 
manure from a process that liquefied the fats and compressed the flesh of carcasses. In 
1816 Foucques wanted to use the flesh, bones and intestines from the slaughter of 
horses in the production of alkaline liquid and different coloured soaps. Some years 
later, research by the young Jean-Pierre Barruel meant that ammonia salt could be 
produced from bone remains, carcasses and purifying water. And after 1825 the 
Pluvinet factory at Clichy outside Paris, which was a drying works, processed animal 
blood into products that were exported on a large scale to sugar refineries in the 
French colonies. On the whole, 'Every part of the corpse, deodorized and carefully 
sorted, had a rational use' (Corbin 1994: 121). Like the copraphilias and copraphages 
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in Pasolini's (1975) movie SaiD, or The 120 Days of Sodom, the argument was that 
nothing must ever go to waste.! 
Of course, the utilitarian use of waste and excreta precedes and exceeds the above 
examples from nineteenth century France. Humans have fertilised their fields with 
human and animal excrements since the emergence of agrarian civilisation five 
thousand years ago (Lenski et al. 1994). And most farmers across the world continue 
to do so today, as do most people who want their garden tulips to grow. During the 
European BSE crisis of the last few years, we have also been informed that British 
cattle have been fed on the pulverised spines and skeletons from other cattle (cf. e.g. 
Ridley and Baker 1998). And perhaps more alarmingly, the news media have reported 
about copraphagiac circumstances in the French beef industry during the last decade 
or so, where cattle manure has been systematically mixed into the cattle fodder (cf. 
e.g. Bates 1999). Interestingly, little alarm has arisen in light of the diet of the average 
pig, which consumes leftovers from restaurants and other waste products, and the diet 
of the fox bred by the fur industry, which eats fodder made by the pulverised 
remnants of dead family pets such as cats, dogs and guinea pigs. 
The chemically useful qualities of urine are also well known to the textile industry. 
During the industrial revolution in England, cattle urine, which has a high nitrogen 
content, was used in the dyeing and scouring of wool, cotton and silk. Often child 
labourers in their bare feet would be stamping in containers filled with urine and 
I Pasolini's movie is based on the infamous book by the Marquis de Sade, The One Hundred and 
Twenty Days of Sodom. 
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textile sheets, a process that gives textile the strong colour of Prussian blue (cf. e.g. 
Stearns 1993). At around the same time, urine and faeces were also the key 
ingredients in the production of gunpowder and ammunition, though there is no 
known etymological relationship between ammonia and ammunition? Since the 
Nuremberg trials following the Second World War, there have also been discussions 
and investigations about the Nazis' exploitation of human corpses and body parts for 
industrial purposes. Although mainstream historians have come to doubt the reliability 
of the witness accounts giving rise to these discussions, Claude Lanzmann's 
documentary film Shoah (1985), the narrative accounts of Kurt Vonnegut (1968) and 
Martin Amis (1991), and Ben Hirsch's (2000) biographical account all persist that the 
flesh and bones of dead human bodies murdered in the Nazi concentration camps first 
became ammonia, then soaps and candles, glues and explosives. 
Throughout Western history both urine and faeces have also been utilised for their 
therapeutic properties. In his remarkable study entitled History of Shit, the 
psychoanalyst Dominique Laporte (2000: 98) reminds us that the Romans 'routinely 
claimed that both wounds and disease could be cured cum stercore humano' (i.e. "by 
human dung"). For example, Dioscurides, Apuleius, Catallus, Trabo and Diodorus of 
Sicily all attributed 'the whiteness of teeth and beards, the sturdy development of 
once-weak children, and the recovery of sharp vision to urine' (Laporte 2000: 98). 
They also prescribed the use of urine in the treatment of headaches and so-called 
feminine disorders, and the use of faeces as a cooling balm for burns and as a stinging 
2 The word ammunition, which has a French origin, is actually an army corruption of the word 
munition, which means fortification, defence or protection. 
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cleanser for festering wounds. Further on, whilst drawing on a compilation made by 
the prominent historian and philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard, Laporte informs 
us about the use of animal excreta in eighteenth century France. The scent I 'eau de 
Millefleurs, for example, was made from distilled cow dung. Stercus nigrum, or rat 
droppings, was used against constipation, and when mixed with honey and onion 
juices it was seen as a certain cure for baldness. Urine continues to be utilised for 
therapeutic purposes, I have been informed by an acquaintance of mine working as a 
biochemistry researcher in one of the Pasteur research laboratories in France. As urine 
contains hormones as well as nitrogen and other substances, pharmaceutical 
companies have for the past ten years or so extracted oestrogen from women's urine 
and given this to women having complications during pregnancy due to oestrogen 
shortage. Such hormones were previously extracted bio-synthetically from the 
hypophysis or pituitary gland in the brain of dead female bodies. 
Readers might be puzzled by the dwelling on these examples in a thesis on 
organisation theory. However, as they draw our attention to the body and the waste 
products of the body, they are central to the main argument developed in this thesis. 
The body is actually a site and an interface where two major themes in organisational 
theorising meet: the organisation of production (pursued in mainstream work) and the 
production of organisation (pursued in peripheral areas of the discipline). Whereas 
the mainstream I am referring to here is typified in contemporary US-style research 
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published in leading journals such as the Academy of Management Reviel1' (AMR) 
and Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ) and exemplified by authors such as 
Jeffrey Pfeffer (1992), Lex Donaldson (1985, 1996) and Henry Mintzberg (1983, 
1994), the periphery that I am referring to sometimes appears in European journals 
such as Organization Studies and Organization and may be exemplified by authors 
such as Gibson Burrell (1988), Robert Cooper (1989) and Robert Chia (1995). The 
organisation of production is basically about the internal workings of formal 
organisations and relates to how formal organisations go about their business in terms 
of activities such as planning, decision making, operations, production, human 
resource management, sales and marketing. Here, typically organisation is a bounded 
entity governed by an overall goal or more or less common purpose. In contrast, the 
production of organisation, which was first coined as a concept by Cooper and Burrell 
(1988) in the introductory article of their four-piece series on modernism, 
postmodernism and organisational analysis in Organization Studies, assumes a 
broader perspective of organisation. Here, Cooper and Burrell argue that 
We need to see organization as aprocess that occurs within the wider "body" of 
society and which is concerned with the construction of objects of theoretical 
knowledge centred on the "social body": health, disease, emotion, alienation, 
labour, etc. In other words, to understand organizations it is necessary to 
analyze them from the outside, as it were, and not from what is already 
organized. It becomes a question of analyzing, let us say, the production of 
organization rather than the organization of production (Cooper and Burrell 
1989: 106). 
From this, which still may be regarded as both path-breaking and peripheral work in 
organisation theory, arises a research programme concerned with two things in 
particular. First, it is concerned with the ways in which formal organisations are made 
possible in the first place, by activities of boundary-drawing, ordering and 
categorisation, such as the use of a particular language, computing system, accounting 
standard or statistical procedure, and the submission to timetables, dress codes and job 
descriptions. As such, organisation is not simply 'a social tool and an extension of 
human rationality' expressed in 'planned thought and calculative action'. Following 
Nietzsche, it is more a 'defensive reaction to forces intrinsic to the social body which 
constantly threaten the stability of organized life' (Cooper and Burrell 1989: 91). 
Consequently, it appears that the production of organisation incites an element of 
uncertainty that undermines the power and stability of organisation. The key aspect of 
the production of organisation, however, is that it is concerned with the ways in which 
organisation continues to order social life outside the boundaries of formal 
organisations. Our lives are not simply organised in the workplace. They continue to 
be so through discourses and institutions that make us think and act in certain ways 
both at home and in public space. Surveillance technology in city centres and on the 
motorway, advertising campaigns on television and in glossy magazines, and rules 
and regulations for appropriate behaviour influence how we live our everyday lives in 
a contemporary modern society. As such, the production of organisation may be as 
goal-directed or purposive as the organisation of production. But even if it seeks to 
institute boundaries on the conduct of social life and to some extent makes possible 
the boundaries of formal organisations, it is not restricted to the boundaries of formal 
organisational entities. 
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In sum, then, this thesis associates organisation with boundaries and purpose. These 
themes are perhaps most clearly articulated in mainstream organisation theory, where 
formal organisational entities are distinguished from the rest of the world through 
their capacity to maintain their boundaries against the environment, and the 
assumption that organisations are driven by a common purpose (cf. e.g. Barnard 
1938). Moreover, since Weber's (1947) writings on bureaucracy, organisations have 
been associated with a hierarchical division of labour made possible by the institution 
and maintenance of boundaries between the various people, roles and responsibilities 
within the organisation. However, it can also be argued that a somewhat different 
division of labour is produced by processes of organisation that institute and maintain 
boundaries that separate different groups of people in society, by which some groups 
are stigmatised whilst others are valorised and by which some groups gain power to 
dominate others. This latter aspect of organisation, which alludes to the notion of 
"labours of division" (cf. e.g. Hetherington and Munro 1998; Dale 2001), will be dealt 
with in parts of the thesis. On the whole, however, I shall not be concerned with the 
division of labour and labours of division in an explicit sense. 
As we see from the examples above, the body and its waste products is used 
commercially in the organisation of production, by companies and other 
organisational entities that seek to organise their production processes as rationally as 
possible. The body is therefore located inside the organisation of production - and in 
many instances at the very centre of organisations of production, which benefit from 
utilising human and animal excreta as raw material. But in order to be exploited 
commercially, and by being exploited in industrial production processes, the body and 
its waste products are also at the centre of the production of organisation. If we 
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assume like Mary Douglas (1966) that dirt, disorder and disorganisation is simply 
"matter out of place", urine and faeces cease to be dirty and disgusting when removed 
from the areas of urban dwelling and relocated within the ammoniapolis outside the 
city where they are transformed into artificial fertilisers, textile dyes and explosives. 
And dead bodies cease to be dirty and disgusting when supplied to the glue factory. In 
other words, the production of organisation turns disorder into order. Bodies and 
bodily waste products, which initially are matters of disorder, disorganisation or 
nonorganisation, become matters of order and organisation when subjected to the 
production of organisation. 
I am not suggesting here that the terms disorder, disorganisation and nonorganisation 
are synonymous. Disorder is often used normatively in everyday language as another 
word for mayhem, havoc or ragnarokk. As I shall discuss later, there is also a notable 
difference between disorganisation, which by some organisation theorists is treated as 
a bizarre or inferior version of organisation (e.g. Tsoukas 1998a), and what I call 
nonorganisation. Disorganisation, which is mounted on the natural science 
understanding of "chaos as nonlinear order" (cf. e.g. Stewart 1989; Cohen and Stewart 
1994), preserves some sense of teleology or goal-direction and may be reduced to a 
matter of organisation. Nonorganisation, on the other hand, is irreducible to 
organisation. Nonorganisation is most certainly not about different members of an 
organisational entity working towards conflicting goals. Nonorganisation is about not 
having or working towards any set goals at all and refers to the creative forces of 
excess that disrupt, subvert and escape organisation altogether. Despite these 
differences, disorder, disorganisation and nonorganisation alike do stand in contrast to 
what we tend to think of as order and organisation. And even if the production of 
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organisation can never fully tum the disorderly, disorganisational and 
nonorganisational matters of bodies and bodily waste products into clean matters of 
order and organisation, this is certainly the direction in which it is working. Most 
notably, this has recently been recognised by two established professors in 
organisation theory, Robert Cooper (in Chia and Kallinikos 1998) and Robert Chia 
(l998a). Albeit in brief, and by reference to the same text, they have highlighted the 
training of bodily functions and the private and public management of bodily waste as 
crucial to the rational organisation of modem society since Victorian times. 
My preoccupation with the body is of the same order as Foucault's. Whilst Foucault 
speaks in terms of the pervasive microphysics of power and the overarching bio-
politics (or bio-power) that write themselves upon and regulate the body into a body-
politic, I am concerned in this thesis with the organisation of production and the 
production of organisation that impose themselves upon and organise the body. In 
Foucault's words, "power" and the "body". In my own words, but without reducing 
Foucault's terms to my own, "organisation" and the "body". Like Foucault, I am 
interested in the body politic, i.e. the ways in which the body is organised to become 
an organism, an organised body. This is no coincidence. As Karen Dale (2001) shows 
in her groundbreaking book, which is the first systematic and detailed treatise of the 
body in organisation theory, it is the body that gives us organisation: 'The idea of 
"organisation" stems from that of "organ". It derives directly from the structured view 
of the body [ ... ]' (Dale 2001: 116). Consulting the Oxford English Dictionary, one 
learns about the etymological links between the body and organisation. In the 
Renaissance, organisation was an activity performed by the anatomist in the anatomy 
theatre, at the dissection table, with the scalpel in hand. To organise was to furnish a 
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body with organs, i.e. to tum a body into an organism. And since the writings of Elton 
Mayo (1933), the organism has provided one of the most significant metaphors for 
thinking about formal organisations (e.g. Katz and Kahn 1966; Lawrence and Lorsch 
1967; Kast and Rosenzweig 1973; Morgan 1986). 
This is only one side of the story. The organisation of the body is by no means 
obvious. It is only in anatomy textbooks and other medical teaching aids that the 
organs of the body are to be found in predictable places. Once cut open, a body might 
reveal a structure deviant from that portrayed in the placards and dummies of the 
medical school classroom. An internal organ such as a lung or the heart of an 
individual corpse might not lie exactly where the anatomist would normally expect to 
find it. Therefore, in spite of the continuous efforts to organise the body, the body 
cannot be reduced to a matter of organisation. 
Bodies are surrounded, penetrated and constituted by powerful forces of 
nonorganisation that disrupt the boundaries of organisation. Deleuze and Guattari 
(1988) bring out this point - perhaps more clearly than Foucault - in their writing 
about creative involution, which springs out of their more general emphasis on 
becoming. Commenting on Deleuze and Guattari's notions of creative involution and 
becoming, which here concerns the relations between animal bodies, the philosopher 
Keith Ansell Pearson (1999) states that 'Becoming is of a different order than filiation 
simply because it concerns alliances which cut across phyletic lineages' and allow for 
"'the dance between the most disparate things'" (Ansell Pearson 1999: 162; 68). Like 
Charles Darwin in The Origin of Species (1985), Deleuze and Guattari's favourite 
example concerns the symbiotic and sympathetic relationship between the wasp and 
the orchid. But unlike Darwin, who used this example to illustrate the complexity of 
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natural selection, Deleuze and Guattari use it 'in order to show how living matter can 
evade or transform "selective pressures'" (Ansell Pearson 1999: 144). According to 
Deleuze and Guattari, the wasp and the orchid are not distinct beings separated by 
complete and watertight boundaries. Instead, they engage each other in processes of 
transversal communication that disrupt, undermine and transgress boundaries between 
species, phyla and kingdoms. The wasp and the orchid use one another and need one 
another to reproduce. The wasp, for example, does not simply evolve from a 
rudimentary to a more mature stage of what it means to be a wasp, but is a wasp 
becoming-orchid. Similarly, the orchid is not an orchid, but an orchid becoming-wasp. 
This means that the boundaries between the wasp and the orchid are not stable, 
complete and always maintained, but leaky, permeable and unstable. I shall say more 
about this nonorganisational and boundary-disrupting notion of embodiment in 
chapter 7. 
However, before moving on it is worth noticing that both in his own work and in his 
work with Guattari, Deleuze develops a number of ways to think (at least implicitly) 
about how nonorganisational embodiment disrupts the boundaries of organisation 
(e.g. Deleuze 1988a, 1988b, 1992; Deleuze and Guattari 1988). The well-known 
notion of the "body without organs" is perhaps the clearest example of this (cf. 
Deleuze and Guattari 1988). The body without organs is not literally a body void of 
organs; 'The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to the organization of the organs 
called the organism' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 158). Rather, 'it is an inevitable 
exercise or experimentation' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 149); it is a body that 
invites us to change our bodily habits and ways of life by experimenting with what a 
body can do. And as such, it is a body that disrupts and goes beyond the 
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organisational boundaries of the orgamsm. Although the boundaries instituted and 
maintained by the organism make possible certain forms of lived embodiment they do 
by no means capture the entire force, capacity and complexity of the body. 
Nonorganisation means that no body can ever be fully organised as a stable bounded 
entity. The body is out of bounds. And it is this exclusion that gives rise to the subject 
of this thesis: disrupting boundaries. 
The relationship between organisation, boundaries and the body is an ambiguous one 
that needs to be examined in some detail. This might be done through the example of 
Western public health, which I shall investigate, at greater length, in the next chapter. 
As we shall see, public health is a micro-physics of power and a bio-politics or bio-
power that joins the organisation of production and the production of organisation in 
its attempt to organise our bodies in everyday life. Insofar as public health constitutes 
an empirical example of the production of organisation, the organisational aspects of 
public health cannot be reduced to the bounded entities or formal organisations that 
carry out its policies and strategies - be they research laboratories, public policy units 
or regulatory agencies. As the sociologists Petersen and Lupton (1996) suggest, public 
health is much bigger than that and should not be defined in terms of specific services 
or forms of property, but in terms of its level of analysis. Whilst other strands of 
medicine are primarily concerned with the individual body, public health is more 
concerned with bodies in groups in an interactionist sense and how they live in 
relation to their environment. Hence, it is the popUlation that is the object and target of 
the detailed knowledge systems and strategies that service public health. This 
commitment to the population puts public health in an ambiguous relationship to 
boundaries and organisation. On the one hand, it institutes boundaries, and on the 
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other hand, it cuts across boundaries. I shall deal with the latter first. In this 
discussion, boundaries should not be regarded as complete, stable and unbreachable, 
but recognised as leaky, unstable and permeable, as always in the making and never 
fully completed. And as I shall discuss in chapter 5, Robert Cooper (1990) draws 
attention to at least the unstable and incomplete nature of boundaries whilst 
underlining their ambiguity. Boundaries do not only belong to the system, but also to 
the "outside" environment. They are meeting places. 
It cannot be denied that public health operates from a number of formal organisations 
that themselves are defined by the boundaries that distinguish them from the rest of 
the world. Biochemical and pharmaceutical research and production laboratories, 
health policy units and regulatory agencies, and community health clinics and public 
information offices are all part of a vast network of formal organisations that work for 
the improvement of the public's health. But simultaneously, public health needs to cut 
across these same boundaries, both in order to organise how we live with our bodies 
in the everyday and in order to reach its espoused objective of a good public health for 
the entire population. This is the only way it can try and make sure that we take care 
of our own bodies and relate to other people and their bodies in ways that do not put 
our own health and the health of other people at risk. Moreover, this is the only way 
that public health can become what it is. That is, public health can only become public 
to the extent that its formal organisations are capable of cutting across their own 
boundaries and work actively with and on the public. As a consequence, public health 
is defined at least as much by what goes on outside its organisational entities as it is 
by what happens inside of them. And more importantly, our lives are not just 
organised to the extent that we work and dwell in organisations. Life is further 
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organised to the extent that public health manages to organise what we do outside of 
these same organisations. This is why it is not sufficient to investigate the internal 
structures and processes that characterise the formal organisations of public health. 
That is not where public health, or organisation for that matter, begins or ends. Rather, 
it is crucial to study public health in terms of the strategies, practices and activities 
that precede and exceed these same formal organisations. 
However, public health does not merely cut across boundaries. As noted above, public 
health is also about the institution and drawing of boundaries, and it is this that makes 
it an organisational practice in the first place. The public health authorities seek to 
confine, differentiate and organise the population by instituting and controlling 
boundaries between bodies and by placing boundaries upon the things that bodies can 
do. Although insisting on different health problems being related across boundaries 
(for example between the private and the public, between one country and another, 
between the body and its environment), public health continues to institute boundaries 
that differentiate and classify the population into different groups and categories. The 
result is a mode of organisation that on a general plane seeks to separate the unhealthy 
from the healthy, the dirty from the clean and high-risk groups from low-risk groups. 
Public health as a whole is however underpinned by a fundamental discontinuity. 
Different public health regimes have adopted different techniques, instituted different 
kinds of boundaries and implemented the production of organisation differently. I 
shall maintain this sense of discontinuity in my investigation of public health in the 
next chapter. 
Another sense of discontinuity also emerges in the context of public health and 
boundaries, organisation and embodiment. Although public health seeks to organise 
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how we live with our bodies in the everyday, it can never do so fully and completely. 
We eat stuff that is deemed unhealthy, we smoke and drink more than we are told is 
good for us, and we enjoy intimate relationships that allegedly put our sexual health at 
risk. Also, we do not clean ourselves enough, or we clean ourselves too much, 
sometimes developing skin allergies as a result. Consequently, the organisational 
boundaries of public health are discontinued and disrupted by the nonorganisational 
forces of embodiment itself. Whilst the body is a site on which the organisation of 
production and the production of organisation meet and interact, it poses a problem 
for the workings of organisation. And as such, it poses a problem for the discipline of 
organisation theory. This gives rise to three questions, which provide the starting 
point of this thesis. First, how does organisation theory deal with the problem of the 
body? Second, how should organisation theory deal with the problem of the body? 
And third, what implications does this have for how we, as organisation theorists, 
should think about organisation? 
Given the abundance of bodily metaphors in organisation theory (for example the 
notions of the corporate headquarter, corporate foot soldiers, corporate anorexia, the 
heart of the organisation, the slimming down of operations, headhunting, and indeed 
the organism metaphor itselt), I must insist that this is not another attempt to make us 
think about organisations as if they were organisms. Instead, it is an attempt to put the 
body at the centre of organisational theorising. First, by critically ana~l'sing how 
various processes seek to organise the body. And second, by drawing attention to the 
W(Jl'S in which bodies precede and exceed, disrupt, undermine and escape 
organisation. 
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The body that I want to introduce into organisation theory is therefore the concrete 
and very physical body of flesh and blood, bones and tissue, pains and pleasures, and 
habits and desires. This is the body that makes life possible and through which life is 
lived. This is the gendered, sexual body and ethnic body: the queer and straight body; 
the ill and healthy body; the young, ageing and dying body; the ugly and beautiful 
body; the clean and dirty body; the anorexic and obese body; the hungry, starving and 
saturated body: the suffering and violent body; the moving and arrested body; the 
painful and joyous body; the emotional and thinking body; the consuming, working 
and creative body. This is the human, non-human and transhuman body, the same and 
different body, the normal, deviant and abject body. This is the organised and 
nonorganisational body. This is the body that for decades has been an absent body, a 
body excluded from the social sciences by the Cartesian mindlbody dualism because 
it poses a problem for the rational mind and because it can be all the things above and 
many more (cf. Leder 1990: Shilling 1993; Dale 2001). Surely, this body cannot be 
reduced to the status of a metaphorical body as an insubstantiated, rhetorical trope. 
Feminism, from the work of Simone de Beauvoir (1997), was the first strand of 
thought to introduce the body into the social sciences. Although feminism does not 
necessarily imply a concern with all the aspects of embodiment mentioned above, 
many of them are dealt with in feminist work and all of them can be dealt with from a 
feminist perspective. Bodily difference is a central theme in feminism (e.g. Firestone 
1972; Wittig 1981, 1987; Kristeva 1982: lrigaray 1985: Jaggar and Bordo 1989; 
Butler 1990, 1993: Bordo 1993; Grosz 1994; Grosz and Probyn 1995). This means 
that feminism deals with and may enable organisation theorists to deal with the ways 
in which bodily difference is constructed by organisational processes within and 
24 
without the boundaries of formal organisations. Moreover, it can help organisation 
theorists recognise and deal with the ways in which bodily difference disrupts, 
undermines and escapes such organisational processes and constructions. 
In his recent piece in the anthology Body and Organization, Martin Parker (2000) 
warns about the potential problems of making the body our centre of attention. Parker 
is particularly worried that the increasing interest amongst social scientists in the body 
will lead to what he calls "deceptive materialism" (Parker 2000: 72); that once we 
know what the body is we can understand how it is constructed and organised. This 
materialism is deceptive because it supposedly gives us a point at which analysis can 
begin and end. For me, however, bringing the body into organisation theory is not a 
question of analytical closure, but openness. Unlike biomedicine, which seeks a finite 
understanding of what the body is, the approach that I am proposing here does not 
pursue the production of a complete knowledge about the body. The complexity and 
dynamism of embodiment means that we can never fully know what a body is and 
what a body can and cannot do. We can only begin to experiment with what a body 
can do. This is why the body becomes so important for organisation theory. If we 
cannot know what a body can do, we must also recognise that the body cannot be 
fully and completely organised. 
So far, I have spoken largely in terms of "the body". But as Karen Dale (2001) insists, 
this is a highly problematic concept. "The body" might easily give the impression that 
one is talking about one homogeneous and uniform body, a body that is rather similar 
to the biomedical organism, an already organised body that can only look a certain 
way and can only do certain things. Also, the notion of "the body" or even "a body" 
runs the risk of reification; the body becomes a stable thing or object, a bounded 
entity impervious to change. Dealing with this problem, Dale chooses to speak in 
terms of "embodiment" rather than "the body". "Embodiment" signifies more 
obviously the processual and dynamic aspects of what it means to be a body, aspects 
that should become clearer when I in chapter 7 deal with the nonorganisational 
workings of bodies and embodiment. Simply getting rid of the notion of "the body" or 
"a body" has however proven extremely difficult, especially when dealing with the 
more empirical context of public health and when examining the works of others 
dealing with body-issues. And doing so is by no means a guarantee for avoiding 
reification. The reader will therefore find that I speak in terms of both "the body" and 
"bodies", "a body" and "embodiment" throughout this thesis, and the meaning of each 
term should become clear given the specific context in which it is used. 
As already indicated, this thesis is about how organisation theory deals with and 
should deal with the problem of the body. But before actually investigating this, I 
shall in chapter 2 elaborate on various ways in which the body is a problem for 
organisation, thus becoming a site where the organisation of production and the 
production of organisation meet. This is done through the example of public health. 
Public health brings together formal organisations of production and the production of 
organisation in an attempt to organise bodies in everyday life, at the level of 
populations. Although the major concern of this chapter is with the New Public 
Health of contemporary modem societies, particularly in the West, I do also deal at 
length with four other public health regimes: the Great Confinement, the Victorian 
Sanitary Movement, Pasteurian Public Health and Eugenic Public Health. These 
regimes of what one might call the "Old Public Health" all provide a necessary 
background and contrast to the New Public Health, as they help us recognise the 
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different organisational principles employed to tackle different bodies and different 
problems of health and embodiment in different historical contexts. And the 
discontinuities between all these regimes raise questions about the durability and 
power, not only of individual public health regimes or public health as a whole, but of 
organisation in general. And consequently, it draws attention to the methodological 
question of how one can study the ways in which organisation theory deals with, and 
should deal with, the problem of the body. 
In chapter 3, I tum my attention to this methodological question. My answer is to 
propose a conceptualist methodology and a method of concept analysis developed 
from the works of Georges Canguilhem (1989, 1994), Michel Foucault (1970, 1972, 
1979) and Gilles Deleuze (1988c), three French twentieth century thinkers who are all 
part of the same but not homogeneous intellectual tradition. In general, the method, or 
perhaps methods of "concept analysis" that are legitimised by my "conceptualist 
methodology" first make possible the critical analysis of the concept of organisation 
and the concept of embodiment in different strands of organisation theory. And it 
makes possible the critical analysis of how these strands do or do not deal with the 
problem of the body. Further on, it makes possible the critical analysis of a concept of 
embodiment that may enable organisation theory to create a concept of organisation 
that recognises the fragility as well as the power of organisation. Insofar as this 
conceptualist methodology pursues not only the critical analysis of previous 
conceptualisations, but also the creation of new concepts of organisation, and insofar 
as philosophy is a matter of concept creation, it also provides a starting point for how 
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we as organisation theorists might develop a philosophy of organisation.3 The various 
ways in which Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze contribute to this conceptualist 
methodology will be clarified in this chapter. 
In the remaining chapters this methodology is put to work. In chapter 4, I analyse the 
concept of "organisation" in mainstream organisation theory by (i) examining the 
intellectual roots giving rise to this concept, (ii) identifying the main characteristics of 
this concept, and (iii) assessing the ways in which this concept of organisation deals 
with the problem of the body. Although it may be problematic to treat this as one 
single conceptualisation of organisation, the shared preoccupation amongst different 
authors makes it possible to at least speak in terms of one (if not one single) concept. I 
trace this concept of organisation in the following literature: First, in the work of L. J. 
Henderson (1935), Elton Mayo (1933) and Talcott Parsons (1951, 1956a, 1956b), who 
were all conjoined in the Harvard Pareto Circle, and who all preceded the founding of 
organisation theory as a distinct academic discipline. Second, in the work of the three 
classical organisation theorists Philip Selznick (1949), Peter Blau (e.g. 1955) and W. 
Richard Scott (e.g. 1981). Third, in the work of the Australian organisation theorist 
and positivist Lex Donaldson (1985) from the 1980s. And fourth, in more recent 
textbook and encyclopaedia entries by Andrzej Huczynski and David Buchanan 
3 I realise that invoking the tenn "we" might be problematic in this context, as it may be seen to suggest 
that the discipline of organisation theory is underpinned by some sense of unitary consensus or 
common identity. However, this is not my intention, and - as my further discussion indicates - I seck 
to recognise the discontinuous and some times antagonistic relationships between different strands of 
organisation theory. For example, a philosophy of organisation - as opposed to a more descriptive and 
empirically oriented organisation theory - is not necessarily everyone's "cup of tea". Nc\crthcJcss. 
events such as "The Philosophy of Organization" workgroup, which since the year 2000 has been a 
standing workgroup at EGOS, indicate an increasing interest in developing organisation thcory along 
the lines of a philosophy of organisation, and it is this expanding, albeit heterogeneous, population of 
organisation theorists that constitutes the "wc" in this context. 
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(1991), Paul Thompson and David McHugh (1990), and Arndt Sorge (1996). I do so 
because these figures have had a demonstrable impact on the formation of 
organisation theory in terms of institutions, book sales and intellectual influence. 
Their work also brings out the central themes of mainstream organisation theory in a 
"representative" way. 
In chapter 5, I analyse what concept of organisation is pursued in a more peripheral 
area of organisation theory that is more preoccupied with organisational processes 
than formal organisational entities. Beginning with a brief examination of the 
influence of Weber in this strand of thought and a brief discussion of the processual 
concept of organisation developed by Karl Weick (1969, 1979), I devote most of this 
chapter to the thinking of Robert Cooper (1976, 1990), Haridimos Tsoukas (l998a) 
and Robert Chia (1995, 1998a). Here, I inquire into the main characteristics of the 
concept of organisation emerging out of their work and I continue to ask how this 
concept of organisation deals with the problem of the body. 
In chapter 6, I tum my attention to different implicit or explicit concepts of 
embodiment developed in the quite recent and highly peripheral strand of thought in 
organisation theory that claims to actually focus its research efforts on the body. 
Again, I am concerned to find out how these thinkers deal with the problem of the 
body. First, however, I investigate some of the feminist and sociological research that 
has inspired and influenced work in this area. The first section deals with feminist 
research outside organisation theory (Judith Butler 1990, 1993; Susan Bordo 1993: 
Sandra Lee Bartky 1988; Luce Irigaray 1985) and with feminist research inside 
organisation theory (Arlie Hochchild 1983, the journal Gender, Work and 
Organi~ation, and Karen Dale 2001). In the second section I analyse the concept of 
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embodiment in the sociology of the body as represented in the works of Bryan Turner 
(1992, 1996), Nick Crossley (1995), and Simon Williams and Gillian Bendelow 
(1998). And in the third section I examine attempts made by organisation theorists to 
deal with the problem of the body, including Burrell (1984), Cooper and Burrell 
(1988) and the anthology Body and Organization. At the end of this chapter I return to 
Karen Dale's (2001) project. Three main ways of dealing with the body are identified 
across the writers examined in this chapter: the organisation of the body, the 
embodiment of organisation, and nonorganisational embodiment. 
In the penultimate chapter 7, I continue to investigate nonorganisational embodiment 
by analysing some of the concepts of embodiment developed by Gilles Deleuze. From 
his starting point in a philosophy of becoming in which the concept of the virtual is 
very central, I tum to examine three of his conceptualisations in depth: the Spinozist 
body; creative involution and becoming-other; and the body without organs. I end the 
chapter by discussing how De1euze, on a more general level, thinks about nonorganic 
and organic forms of embodiment. 
In the concluding chapter 8, I attempt to bring together the main arguments made 
throughout the thesis and sketch out the main elements of what I choose to call a 
monstrous organisation theory; that is, an organisation theory pursued in a space of 
boundaries and an organisation theory capable of disrupting boundaries. Here, 
Deleuze's thinking about nonorganisational embodiment is used to raise an important 
challenge to the discipline: How should organisation theory deal with the problem of 
the body, and what implications does this notion of embodiment have upon hOH' H'e, as 
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organisation theorists, should think about organisation?4 The conclusion is therefore 
not simply a summary of previous chapters. In addition, the conceptualist method 
emerging out of Deleuze and Guattari's (1994) notion of philosophy as concept 
creation is employed in the creation and invention of a new monstrous concept of 
organisation. Insofar as one accepts the DeleuzoGuattarian notion of philosophy, the 
creation and invention of new concepts of organisation constitutes the first step in 
developing a philosophy of organisation. Of course, the monstrous concept developed 
here is not completely different from what has been said before. But it seeks to 
explicate the implications that the problem of the body has upon organisation by 
recognising the excess power of bodies that disrupts and makes organisation and its 
boundaries less stable and less powerful than we often realise. As such, this concept 
of organisation constitutes a platform from which the philosophy of organisation may 
be developed. 
4 This "we" is somewhat broader than the "we" invoked on p. 27. It not only refers to organisation 
theorists concerned with the philosophy of organisation (or issues of embodiment for that matter), but 
includes the discipline at large. Even if many orga~isa.tion. t~eorists .m~y .not be convmced by the 
proposed connection between embodiment and orgamsatlOn. It IS the dlsclplme as a whole that I want 
to address. 
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Chapter 2 
Public Health and the Organisation of Bodies in Everyday Life 
2.1 Introduction 
As I argued in my introductory chapter, the body is a site and an interface whereupon 
two major themes in organisational theorising meet: the organisation of production 
and the production of organisation. The body, which is a carnal, messy and enigmatic 
matter very much alive and teeming, is targeted by the organisation of production 
through formal organisations and by the production of organisation through processes 
seeking to order social life within and without the boundaries of formal organisations. 
As both themes imply (though rarely explicate) a quest for organising the body 
through the institution and maintenance of boundaries, the body poses a problem for 
organisation. Western public health is an example of how formal organisations of 
production as well as the more general processes of the production of organisation 
meet to organise bodies in everyday life. Since the body poses a problem for 
organisation, it also poses a problem for public health. But as I indicated in the 
previous chapter, it is not only as a target that the body poses a problem for the 
organisational projects of public health. The body is a problem because bodies are 
capable of disrupting the organisational boundaries of public health; we do not always 
do what we are advised or told to do by the public health authorities; for example, we 
often eat and drink stuff that might increase the risk of developing coronary heart 
disease. 
Before I in the remammg chapters tum to the more general question of how 
organisation theory deals with and should deal with the problem of the body, I shall in 
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this chapter elaborate on how public health - as an organisational regime - deals with 
the problem of the body. In other words, how does public health seek to organise 
bodies in everyday life? The notion of an "organisational regime" should in this 
context be understood in terms of Foucault's (1979, 1980) notion of power-
knowledge regimes, i.e. as the rules, regulations and regularities that are instituted for 
the production of order and organisation (cf. also Foucault 1972). As an 
organisational regime, public health should therefore be understood in terms of the 
rules, regulations and regularities that are instituted for the production of order and 
organisation on the body. 
The principal task and overall objective of public health in the West is to prevent the 
spread and occurrence of disease, illness and injuries and to promote and improve the 
health and wellbeing of the population.5 Western public health seeks to do so through 
a vast network of formal organisations in the State apparatus such as biochemical and 
pharmaceutical research and production laboratories, public policy units and 
regulatory agencies, public information offices and community health clinics. In 
addition, there are numerous companies that profit from increasing health 
consciousness across the population. This includes gyms and fitness centres, 
manufacturers of so-called healthy foods (for example of bran, rye and yoghurts and 
of light versions of butter, cheese and sauces), pharmaceutical companies and 
chemists, and manufacturers, distributors and retailers of sports gear and sports 
5 Health and wellbeing are highly problematic concepts in that different people may have different 
views of what good health and wellbeing is about. Western public health authorities today do howcvcr 
tend to generalise these notions and define them in terms of a person's ability to participate in work and 
to work at leisure activities. 
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equipment. Ideally, an investigation of public health should therefore deal with such 
organisations in some detail. After all, it is these organisations of production that 
institute the production of organisation that is meant to organise how entire 
populations live with their individual bodies. But since the real power of public health 
is that it organises bodies beyond its own formal organisations, it is the production of 
organisation through public health that attracts my major attention here. Foucault's 
(1979) concept of bio-power, which refers to the mass of techniques driven to 
organise bodies and populations, brings out the key characteristics of the production 
of organisation. Hence, it may help us view the production of organisation instituted 
by a public health concerned to improve the health and wellbeing of the population in 
a more general context: 
During the classical period, there was a rapid development of various disciplines 
- universities, secondary schools, barracks, workshops; there was also the 
emergence, in the field of political practices and economic observation, of the 
problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration. Hence 
there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the 
subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of 
an era of "'bio-power" (Foucault 1979: 140). 
Although public health is preoccupied on the whole with the organisation of bodies 
and populations, it is important to recognise that the history and practice of public 
health is one of discontinuity. Different public health regimes have applied different 
strategies in different countries at different points in time and thereby instituted 
different principles of organisation. Significant discontinuities in these organisational 
schemata may include the shift from miasmic theory to germ theory towards the end 
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of the nineteenth century as well as the shift towards an increasingly lifestyle-oriented 
public health during the last decades of the twentieth century. Additionally, one 
cannot ignore the many discontinuities that underpin the conduct of public health 
within one type of society at a certain point in time, as public health authorities try to 
tackle a wide range of different health problems. Public health policies in 
contemporary Western societies, for example, are spread out across an extensive 
patchwork of various organisational practices, stretching from mass vaccination 
programmes to nation-wide health education campaigns. 
Given the discontinuous nature of public health, it is crucial to recognise that the 
practices investigated in this chapter are not seen to actualise a principle of 
organisation that is universal to or equally embedded in all the different areas of 
public health. Instead the assumption is made that public health operates by a 
heterogeneous set of different organisational principles that must be carefully 
examined in light of the particular practices that bring them forward. In this chapter, I 
shall trace therefore the production of organisation through a limited sample of public 
health regimes. This is an attempt to identify the specific organisational practices that 
are at work in each one of these regimes and to examine the distinctive ways in which 
these variations on bio-power organise bodies and populations. In order to do so, I 
will deal with some of the different practices that have come to shape public health 
throughout its history. This is obviously quite different from writing a conventional 
history-project, as that would call for an all-inclusive and fully chronological account 
of the history of public health. Indeed, the conventional historian might find my study 
incomplete, inadequate and irrelevant, in that my tracing of discontinuities in the 
organisation of bodies gives rise to a highly selective study of public health. The 
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sanitary arrangements of the Ancients, for example, which often is seen to mark the 
beginning of the history of public health (e.g. Rosen 1993), is left out. What this 
enables me to do, however, is to identify five different regimes of public health, all of 
which exemplify how the production of organisation writes itself onto the ways in 
which we live with our bodies in the everyday. The five regimes examined are the 
following: the Great Confinement, the Victorian Sanitary Movement, Pasteurian 
Public Health, Eugenic Public Health, and the New Public Health - in that order. 
These regimes are chosen because they are the most obvious, the most written about, 
and the most inclusive from a Western perspective. 
2.2 The Great Confinement 
During the seventeenth century, public health (if we can employ this term to practices 
of that period) was part of the medico-political and organisational regime that 
Foucault (1967) calls the Great Confinement and Goffrnan (1961) refers to as the rise 
of total institutions.6 Prior to the Great Confinement, medicine had been the private 
province of wealthy patrons, who could afford to be looked after by private male 
doctors. The general population, on the other hand, resorted to folk medicine and 
witchcraft executed by barbers and wise women, and it was only with the Great 
Confinement that medicine became public, i.e. concerned with large numbers of 
people at the level of the population. 
6 Although Foucault is primarily interested in the effects that the ~reat Confin.ement had upon the 
treatment of madness in the Classical Age, he acknowledges that the Insane constItuted only one strata 
of a much larger target group implicated in this system of gowmance. 
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Under the Great Confinement, which Foucault (1967: 46) characterises as a "'police" 
matter', the impoverished, unemployed and disease-ridden working classes were 
conceived as major threats to the social order and to the health and wellbeing of the 
upper classes. They were therefore lumped together in large numbers in penitentiary 
institutions such as workhouses, poorhouses, madhouses and asylums. Indicating the 
scale of the Great Confinement, Foucault writes that: 
more than one out of every hundred inhabitants of the city of Paris found 
themselves confined there, within several months (1967: 38). 
Further on, Foucault argues that the Great Confinement served an economic function 
in that 'Throughout Europe [ ... ] It constituted one of the answers the seventeenth 
century gave to an economic crisis that affected the entire Western world: reduction in 
wages, unemployment, scarcity of coin' (1967: 49). In times of recession, the Great 
Confinement prevented the poor, unemployed and thieving working classes from 
stealing, plundering and uprising. In times of recovery, it provided the same people 
with work, 'thus making them contribute to the prosperity of all' (1967: 51). 
Moreover, work was (and I would argue that it still is) thought to have a leading effect 
on morale as it diverted the person away from self-indulgence and crime. 
But even though this relationship between economy and morality goes some way in 
explaining the rise of the Great Confinement, it is also necessary to look at the ways 
in which the public health of the Great Confinement operated as an organisational 
regime. Like dirt, the poor were treated as matter out of place, and the authorities put 
great efforts into forcing this part of the population into a bounded and limited space 
within which they could mind their own business whilst being separated from the rest 
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of society. Since the main objective was to stop certain people from getting out and 
about and into the streets and quarters frequented by healthy, wealthy and decent 
citizens, this regime was in principle little else than a formalised version of the ghetto, 
only with narrower and more formally imposed boundaries. Although work, which 
transforms and utilises bodies as labour power was an important aspect of everyday 
life in the asylum, the training and disciplining of the body and the treatment of 
somatic and mental illness was still not exercised and regulated through any coherent 
system. 
The importance during the Great Confinement of maintaining a bounded sense of 
space may exemplify Robert Cooper's understanding of organisation as "simple 
location". Cooper takes this term from Whitehead (1925: 72) and employs it to make 
sense of Foucault's (1973, 1977b) understanding of the gaze as 'a maj or strategy of 
modem organizing' (Cooper in an interview with Chia and Kallinikos 1998: 137). 
More specifically, Cooper's reference to simple location is concerned with the ways 
in which the world is formed by regimes of knowledge and made to exist as 
identifiable things with a definite and finite place in space and time. The long-term 
confinement of the poor within the bounded space of the penitentiary institution 
materialises this organisational principle in that it implies the localisation of a 
particular portion of society within a limited space. 
Simple location clearly provided a solution for the Great Confinement. However, the 
way in which simple location operated under this regime was also part of the problem. 
As the penitentiary institution made little effort to discipline the ongoings inside its 
own boundaries and actually treat disease, illness and mental disorders, and as urban 
populations continued to grow rapidly throughout the nineteenth century. confinement 
38 
of the diseased proved increasingly difficult. Moreover, as epidemics such as cholera 
continued to kill thousands of people, it was recognised that this regime did little to 
contain, let alone cure disease itself. In fact, mortality was much higher inside the 
penitentiary institutions than outside, and few people who entered a poorhouse or 
asylum were likely to come out alive. As a result, provoked urban masses rioted in the 
streets of European cities demanding the system to be abolished. Though far from 
giving a complete explanation, these factors may together help us understand why 
towards the middle of the nineteenth century the Great Confinement gave way to the 
Victorian Sanitary Movement. As we shall see, the organisational principle of simple 
location may be more closely associated with the Victorian Sanitary Movement than 
with the Great Confinement. This does not mean that the continuity of simple location 
as an organisational principle should be exaggerated. The way in which simple 
location operates under the Victorian Sanitary Movement is rather different from the 
way in which it operates under the Great Confinement. 
2.3 The Victorian Sanitary Movement 
The Victorian Sanitary Movement is an interesting case, not just because of its role in 
creating a formal system of public health institutions and procedures, but also because 
it has already been recognised as an organisational regime by other organisation 
theorists. Robert Cooper and Robert Chia, two of the most prominent advocates of 
processual thinking in organisation theory, highlight the Victorian Sanitary Movement 
as an example of the production of organisation, or "generic organisation" as Cooper 
also calls it. Chia (1998a) does so in his editorial introduction to his Festschr(ft to 
Cooper, whilst Cooper invokes this example in an interview by Chia and Kallinikos 
(1998), which appears at the end of the same Festschr(ft. Both Cooper and Chia draw 
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upon and make some thoughtful remarks about a text written by the nineteenth 
century historian Richard Schoenwald (1973). In this text, which appears as a book 
chapter in an anthology on urban culture in Victorian England, Schoenwald (1973: 
669) argues that the Victorians 'found dirt horrifying' and that numerous 
technological, legislative and administrative devices were instituted in order to 
'reduce some of the filth in growing cities.' Schoenwald's main interest, however, lies 
with the psychological dimensions of the Victorian Sanitary Movement, and he draws 
attention to the colonisation of the very private by the public by dealing specifically 
with the various techniques applied to train and discipline the urban citizen and create 
social order on a mass scale in the industrial centres of nineteenth century England. 
The Victorian Sanitary Movement and the training of excretory functions figure 
prominently in Schoenwald's account: 
The control of excretory behaviour furnished the most accessible approach on a 
mass basis to inculcating habits of orderliness. The sanitary reformers wanted to 
break man's self-indulgent unboundedness by making him learn certain ways of 
behaving which he would repeat every day of his existence. They determined to 
remove with impersonal finality the products of his body. If man could be 
forced to yield to interference in such a sensitive domain [i.e. excretory 
behaviour], he could be made to acquiesce in any kind of control: he could be 
made to learn many ways of binding his energy, he could be pressed into 
modernity (Schoenwald 1973: 675; my addition). 
This point is picked up by both Chia (1998a: 2-4; 9) and Cooper (in Chia and 
Kallinikos 1998: 137-138). Early on in his text, Chia (1998a: 2) quotes two statements 
from Schoenwald (1973). The first deals with the emphasis on teaching people to 
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fundamentally change personal habits that are unacceptable to the norms of 
rationalised urban life: 
Learning that some smells are good, and that others are bad, re-enacts the great 
scene in man's developmental history when he began to walk erect. He could 
not maintain erect posture and still yield to the array of tempting aromas at 
ground level which drew his less highly developed [animal] forebears. [ .... ] 
Stand up straight and act like a human being! You have to learn how to live with 
other people, with lots of them in big cities, and you have to learn that they can't 
find your smells as beguiling as you do, or everyone will be down on all fours 
and riot and rampage will run in the streets! Tum your nose away from the 
smell of lower parts, tum your eyes and your mind to higher things! 
(Schoenwald quoted in Chia 1998a: 2: Chia's omission).7 
Chia then invokes a second quote from Schoenwald, which highlights the notion that 
'things have their rightful and wrongful places' (1998a: 2). This also alludes to the 
notion of organisation as simple location referred to in my discussion of the Great 
Confinement, even if in a different way. Whereas the Great Confinement instituted an 
organisation of simple location seeking to locate particular people in particular places, 
the Victorian Sanitary Movement sought to identify and locate particular things and 
objects in particular places: 
7 Chi a does not indicate that he omits the word "animal" from Schoenwald's original. I ha\c therefore 
added it back in. 
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Industrialized society rests on order; order means everything in its place; dirt is 
whatever is not where it should be; the meanings of dirt held most deeply 
because learned earliest relate to bodily operations; then a society bent on order 
should put the body into order by putting order into the body; society gains 
order by "training" (Schoenwald quoted in Chia 1998a: 2). 
Reading Schoenwald's own text, one understands that this statement is in direct 
alignment with the perspective brought forward by the anthropologist Mary Douglas 
(1966) a few years earlier, which is inspired by Freud's idea that 'Dirt is matter in the 
wrong place' (Freud quoted in Schoenwald 1973: 673). In her seminal work Pliri~l' 
and Danger, which is more broadly concerned with ritual practices of purification and 
cleanliness across pre-modem and modem societies, Douglas demonstrates how dirt is 
invested with danger and taboo. Defining dirt as disorder, and disorder as "matter out 
of place", her main argument is that examining what is regarded as dirty or unclean in 
any culture is the key to understand what kind of order that culture seeks to establish. 
Schoenwald elaborates how the instalment of order relates to boundaries: 
By crossmg boundaries that should not be crossed, dirt has violated the 
prescriptions of the surrounding culture. Men are always trying to organize each 
other, by setting bounds, and by treating trespasses on these bounds as 
pollutions. To maintain itself a society must proclaim that things have their right 
places, whether within the biological organism or the social (Schoenwald 1973: 
673). 
Unlike Schoenwald, Chia makes no reference to Douglas (and neither does Cooper for 
that matter). Instead, he comments upon the second statement that he borrows from 
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Schoenwald ('Industrialized society rests on order [ ... .]') by relating the training of 
excretory functions to the potty training undergone by most children when learning to 
grow up in modem society. As potty training implies 'disciplined retention and 
scheduled letting go', Chia argues that this is the most evident example of how order 
is put into the body (l998a: 2). And, yet again invoking Schoenwald, he adds that this 
bodily order, which was underscored and reinforced by the water closet and the sewer, 
was 'necessary to keep an industrialized society producing and consuming' 
(Schoenwald quoted in Chia 1998a: 3). 
These are interesting thoughts, but despite the construction of large-scale sewage 
systems and the appearance of the first water closets in the Victorian era, I would be 
cautious to overrate the role of these technologies in the rise of potty training. The 
establishment of a causal link, which is what Chia (using Schoenwald) seems to be 
suggesting between the sewer and the water closet on the one hand and the rise of 
potty training on the other, could easily lead to the kind of technological determinism 
that Schoenwald wants to avoid in his psychologically focused study. Although the 
sewer and potty training were both central elements in the sanitation of Victorian 
society, it was only much later that private houses were connected to municipal 
sewage lines, and that water closets became widespread enough to have a significant 
impact upon the regulation of excreta in Western countries. Prior to the water closet, 
in Victorian times and several years beyond, people handled their excreta by means of 
the chamber pot and the privy, and most children growing up in the West still begin 
potty training on the chamber pot before proceeding to the water closet. By the time 
the water closet did find its place into almost every household in the West. potty 
training was already internalised into the everyday life of most citizens. 
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Moreover, the Victorian sewage systems cannot be causally linked to the rise of potty 
training in the same era, as the excretory regulation undertaken by means of the sewer 
takes place on a different level from that undertaken by means of potty training. 
Whereas potty training enables us to exhaust excreta from our bodies in a controlled 
and scheduled manner, the sewer facilitates the transportation of excreta not away 
from our bodies as such, but away from the dwellings in which we live with our 
bodies. As Freudian psychoanalysis has demonstrated, these two examples of 
excretory regulation may be connected in the sense that they are driven by the same 
desire for order and cleanliness. But to suggest that one is the cause of the other is at 
best problematic. Chia does not discuss this problematique at all, and hurries to 
conclude that the Victorian Sanitary Movement 'provided one of the most efficient 
means for ordering social habits in space-time and for instilling attitudes of 
orderliness on a mass basis' (1998a: 3). 
That may be so, but the Victorian Sanitary Movement is not the only area addressed 
by Chia in this text, and in the next paragraph he turns his attention to the role played 
by statistics in the organisation of the population in Victorian times: 
Administrators struggled to manage a large amorphous mass whose sheer 
magnitude could only be understood in terms of statistical representation. 
Statistics, the "science of the state", became, therefore, the dominant means for 
"understanding" and thus managing the inchoate masses (l998a: 3). 
As with his brief discussion of sanitation, Chia provides an interesting and important 
account of statistics that stresses its managerial and organisational functions. But 
statistics is also not the prime focus of Chia's analysis. Despite noting (but only 
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noting) the emergence of new conceptual terms such as population densities, death 
rate and birth rate, he does not relate statistics and its affiliated approach of 
Benthamite methodisation back to the workings of the Victorian Sanitary Movement. 
Instead, he proceeds to discuss the attempt of John Wilkins and Thomas Sprat, co-
founders of the Royal Society in England, in removing slipperiness from everyday 
language. Consequently, Chia's references to statistics and to the Victorian Sanitary 
Movement, albeit interesting in themselves, remain too shallow and too unarticulated 
for the purpose of this chapter, whose main focus is the organisational aspects of 
public health. Although Chia provides an interesting starting point to the public health 
of the Victorian era, it does not provide the level of detail necessary to grasp how 
Victorian public health seeks to organise bodies. Before leaving this particular regime, 
I shall therefore move away from Chia's text and look more closely at the role of 
sanitation and statistics in the crusade for a good public health in Victorian Britain. 
The rise of the Victorian Sanitary Movement towards the middle of the nineteenth 
century gave rise to an increasingly institutionalised public health effort against 
poverty and epidemics in Britain. What had started off as a voluntary front largely 
consisting of philanthropist Quakers and Dissenters, under the leadership of 
utilitarians Edwin Chadwick and Thomas Southam Smith, turned into a professional 
civil service whose operations were guided by the assumption that disease caused 
pauperism. Poverty was seen as an economic problem with a medical cause, both on a 
national level and on the level of individuals and families. Since the diseased could 
not supply their bodies to the labour market, they could not playa productive part in 
the national economy of wealth creation and were thus unable to take a salary or wage 
to support themselves and their own families. Hence, sickness bred poverty and 
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obstructed the movement of the labour market. Further on, sanitation and hygiene 
amongst the poor were seen to be of such appalling standards that their dwellings 
became fertile habitats for the growth and spread of disease. But rather than targeting 
poverty directly, the pioneers of the Victorian Sanitary Movement sought to improve 
public health and remove barriers to wealth by investing in sanitation and hygiene. 
Even though it was impossible to abolish poverty as such, it was possible to eliminate 
poverty due to preventable disease. 
The sanitary and hygienic projects of the Victorian era were rooted in the miasmic 
theory of disease, which for many centuries had explained the occurrence and spread 
of fevers and infectious disease. According to this aetiology, 'disease was caused by 
gases given off by putrefying, decomposing organic matter, rotting flesh and 
vegetables' (Porter 1997: 411). Hence, the Victorian Sanitary Movement adopted a 
very broad approach where improvements in public health had to come from a 
cleaning up of the entire physical environment in which people lived and worked. 
This period saw the construction of drainage systems, sewage removal canals and 
waste disposal systems. It also saw the removal of cesspools, the improvement of 
water and gas supplies and the provision of burial grounds. And it saw the sanitary 
regulation of factories, workshops, schools and houses unfit for human habitation, as 
well as the monitoring of "offensive" trades such as slaughtering, tanning and dyeing. 
To implement and supervise these projects and to inspect and survey sanitary and 
hygienic conditions, an expanding number of local medical officers administered 
them under local health boards and assisted by a growing body of legislation in the 
form of Public Health Acts. Since the entire environment was the object and target of 
this public health regime, it adopted a macroscopic approach by which the 
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environment was organised through the separation of filth, rubbish and excreta from 
the spaces in which people lived and worked. 
Although these organisational practices were typical of the Victorian Sanitary 
Movement, they were not the only kind, and it would be wrong to reduce this regime 
to a macroscopic matter of infrastructure. As well as showing a broad concern with 
hygiene and sanitation, the Victorian Sanitary Movement also showed, as Chia's 
(1998a) and Schoenwald's (1973) accounts imply, a more microscopic interest in 
organising bodies. Public health officials were convinced that the health and hygiene 
of the population was influenced by the health and hygiene of individual bodies, and 
this belief triggered the rise of initiatives insisting that people took greater care in 
cleaning themselves, their clothes, their homes and their family members. 
Consequently, with the introduction of disciplinary techniques, the Victorian Sanitary 
Movement sought to colonise private and intimate hygiene because of the individual's 
impact in interaction upon other individuals. 
In the final years of the Victorian Sanitary Movement, the emergence of epidemiology 
made statistics an increasingly important tool in the fight against disease and 
epidemics. Epidemiology, which is the study of the incidence, distribution and 
possible control of disease, was able to provide Victorian public health officials with 
prevalence figures indicating the distribution of disease across the population. Thus, 
epidemiology could construct relationships between disease and particular elements in 
the physical environment, confirm the connection between disease and pauperism, 
and justify the huge investments into large-scale sanitation and hygiene programmes. 
In so doing, epidemiology also provided public health authorities with a means to 
survey and inspect the health situation at the level of society, diyide and classify the 
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popUlation according to morbidity rates, demographic and socio-economic variables, 
and organise disease into recognisable entities of epidemics and pandemics. Hence, 
the rise of epidemiology throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century added 
another type of organisational practice - a discursive system of surveillance and 
classification - to the already complex and extensive scene of Victorian public health. 
The Victorian Sanitary Movement was however far from capable of utilising the full 
potential of epidemiology. Epidemiological measures such as morbidity rates enable 
the organisation of bodies and populations according to risk groups, which in tum 
may enable a more narrow and intensified public health effort. But the lasting 
commitment to miasmic aetiology meant that Victorian officials continued to see 
threats and hazards to public health almost everywhere in the environment and 
therefore to organise accordingly. 
If we are to follow Bruno Latour's (1988) argument from The Pasteurization of 
France, the same can be said about the hygienist movement and its implementation of 
public health policies in mid-nineteenth century France. According to Latour, a more 
focused public health only appeared with the shift from miasmic aetiology to the germ 
theory of disease. Prior to this, the French hygienist movement pursued an approach 
that was both too broad and too thin to be effective. As public health officials in 
France as well as in Britain and other European countries sought to improve hygienic 
conditions all across society, they did not necessarily direct their efforts where they 
were most acutely needed. As they tried to do everything, they ended up with a 
regime that in fact was capable of doing very little of what it intended. Although these 
aspects do not fully explain the paradigmatic shift undergone by public health about a 
century ago, they certainly made it more difficult to maintain the miasmic theory of 
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disease and the broadly yet thinly distributed measures that followed from it. And by 
the first years of the twentieth century, there had been a move to a germ theory of 
disease that informed public health officials to pursue a different set of organisational 
initiatives. Drawing on yet departing from Latour's (1988) account, I shall examine 
this regime in more detail in the next section. 
2.4 Pasteurian Public Health 
In the first part of The Pasteurization of France, Latour (1988) analyses the shift from 
a hygienist movement informed by miasmic theory to a hygienist movement informed 
by Pasteurian germ theory. Unlike miasmic theory, whose macroscopic perspective 
led public health authorities to tackle disease and epidemics by means of civil 
engineering and large-scale infrastructure projects, the microscopic bacteriology of 
germ theory informed a public health regime that turned its focus on the small and 
hitherto invisible things in the world. More specifically, it held the general idea that 
disease is caused by 'tiny invasive beings' (Porter 1997: 428), which also had 
informed earlier theories of contagion concerned with how disease entities pass from 
infected persons to others. But unlike earlier theories, bacteriological germ theory was 
able to identify microbes as the actual source of disease. And since only particular 
microbes could produce particular pathological conditions, prevention became 
possible through the development of vaccines once these microbes were known. Louis 
Pasteur demonstrated this in a number of cases, developing successful vaccmes 
against chicken cholera, anthrax and rabies. These results formed the basis of 
Pasteur's germ theory, which not only was the first general theory of bacteriology, but 
also was instrumental in changing the conduct of public health. 
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As noted above, Latour argues that public health and hygiene prior to Pasteur had 
tried to tackle a range of issues too wide to be seriously effective in dealing with any 
one issue. Pasteur's discoveries in bacteriology made possible a streamlining and 
simplification of public health that in tum made the fight against disease and 
epidemics more intensive and more effective. Having previously targeted the totality. 
hygienists now subscribing to Pasteurian germ theory were able to focus on microbes 
alone. Latour helps us understand how this had significant implications for the 
conduct of public health: 
Either the microbe gets through and all precautions are useless, or hygienists 
can stop it getting through and all other precautions are superfluous. The 
hygiene that took over the doctrine of microbes became stronger and simpler, 
more structured. It could be both more flexible - quarantine could be relaxed -
and more inflexible - total disinfection to 120 degrees. In a sense hygiene lost 
ground, since it was no longer directed at the totality, but in another sense it 
gained ground at last by striking more surely at an enemy that had become 
visible (Latour 1988: 48). 
Further on, Latour argues that the Pasteurian strike against the microbes set in motion 
no less than a social transformation. However, it was the microbes themselves, he 
emphasises, that made this possible in the first place. It was because the microbes in 
Pasteur's laboratories behaved in a certain way that Pasteur and his colleagues were 
able to obtain the scientific results they did, successfully develop the vaccines they 
did, and become as popular with the hygienist movement as they did. In other words, 
the microbes were not just the objects of Pasteurian bacteriology, germ theory and 
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public health and hygiene, but subjects or actants operating alongside human actors in 
a social network. 
It should be no surprise that this point is at the centre of Latour's investigation. Not 
only does it enable Latour to analyse that which precedes and makes possible a 
particular science or technology. Doing so is commonplace amongst most historians 
and social scientists devoted to the study of science and technology. His emphasis on 
the social role played by microbes in making possible the rise of Pasteurian science is 
however all but commonplace. This must therefore be seen as part of Latour's general 
attempt to redefine the "social" and the way that social scientists should study science 
and technology. This is an admirable project, which not only illuminates the processes 
giving rise to a Pasteurian science and public health, but also helps us understand the 
consequences of this regime. If Pasteur had not discovered the role of microbes in the 
occurrence and spread of disease and in the development of vaccines, the microbes 
would not have been selected as the main target of public health. And consequently, 
public health would not have undergone the changes that it did and had the effects that 
it had in terms of regenerating the human and reorganising and transforming human 
behaviour and societies. Vaccination is perhaps the most obvious example of how 
Pasteurism reorganised and regenerated the human. As a vaccine is injected into 
someone's body, it does not simply - if successful - give him or her enhanced 
resistance to a certain disease-carrying microbe. Firstly, inoculation is a penetration of 
the bodily boundary constituted by the skin. Secondly, inoculation alters the 
biochemical constitution of the body and reorganises the way the body functions and 
responds to external attacks from disease-carrying microbes. And thirdly, by assisting 
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the body's immune system, it solidifies the boundaries that separate and defend the 
body from its surroundings. 
As Pasteurism and the distribution of vaccines enabled public health authorities to 
shift their focus away from pauperism and dirt, hygienists like Walcott in the US, who 
saw hygiene as a means of social control, were worried that it would 'terminate the 
ultimate responsibility of the individual to preserve conscientious cleanliness' 
(Rosenkrantz quoted in Latour 1988: 257). This seems premature, however, as 
vaccination was far from capable of solving all the problems of public health. Since 
the discovery of the microbe could only narrow down and relax public health and 
hygiene to the extent that bacteriology could eliminate microbes or successfully 
vaccinate people against them, Pasteurian public health had to continue to rely upon 
and carry forward methods previously employed by the pre-Pasteurian hygienists. Of 
course, acts of social control that did little or nothing for the targeting and fight of 
microbes lost ground, and this does for example explain why the length of quarantine 
in some cases was reduced. Those cases that were accompanied by more extensive 
quarantine, on the other hand, suggest a more restrictive regime, and the entry of 
Pasteurism into the doctor-patient relationship made the doctor central to the 
execution of social control. As individual liberty was redefined so that 'no one had the 
right to contaminate others', the doctor should take responsibil i ty for everyone's 
liberty by making sure that the contagious patient was notified, 'isolated, disinfected, 
in short put out of harm's way, like a criminal.' Hence, the doctor played an important 
role as a policeman and inspector in an organisational system of notification and 
quarantine where 'Disease was no longer a private misfortune but an a/fens£! to public 
order' (Latour 1988: 123). And with the Pasteurian assumption that anyone and 
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everyone in the population could be contaminated by contagious diseases, this was an 
offence that at least in principle could be committed by the rich and powerful just as 
much as by the poor. 
In conclusion, Pasteurian public health operated on a level of analysis that was both 
more focused and more total than that of the pre-Pasteurian regime. Firstly, it was 
more focused because it did not regard as health hazards just anything giving off a 
foul or upsetting smell. Although drains had a pestilential smell, 'they presented no 
danger' unless microbes passed with the smell (Latour 1988: 48). And secondly, it 
was more total because it looked beyond the health-and-wealth relationship that 
informed Chadwick's sanitary projects in Victorian Britain and Villerme's hygienist 
policies in France and marked out the poor and social outcasts as risk groups of 
disease and epidemics. Not just the poor, but the entire population was seen to be at 
risk from the microbes. Finally, Pasteurian public health was characterised by three 
main practices of organisation: (i) vaccination, which cuts across the bodily boundary 
of the skin, reorganises the functioning of the bodily interior and strengthens the 
boundaries between the body and its surroundings; (ii) policing, which identifies the 
occurrence and spread of microbes in the population and notifies patients and 
authorities so that the right measures can be taken; and (iii) quarantine, which isolates 
carriers of infectious disease for a certain amount of time within the boundaries of the 
hospital and the sanatorium. Interestingly, the notion of policing and quarantine 
resemble some aspects of previous public health regimes: policing, that of 
surveillance during the Victorian Sanitary Movement, and quarantine, that of the 
asylum during the Great Confinement. There is therefore some continuity bet\\'een 
Pasteurian Public Health and previous public health regimes as well as some newness 
making Pasteurian Public Health different from whatever went on in public health 
before. 
The Pasteurian preoccupation with microbes did however not take full charge of 
public health and was therefore unable to save minority groups from being 
specifically targeted as risk groups under the new Eugenic Public Health. And 
although the rise of eugenics in the early decades of the twentieth century did not 
erase the microbes from the minds of public health officials, it did shift their agenda 
so that certain individuals and certain minority groups again became the selected 
target of public health policy. Before moving to the lifestyle-focused public health 
regime of contemporary Western societies, I shall therefore trace the organisation of 
bodies in Eugenic Public Health. 
2.5 Eugenic Public Health 
Eugenics, which is the science of controlling breeding to produce a healthier and more 
intelligent race, emerged as a significant force at the public health scene early in the 
twentieth century and soon became popular amongst medical scientists, politicians, 
the bourgeoisie, and the labour movement (cf. Weindling 1989; lohannisson 1994). 
As these groups were not single-handedly interested in public health and hygiene, 
their interest in eugenics also had to do with the need for an effective labour force, 
increasing fears of foreign infiltration, economic strain, and class antagonism. A 
public health based on eugenics was therefore seen as a way of restoring 'order and 
social harmony in a society undergoing great social upheaval' (Johannisson 1994: 
174). 
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Eugenics springs out of the quest to cultivate a population with beautiful genes and 
strong bodies, a quest that was made obvious in art-works, political propaganda and 
popular movies and broadcasts in the inter-war era. For example in Nazi Germany, 
young Aryan men were sent to special camps where they were required to fertilise as 
many women as possible. As the men underwent a fiercer selection process than the 
women in these camps, it seems that the Nazi eugenicists were more concerned with 
men's genes than women's genes. However, eugenics is also about the eradication of 
bad genes and weak bodies. Whereas Pasteurian Public Health regarded microbes as 
foreign elements that had to be eliminated from the environment and inhibited from 
penetrating the boundaries of the body, eugenics was concerned that foreigners were 
kept out of the boundaries of the nation state. Foreigners were seen to threaten the 
quality of national health and strength by spreading disease, undermining racial purity 
and reproducing excess numbers of children of inadequate stock. Eugenics made 
similar generalisations about people with mental and physical disabilities, who were 
regarded as foreign elements inside national borders. They should therefore under no 
circumstances be allowed to reproduce. Internationally, the US was at the cutting edge 
of eugenics. Between 1907 and 1940, 
18,552 mentally ill persons were sterilized in US State hospitals. Some States, 
beginning with Connecticut in 1896, passed legislation that restricted marriage 
between nervous and mentally ill individuals. Federal legislation was also 
passed in the 1920s which limited immigration from eastern and southern 
Europe (Dowbiggin 1992: 379). 
Whilst restrictive immigration legislation was specifically passed to 'protect the 
public from disease or practices contradictory to the dictates of modem medicine' 
(Carson 1996: 506), all these incidents were part of the Americans' strive to restrict 
'breeding of the unfit' (Mosussi 1993: 465). Being the most active state, SIX 
Californian institutions accounted for eighty percent of all sterilisation in the US 
between 1918 and 1920. And when the Germans started their systematic persecution 
of Jews, gypsies and 'individuals [ ... J thought to be hereditarily unfit (homosexuals, 
the mentally ill and "antisocials")' (Harwood 1992: 467), they turned to California for 
inspiration and advice on their sterilisation campaign (Mosussi 1993). According to 
Lerner (1997), the Nazis did not vu1garise or politicise eugenics with the Final 
Solution. Rather, they realised the beliefs held by many of the leading scientists at the 
time. A similar view is put forward by Weindling (1989), who argues that Gennan 
eugenics did not have its roots in the nationalist and racist movement, but instead was 
a reflection of German public health, social policy and biomedical science at the time. 
Even though eugenics was taken to its extreme during the Holocaust, it was by no 
means brought to an end when Gennany capitulated in the Second World War. Long 
after the consequences of the Final Solution became known, eugenics was applied on 
a large scale in most Western countries, even if driven by different motives and 
different means. In the Netherlands, for instance, eugenics was more a matter of class 
than race, and its methods were specifically directed at the poorer members of the 
population (Heteren 1991). In Scandinavia, eugenics in the form of the involuntary 
separation of families, enforced confinement and coercive sterilisation, was employed 
to control different minority groups, but affected those at the lower end of the social 
ladder most seriously. Both in Sweden and Norway state officials and politicians were 
concerned that people who made inadequate parents should not have children or at 
least not be responsible for the upbringing of children. As a result, numerous families 
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were separated against their will, and children were confined in orphan homes. In 
1934, Sweden introduced their first sterilisation law, which was tightened in 1941. 
When the law was revoked in 1975, sixty thousand people had been sterilised, of 
which ninety percent were women (Johannisson 1994: 177; sic.). Decisions had been 
made by the National Board of Health in each case, and were based on eugenic, 
medical and social indications. Amongst those sterilised were mentally retarded 
people, psychiatric patients, Romany people, orphans, "teddy boys" and their 
girlfriends, and young single mothers. As well as aiding the engineering of the perfect 
Nordic body and a harmonious social order, sterilisation was an effective 
contraceptive that helped controlling the birth rate in poor families. If only of a 
smaller scale, similar projects were done in most Western countries during this period. 
The Norwegian health authorities, for example, sterilised large numbers of Romany 
people, psychiatric patients and "mentally retarded" people, inter alia (cf. Ministry of 
Local Government and Regional Development 2000-2001). 
The mass sterilisation projects in the West did however lose ground in the late 1960s 
as contraceptives became available to the entire population and the birth rate 
decreased amongst those deemed inadequate for parenthood. By that time, the eugenic 
projects of Western public health had managed to organise people and populations 
according to three main organisational practices. Restrictive immigration legislation, 
concentration camps and penitentiary institutions had organised societies by 
constructing boundaries that controlled movement and separated national populations 
from so-called foreign elements, whether these people were on the outside or inside of 
national borders. Coercive adoption of children organised families by separating 
parents from their children and raising children in orphanages and with foster parents. 
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And coercive sterilisation organised individuals deemed social outcasts by interyening 
into their bodies and conducting genital surgery that restricted what these people 
could and could not do. Although specific in their own right, the first two kinds of 
practices remind us of the Great Confinement two-to-three hundred years earlier. And 
overall, these three organisational practices exercised massive control upon societies, 
ranging from who could enter and move freely within a country's national borders, to 
who could become and continue to be parents. Hence, the eugenic regime controlled 
the kind of roles that people could play in society, the kind of social relationships they 
could pursue, and the kind of experiences they could have. Despite some of the same 
rhetoric and policies are still present in the public and popular discourse on 
immigration (non-Westerners are often stigmatised as being more diseased, more 
likely to commit crime and more likely to reproduce), most Western countries have, 
after decades of Eugenic Public Health, acknowledged that eugenic methods are at 
odds with the ethico-political values of liberal democracy. And they have realised that 
there are more important challenges for the betterment of public health and wellbeing 
than the purification of hereditary stock. Particularly significant is the recognition that 
the entire population should be the target of public health, and that lifestyle-related 
disease has emerged as an increasingly prevalent health problem in the West. During 
the last three or four decades of the twentieth century this has given rise to what is 
known as the New Public Health, and it is therefore to this lifestyle-oriented regime 
that I now tum my attention. 
2.6 The New Public Health: Lifestyle, Lifestyle-Related Illness and Health 
Promotion 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, public health has always been distinguished 
from other strands of medicine by looking beyond the biological aspects of individual 
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bodies and into the social dimensions of health. But whereas the Old Public Health 
sought to prevent the spread of disease by means of sanitary inspection, vaccination, 
and coercive measures like quarantine, confinement and sterilisation, the New Public 
Health has turned more of its focus towards health problems associated with the 
modem lifestyle and the conduct and appearance of the individual body. This does not 
mean that the methods of the Old Public Health have been totally discarded by the 
New Public Health. But since contagious diseases like tuberculosis and polio are 
conceived as less serious threats to the public health of Western countries, lifestyle-
related diseases like cancer and cardiovascular disease have been singled out as the 
biggest health problems facing this part of the world. In order to deal with these health 
problems, the New Public Health has become increasingly reliant upon health 
promotion and health education campaigns that seek to influence habits of eating, 
drinking, smoking, exercise and sex. In short, the messages communicated in these 
campaigns tell us to eat less, drink less alcohol, quit smoking, start exercising and 
take care when choosing partners and having sex. Below I shall refer to some of these 
campaigns to illustrate the workings of this regime, which is involved in such a wide 
variety of issues that, as Dorothy Porter (1999) suggests in her history of public 
health, it is concerned with everything and everybody, and, may I add, with 
everything that everybody does. 
The shift towards a public health of lifestyle-related disease is one by which, in 
principle, the entire population is treated as a risk group. In the UK, this interest in the 
population as a whole may be dated back to 1943 and the appointment of John Ryle as 
the first chair in social medicine at Oxford University. According to Ryle, the 
physician and medical sociologist David Armstrong (1983) informs us, his new 
version of social medicine had to be distinguished from previous attempts. Whereas 
the old social medicine had merely addressed the problem of so-called deviant groups 
in society, the new social medicine was concerned with pathological deviance in the 
population as a whole (Armstrong 1983). Thus portrayed, Ryle's perspective was in 
line with Canguilhem's (1989) point that towards the middle of the twentieth century 
medical research realised that it was normal to be pathological and that illness struck 
even those who seemed to be the most healthy members of society.8 This was both the 
popular and professional perception of polio victims in the 1940s and 1950s, as the 
disease typically struck children, adolescents and young adults with active lifestyles 
and of any social class. And this was and still is the popular and professional 
perception of cancer, as it has been difficult to identify systematic variations in the 
prevalence of cancer across different socio-economic strata in the population. 
Consequently, public health authorities have insisted on a generalised notion of 
surveillance where everybody has to be observed and targeted. In the words of 
Armstrong (1983: 37), 'The new social diseases of the twentieth century [ ... J had 
been reconstructed to focus medical attention on "normal" people who were 
nevertheless "at risk".' And since everybody is at risk, health education campaigns 
emphasise that everybody should take responsibility for their own health, no matter 
how normal they are. This position is closely related to research findings in 
epidemiology, and the lifestyle-oriented regime of health promotion and health 
R Canguilhem, who studied at the Ecole Normale Superior in Paris in the 1920s, develops this point 
from another "normalien", Emile Durkheim (1947, 1951) and his concept of anomie. It IS also \\ orth 
noting that Canguilhem became professor at the Sorbonne four decades after Durkheim was installed as 
professor there and two and a half decades after Durkheim's death. 
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education campaigns continues to be heavily connected to and reliant upon 
epidemiological research. 
As epidemiology is preoccupied with the emergence, prevalence and possible control 
of disease, current epidemiological research conducts health promotion surveys or so-
called lifestyle surveys designed to reveal the distribution of particular habits and 
health problems in the population. Apart from asking respondents to provide personal 
and demographic information such as date of birth, gender, race and marital status, 
these surveys are concerned with a number of factors: participation in work, 
education, exercise and leisure activities~ social and sexual relationships; the intake of 
fats, sugars and fibres: the consumption of drugs, alcohol and tobacco~ blood pressure 
and cholesterol level: and family history of chronic and terminal illness. From the data 
collected, researchers link lifestyle with illness. This is done by calculating risk 
factors and designing risk profiles that in turn are associated with increased chances of 
illness, and it is done by identifying risk groups in the population that are seen to be at 
a higher risk than other people in developing particular pathological conditions. The 
expert knowledge of epidemiological research is applied in the development of 
guidelines about lifestyle changes that people should undertake to prevent and ease 
health problems, and it is further communicated to the lay public through information 
channels such as self-help manuals and health education campaigns. Together, 
epidemiology and health education constitute a discursive practice and a domain of 
power-knowledge relations that on an everyday basis seeks to organise the formation 
of subjectivity, and, in turn, embodiment. The expert knowledge of epidemiological 
research is presented as objective truths in health education campaigns (Petersen and 
Lupton 1996: 59) that provide information and suggest 'alternatives to individuals, 
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families or groups to prevent disease and promote health' (Gastaldo 1997: 113). And 
in order to enhance the status, credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness of health 
education campaigns, it is rarely concealed that the imperatives they try to further are 
founded on scientific epidemiological research. The appeal to scientific legitimacy 
may be illustrated with the following quote from a Norwegian campaign seeking to 
promote physical exercise amongst the population: 
Both Norwegian and international studies show that an active life can inhibit a 
range of diseases and improve the quality of life. The risk of dying from 
cardiovascular diseases is for instance twice as high amongst physically inactive 
as amongst physically active people, even when risk factors such as a high 
blood pressure, a high level of cholesterol and smoking are taken into account. 
In addition to prevent a range of physical ailments, there is documentation that 
physical exercise also has a positive effect on mental health. [ ... ] Recent 
research has shown that a bit of light exercise half an hour every day yields the 
best improvement to health (National Council on Nutrition and Physical 
Exercise 2000; my translation). 
Further on, in the quest to organise everyday lifestyles, health education constructs a 
morality of personal responsibility by which everybody is seen to have the choice to 
be healthy or unhealthy citizens. In other words, health education constructs two 
identities that people can choose from by stating what people are expected to do and 
by identifying and enunciating the potential outcomes of certain habits and behaviours 
(Gastaldo 1997). On a more general plane, the emphasis on personal responsibility 
means that public health is not simply about the organisation of the body. Instead. it 
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highlights the sense in which the individual is invested with a particular kind of 
identity or subjectivity, which in tum becomes the vehicle for organising the body. 
The significance of moral choice is for example evident in anti-smoking campaigns, 
which identify smoking and smoking-related health problems as one of the most 
serious threats to good health. The current anti-smoking campaign 'Giving-up-
Smoking', which is organised by the UK National Health Service (NHS), argues that 
'Smoking is the biggest single cause of ill health and premature death in the UK.' 
Further on, the campaign states that 'nearly one in five of all deaths are smoking-
related', and that 'on average, smokers lose more than one day of life each week' 
(National Health Service 2000). Similarly, Norwegian health promoters associate 
smoking with heart disease, cancer and respiratory illness, and state that in Norway 
every year 7,500 deaths are caused by smoking, that internationally the equivalent 
figure is three million people, and that in Norway between 350 and 550 deaths are 
caused by passive smoking (Statens tobakksskaderad 1999a). That these are moral 
choices is evident in at least two senses. First, in that they are seen to offset the pains 
and joys of the lives that people are able to live. And second, in that they are seen to 
affect one's ability to contribute to society and the level of one's costs to society. 
A campaign targeting Norwegian teenagers is more specific about the consequences 
of smoking, and information is presented in association with a picture of a young 
naked girl with a cigarette in her mouth and a sad expression on her face (see fig. 2.1). 
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UUNN 
OJlI~ t~,,"er, t. hn, e , 
4farh, anh , Evnen ti l 
lukt og smak svckkes! 
(Figure 2.1: Norwegian Anti-Smoking Campaign Targeting Teenagers) 
The girl lies in a bathtub filled with cigarettes floating around in filth y water. On the 
picture, different tags relate the different consequences of smoking with the health and 
appearance of bodily organs: 
• Mouth: yellow teeth, rough tongue, bad breath. Impaired ability to smell and 
taste! 
• Skin: your skin gets grey and rough and develops wrinkles more easil y! 
• Lungs : impaired lung capacity, bronchitis, emphysema and lung cancer! 
• Hands : Cold hands, yellow fingers. 
• Sex . She: impaired fertility, cervical cancer. He : Impaired potency! 
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• Legs: impaired blood circulation, later in life smoker's legs with reduced 
functioning! 
(Figure 2.1: Statens tobakksskaderad, undated; my translation) 
Making the wrong choice is therefore portrayed as having very serious consequences. 
Either you follow the guidelines for healthy living communicated in health education 
campaigns and increase your chances for a long and healthy life. Or you fail to adopt 
the professional advice of the public health authorities and undermine your chances of 
preserving your physical capacity and avoiding disease. Inability to make the right 
choice, i.e. inability to be healthy, to regulate your own lifestyle and to modify your 
risky behaviour is seen as a moral failure on two levels. Firstly, because the self fails 
to take care of itself (Greco 1993: 361). And secondly, because unhealthy living 
breaks with what Greco calls our 'duty to stay well', a duty which is served by our 
'individual appropriation of rational choice' (1993: 357) and paid to the larger 
collective in which we live. The health status of an individual is therefore not simply a 
private matter. As Herzlich and Pierret (1987: 161) argue several decades after the 
Victorian Sanitary Movement and the Eugenic Public Health, good health is still seen 
as 'collective capital, owned by the lineage, the race or the nation.' 
Convincing people to take personal responsibility for their own health is not just a 
matter of stressing the moral obligation that every citizen has to the population as a 
whole. Health education campaigns also appeal to the idea that people have a rational 
and egoistic self-interest in taking such responsibility. This is for example evident in 
the Norwegian youth campaign referred to above. Furthermore, other anti-smoking 
campaigns emphasise that giving up smoking slows down the ageing process and 
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saves you a lot of money that 'You can spend [ ... ] just on yourself (Statens 
tobakksskadenld 1999b; my translation). Arguments like these have proven all the 
more powerful in the narcissistic culture of contemporary Western societies where the 
body has become a project of the self to be worked upon and subjected to self-care. 
self-examination and self-improvement. Living a healthy life is about realising the 
body as a project of the self, and is associated with self-satisfaction, self-fulfilment, 
and seen as the key to live an active and enjoyable life, participating in society and 
responding dynamically to changes in the outside world. Although the advice given in 
such campaigns is driven by an attempt to promote healthy living, people can by 
following the same advice pursue the narcissistic ideals of beauty, physical 
appearance and an attractive body shape, ideals that may sometimes contradict with 
what is seen to be healthy. 
Even if contradicting one another, both the emphasis on personal responsibility and 
the emphasis on self-interest emerge from a bourgeois value-system that presumes the 
existence of the individual, and could only be made possible with the construction of 
the individual as a distinct and autonomous entity capable of social, moral, rational 
and egoistic agency. As Foucault (e.g. 1970, 1979) demonstrated during his tireless 
efforts to rewrite the intellectual history of the modems, the rise of the individual can 
be attributed to changes in European society, politics and science occurring at the end 
of the eighteenth century. It was during this epoch that the individual was separated 
from the rest of the world to become an agent in its own right. 
Some of the first and still most groundbreaking attempts to conceptualise the 
individual can be found in Kant's critical philosophy. With a more contemporary and 
rather simplistic wording, it can be argued that Kant's Critique of Pure R(!([SOl1 
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(199611787) and Critique of Judgement (198711790) asserts the individual as a 
rational subject capable of goal-directed behaviour and free to pursue actions in 
search of self-fulfilment and self-actualisation. Whereas the Critique of Pure Reason 
brings out an understanding of the rational and goal-directed subjected, the Critique of 
Judgement brings out an understanding of the human body as an organism, i.e. an 
organised body functioning teleologically and acting rationally due to the laws of 
nature and the organising powers of the rational mind. And with the deontological 
ethic presented in Critique of Practical Reason (199311788), it can be argued that 
Kant erects the individual as a moral being with the capacity and the duty to take 
personal responsibility for his or her own actions. Since then, Kant's thinking about 
the individual has been actualised in the liberal discourse of modem democracy, in 
which freedom is always coupled with duty and responsibility. 
The New Public Health illustrates how contemporary Western nation states, on a 
macro-level, carry this discourse forward in the government of individual citizens, 
who on a micro-level, internalise and act according to this same discourse. More 
specifically, health education campaigns first provide information about how 
individuals across the entire population can prevent disease and promote health. 
Individuals then supposedly behave as rational actors and moral agents who utilise 
this information to make the right decisions about how to live - both in terms of self-
interest and in terms of their moral duties and obligations to the community. 
These aspects of the New Public Health highlight how two levels of analysis - the 
macro-level of the population and the micro-level of the individual - are brought 
together in the prevention of health problems and the promotion of health and 
wellbeing. Of course, the macro and the micro are not absolutely distinct, and it is 
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difficult to see where one ends and the other begins when their boundaries are so 
much disrupted. But on the one hand, the New Public Health is concerned with the 
health condition of the population as a whole, whilst on the other, it makes it the task 
of private individuals to take care of their own health and their own bodies. The New 
Public Health therefore produces a certain sense of selthood, which in tum organises 
individual bodies as well as populations. Hence, it is a privatised regime that cannot 
be simply defined as that which is not private health. Indeed, the notion of the public 
in public health is far from straightforward, and before proceeding it should be 
acknowledged that equalling the public with the population is deeply problematic, 
both within a historical and a contemporary context. 
For example the rei publicae of Cicero's political philosophy, which referred to the 
upper class community of free men (no women) in the city states of Ancient Rome, 
implies a narrow and elitist understanding of the public, in sharp contrast to the notion 
outlined earlier. Opposite to Cicero's rei publicae, and different from the idea that the 
public in public health includes the entire population, is also the way in which 
nineteenth century public health was primarily concerned with the impoverished 
working classes. Within a contemporary context, the notion of the public in public 
health is complicated further as the New Public Health is not only concerned with 
populations at the macro-level and individuals at the micro-level. Although the New 
Public Health constructs the population as a whole into one big risk group, this 
reflects only one version of how epidemiology defines the public. Current 
epidemiological research also identifies specific risk groups at the meso-level, i.e. 
groups of individuals within the population. These groups are both seen to be at a 
particularly high risk from certain pathological conditions, and they are further 
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stigmatised by being seen to pose greater risks to the health of the population as a 
whole than are other people. This is for example reflected in UK sexual health 
campaigns, which on the whole still maintain that gays, prostitutes and injective drug 
users are at higher risks than the rest of the population from contracting HIV and 
AIDS. Despite the reminder that 'the rate of HIV infection amongst heterosexual men 
and women is rising', we are also informed that 'In the UK, most new infections are 
amongst gay and bisexual men' (Health Education Authority, undated). 
Moreover, these same campaigns give specific advice to some of these risk groups as 
to how they can avoid infection. Gay men are for example informed about how to 
conduct safe sex. 
Many ways of having safe sex carry no risk of HIV - like kissing, masturbation 
and body rubbing. [ ... ] Gay men have shown how you can make safer sex great 
sex too. Safer sex has an added bonus. It helps protect you from other 
infections, such as gonorrhoea and hepatitis B (hep B). These infections can 
increase the risk of contracting HIV if you have unsafe sex (Health Education 
Authority 1996: 3). 
Although it is normal to be pathological, the construction of risk groups means that 
some people are more pathological (or should I say more normal) than others, and 
more often than not treated accordingly by the public health authorities. This does not 
contradict the notion of a privati sed public health and a public health concerned with 
everybody in the entire population. It only calls for a more complex account of the 
New Public Health, where some people in the population are expected and compelled 
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to make more severe modifications to their everyday habits and lifestyles than are 
other people. 
Nevertheless, as the New Public Health makes the individual its centre of attention by 
emphasising personal responsibility, appealing to self-interest, and defining health in 
terms of self-enjoyment, self-fulfilment and bodily attractiveness, coercive measures 
become peripheral to the attainment of its objectives. Instead, people are disciplined 
by constructs of knowledge that first make them conceive of health in these terms and 
second give them the impression that they voluntarily choose health-promoting ways 
of life because they want to and not because they are forced or manipulated to do so. 
Consequently, one is being convinced that the changes in lifestyle proposed by health 
education campaigns are acts of personal self-interest and not acts of ascetic self-
denial (Petersen and Lupton 1996). But by providing selective information to foster 
healthy lifestyles, health education campaigns do interfere with individual choice. 
And even though such campaigns may help people make informed decisions, the 
information given is derived from and pre-formed by expert knowledge that align 
with public health policy. Having in this section used contemporary examples to 
illustrate how the New Public Health works to improve health and wellbeing across 
the population, I shall in the subsequent and penultimate section of this chapter 
discuss the organisational regime of the New Public Health in light of Foucault's 
concept of governmentality. 
2.7 The New Public Health and Governmentality 
The shift from coercive methods to more subtle techniques of self-discipline has given 
way to a public health whereby the production of organisation is extended beyond that 
of previous regimes. The New Public Health is not content with cleaning up the space 
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we inhabit, disinfecting our water, pasteurising our milk, vaccinating us against 
disease-carrying bacteria and isolating us when suffering from a contagious disease. 
Instead, it seeks to organise our everyday lives and daily activities by imposing 
boundaries upon our lifestyles and upon what bodies can and should do. Since the late 
1980s this trend has provoked a number of sociologists to analyse the New Public 
Health in terms of Foucault's concept of governmentality (e.g. Nettleton 1997, 
Osborne 1997, Petersen 1997, Turner 1997). Although Turner (1997) in particular 
identifies a tension between Foucault's concept of governmentality and Ulrich Beck's 
(1992) notion of a risk society, he still advocates the former as a way of appreciating 
the ways in which contemporary society, including the public health authorities, seeks 
to deal with and eliminate risk. But before I return briefly to some of these authors in 
the discussion below, I need to say something about the general aspects of 
governmentality in Foucault's thinking. 
Arguing that 'We live in the era of governmentality', Foucault (1991: 103) introduced 
this neologism in a series of lectures given at the College de France in the late 1970s, 
some of which have later been published in edited collections of his works (e.g. in 
Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991 and in Foucault 1997a). Although Foucault 
throughout this lecture series often used the word governmentality interchangeably 
with the terms "governmental rationality", the "rationality of government" and the 
"art of government", this should not be taken as an indication of just a narrow concern 
with government in the political domain (Gordon 1991). In the English-speaking 
world, "govern-mentality" carries two additional meanings: the mentality of the 
governor and the gm'ernment of mentality (cf. Rose 1989). However, more central to 
Foucault's concept of governmentality was the even broader concern with the 
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relationship between power, knowledge and subjectivity, and it is this understanding 
of governmentality which is my primary interest here. Interestingly, this general 
understanding is indicated in the title of Foucault's last two years' lectures at the 
College de France: 'The government of one's self and of others' (Gordon 1991: 2). 
This meaning is also evident in one of Foucault's other lectures on the subject matter. 
where he comments on what he sees as the explosion of government in the sixteenth 
century and the rise of a body of literature concerned with giving "'advice to the 
prince'" on how to govern: 
Government as a general problem seems to me to explode in the sixteenth 
century, posed by discussions of quite diverse questions. One has, for example, 
the question of the government of oneself, that ritualization of the problem of 
personal conduct which is characteristic of the sixteenth century Stoic revival. 
There is the problem too of the government of souls and lives, the entire theme 
of Catholic and Protestant pastoral doctrine. There is the government of children 
and the great problematic of pedagogy which emerges and develops during the 
sixteenth century. And, perhaps only as the last of these questions to be taken 
up, there is the government of the state by the prince (Foucault 1991: 87). 
This concern with government, Foucault says, lasted to the end of the eighteenth 
century. But even though Foucault here rests with a specific historical period, this is 
not to say that the phenomenon of governmentality itself is limited to this historical 
period - even if that was when it was first discovered. As stated above, he insists that 
'We live in the era of governmentality' today, and this effectively means that 
governmentality has become the dominant mentality grounding all modern fOnTIS of 
political thought and action (Miller and Rose 1990). This vie\\" is also in contrast to 
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the idea that govemmentality is limited to the state apparatus. Although 
governmentality initially emerged as a triangular relationship between sovereignty, 
discipline and government to regulate and control populations through an apparatus of 
security requiring a whole series of knowledge regimes, this does not make 
governmentality an effect of the administrative state. Instead, it makes the 
administrative state an effect of govemmentality. 
In another of his College de France lectures on govemmentality, Foucault relates the 
term to 'the "care" and the "techniques" of the self. Here, he defines govemmentality 
as 'the government of the self by oneself in its articulation with relations with others', 
and finds examples of govemmentality in pedagogy, behavioural counseling, spiritual 
direction and models of living (Foucault 1997b: 88). Consequently, Foucault bridges 
the gap between regimes of discipline and the production of the self, thus providing an 
integrated understanding of power-knowledge relations and the emergence of the 
modem self through disciplinary technologies. Foucault elaborates on this 
understanding in a lecture originally given at the University of Vermont in 1982, 
arguing that govemmentality is the point of contact between technologies of 
domination such as discourse and the state on the one hand, and technologies of the 
self on the other hand (Foucault 1997 c). 
Techniques for improvement and participation are therefore double-edged. First, they 
extend the clinical gaze and constructively manage the population, and in doing so, 
they produce an enterprising, self-caring and self-regulating subject whose personal 
life and personal relations are increasingly managerialised. Consequently, 
Foucauldian govemmentality, which locates power in a diverse and diffuse array of 
sites, associates power with the day-to-day practices, expert systems and knowledge 
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regimes of professionals. As a matter of governmentality, power is expressed in self-
help manuals and public infonnation campaigns and adopted by ordinary people in a 
quest for self-achievement, good health and wellbeing. 
Sociologists studying public health from a Foucauldian perspective have specifically 
invoked the concept of governmentality to deal with the increased focus on lifestyle 
and lifestyle-related diseases, the increased use of health education based on 
epidemiological research, and the increased emphasis on self-interest and personal 
responsibility in the management of health risks. Both Nettleton (1997) and Petersen 
(1997), for instance, examine governmentality in relation to the New Public Health by 
drawing attention to the ways in which health promotion as a disciplinary technology 
relies upon producing a self which is always seen to be at risk and therefore seen to be 
responsible for managing risk. 
On the whole, the concept of governmentality enables us to recognise, on the one 
hand, how people govern themselves voluntarily as particular kinds of persons, and on 
the other hand, how public health experts act as judges of normality that assist in 
processes of self-governance and self-discipline by giving advice and by promoting 
social institutions that facilitate so-called healthy choices. This means that in the New 
Public Health, power is ambiguous in that it is less about repression, violence, direct 
coercion and blatant control than it is about the creation of an expert knowledge 
regime which, through its knowledge about the normal human subject, ser\'es to 
channel and constrain thinking and action. 
But as govemmentality acknowledges the complex, subtle, incomplete and partial 
nature of power relations and constructs power as a matter of micro-negotiations, 
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studies that examine public health in tenns of governmentality can also recognise that 
the extent to which public health is able to organise bodies and populations is limited. 
Although the New Public Health influences how the body is to be disciplined and 
manufactured as a project of the self, people also resist public health imperatives by 
taking charge of how their own bodies are to be regulated and manufactured as 
projects of the self. In other words, people institute their own regimes of self-
discipline by subverting the regimes pursued by the public health authorities. Bare-
backing is one example of such resistance. Despite, or rather because of, militant anti-
AIDS campaigns promoting safe sex, a minor but growing number of gay men in the 
US (and to a lesser extent elsewhere) frequently and deliberately engage in 
unprotected sex with random partners. Seemingly, their motivation is not merely a 
wish to resist what the State and public morality tells them to do.9 Risking HIV 
infection, they are also driven by a desire to live dangerously and engage in limit 
experiences that might have lethal consequences for themselves and for others. 1o 
Other examples of how the organisational attempts of public health are disrupted may 
include smoking, drug use and sunbathing. For many teenage girls, smoking provides 
a means to regulate body-weight, and can be seen as a way to cope with the increasing 
pressures of achieving a slim and attractive figure at an age when their bodies undergo 
significant change. For a large number of adolescents and young adults, doing drugs is 
a central aspect of participating in the club scene, as it enables people to lose weight 
9 Although "motivation" as a term may .carr~ a I~t of a~sumptions, and .even tho~gh attempts to 
identify any particular motives are speculattv~, mter~Iews WIth people commItted to thIS scene suggest 
that a more complex set of motives informs thIS practice (cf. QX 2000). 
10 If we accept James Miller's (1994) bi~graph~ of Fouca~1t, Foucault in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
engaged in similar limit experiences of nsk-takmg. at the mterface between sex and VIOlence, drugs and 
disease, pain and pleasure. 
75 
and party all night, unrestricted of mental inhibitions and bodily needs of sleep, rest 
and food. And for numerous sunbathers, young and old, who skip sun protection and 
expose their bodies to excessive hours of sun on the beach, in their garden or on the 
sun bed, the risk of skin cancer seems a small worry compared to the unbearable 
thought of lightness - looking pale and bleak. 
These are all examples of how public health is resisted, subverted and ignored. In 
addition, we should be aware that the organisational attempts and imperatives of 
public health are disrupted and undermined because people have sincere difficulties in 
living up to them. Even if highly motivated to institute and maintain the boundaries 
that are meant to enhance our own health, we are not necessarily able to do so. First, 
social situations beyond our own control and choosing may subject our bodies to 
accidents, injuries and violence that put our health at risk. Second, bacteria and 
viruses may germinate, contaminate and infect our bodies in spite of any personal 
measures taken to prevent disease. And finally, it is difficult enough to change a few 
established habits if not to mention an entire lifestyle. In other words, we are (i) 
incapable of maintaining the boundaries that separate our intimate sphere from the 
larger social sphere and the people, animals and other objects that populate it; we are 
(ii) incapable of maintaining the boundaries that separate our individual organism 
from its internal and external environment; and we are (iii) incapable of imposing 
boundaries upon our everyday habits and lifestyles. In conclusion, it must be 
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recognised that the New Public Health, even if powerful in itself, is up against some 
very powerful forces. These forces undermine what it tries to do to bodies and what it 
tries to make bodies do to themselves. And consequently, it seems that they make it 
impossible for public health to fully organise bodies according to its own objectives 
and imperatives, principles, techniques and boundaries. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Having studied some of the ways in which public health throughout Western history 
has sought to prevent disease and promote good health, five different regimes of 
public health organisation have been identified as significant for my argument: the 
Great Confinement, the Victorian Sanitary Movement, Pasteurian Public Health, 
Eugenic Public Health, and the New Public Health. Despite similarities and overlaps 
between these regimes, it is important that we acknowledge the discontinuities that 
make one regime different from the next. Based on my investigations in this chapter, I 
would suggest the following taxonomy as a means, albeit simplistic, to make sense of 
the processes that characterised the organisation of embodiment at the level of the 
population under each of these public health regimes. This taxonomy is further 
illustrated in table 2.1, where each public health regime is associated with a particular 
or a number of various problems, organisational institutions, organisational 
discourses, and organisational principles or solutions. Like most tables, this one is 
overly simplistic and does not for example include all the organisational discourses 
and institutions discussed in this chapter. Moreover, the organisational institutions and 
discourses included do not necessarily belong to the same level of institution or 
discourse. But even though the neo-liberalism of the New Pubic Health and the germ 
theory of the Pasteurian Public Health, let's say, are of different discursi\'e orders, I 
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hope that the table helps tease out the key elements of each public health regime and 
eases comparison between different public health regimes. 
Public Health Problem Organisational Organisational Organisational 
Regime Institution Discourse Principle or Solution 
The Great Poverty Asylum Health-wealth Separation, Isolation, 
Confinement relationship Exclusion (Simple 
Location I) 
The Victorian Dirt Sewage system, Miasmic theory, Hygiene (Simple 
Sanitary urban works, health epidemiology, Location II) 
Movement inspectorate urban planning, 
architecture, Surveillance, Training 
engineering Colonisation 
Pasteurian Public Micro- Laboratory Germ theory Immunisation, 
Health orgamsms Vaccination 
Eugenic Public Foreign, Immigration Eugenics Selection, Separation, 
Health weak and control, death Isolation, Exclusion, 
Impure camp, asylum, Extermination, 
bodies orphanage Sterilisation 
The New Public Lifestyle Health education Neo-liberalism Govemmentality 
Health 
(Table 2.1: Differences and Similarities across Five Public Health Regimes) 
From this, we can see that the Great Confinement sought to organise the population 
by separating, isolating and excluding the poor and diseased from the rest of society. 
The Victorian Sanitary Movement sought to organise the population by cleaning up 
the environments in which people lived and worked as well as training people to clean 
their own bodies. Pasteurian Public Health sought to organise the population by 
exterminating disease-spreading micro-organisms from the bodies of people and 
animals, from the food and water consumed by people and animals, and from the 
spaces inhabited by people and animals. Eugenic Public Health sought to organise the 
population by selecting good genes and strong bodies and excluding and 
exterminating bad genes and weak bodies. And finally, the New Public Health still 
seeks to organise the population by influencing and invoking boundaries on people's 
lifestyles. 
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Across these five regImes, it is also possible to identify two diverging lines of 
development. On the one hand, as public health has expanded into new fields of 
interest in an attempt to organise and impose boundaries upon new areas of everyday 
life, it has become both more intensive and more extensive. But on the other hand, a 
number of examples suggest that public health sometimes relaxes the daily pressure 
on bodies and populations, whilst at other times even fails to organise everyday life 
and embodiment to the extent that it wants. Foucault's concept of governmentality 
does to a certain extent encapsulate this ambivalence, at least with regards to the New 
Public Health. First, it implies that the disciplinary technologies of power-knowledge 
regimes are internalised by people in how they go about governing their own bodies 
and their own daily lives. And second, it acknowledges that none of these disciplinary 
technologies can be fully internalised into all-pervasive regimes of self-discipline. 
This openness means that self-discipline is sometimes taken over by individuals 
themselves who create their own subjectivities, ways of life and sub-cultures in 
contradiction and resistance to, independently from and in order to subvert the 
disciplinary technologies of exterior power-knowledge regImes. Foucault's 
recognition is by all means an important one, and it helps us become aware that the 
organisational boundaries instituted by public health are open to disruption, 
subversion and termination. And in that respect, it helps us recognise that the body is 
a problem for organisation. Not just in the sense that it is a problem to be solved, but 
also in the sense that it is a consistent problem that we may never be able to sol\'e 
with the help of organisation. Since the body, then, is a problem for organisation, we 
as organisation theorists - whose research object supposedly is organisation - ought 
to think about how we are to deal with this problem. And as I explained in my 
introductory chapter, this is the task of this thesis. That is, to study how organisation 
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theory deals with the problem of the body and to make some further propositions as to 
how organisation theory should deal with the problem of the body, all along bearing 
in mind that the body is capable of disrupting the boundaries of organisation. 
Foucault's work, which has been much neglected by mainstream organisation 
theorists but used extensively by more peripheral scholars to study the production of 
organisation (e.g. Burrell 1984, 1988; Cooper and Burrell 1988; Townley 1993: Grey 
1994), might help us illuminate the production of organisation on the body. So before 
I in chapters 4 to 8 tum to examine how organisation theory does and should deal with 
the problem of the body, I shall in the next chapter outline the methodology and 
method that enables me to pursue this task. 
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Chapter 3 
A Conceptualist Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I shall outline and critically analyse the methodological principles and 
metatheoretical assumptions that will guide this investigation of how organisation 
theory does and should deal with the problem of the body. This endeavour is 
threefold. First, I will discuss what I mean by methodology and what I regard to be 
the task of methodology, both in general and with particular reference to a 
conceptualist methodology applied to the study of organisation and embodiment. The 
objective of this discussion is to position this thesis metatheoretically in relation to the 
larger terrain of social science research. Second, in what is the major part of this 
chapter, I will analyse the key ideas that inform my conceptualist methodology and 
the method of concept analysis that goes into it. These ideas are adopted from three 
French twentieth century thinkers: Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault and Gilles 
Deleuze, who are arguably all part of the same intellectual tradition. Finally, and with 
reference to the remaining chapters of the thesis, I will briefly outline how I attempt to 
utilise this conceptualist methodology in my investigation of how organisation theory 
does and should deal with the problem of the body. 
3.2 A Method of Concept Analysis and a Conceptualist Methodology 
Put briefly, method is the tools and techniques that are used in order to in\'estigate a 
particular research issue or problem. In the social sciences, where one typically makes 
a distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods, this may include anything 
from regression analysis, via \'arious types of questionnaires, interviews and 
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observation techniques, to documentary analysis and discourse analysis, which are 
techniques for the study and interpretation of text. Concept ana~~'sis, which is the 
method utilised in this thesis, falls into the latter category of qualitative research, 
where texts drawn from particular streams of thought are studied with the particular 
goal of revealing meaning. Unlike traditional hermeneutics (e.g. the young Dilthey; 
cf. Dilthey 1976; Burrell and Morgan 1979: 236; Schwandt 1994: 121), this is not an 
attempt to verify objective meanings. Interpretative openness is essential to this 
project. Moreover, this notion of concept analysis is very different from the method of 
concept analysis in the discipline of logic. In logic, a concept is usually a short 
enunciation or sentence that is to be broken up into its attributes in order to be deemed 
consistent or inconsistent, true or false, analytic or synthetic, a priori, a posteriori, or 
tautological (cf. Mates 1965; Fjelland 1995). In this thesis, I am not interested in 
making "logical" inferences. Rather, the method of concept analysis developed here is 
employed to trace and critically analyse what presumably is the most central concept 
within organisation theory, the concept of "organisation". And it is employed in order 
to find out what different conceptualisations of organisation within organisation 
theory say about the problem of the body. 
But method is not synonymous with methodology. First, one particular methodology 
can include a number of different methods, each of which enables one to do different 
things. And second, methodology, which is the theory of method, takes place on a 
different and more abstract level than method. In this thesis, I propose a distinction 
between a method of concept analysis on the one hand and a conceptualist 
methodology on the other. A conceptualist methodology may include different 
analytical methods, each of which enables one to analyse a concept in different ways. 
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Moreover, conceptualist methodology involves the critical evaluation and assessment 
of what form the analysis of concepts takes and what it can and cannot achieve. From 
a starting point in conceptualist methodology, one can therefore ask what a particular 
concept reveals about the discursive field within which that concept is developed. And 
one can ask how the critical analysis and recreation of a particular concept may enable 
further developments in the same (yet constantly changing and inevitably different) 
discursive field. In this thesis I am interested in tracing the formation of the concept of 
organisation in organisation theory and finding out what it can say about organisation 
theory, which undeniably is the main discursive field within which the concept of 
organisation is formulated and expressed. The main question here concerns how 
organisation theory and different conceptualisations within organisation theory deal 
with the problem of the body. Further on, I am interested in how the concept of 
organisation can be changed within organisation theory, and I am keen to map out 
some of the implications that such change may have upon the ways in which 
organisation theory operates, how it thinks, and what it does. More specifically, I am 
interested in what might happen to organisation theory and the concept of 
organisation once it starts dealing with the problem of the body. I will return to the 
methodological aspects of this whilst examining the conceptualism of Canguilhem, 
Foucault and Deleuze. But first, I shall briefly outline my position on three other 
metatheoretical dimensions: epistemology, ontology and human nature, starting with 
11 the former two. 
II I thought long and hard on inclu?i~g ten p.ages on how I arri\ed on. my epistemologi~al ~nd 
t I 'cal position. But since I feel It IS more Important to move the thesIs on rather than gd slde-on 0 ogl ' I d' '. A . 
tracked, I decided to simply present my standpomt on these metatheoretlca ImenSlOns. t some pOInt. 
I also thought about working from the perspecti\c of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), and some people 
might argue that ANT, as represented in the work of Michel Calion (e.g. 1986) and Bruno Latour (c.g. 
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3.3 A Realist Epistemology and A Relativist-Materialist Ontology 
Drawing upon the ideas of Stephen Brown, Joan Pujol and Beryl Curt (1998), I 
propose a realist epistemology and a relativist-materialist ontology. A realist 
epistemology implies that a discursive formulation, such as a map, concept or theory, 
is real in the sense that it influences how we look at the world. By means of exclusion, 
and even if only within a regional or limited realm of discourse, a discursive 
formulation simplifies, orders and stabilises that which otherwise would be disorderly 
and unintelligible. This is particularly interesting with regards to the body, since a 
realist epistemology would argue that the constructed views about the body have 
important consequences for how we live with our bodies. 
This realist epistemology shares an important position with pluralist and relativist 
epistemology. As it abstains from making absolutist truth-claims about the research 
object studied, it acknowledges the possible existence of several different and often 
contradictory discourses on what might nominally be regarded as one and the same 
research object. This does not mean that it encourages, as does naive pluralism, the 
combination of incommensurable principles within one and the same intellectual 
programme. Instead, this underlines the futility of the positivist tenet that the world 
can be fully represented by one universal knowledge system. 
1987, 1988, 1999), is part of the same French twentieth century intellectual tradition as Canguilhem., 
Foucault and Deleuze. But because of certain problems with much ANT (for example the danger of 
reifying reality by speaking of actor-networks .as entities \\itho~t sho~ing su~ficient concern for ho\\ 
actor-networks come into being), and because It comes short of the phIlosophIcal ngour charactenstJc 
of Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze, 1 believe that its weaknesses outweigh its strengths. 
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The relativist-materialist ontology pursued in this thesis stands in stark contrast to the 
universalist ontology that often is accepted and augmented by critical realism (e.g. 
Bhaskar 1978). A relativist-materialist ontology recognises material reality as the 
relative and relational play between heterogeneous and multifarious, dynamic and 
unpredictable forces. In other words, reality is a matter of many different material 
realities of which it is impossible to gain complete and absolute knowledge and fully 
represent in any system of knowledge. However, the impossibility of perfect 
representation is no reason for avoiding ontological questions. It is the indeterminate 
and open-ended nature of reality that makes ontology such an endless inquiry and the 
ontological tum such an important challenge, certainly if one's objective is to re-
evaluate the implications that the reality of embodiment has upon organisation. This 
project is too important to be left to the natural scientist's quest for representational 
certainty. It can only be pursued if one opens oneself up to the tools delivered by the 
open-ended enterprise of philosophical speCUlation. Though itself a representation of 
reality, the relativist-materialist ontology adopted here does at least seek to critically 
understand what reality is and what is in it. I shall return to the enterprise of 
philosophical speculation later in this chapter, whilst discussing the method of 
concept creation developed by Deleuze (with Guattari 1994). But before rounding off 
my metatheoretical discussion, I shall deal with the topic of human nature. 
3.4 Human Nature, the Conditions of Humans and the Transhuman Condition 
Ontology is closely related to human nature, which is the metatheoretical dimension 
concerned with the relationship between human beings and their environment. Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) distinguish between two basic approaches to human nature: 
voluntarism and determinism. Whereas voluntarism emphasises the rational ability of 
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the human being to act according to her free will and change the environment in 
which she lives (regardless of what environment that is), determinism highlights the 
environmental structures and forces that influence and constrain the human being so 
as to only act in certain predictable ways. According to this dichotomy, one is giyen 
the impression that determinism is about the environmental conditions under which 
humans live (i.e. the conditions of humans). Simultaneously, one is given the 
impression that voluntarism is about the human alone or the human condition (i.e. 
what the human is and what s/he is capable of), which is little different from ontology 
understood as the reality of the human. 
The distinction between the conditions of humans and the human condition is 
traditionally what marks the dividing line between the social sciences and philosophy. 
But since determinism and voluntarism are perspectives pursued by social scientists 
and philosophers alike, it would be highly problematic to simply associate 
determinism with the conditions of humans and voluntarism with the human 
condition. Not only would this conception split investigations of human nature into 
two separate types of inquiry, none of which would investigate human nature as a 
whole (one would be concerned with the human environment whilst the other would 
be concerned with the human). This conception is also problematic because 
voluntarism itself implies a view of the human being, which does not say all there is 
to say about the human condition. Indeed, it may be argued that the rational actor 
portrayed in voluntarism is herself subjected to particular conditions under which s'he 
lives, rationality, the possession of a rational mind and the pursuit of rational 
behaviour being the most obvious. And since voluntarism is inseparable from rational 
behaviour, it does not imply a more unpredictable world than determinism does. 
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The determinate character of both determinism and voluntarism gives rise to a bias 
towards the conditions of humans. Consequently, the determinism/voluntarism 
dichotomy provides a highly limited understanding of human nature. This point has 
particular relevance for this thesis, as the notion of the rational actor of free will is 
quite similar to that of the organised body of the organism. After Kant's (199611787) 
critical philosophy, which turned the human into the centre of the Universe, both the 
rational actor and the organism have been typically conceived as self-regulating, 
autonomous and teleological beings. Whereas the rational actor is seen to pursue 
certain means for the fulfilment of certain ends, the organism is seen to operate 
through certain physiological functions for the fulfilment of certain forms of 
embodiment. In other words, they are both seen to function according to a set of 
general laws that reflect a rational organisation induced by a rational mind, by a 
divine power or by Nature itself. Further on, the organism is typically regarded as the 
human condition, in that it is seen as the natural and thus the only possible form that 
embodiment can take. However, insofar as the organism is only one possible form of 
embodiment, a form that is primarily imposed upon embodiment by biomedical (and 
to some extent biophilosophical) discourse, the organism is also produced by a certain 
set of environmental conditions. Therefore, the reduction of embodiment to the 
organised body of the organism is not the human condition, but rather a condition 
(and an organised one) under which human beings may live. 
In this thesis, which among other things is concerned with alternative ways of 
thinking about the body, a central task is to think beyond the organisation of bodies 
and beyond the organised body of the organism. It is important to think beyond 
organisation because it is organisation that closes down the range of alternatives open 
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to lived embodiment. The ways in which Deleuze thinks embodiment beyond the 
organism is the topic of chapter 7. Insofar as the organisation of the body and the 
organised body of the organism is about the conditions of humans, this thesis 
therefore seeks to go beyond the usual territory of the social sciences and enter what 
traditionally has been the sanctuary of metaphysicians, the human condition. This is 
not the human condition as conceived through the rational actor or the organism. And 
since I seek to think about the body beyond organised bodies such as the organism, 
simply speaking in terms of the human condition is somehow inadequate. Thinking 
about the body in ways that transgress the boundaries of the organism involves 
thinking about the human condition in ways that transgress the boundaries of the 
human condition. The transgressive nature of the human condition therefore makes it 
more appropriate, as does Deleuze (1994), to speak in terms of the transhuman 
condition. And since this sense of the transhuman condition draws our attention to the 
ways in which bodies transgress the boundaries of organised embodiment, this is an 
underlying theme of chapter 7. 
But as I hope to make clear in that chapter, the transhuman condition is not simply 
about the ability of an individual human to exceed the boundaries of its own current 
existence. Although changing one's habits and ways of life is a central aspect of the 
transhuman condition, this also places the human in a radically different and 
indeterminate relationship to its environment. Consequently, the 
voluntarism/determinism dichotomy, which confines human nature to a matter of 
determinacy, cannot be maintained in this thesis, but must be replaced by the notion 
of the transhuman condition, which recognises the indetl:!rminac), afhuman natw·l:!. 
Having now outlined the metatheoretical positions that inform this thesis, I shall in the 
next part develop in further detail the method of concept ana~vsis utilised in this thesis 
and, from the perspective of conceptualist methodology, evaluate what can be 
achieved with this method. As noted above, this section involves a senous 
engagement with Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze, in that order. But before dealing 
separately with each one of them, I shall say something about why I have chosen to 
develop my conceptualist methodology and my method of concept analysis through 
the ideas of these three thinkers. And I shall say something about what it is that brings 
these thinkers together, both intellectually and biographically. This is not an attempt 
to reduce their individual projects to one homogeneous tradition in French twentieth 
century thought. Their individual distinctions will become more apparent when I deal 
with each one of them. This is also not an attempt at biographical reductionism, which 
would reduce the works and ideas of a certain intellectual to his or her personal 
history. I do however see some biographical connections between Canguilhem, 
Foucault and Deleuze, and I do believe that drawing attention to some of them can 
help us appreciate the continuity in their thinking and writing. Hence, in the 
discussion of Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze, I am trying to do two things 
simultaneously. One is to show that they are connected biographically and 
intellectually, and the other is to show that each of their projects are different and 
enable me to do different things - in a sense, the three of them give rise to three 
different methods of concept analysis. The following sections will therefore de\'dop 
in some tension between these two tasks. 
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3.5 Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze 
On a most general level, Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze are all representatives of 
a philosophy of concepts that stands in stark contrast to the philosophy of 
consciousness and experience pursued by other twentieth century philosophers in 
France, and most notably so by Jean-Paul Sartre's (1957) existentialism and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty's (1962) phenomenology. In his introduction to the English edition of 
Canguilhem's (1989) The Normal and the Pathological, Foucault invoked this 
dichotomy as a retrospective tool to make sense of and locate himself and Canguilhem 
within the larger terrain of the history of French philosophy and French history of 
science. As the Foucault biographer David Macey (1993) shows, the same dichotomy 
is even utilised by the contemporary sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who is specifically 
concerned to draw an opposing line against vulgar existentialism. Although 
problematic, the distinction between the philosophy of concepts and the philosophy of 
consciousness and experience can be traced well back into the nineteenth century. 
Drawing on Foucault's introduction to The Normal and the Pathological, the Foucault 
commentator Gary Gutting (1989) identifies similar oppositions between the 
philosopher Maine de Biran and the pioneering sociologist Auguste Comte, the 
philosopher Jules Lachelier and the mathematician and philosopher Louis Couturat, 
and the philosopher Henri Bergson and the mathematician and philosopher of science 
Henri Poincare. Whereas Maine de Biran, Lachelier and Bergson are associated with 
the philosophy of consciousness and experience, Comte, Couturat and Poincare are 
associated with the philosophy of concepts. Further on, though recognising the 
twentieth century thinker Alexandre Koyre and the philosopher and mathematician 
Jean Cavailles as later representatives of the philosophy of concepts, Foucault 
identifies the philosopher and historian of science Gaston Bachelard. \\ith Georges 
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Canguilhem, as the key figure of the philosophy of concepts in twentieth century 
France. Teaching Canguilhem at the prestigious Ecole Normale Superior (ENS) in 
Paris, it was Bachelard who initiated the emphasis in the history of science on 
epistemic breaks, discontinuities or ruptures (coupures) in the explanation of scientific 
change, and this became a central theme in the works of Canguilhem and Foucault. 12 
Although Deleuze's philosophy, which includes a serious commitment to what he 
calls superior empiricism is strongly influenced by Bergson, this does not exclude him 
from the wider tradition of the philosophy of concepts, and it may even be emphasised 
that the association of Bergson with the philosophy of consciousness and experience 
is an uneasy one. \3 And even though De1euze (with Guattari) (1994) develops a 
different philosophy of concepts from Canguilhem and Foucault, it will become more 
apparent in the section on Deleuze below that some concern with rupture is also 
noticeable in his histories of philosophy. 
The distinction between the philosophy of concepts and the philosophy of 
consciousness and experience may be further problematised by drawing attention to 
Foucault's and Deleuze's common interest in the relationship between theory and 
practice. The same year as Foucault in his foreword to Deleuze and Guattari's (1984) 
Anti-Oedipus announced the twentieth century as Deleuzian, twenty-two years before 
12 Interestingly, Louis Althusser, who was Canguilhem's colleague and Foucault's teacher at the ENS. 
did also emphasise the role of coupures in explaining scientific change. Jacques Derrida, who like 
Althusser was a pied noir brought up in Algeria, was taught by both Althusser and by the four years 
older Foucault at the ENS. Concerned with identifying internal differences and contradictions in 
discourse so as to offer controversial rereadings of conventional texts. Derrida's (1976. 1978, 19:-:~) 
deconstructivism may also be seen to develop from a preoccupation with coupures. 
13 Admittedly, Bachelard (2000) attacked Bergson's theory of duration for neglecting the imp0:ta~ce of 
coupurl's. This does however not m.ake Foucault's (1989) .attempt to locate Bergson wlthm the 
philosophy of consciousness and expenence any less problematIc. 
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Deleuze made his speech at Foucault's funeral, and some years before they stopped 
meeting in person due to some misunderstanding about each other's conception of 
power, Deleuze and Foucault did a joint interview on intellectuals and power 
(Foucault 1977a). In this discussion, which brings out the mutual respect and 
admiration that they had for each other, Deleuze argues that we are about to 
experience 'a new relationship between theory and practice.' Previously practice has 
been regarded either as a mere consequence or application of theory, or as the 
inspiration of theory, as that which is 'indispensable for the creation of future 
theoretical forms.' But 'In any event', Deleuze states, 'their relationship was 
understood in terms of a process of totalization' (Deleuze quoted in Foucault 1977a: 
205). Deleuze's alternative, in which he implicates Foucault, argues for a more 
'partial and fragmentary' relationship between theory and practice where 'theory is 
always local and related to a limited field, and [ ... ] applied in another sphere, more or 
less distant from it.' Hence, theory and practice do not resemble one another, but need 
one another. It is practice that provides theory with a set of relays enabling theory to 
move from one point to another, and 'theory is a relay from one practice to another. 
No theory can develop without eventually encountering a wall, and practice is 
necessary for piercing this wall' (Deleuze quoted in Foucault 1977a: 206). The kernel 
of this is that not only is theory a practice in itself, but theory and practice inform and 
shape each other enabling both to make decisive radical movements and develop 
further. 
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Referring to collective resistance and grass root movements, Foucault agrees that 
'theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice' (Foucault 
1977a: 208). The theoretician or intellectual cannot 'place himself somewhat "ahead 
and to the side" in order to express the truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle 
against the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the 
sphere of "knowledge," "truth," "consciousness," and "discourse'" (Foucault 1977a: 
207-208). In other words, the theoretician's activity is not about representation or 
truth-telling at all, but is always part of the struggle for power. 
Accompanying the broadly defined philosophy of concepts that joins Canguilhem, 
Foucault and Deleuze, is also a serious pursuit of the philosophy of life, otherwise 
known as biophilosophy. As Deleuze showed the strongest commitment to 
philosophy, metaphysics and ontology, it is in his thinking that one most clearly can 
find a philosophy of life. But even though Canguilhem's and Foucault's writings are 
often seen as epistemological projects preoccupied with the history of science and the 
formation and operation of discourse (e.g. Delaporte 1998), this is not their sole 
concern. Even if less explicitly than in Deleuze's writings, both Canguilhem's and 
Foucault's work express ontological agendas. Canguilhem and Foucault are not 
exclusively concerned with the epistemic regularities of the life sciences, but also 
demonstrate a serious interest in the reality of life itself. 
The above discussion of the philosophy of concepts and the philosophy of life might 
give the impression of Deleuze as an outsider in the company of Canguilhem and 
Foucault. The relationship between the three is however less straightforward. and it 
must be recognised that Canguilhem, who was born in 1904, belonged to a different 
generation from Foucault and Deleuze, \",ho were born in 1926 and 1925 respectively. 
It must also be recognised that even if Foucault and Deleuze are uneasily categorised 
within one particular field of knowledge, the diverse character of Canguilhem's 
career, which involved a long-term engagement with philosophy, medicine and the 
history of science and medicine, was unparalleled by Foucault and Deleuze. Since 
Canguilhem is much less of a name in organisation theory than Foucault and Deleuze, 
it is necessary to elaborate on these aspects, which make Canguilhem stand out. 
Canguilhem entered the ENS in 1924 to read philosophy and enrolled in the same 
class as Sartre and the sociologist Raymond Aron, one year before Merleau-Ponty and 
Althusser. After graduating, Canguilhem taught philosophy at various academic 
institutions in France, but resigned from his post as philosophy instructor at Clermont-
Ferrand with the Vichy regime coming to power in France and started studies in 
medicine. He had not studied philosophy to teach fascist doctrine (Macey 1993). The 
move to medicine was however not motivated by an interest in practising medicine. 
By studying medicine, Canguilhem got an opportunity to acquire first-hand 
knowledge about a field of knowledge whose historicity and philosophical 
underpinnings interested him. The first systematic expression of this interest was 
Canguilhem's second doctoral thesis, written at the end of his medical studies in the 
early 1940s and published under the now famous title The Normal and the 
Pathological. 
The close relationship between Canguilhem and Foucault first started to take shape 
whilst Canguilhem was a philosophy instructor at the University of Strasbourg in the 
early 1950s. At the same time, he was affiliated with the ENS and happened to be at 
the entry panel when Foucault applied to the school. A couple of years later he was 
also a member of the examination jury when Foucault had to re-sit his examination at 
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the end of his degree. Foucault did splendidly and Canguilhem wrote Foucault a 
recommendation letter that secured him a research post following his graduation 
(Macey 1993). Moreover, Canguilhem, who by that time had replaced Bachelard as 
chair of philosophy at the Sorbonne, was appointed by the University to review (not 
examine) Foucault's doctoral thesis and clear it for publication. Most English-
speaking readers would know this thesis under the title Madness and Ci\'ili=afion. 
This was the real start of what later became a close friendship between two academics 
who perhaps had more in common than we often realise. Although Foucault was 
never directly taught by Canguilhem, the former read the works of this master with 
great interest at an early stage of his university studies. 
Although Canguilhem did teach Deleuze when the latter was studying philosophy at 
the Sorbonne during the Second World War, the relationship between Canguilhem 
and Deleuze is less obvious. Canguilhem was not the teacher that Deleuze was most 
impressed with. Deleuze held Ferdinand Alquie and Jean Hyppolite in greater esteem 
than he did Canguilhem, even though he found them both to be stuck in the history of 
philosophy (cf. Olkowski 1998). Canguilhem's influence should nevertheless not be 
underestimated, most notably because Canguilhem's project entails so much more 
than it is traditionally seen to do. The philosopher and Deleuze commentator Keith 
Ansell Pearson (1999) sees a strong similarity between Deleuze's biophilosophy and 
Canguilhem's vitalism, and is certain that Deleuze found an important source of 
inspiration in the work of his former philosophy teacher. The way that Canguilhem 
reconceptualised traditional categories of the normal and the pathological, health and 
illness, life and death, has found resonance in much of Deleuze's own writings. More 
specifically, Ansell Pearson mentions Deleuze's notion of the crack developed in The 
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Logic of Sense (1990), where Deleuze attempts to rework Nietzsche's notion of great 
health (the health that has incorporated sickness). And he draws attention to Deleuze 
and Guattari's (1988) understanding of evolution in A Thousand Plateaus where 
symbiotic complexes such as monstrous couplings and unnatural participations are 
regarded as 'the source of real innovation in evolution' (Ansell Pearson 1999: 8). 
Although Canguilhem is primarily regarded as an epistemologist, his vitalism has 
therefore given significant impetus to Deleuze's ontological project. But beyond 
Canguilhem's influence on Deleuze, and just as importantly, it is possible to identify 
Canguilhem's rethinking of the normal and the pathological as an ontological 
endeavour in its own right. In addition to evaluate the methodological ramifications of 
Canguilhem's conceptualism and how Canguilhem seeks to study epistemic 
formations and change, I shall return to the ontological dimensions of Canguilhem's 
conceptualism later in the following section. 
3.6 Canguilhem's Conceptualism 
In his introduction to The Normal and the Pathological, Foucault (1989) argues that 
Canguilhem initiates a remarkable shift in the history of science. Whereas previous 
work had been preoccupied with so-called noble and pure sciences with a high degree 
of formalisation and mathematisation, such as mathematics, physics and chemistry, 
Canguilhem directs his attention at a group of sciences that were and still are less fit 
for formalisation and mathematisation and more dependent on external and 
ideological factors. To be precise, Canguilhem deals with the so-called 'middle 
regions where knowledge is much less deductive' and far more influenced by 'the 
marvels of the imagination' (Foucault 1989: 13). 
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But apart from re-evaluating what Foucault identified as an - until then - 'relatively 
neglected domain', Canguilhem triggers or at least reinforces a set of other significant 
changes in the history of science. First, as in the work of his precursor Bachelard (e.g. 
1984), ruptures, breaks or coupures is a fundamental theme running through 
Canguilhem's project. Rejecting the idea that the history of science can restore or 
discover continuities, unities and totalities in discursive fields, Canguilhem focuses on 
sudden changes, inconsistencies, discontinuities and paradoxes. 
Second, Canguilhem makes an epistemological tum, which according to Foucault 
(1989: 17) goes "hand in hand" with his ·'coupurism". It is by looking through an 
epistemological lens that the historian of science is capable of identifying the regional 
discontinuities running through her object of study. It is by becoming an 
epistemologue that the historian of science can discover the shifts in normativity that 
get rid of certain norms within a particular domain and invent new norms governing 
scientific practice. 
Third, by studying the sciences of life, Foucault (1989) argues that Canguilhem shows 
equal interest in their Other, i.e. vitalism. It is in order to understand the concepts of 
life, health and the living being or organism that Canguilhem has directed his 
attention to death and disease, morbidity and monstrosity, anomaly and error. 
And finally, Canguilhem's approach to the history of science is a privileging of the 
concept. After all, it is the concept that makes science what it is (Canguilhem 1994). 
More specifically, it is the cutting out and formation of a concept that allows the study 
of the processes proper to a certain scientific object. As Foucault (1989: 19) reminds 
us, the concept must however not be so narrow that it does not allow for "elementary 
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analysis". With respect to the life sciences, this means that a biological concept must 
be sufficiently open to be accessible to the elementary analysis of physics and 
chemistry (in organisation theory, perhaps a similar relationship should be assumed 
between our own concepts and the disciplines of sociology, psychology, political 
science, etc.). According to Delaporte (1994), this means that Canguilhem takes a 
macroscopic view of the history of science. Grouping biology, physiology and 
medicine together, he does not write the history of isolated disciplines but the history 
of concepts, theories and biological objects. In conclusion, it is the formation of a 
concept and the constitution of an object that are the key events for Canguilhem in the 
history of science. Since it is the study of concepts that is the primary concern in this 
thesis, it is this aspect ofCanguilhem's project that is the main focus of the remainder 
of this section. 
Canguilhem's history of science is particularly concerned with the formation of 
biomedical concepts, such as the reflex and the cell. More specifically, this historical 
study of scientific concepts involves analysing the development and content, 
elaboration and underlying principles of concepts in the life sciences rather than 
developing alternative conceptualisations. This preoccupation reveals an 
epistemological rather than an ontological focus in Canguilhem's work, and he makes 
it absolutely clear that he is a student of the history and historicity of science rather 
than of science itself. Rather than setting out to change a scientific concept and the 
scientific field of knowledge within which it operates, his project is a study of the 
changes and ruptures undergone by science (cf. Canguilhem 1989). 
Related to scientific change is the central notion of truth and error. Although 
Canguilhem does not discuss or necessarily believe in the truthfulness of science as 
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such, his studies deal with scientific concepts that are or have been taken to be true by 
the scientific community by which that particular concept has been invented. For 
Canguilhem, the success or failure of a scientific concept therefore depends on its 
capacity to tell truth or commit error, i.e. it depends on the extent to which the 
scientific community having invented the concept continue to accept it as true or not. 
This understanding of truth and error places Canguilhem's history of science in an 
interesting relationship with the internalismlexternalism divide, which, as LaCapra 
(1983) argues, has proven so troublesome to the Anglo-American tradition of the 
history of science. First, Canguilhem lacks the genuine commitment to the discovery 
of truth and the correction of error pursued by internalist historians of science. And 
second, the external environment of scientific concepts, such as the academic 
community, the biography of scientists, political events, technology and techniques, 
economic conditions, national culture, etc., are only regarded significant insofar as 
they playa role in the scientific formation of concepts. 
If one scrutinises Canguilhem's project more closely, the epistemological bias 
identified above does however become less apparent and his interest in concepts 
becomes more ambiguous. In the first edition of The Normal and the Pathological 
completed in 1943, Canguilhem is quite explicit about the limitations of his inquiry 
and the epistemological nature of his project. Unlike Bergson (1965), who in 
Duration and Simultaneity sought to renovate Einstein's theory of relativity in physics 
by adding to it a metaphysical treatise of relativity, Canguilhem does not attempt to 
renovate medicine by adding to it a metaphysical understanding of the human body. 
Whilst renovation is a task for physicians themselves, Canguilhem views his own 
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contribution at the level of methodology where he seeks to renovate or renew certain 
methodological concepts in the history and philosophy of science and medicine. 
Contrary to Canguilhem himself, however, I would argue that this distinction between 
methodology and metaphysics is an uneasy one, and even if Canguilhem does not 
renovate the biomedical metaphysic, he is engaged with metaphysical problems. More 
specifically, he does so by using philosophy as a means to reopen rather than to close 
down problems. Referring to Leon Brunschvicg, Canguilhem argues that 'philosophy 
[ ... ] is the science of solved problems' (1989: 35). This does not mean that it is the 
task of philosophy to solve problems or develop solutions to problems. Rather, 
philosophy problematises already existing solutions by reopening them for further 
questioning and inquiry. Even though Canguilhem's project is undoubtedly biased 
towards the epistemological or methodological analysis of biomedical concepts, its 
attempt to reopen problems philosophically means that it is not restricted to 
epistemology and methodology. And despite Canguilhem's great respect for 
biomedical science and its solutions, he does in effect take some steps towards 
renovating the understanding of life and embodiment, health and disease beyond the 
biomedical metaphysic. This ontological undertaking is less than obvious in the first 
edition of The Normal and the Pathological. But it becomes a crucial and slightly 
more apparent theme when Canguilhem, in what is effectively the third edition of the 
book written twenty years later, adds a section on what he calls vitalism. 
The notions of the norm and the normal, the normative and normativity are at the 
centre of Canguilhem's vitalism. Although Canguilhem problematised the 
understanding of normality already in the 1943 edition by making the pathological an 
immanent aspect of the normal and arguing that contemporary biomedicine had made 
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it normal to be pathological, his vitalism is a more explicit attempt to destabilise the 
traditional understanding of normality. Inspired by Bachelard, Canguilhem argues that 
'The normal is not a static or peaceful, but a dynamic and polemical concept' (1989: 
239). This is in contrast to traditional views in biomedicine, which tend to study 
normality in terms of the Gauss curve and associate the normal with what is 
quantitatively cornmon. More specifically, Canguilhem turns the normal into a matter 
of normativity, by which he means 'the biological capacity to challenge the usual 
norms in case of critical situations' (Canguilhem 1989: 284). This means that different 
people need to institute different norms according to their own condition: 
Each of us fixes his norms by choosing his models of exercise. The norm of a 
long-distance runner is not that of a sprinter. Each of us changes his norms 
according to his age and former norms. The norm of the former sprinter is not 
that of a champion. It is normal, that is, in conformity with the biological law of 
aging, that the progressive reduction of the margins of security involves 
lowering the thresholds of resistance to aggressions from the environment. The 
norms of an old man would have been considered deficiencies in the same man 
just reaching adulthood. This recognition of the individual and chronological 
relativity of norms is not skepticism before multiplicity but tolerance of variety 
(Canguilhem 1989: 284). 
Whether intentional or not, in his introduction to A Vital Rationalist, which is a 
selection of Canguilhem's writings, Paul Rabinow (1994) enables us to extend the 
implications of this reconceptualisation of normality. As the normal becomes a matter 
of normativity and health becomes a matter of instituting new norms of living, 
Rabinow (1994: 18) argues that Canguilhem's vitalism offers not the 'invincible 
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philosophy of biologists', but 'has an essential role [to play] as an "indicator" in the 
history of biology.' This means that vitalism may act as a 'theoretical indicator' that 
draws attention to problems to be solved, and act 'as a critical indicator of reductions 
to be avoided.' Vitalism, which Rabinow regards as an expression of Canguilhem' s 
pathos is therefore no substitute for biomedicine, and it does also not remove 
Canguilhem from the rigorous study of biomedical concepts, which Rabinow regards 
as an expression of Canguilhem's ethos. It does however mean that concepts of life 
are put in touch with life itself and that Canguilhem not only pursues a philosophy of 
concepts that studies how life science has elaborated concepts of life (ethos), but also 
a philosophy of life by which these concepts become an integral part of life itself 
(pathos). 
It is also possible to identify an ontological orientation in another aspect of 
Canguilhem's conceptualist proj ect. The concept is not only Canguilhem' s target 
because it is that which makes science what it is. The concept also defines the human 
condition; the concept is that which makes humans what they are. In other words, it is 
our development and use of concepts that makes us different from other living beings 
and enables us to structure our environment. Of course, one may disagree with 
Canguilhem about the extent to which human beings are different from other living 
beings, and one may disagree with him about the extent to which human beings are 
capable of structuring their environment. Moreover, the anthropocentric sentiments of 
this approach stand in some contrast to my previous discussion of the transhuman 
condition. But rather than dismissing Canguilhem's thought as mere 
anthropocentrism, it is possible to view his connection between the human and the 
concept in close affinity with the transhuman condition and the realist epistemology 
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argued earlier. As Foucault (1989) argues, the development and use of concepts does 
not kill life and it does not separate human beings from life. Instead, concepts enable 
life in general, they enable life to be lived in certain ways and certain lifestyles to be 
pursued, and they enable the construction of certain worlds - lives, lifestyles and 
worlds that would not be possible without concepts and conceptual knowledge. As we 
shall see, even if in a slightly different way, this role of the concept also figures 
prominently in Deleuze's philosophy of concepts. First, however, I shall tum to 
Foucault. But instead of attempting an all-encompassing study of Foucault's project 
here, I shall be highly selective and focus on how his project may aide my 
development of a conceptualist methodology. And in order to do so, I shall adopt a 
reading of Foucault which may be unusual in the social sciences. That is, I shall 
largely read Foucault through Deleuze's (1988c) sympathetic and very creative 
reading developed in the book with the same name. Let me nevertheless start by 
exposmg an element in Foucault's thought that locates him in close affinity to 
Canguilhem. 
3.7 Foucault: Knowledge, Power and Self 
Although Foucault is less explicitly concerned with concepts than Canguilhem, the 
influence of Canguilhem's move beyond the intemalismlextemalism dichotomy is 
obvious in Foucault's (1970) The Order of Things. Like Canguilhem, Foucault was 
uneasy with any attempt to develop frameworks of causality to systematically explain 
the various external causes that contributed to the production of knowledge and to 'a 
specific change in science' (1970: xiii). Foucault found questions regarding what 
made a particular discovery possible, what made a new concept emerge, and the 
origin of a particular theory 'highly embarrassing' (1970: xiii). This was not merely 
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because Foucault (1970: xiii) found 'no definite methodological principles on which 
to base such an analysis'. In fact, he argued that no such framework existed. And most 
embarrassing were such questions when posed in relation to the empirical or positive 
sciences. Even though 'the role of instruments, techniques, institutions, events, 
ideologies, and interests is very much in evidence', 'one does not know how an 
articulation so complex and so diverse in composition actually operates.' This led 
Foucault to the following conclusion: 
it would not be prudent for the moment to force a solution I felt incapable, I 
admit, of offering: the traditional explanations - spirit of time, technological or 
social changes, influences of various kinds - struck me for the most part as 
being more magical than effective (Foucault 1970: xiii). 
It is from this starting point that Foucault in The Order of Things employs an 
approach to the history of science that focuses on the discontinuities of epistemic or 
discursive formations, i.e. the changes undergone by a scientific field or an area of 
thought over time. Like Canguilhem, Foucault does not study scientific disciplines in 
isolation, but does instead investigate how a group of different disciplines deal with 
the apparently same concept, theory and object. Furthermore, Foucault denounces the 
possibility of discursive unity and argues that it is the contradictions within one 
discursive formation - i.e. the existence of incommensurable or irreconcilable 
concepts - that drives such changes and discontinuities. Although this leads Foucault 
(1972) in the Archaeology of Knowledge to denounce the investigation of scientific 
concepts as limited and dissatisfactory because the study of all aspects of the 
discursive formations within which these concepts have been developed is cruciaL 
Canguilhem's influence on Foucault is apparent. 
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It is worth noting that Foucault has also utilised this approach earlier, both in Madness 
and Civilization (1967) and in The Birth of the Clinic (1973). Whereas Madness and 
Civilization is preoccupied with epistemic breaks in the study of madness and The 
Birth of the Clinic focuses on epistemic breaks in medicine, The Order of Things is 
preoccupied with epistemic breaks in three different areas; the study of life, language 
and political economy. Foucault does not, however, discuss this approach in detail in 
any of these works, but does instead provide an outline of its main principles in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). It is for instance here that Foucault privileges the 
level of discourse - as opposed to the levels of concepts, objects, enunciations or 
themes - and elaborates on the significance of contradictions in discourse. More 
specifically, he argues that it is the existence of incompatible propositions, 
irreconcilable meanings and 'concepts that cannot be systematized together' that leads 
to changes and transformations, ruptures and discontinuities in discourse' (1972: 149). 
Foucault's use of the term archaeology has led certain Foucault commentators (e.g. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982) to refer to all these works as Foucault's archaeological 
studies. 
Trying to make sense of Foucault's later works, the same commentators have 
typically located Discipline and Punish (1977b) within what they call Foucault's 
genealogical period. Whereas Foucault's archaeology is seen to concern itself with 
epistemic or discursive discontinuities, his genealogy is seen to deal with breaks or 
ruptures in institutional practice. In highly simplistic terms, and just for the time 
being, Discipline and Punish may be seen as a study of the changing ways in which 
society, in an attempt to achieve order and stability, deals with deviance. Even though 
this study takes its material largely from the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth 
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centuries, it is not a conventional history. More specifically, it is not a history of the 
past seeking to understand the past through the eyes of the present for the purpose of 
making us contemporary modems learn from and avoid the mistakes of the past. 
Instead, it is a history of the present that genuinely seeks to understand the present 
through the past. And it is not merely concerned with discontinuity in the sense that it 
seeks to trace ruptures in institutional practices of the past. Genealogy is not 
concerned with primordial origins and continuous lines of development, but with 
finding traces of the present in the past so as to undermine the uniqueness, purity and 
innocence of the present. By tracing the disciplinary practices of contemporary 
modem society to the Benthamite panopticon of the eighteenth century, Foucault 
places us contemporary modems in juxtaposition to and not in opposition to those 
who lived before us. 
Although I have no problem with labels such as archaeology and genealogy per se, it 
is the tendency amongst certain Foucault commentators to impose a sharp distinction 
between Foucault's early archaeological period and his later genealogical period that I 
find unhelpful. Further on, as Foucault's latest works in particular - and most notably 
the three volumes of The History of Sexuality - are concerned with both discursive 
and institutional breaks in a way that complicates the relationship between power, 
knowledge and the formation of the self or the subject, the inadequacy of the 
archaeology/genealogy dichotomy becomes more obvious. 
Avoiding such dichotomies, Deleuze (l988c) reads Foucault's project as a whole and 
appreciates the close connections between his so-called archaeology and genealogy. 
Doing so, Deleuze's approach is very much in line with how Foucault himself. in the 
introduction to The Use o.lPleaslire (the second volume of The History of Se.utality) , 
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made sense of his own project. Not only does this approach more readily recognise 
the true potential of Foucault's project. As we shall see, Deleuze's Foucault also 
provides an interesting starting point for utilising Foucault's project as a way to study 
how the body is a problem for organisation and how organisation theory deals with 
this problem. 
Although the first part of Deleuze's Foucault (i) focuses on The Archaeology of 
Knowledge and Discipline and Punish, (ii) appreciates the thematic differences 
reflected in these books, and (iii) recognises that the latter indicates a rupture in 
Foucault's project, Deleuze also develops a reading that connects the themes of these 
books. The emphasis on discursive breaks in The Archaeology of Knowledge and on 
institutional breaks in Discipline and Punish are brought together in the second part of 
Deleuze's Foucault where Deleuze identifies three main themes in Foucault's oew'rt': 
knowledge, power and self or subjectivation. Deleuze's point is that despite variations 
in emphasis, Foucault preoccupies himself with all three themes throughout his entire 
project. 'These three dimensions - knowledge, power and self - are irreducible, yet 
constantly imply one another' (Deleuze 1988c: 114).14 
Even though all three themes could be seen to reflect an epistemological orientation in 
Foucault's project in that they concern the problem of societal order and the ways in 
which such order is produced, Deleuze finds that Foucault treats them as if 'They are 
14 Deleuze introduces the concepts of the diagram and the fold to make sense of this complexity, and to 
show how regimes of knowledge, power and self come into being, how they change and how they 
cease to exist. This offers a very interesting reading of Foucault's project. But as Foucault says nothing 
about the fold and very little about the diagram in his own works, it would not be possible to do justice 
to these concepts without displacing Foucault and turning this section into a section on Dc1euze rather 
than Foucault. 
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three "ontologies'" (1988: 114). However, the "ontology" referred to here is not the 
same sense of ontology as I discussed in the first section of this chapter. This is not 
because Foucault insists that these ontologies are not universal but historical. As my 
earlier discussion indicates, I not only support but also seek to develop a non-
universalistic - i.e. relativistic - ontology. The problem is that Foucault's ontologies 
do not sufficiently focus on what exists outside knowledge, power and subjectivation, 
but instead on the ways of being that are produced by processes of knowledge, power 
and sUbjectivation. I would argue that a more genuine, even if underdeveloped 
ontological tum, is only realised in the fourth theme identified by Deleuze in the 
appendix entitled 'The Death of Man and Superman'. Here, specifically hinting to 
Foucault's ending in The Order of Things, Deleuze indicates that Foucault opens up 
for a future understanding of the human condition which is not human but transhuman 
and exists outside knowledge, power and self. In the following discussion I attempt to 
bring together all four themes - knowledge, power, self and the death of man and 
superman. In the final section of this chapter I shall also indicate how these themes 
are reflected in my own investigation of how organisation theory deals with the 
problem of the body. 
The novel way in which Foucault brings together power and knowledge in what is 
known as power-knowledge relations is appreciated by most Foucault commentators, 
not least because he does so explicitly in the first volume of The History of Sexuality 
108 
(1979). Here, Foucault clarifies his understanding of power from Discipline and 
Punish. This view is controversial and groundbreaking in that it not only rejects 
bourgeois understandings of power but also abandons significant aspects of the 
traditional Marxist understanding of power. In bourgeois understandings, power is 
typically reduced to a matter of apolitical negotiations or reified in terms of objects 
and tangible resources. The possession of resources is therefore associated with the 
possession of total power (cf. e.g. Dahl 1957). In Marxist theory, which to some 
extent reproduces a reified understanding of power where power is bound up with the 
ownership of the means of production in society, power is seen in terms of the 
repressIOn hypothesis - as repressive - and as that which inhibits things from 
happening. 15 
The modem State plays a central role in both bourgeois and Marxist perspectives. In 
the former, it is the sovereign status of the State that protects the population and its 
territory from attacks by external and internal enemies so as to ensure social order and 
harmony. In the latter, the State is the expression of the values of the dominant classes 
in society. In capitalist society, the State is therefore a capitalist State expressing the 
values of the bourgeoisie. Real social change, whereby the domination and 
exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie is brought to an end, is therefore only 
15 Reading Philip Goodchild's (1996) introductory commentary on Deleuze and Guattari, one is led to 
believe that it was Foucault's (1979, 1980) attack on the repression hypothesis that caused the 
relationship between Deleuze and Foucault to go cold. During the years up until Foucault's death, 
Deleuze and Foucault did not meet in person but only communicated through letters and by reading 
each other's work. Although Foucault's critique was not explicitly directed at Deleuze and Guattari, but 
on the Reichians who preached "the revolution of desire" and analysed power in tenns of desire and 
repression, it is likely that Deleuze and Guattari's (1984) Anti-Oedipus was a main target of this 
critique, as they spoke in exactly such tenns. Interestingly, by the time of.-I Thollsand Plateaus, the 
follow-up to Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari had dropped the concept of desiring-machines and 
largely adopted Foucault's non-repressive understanding of power as micro-physics. 
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possible if the proletariat is able to overthrow the bourgeois capitalist State in the 
largescale uprise of the proletarian Revolution. 
In contrast to these two perspectives, Foucault argues that power is not total but 
relative. Power is not a thing, but is instead to be understood in tenns of micro-
physical forces or micro-powers that are not simply localisable to the State or to 
capital, but operate through and in relation to knowledge and resistance. This is not to 
ignore the power of the State. But rather than viewing the State as the cause of power, 
the State is seen as an effect of various micro-powers, such as regional discursive 
fonnations, local institutional practices and small-scale activities of resistance. 
Consequently, power is positive or productive in that it makes things happen. I will 
elaborate on the relative, micro-physical and productive nature of power in the 
discussion below, dealing first with the productive nature of power-knowledge 
relations. 
Foucault extends Francis Bacon's seventeenth century doctrine that knowledge is 
power by turning it on its head and saying that power is knowledge. Doing so, 
Foucault not only recognises that one may be able to execute power by expressing 
knowledge. He also argues that it is by executing power that one can produce 
knowledge and decide what is knowledge and what is not. Although Foucault has 
been preoccupied with the production of knowledge ever since writing Madness and 
Civilization, it is not until The History of Sexuality that he goes some way in offering 
a systematic and explicit discussion that maps out the intricate relationship between 
power and knowledge and underlines the political nature of knowledge. As indicated 
above, this first enables Foucault to highlight the ways in which power produces 
knowledge or the ways in which discursive fonnations are produced within networks 
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of power. The truth claims of a scientific discipline such as medicine are for instance 
not produced within a political vacuum, but reflect the values and interests of certain 
people, communities and institutions. Further on, by drawing attention to the political 
nature of knowledge, Foucault is also able to highlight the ways in which power 
produces knowledge about phenomena that would not otherwise have existed as such. 
Sex and sexuality, which obviously is the topic of The History of Sexuality is a 
splendid example in this respect. Rather than repressing sexual activity, the discourse 
on sex that starts to emerge in the nineteenth century, and constitutes the focus of 
Foucault's inquiry, gives rise to sexual activities that are not known of in previous 
centuries. The sexual practices of the masturbating child, the perverse adult and the 
Malthusian couple therefore only appear in the nineteenth century. 
Second, the notion of power-knowledge relations highlights the ways in which the 
practising of knowledge can have powerful influences upon people and societies, and 
this brings us to the third theme identified by Deleuze (1988c). It is in these relations 
between power and knowledge that people are subjectivated into certain types of 
being, selfhood and identity. In other words, power-knowledge relations produce 
subjectivities and shape the ways in which people live in the world. More specifically, 
as a particular discourse or knowledge regime may inform and be informed by a 
particular institutional practice, the coming together of that knowledge regime and 
that institutional practice may shape and influence the people (and the thinking and 
acting of those people) who are targeted by that same knowledge regime and that 
same institutional practice. For example, as the joint forces of pedagogical discourse 
and the school shape or subjectivate the child into a pupil, they invest that child with a 
certain identity, behaviour and way of being. A pupil is supposed to sit quietly at her 
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desk, read and write, answer questions politely when asked by the teacher, etc. 
Similarly, as the interaction between medical discourse and the hospital subjectivates 
and transforms the person into a patient, a set of behavioural rules, almost a code of 
conduct, is imposed upon the patient. A patient is supposed to stay in her hospital bed, 
be examined by a doctor, take her medical prescriptions, etc. The body - whether 
disciplined or not - therefore figures at the centre of these power-knowledge relations. 
Perhaps this becomes less of a puzzle when acknowledging that the body was a 
central aspect of both Foucault's intellectual project and his private life. As the 
Foucault biographer James Miller (1995) suggests, Foucault's intellectual interest in 
the body cannot be seen as separate from his own homosexuality and personal 
engagement in the gay masochist scene in San Francisco. 
Yet another example in this context is public health, which was the focus of my 
discussion in chapter 2. Operating through a complex network of different discourses 
(e.g. biomedicine and demography) and institutional practices (e.g. vaccination 
schemes and health promotion campaigns), public health seeks to organise people, 
bodies and how we think and what we do in everyday life. As a power-knowledge 
relation attempting the subjectivity of the healthy body or the healthy citizen, public 
health therefore exemplifies how a concept of organisation and the organisational 
discourse surrounding that concept operates through institutional practices so as to 
exercise material effects upon how we live in the everyday. This is the key element 
that I take from Foucault when trying to make sense of how organisation deals with 
the problem of the body. And consequently, this is central to how organisation theory 
may be seen to deal with the problem of the body. 
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But in addition to highlight the material effects of organisational discourse and the 
everyday implications of power-knowledge relations, Foucault also enables me to 
recognise the limited effectiveness with which power-knowledge relations can 
institute particular subjectivities, ways of being and forms of embodiment. Towards 
the end of my inquiry into public health I acknowledged some of the ways in which 
bodies escape, upset and undermine the organisational regime of public health. This 
brings us to the third sense in which power and power-knowledge relations are 
productive, which is to say that power-knowledge relations produce resistance. In an 
oft-quoted statement, Foucault says that 'Where there is power, there is resistance' 
(1979: 95). This means first that power provokes resistance. The more extreme the 
means and methods of the oppressor, the more extreme the response of the oppressed. 
But this also means that resistance itself is an expression of power. In contrast to 
Marxist theory, which tends to view power and resistance as dialectical oppositions at 
the macro-level of society, Foucault shows that resistance not only responds to power 
by doing the opposite of whatever power has already done. Resistance is not merely 
about the large-scale Revolution directed to overthrow the State. Instead, resistance is 
productive and powerful in that it may escape any dialectical opposition, act 
independently of the normalising subjectivities attempted by the combined micro-
physical efforts of knowledge regimes and institutional practices, and produce 
different lifestyles, different types of selfhood and different ways of being that subvert 
and transgress the workings of power-knowledge relations altogether. 
Short time after writing the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault starts 
talking about "govemmentality" and "technologies of the self' (cf. Foucault 1997b, 
based on a College de France lecture from 1978, and Foucault 1997c, based on a 
113 
paper given in 1982). Through these two concepts, which I dealt with in chapter 2, 
Foucault not only appreciates the ways in which subjectivation is produced within 
micro-physical power-knowledge relations. He also recognises the ways in which 
forms and processes of subjectivation are challenged from without by forces in the 
outside world and subverted from within by the subject's own inventions. Both 
concepts are double-edged in that they also emphasise the ways in which people may 
discipline, govern or take care of themselves by pursuing alternative lifestyles through 
which one is taken beyond the ethical space of normalising discourses and institutions 
and their narrow codes of conduct. Thus, the concept of self-discipline first developed 
in Discipline and Punish takes on a different meaning altogether. In Discipline and 
Punish, Foucault (1 977b ) merely regards self-discipline as the means by which 
exterior goals of discipline are internalised by the docile subject. Through the 
ambiguous concepts of governmentality and technologies of the self, self-discipline 
becomes a matter of inventing one's own ethic and codes of conduct. This radical and 
Nietzschean understanding of self-discipline as self-mastery is reflected in the last two 
volumes of The History of Sexuality, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self In 
The Use of Pleasure, Foucault (l986a) discusses how in Ancient Greece ethics was 
not about an externally imposed code of conduct being internalised by the individual, 
but about a sense of self-mastery emerging from within. In The Care of the Se(f 
having first analysed the role of externally imposed codes of conduct in Ancient 
Greece, Ancient Rome and early Christianity, Foucault ends by emphasising 'the 
development of an art of existence dominated by self-preoccupation' (1986b: 238). In 
Foucault's own words, this ethic 
emphasizes the importance of developing all the practices and all the exercises 
by which one can maintain self-control and eyentually arriye at a pure 
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enjoyment of oneself. [ ... J It is the development of an art of existence that 
revolves around the question of the self, of its dependence and independence. of 
its universal form and of the connection it can and should establish with others , 
of the procedures by which it exerts its control over itself, and of the way in 
which it can establish a complete supremacy over itself (Foucault 1986b: 238-
239). 
This understanding of ethics, which draws attention to how one can live 
independently of power-knowledge relations and their externally imposed codes of 
conduct may also be seen in relation to the fourth theme identified by Deleuze 
(1988c), the death of man and superman. In a commentary on Foucault, Canguilhem 
(1997) does also emphasise how Foucault in The History of Sexuality is not simply 
concerned with ethics, but continues to pursue an interest in the human condition, 
understood as the 'conditions in which human beings "problematize" what they are. 
what they do, and the world in which they live' (Foucault quoted in Canguilhem 
1997). Although Foucault's (1986b) notion of an art of existence is underdeveloped 
and may run the risk of turning the human into a voluntaristic and narcissistic subject 
seen to be in total control over her own destiny, a reading that locates this ethic in 
relation to the death of man and superman may provide a less anthropocentric 
perspective. What Deleuze does in his discussion of the death of man and superman is 
to indicate a future where the forces of the human exist in relation to a multitude of 
new forces. As these forces are both indeterminate and non-human, this future will 
bring about the disappearance of the human as such. But since this ontological theme 
remains underdeveloped in Foucault. I shall discuss how such a radical ontology 
figures in Deleuze's philosophy of concepts. 
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Before turning to Deleuze' s philosophy of concept creation, from which his radical 
ontology and philosophy of life emerge, it is worth noticing that his project is also 
underpinned by a sense of discontinuity. Rather than studying the history of 
philosophy and the ideas of a particular philosopher in order of importance or in 
chronological order, Deleuze starts in the middle, at the margins or with particular 
turning points in an author or in the history of philosophy as a whole. This does for 
example explain why Deleuze is interested in some of the more peripheral figures in 
the history of philosophy, such as Nietzsche and Bergson, Duns Scotus and Lucretius, 
Spinoza and Leibniz (cf. Deleuze 1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 1993, 1994), who all in 
one way or the other 'challenged the rationalist tradition in this history' (Deleuze 
1995: 6). The result is not a coherent and holistic presentation of the history of 
philosophy and of particular philosophers, which would be in agreement with the 
conventions of the history of philosophy. Instead, Deleuze departs from those ideas 
and concepts that interest him most personally, thus making unexpected movements 
and connections in thought that break up and reshuffle rather than smoothly order the 
history of philosophy and the oeuvres of particular authors. In a letter to his critic 
Michel Cressole (published in Negotiations 1995), Deleuze characterises his own way 
of doing history of philosophy as buggery. 
I suppose the main way I coped with it at the time was to see the history of 
philosophy as a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate 
conception. I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child 
that would be his own offspring, because the author had to actually say all I had 
him saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous too, because it resulted 
from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations and hidden emissions that I 
really enjoyed (Deleuze 1995: 6). 
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Although the buggery metaphor is aimed to problematise the history of philosophy, it 
is also problematic in itself. As a brief comment made in a letter rather than a fully-
fledged metaphor developed in one of Deleuze's books, it remains underdeveloped 
and unreflective, particularly of its own male-centrist bias. However, it is worth 
paying attention to because it problematises the heterosexist tenns in which we tend to 
think about the male body. From Deleuze's buggery metaphor it is also possible to see 
that even Deleuze's histories of philosophy are exercises in concept creation. They 
are not simply critical encounters with previously invented concepts. The method of 
concept creation is at the centre of What Is Philosophy? (1994), which is Deleuze's 
last joint work with the psychologist Felix Guattari, and it is to their fonnulation of a 
philosophy of "concept creation" that I now tum. 16 
3.8 Deleuze and the Philosophy of Concept Creation 
Already on the second page of What Is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 2) 
argue that philosophy is 'the art of fonning, inventing, and fabricating concepts.' This 
is a very interesting idea, and it is developed with an immaculate sense of detail. By 
no means, therefore, does this statement mark the end of their discussion. Following 
this idea, Deleuze and Guattari outline a complex set of related premises that govern 
the process of concept creation. First, the concept needs conceptual personae. Deleuze 
and Guattari trace the notion of conceptual personae to the Ancient Greek 
16 What Is Philosophy? is indisputably a joint effort between Deleuze and Guattari. I do however feel 
that posing this question and outlining the premises of a philosophy of concept creation is likely to 
have been more of a concern to the philosopher Deleuze than to the psychologist Guattan. As argued 
above, concept creation was also at the centre of Deleuze 'so histo~es of philosophy. Moreover, Deleuze 
(1994) did already in Difference and Repetition (first publIshed In France In 1968) deal systematically 
with philosophy as concept creation. 
11 7 
understanding of the philosopher as friend (i.e. the friend of wisdom), and it becomes 
clear that it is the philosopher, as the friend of the concept, who is the conceptual 
persona who invents the concept. In contrast to the sage in other civilisations, the 
Greek philosopher does not possess wisdom, but continuously seeks wisdom by 
constantly creating and inventing, recreating and reinventing concepts. The role of the 
philosopher as conceptual persona is however a complex one. Not only does this 
make the philosopher the friend of wisdom and concepts. Given the intensity with 
which the philosopher seeks wisdom, s/he is also the lover and claimant of concepts 
who operates in constant rivalry with other lovers and claimants. 
This characterisation of the philosopher as conceptual persona underlines the dynamic 
and uncertain nature of what it means to do philosophy. Since the philosopher is 
constantly inventing concepts and constantly challenging previously invented 
concepts in rivalry against other philosophers, no one philosopher is ever capable of 
achieving total control over a concept. Final definitions are unattainable. The 
autopoietic nature of the concept itself reinforces this indeterminacy. Concepts are 
self-positing; they posit themselves. Concept creation and self-positing are not mutual 
exclusives, however, and Deleuze and Guattari assert that 'The concept posits itself to 
the same extent that it is created' (1994: 11). Consequently, and even though it is the 
philosopher who has the potential to create the concept, s/he can only potentially have 
the concept, its power and its competence. 
Establishing philosophy as the business of concept creation, Deleuze and Guattari also 
elaborate on their understanding of philosophy by saying what philosophy is not. 
Contrary to what is often believed, philosophy is not contemplation, reflection or 
communication. Contemplation is simply 'things themselves seen in relation of their 
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specific concepts.' And reflection has nothing to do with philosophy because no one 
has ever needed philosophy to reflect on anything. Finally, philosophy is not about 
communication because communication is about consensus rather than concepts. 'The 
idea of a Western democratic conversation has never produced a single concept'. 
Deleuze and Guattari insist. Although philosophy creates concepts for contemplation, 
reflection and communication to take place, it is not itself engaged in any of these 
activities, which are merely 'machines for constituting Universals in every discipline' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 6). Deleuze and Guattari are highly opposed to the notion 
of Universals, and argue that philosophy has already left the Universals of 
contemplation and reflection and with it the dream of dominating other disciplines. 
Also, philosophy no longer sees an opportunity in 'falling back on Universals of 
communication that would provide rules for an imaginary mastery of the markets and 
the media' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 7). Their critique of Universals is an 
important one in that it makes concept creation depart from elitist convictions that 
would posit philosophy as the mother of all knowledge. In Deleuze and Guattari's 
own words: 
The exclusive right of concept creation secures a function for philosophy but it 
does not give it any preeminence or privilege since there are other ways of 
thinking and creating, other ways of ideation that, like scientific thought, do not 
have to pass through concepts (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 8). 
If thinking does not need to pass through concepts, then, why do new concepts have to 
be created? Deleuze and Guattari's answer is the following: Philosophy must create 
concepts anew exactly in order to prevent itself from becoming like its rivals, which 
all are disciplines of Universals. After all, philosophy is not just like any other fom1 of 
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thinking, and Deleuze and Guattari emphasise that 'the first principle of philosophy is 
that Universals explain nothing but must themselves be explained' (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 7). In their view, this is exactly the problem with sociology and the 
human sciences, epistemology, linguistics, psychoanalysis and logic, if not to mention 
the more recent rivals to philosophy, computer science, marketing, design and 
advertising and 'all the disciplines of communication.' Although these disciplines 
have colonised the word concept itself whilst claiming to be its friends (i.e. conceptual 
personae), their understanding of the concept and of creativity and concept creation is 
a fundamentally non-philosophical one by which the concept is commodified and 
reduced to a matter of information and enterprise; a product to be sold like a packet of 
noodles or like a simulation of a packet of noodles (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 10).17 
Deleuze and Guattari do however realise that philosophy itself is partly to blame for 
the colonisation and commodification of the concept by the disciplines of 
communication: 
17 Since Deleuze and Guattari highlight the role of marketing in understanding the commodification of 
the concept, their own passage should be of particular interest to academics in the management field. 
Here, they depict marketing and the other rival disciplines as having 'seized hold of the word concept 
itself and said: "This is our concern, we are the creative ones, \ve are the ideas men! We are the friends 
of the concept, we put it in our computers'" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 10). Further on, they argue 
that 'Marketing has preserved the idea of a certain relationship between the concept and the event. But 
here the concept has become the set of product displays (historical, scientific, artistic, sexual. 
pragmatic), and the event has become the exhibition that sets up various displays and the "exchange of 
ideas" it is supposed to promote. The only events are exhibitions, and the only concepts are products 
that can be sold. Philosophy has not remained unaffected by the general movement that replaced 
Critique with sales promotion. The simulacrum, the simulation o~ a packet of noodles has become the 
true concept; and the one who packages the product, commodIty, or work of art has become the 
philosopher, conceptual persona, or artist' (Delcuze and Guattari 1994: 10). 
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Philosophers have not been sufficiently concerned with the nature of the 
concept as philosophical reality. They have preferred to think of it as a given 
knowledge or representation that can be explained by the faculties able to fonn 
it (abstraction or generalization) or employ it (judgment) (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 11). 
Although Hegel and the other post-Kantians are recognised by Deleuze and Guattari 
as having avoided turning the concept into an abstract or general idea, they 
nevertheless argue that it is Hegel in particular who fails the indetenninacy of 
philosophy by reconstructing, by other means, philosophy as the mother of all 
knowledge. Treating conceptual personae as "ghostly puppets", Hegel and the post-
Kantians pursue an encyclopaedia of the concept by which concepts are treated as 
Universals of knowledge. It is from the heights of this universal encyclopaedia that 
the concept has fallen into the disaster described above, where the concept is nothing 
more than a product to be bought and sold in the marketplace. Deleuze and Guattari's 
alternative, which they briefly refer to as a pedagogy of the concept, is more modest 
in that it challenges the arrogance of Hegelian universalism as well as the 
commodified concept in the disciplines of communication. Unfortunately, the notion 
of a pedagogy of the concept remains underdeveloped, and it therefore makes little 
sense to replace the notion of a philosophy of the concept with this notion. If anything, 
Deleuze and Guattari's reference to a pedagogy of the concept appeals to a humble 
learning approach where no philosopher can impose final definitions and meanings. 
Anyway, it is from this starting point that Deleuze and Guattari in the subsequent 
chapter ask what a concept is, and quickly declare that 'There are no simple concepts. 
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Every concept has components and is defined by them' (1994: 15). In other words, the 
concept is a multiplicity. To Deleuze and Guattari, this means two things. First, that 
the concept is a whole, and second, that the concept is a fragmentary whole. Being a 
whole, the concept is able to totalise its components. But being a fragmentary whole, 
this ability is limited. Moreover, since it is only through its fragmented nature that the 
concept can 'escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to 
reabsorb it' (1994: 16), the concept's ability to do so is also limited. Deleuze and 
Guattari's understanding of the concept in terms of wholeness and fragmentation 
should therefore not be interpreted as a leap towards order and closure, but as a 
recognition of the openness of the concept. 
The openness of the concept is reinforced by its relational nature. The concept is not 
absolute and on its own, but always in relation to another. In other words, the concept 
becomes what it is in relation to the Other, and more specifically, the concept 
becomes what it is through its connections with other concepts and with particular 
problems, which are pre-conceptual: 
All concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no 
meaning (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 16). 
Consequently, the discovery of a new problem would change the role, nature and 
meaning of a concept completely. But in addition to reinforce the indeterminate nature 
of the concept, this means that Deleuze and Guattari avoid turning the concept into an 
abstract entity confined to the domain of ideas. Since concepts are connected to pre-
conceptual problems, concepts speak of the world. And insofar as concepts are 
dynamic, they speak of possible worlds. This is the power of the concept: Not just to 
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express that which exists here and now, but to express that which might possibly exist 
in the future. It is through this assertion that Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of 
concept creation extends into an ontological project. It is by creating concepts that 
Deleuze (sometimes with Guattari) rethinks life and embodiment. I shall examine 
parts of this philosophy of life in chapter 7, as I investigate Deleuze' s effort to rethink 
the reality of embodiment. And in the final chapter of this thesis I shall argue that it is 
by inventing different conceptualisations of organisation that organisation theorists 
might be able to rethink organisation. For the moment, however, what needs to be 
recognised is that new concepts of life and embodiment may not only change the 
ways in which we think about life and embodiment. New concepts may also change 
the ways in which we live life and embodiment. Similarly, new concepts of 
organisation may change the ways in which we organise our activities on a daily 
basis. 
Creating new concepts of life, embodiment and organisation is therefore not just a 
matter of pure theorising. Ifwe are to take Deleuze and Guattari's argument seriously, 
any concept needs to be conceptualised in relation to pre-conceptual and post-
conceptual problems and experiences - of life, embodiment and organisation. A 
philosophy of organisation therefore needs to be developed in relation to a non-
philosophy of organisation. Of course, during the last decades there has been an 
unprecedented expansion in empirical and non-philosophical research about formal 
organisations. But since this mainstream body of work is largely inattentive to the 
philosophical aspects of organisation and sometimes even hostile to philosophically 
minded studies of organisation, this is not the non-philosophical Other that I ha\'e in 
mind. For a philosophy of organisation to prosper, it needs to relate to a non-
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philosophical Other that respects it, welcomes it, and complements it. Just as much as 
the philosophy of organisation recognises the need for empirical non-philosophical 
research, the non-philosophy of organisation must recognise the need for theoretical 
and philosophical research on organisation. 
But at the same time, a philosophy of organisation must be developed in relation to a 
different Other: i.e. in relation to a philosophy of nonorganisation. This is not an 
explicit part of Deleuze and Guattari's (1994) notion of philosophy as concept 
creation. Deleuze does however think about issues of "nonorganisation" in detail 
elsewhere (cf. Deleuze 1988a, 1994), and I shall discuss the notion of nonorganisation 
further in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. With regards to Deleuze, it may be argued that 
nonorganisation, through his concept of the virtual that I examine in chapter 7 is at the 
centre of and marks the very starting point of his philosophy of becoming. As a matter 
of nonorganisation, the undivided Whole of the virtual puts organisation into a larger 
context that destabilises specific organisational phenomena as well as organisation in 
general. The consequences of this may be remarkable. First, nonorganisation 
undermines our attempts to organise bodies and bodily activities. And second, it 
destabilises and opens up what it means to be a body. And finally, as we shall see in 
chapter 8, this may have important consequences for how organisation theory should 
deal with the problem of the body. In the next section of this chapter, however, I shall 
give an overview of how the method and methodology outlined above will be put to 
work in the different chapters of this thesis. 
3.9 Conceptualist Methodology and the Problem of the Body in Organisation 
Theory 
Having examined the projects of Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze from the interest 
of developing a conceptualist methodology, I have been able to identify some shared 
intellectual platform or problematique that joins the projects of these three thinkers. 
Not only are they all considerable figures in French twentieth century thought and not 
only did they know each other personally. From their overlapping intellectual 
endeavours, it is possible to identify a common school of thought, constituted by a 
shared pursuit of a philosophy of concepts and a philosophy of life. Given their efforts 
to develop a philosophy of life, it is also possible to identify a shared, albeit different, 
interest in the body. I would argue, however, that it is largely because of the different 
ways in which they seek to develop a philosophy of concepts that they engage 
differently with life and embodiment. This also explains why I in the remainder of this 
thesis employ Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze individually, to examine different 
albeit related problematiques. But before actually doing so, I shall provide a brief 
outline indicating where Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze are individually put to 
work in this thesis, and how each one of them enables me to investigate how 
organisation theory deals with the problem of the body. 
First, Canguilhem's "conceptualism" is employed in chapters 4 and 5 to study the 
concept of organisation in organisation theory and how it deals with the body. 
Although I am concerned with one academic discipline rather than a group of 
different disciplines, I would argue that the interdisciplinary nature of organisation 
theory and my conceptualist focus shows a very similar concern to that of 
Canguilhem. This first enables me to analyse in chapter 4 how the concept has 
developed from classical organisation theory up until contemporary mainstream 
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organisation theory. Although it makes little sense (at least in relation to the research 
project pursued here) to speak of a paradigmatic shift in the history of organisation 
theory, this focus also enables me to draw attention to a paradoxical situation, which 
has had considerable impact on the development of the field. Whereas the body 
through the concept of the organism was of great interest to some of the pioneers of 
organisational research (especially Elton Mayo), studies focusing on the functioning 
of the organism in the working environment were excluded from the discipline 
sometime in the late 1940s and the organism was reduced to a metaphor of 
organisation. I8 Consequently, the body has been an absent presence in organisation 
theory. It is my argument in this thesis that this absent presence has had significant 
implications for how organisation theorists tend to think about organisation. 
Although the classical and contemporary mainstream concepts of organisation are 
very similar (and in principle one and the same concept) in that the majority of 
organisation theorists continue to think organisation as organisational entities void of 
embodiment, Canguilhem' s emphasis on ruptures also enables me in chapter 5 to 
identify another contradiction in organisation theory. Since the 1980s, a new strand of 
thought, which effectively rethinks the concept of organisation in terms of 
organisational processes, has emerged within the discipline. This trend has by no 
IR Abraham Maslow, who is mostly famous in organisation theory for his notion of the hierarchy of 
needs, provides a highly embodied understanding of motivation, which actually focuses on t~e ~asal 
needs of the body in explaining human motivation. This is however largely ignored by the maJ?nty of 
organisational researchers, who typically attribute a privileged status to the mor~ mental kmds ~f 
motivation located at the top of his hierarchy. Another aspect of Maslow's academIC career, whIch IS 
mostly ignored in organisation theory, is his .research in fe~ale sexuality. v.:here he interviewed 
working class and middle class women about theIr sexual fantaSIes (cf. Cullen 1997). 
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means had a chance yet to dominate later thinking in organisation theory. But it 
highlights the disunited nature of the field. Canguilhem's notion of ruptures or 
coupures may be too strong a word to be used in the context of organisation theory, 
even if what is rupturous depends on your particular field of vision. But since 
Canguilhem's notion of ruptures or coupures is the starting point by which an 
emphasis on contradictions and discontinuities is enabled, it most certainly deserves 
to be acknowledged. 
In order to understand the processual concept of organisation, Canguilhem' s 
conceptualism needs to be supplemented with Foucault's concern with pOH'er-
knowledge relations and the formation of the self. Foucault's contribution here is not 
so much a technical matter of how to study a research object, but a more general one 
of where to direct one's focus when studying a particular research object such as 
organisation or the body. What Foucault enables me to do, then, is study what 
organisational discourses and institutions try to do to the body. Although Canguilhem 
and Foucault share a conceptualist bias and a preoccupation with coupures, the latter 
did more explicitly study the political underpinnings and consequences of concepts 
and other discursive elements. In this chapter, Foucault's notion of power-knowledge 
relations therefore enables me to emphasise how the processual concept of 
organisation draws attention to the ways in which concepts and discourses organise 
people in everyday life. Although Foucault's notion of power-knowledge relations 
may most directly be seen to enable inquiry into how the concept of organisation and 
organisation theory may organise people in everyday life, this is not the focus of this 
thesis. Any such inquiry would have to be pursued elsewhere, and it is to some extent 
already developed by Karen Dale (2001) in her book Anatomising Embodiment and 
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Organisation Theory. Most importantly, the use of Canguilhem and Foucault in this 
chapter enables me to see how the problem of the body, though figuring only 
marginally in only some of this literature, remains largely absent in processual 
conceptualisations of organisation. Whereas Foucault in particular draws attention to 
the ways in which the body is disciplined and bodies are constructed and categorised, 
this stream of thought pays very little attention to issues of embodiment, thus making 
little difference to mainstream thinking about organisation in this respect. 
In chapter 6, Canguilhem's conceptualism enables me to analyse how the body is 
conceptualised in feminist research, the sociology of the body and organisation 
theory. More specifically, this chapter identifies a fundamental discontinuity in the 
conceptualisation of the body across (but not necessarily between) these three areas of 
thought. This discontinuity is identified in terms of three main themes that with 
benefit can be thought in relation to Foucault's notion of power-knowledge relations. 
Through these themes, it is also possible to relate the concept of embodiment to issues 
of organisation. The first theme emphasises the ways in which the body is organised 
through discourses and institutions. The second theme emphasises the ways in which 
embodiment enables action and organisation in terms of discourses and institutions. 
And the third theme emphasises the ways in which bodies transgress the power-
knowledge relations of organisational discourses and institutions altogether. As we 
shall see, a majority of the literature is concerned with the first theme. Some writers 
are concerned with the second theme, and very few writers are concerned with the 
third theme, to which I shall return in chapter 7. 
In chapter 7, I analyse some of the different ways in which Deleuze has 
conceptualised embodiment beyond organisation. Although it is possible to identify in 
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Deleuze's thinking a persistent concern with the ways in which bodies transgress and 
exist independently of organisation, Canguilhem's and Foucault's emphasis on 
coupures also enables me to appreciate certain ruptures in Deleuze' s thinking about 
the body. Not only does Deleuze draw upon different philosophers and different 
phenomena whilst thinking about the body. In A Thousand Plateaus, with Guattari, he 
also makes a temporary shift by which a primary interest in the human is 
supplemented (if not replaced) with a stronger interest in non-humans. 
But Deleuze' s own philosophy of concepts also enables me to emphasise the 
ontological nature of his interest in the body. More clearly than Canguilhem and 
Foucault, Deleuze is not merely concerned with how other areas of thought 
conceptualise the body. Consistent with his own philosophy of concepts, which more 
specifically is a philosophy of concept creation, Deleuze seeks to invent new 
conceptualisations of the body in contrast and competition with previous 
conceptualisations, many of which seem to collapse into organised embodiment in 
one way or the other. In the concluding chapter of the thesis, chapter 8, I shall inter 
alia, and without reducing the body to a matter of organisation, put the Deleuzian 
conception of the body emerging from my discussion in chapter 7 in contact with the 
concept of organisation. In contrast to the previous chapters, which in one way or the 
other have dealt with already existing conceptualisations of organisation or 
embodiment, my objective here is to write in the spirit of Deleuze's, or rather Deleuze 
and Guattari' s (1994) philosophy of concept creation and invent a new (or at least 
slightly different) concept of organisation - beyond the still disembodied 
understandings of organisation characteristic of mainstream and processual 
organisation theory. Insofar as I am capable of recreating the concept of organisation, 
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this is an exercise in the philosophy of organisation. Thinking about organisation in a 
way that includes the problem of the body is not an attempt to synthesise organisation 
and the body or to tum their relationship into one of mutual exclusion. It is also not an 
exercise in reducing one to the other. Rather, by thinking organisation and 
embodiment as independent forces that both have the power to affect and to be 
affected by one another, I hope to emphasise the fragility as well as the power of 
organisation. The body is a problem that cannot be solved by means of organisation. 
3.10 Imposing Boundaries: A Narrow Choice of Literature 
Before moving on, it seems pressing to say something about why, in the following 
chapters, I have decided to analyse a somewhat limited selection of literature. 
Whereas the thesis is underpinned by a general interest in the disruption of 
boundaries, it has itself been subjected to quite narrow boundaries. This is perhaps 
most obvious in my choice of organisation theory literature, which includes above all 
the classics of the structural-functionalist tradition (e.g. Selznick 1949; Blau 1955; 
Parsons 1956a, 1956b), but also the more peripheral writers in the processual stream 
of thought (e.g. Cooper 1990; Chia 1995, 1998a; Tsoukas 1998a) as well as the more 
recent work of organisational researchers explicitly concerned with the body (e.g. 
Hassard et al. 2000; Dale 2001). Individual and small group level studies from 
organisational behaviour (e.g. Taylor 1947) and industrial sociology (e.g. Roy 1952, 
1960; Baldamus 1959) that specifically refer to the body in studies of fatigue, job 
design, and physical working conditions, have been excluded from this engagement 
with organisation theory. The investigations 0 lightening c ducted in the Hawthorne 
Studies which were outlined in detail by both Mayo (1933) and by Roethlisberger , 
.-------, 
and Dickson (1939), only get a brief n a more general le\'eL the work of 
130 
the phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists in sociology (e.g. Goffman 1959; 
Garfinkel 1967) and philosophy (e.g. Merleau-Ponty 1968) in which embodiment 
figures rather prominently have also been excluded, and so have Norbert Elias' (1978) 
study of the history of manners and Georges Bataille' s investigations into eroticism 
and the scatological (e.g. 1962). 
Overall, one might justify the exclusion of these bodies of literature by arguing that 
their inclusion would force me to violate the spatial boundaries - i.e. the word limit -
of the doctoral thesis. Furthermore, one might argue that their exclusion has been 
necessary in order to come up with a manageable and doable research project. But 
more importantly, I decided on their exclusion because - in one way or the other -
their inclusion would sidetrack my focus away from the research problem of the 
thesis. This is not to say that the literature mentioned above is irrelevant or 
uninteresting. But if I were to deal with it in as much depth as a rigorous investigation 
would require, this would inhibit me from dealing rigorously and in depth with more 
relevant literature. In other words, including these literatures would force me to 
exclude other things. 
The exclusion of organisational behaviour and industrial sociology must also be seen 
in relation to my understanding of organisation theory. In spite of the interdisciplinary 
roots of organisation theory and even though organisational behaviour as well as 
industrial sociology have close relationships with organisation theory that involve 
much intellectual cross-fertilisation, there are significant differences with regards to 
teaching arrangements, institutional organisation, politico-intellectual tradition and 
research agendas. For example, on the MA programme in Organisation Studies 
(MAOS) at the University of Warwick (which is the academic institution I know 
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best), industrial sociology and organisation theory are taught in separate course 
modules by different members of staff. Similarly, whereas research in industrial 
sociology tends to be done within sociology departments, by work research institutes 
administered under government ministries, or by units specialising in industrial 
relations, organisation theory tends to be done within business schools and 
management departments. FUrthryhereas one may identify amongst the majority 
of industrial sociologists a primary interest in workers, one may identify amongst the 
majority of organisation theorists a primary interest in managers and management. 
And, as the name suggests, the conduct of organisation theory is a more theoretical 
exercise than the conduct of organisational behaviour and industrial sociology, which 
both are dominated)y empirical-and--oft~p. __ .~~~~~~~hic research. Where6 in 
organisation theorY-may find elaborate discussions of the conc~p;-~f-~~ganisation, 
such work is less evident in organisational behaviour and industrial sociology. This is 
not to say that any version of organisation theory should be preferred to relevant and 
interesting work done within industrial sociology and organisational behaviour. As 
my discussions in the following chapters suggest, this thesis attempts a critical 
engagement with organisation theory. I have chosen to focus on literature from 
organisation theory because it is this discipline that constitutes my own academic 
background and it is within this discipline that I see an opportunity to rethink the 
concept of organisation in ways that may recognise the significance of embodiment. 
With respect to phenomenology, ethnomethodology, Elias and Bataille, these bodies 
of literature have been excluded in part because they fall outside organisation theory, 
in part because I feel that my own concerns have been addressed more adequately by 
other thinkers and traditions. Although Elias' sophisticated investigation of the history 
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of manners draw our attention to the organisation of bodies without formal 
organisations, he has been excluded from this thesis simply on the grounds that he is 
not an organisation theorist. Goffman's (1959) phenomenology of symbolic 
interactionism, as pursued through the notion of impression management, and 
Garfinkel's (1967) ethnomethodological investigations of phenomena such as 
transsexualism, privilege the organised nature of social life and embodiment and are 
excluded on the same basis. Furthermore, I realise that Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology has been significant in problematising the Cartesian mindlbody 
dualism and emphasising the embodied nature of experience and subjectivity, and I 
can appreciate the radical implications of Bataille' s explorations of the erotic and the 
scatological. However, I feel that Deleuze's and Deleuze and Guattari's 
biophilosophy is philosophically more sophisticated and more explicitly preoccupied 
with embodiment than Bataille's writings, and I believe that their work is more 
powerful in opening up what it means to be a body than the works of both Merleau-
Ponty and Bataille. 
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Chapter 4 
Organisation Theory and the Organisation of Production 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I outlined the guiding principles of a conceptualist 
methodology for the study of how organisation theory does and should deal with the 
problem of the body. The time has now arrived to put this methodology to work. In 
order to do so, I shall direct my attention in this chapter to the concept of 
"organisation" as it is typically thought within the mainstream of organisation theory. 
My investigation here is guided by three questions. First, what are the main 
characteristics of mainstream thinking about organisation? Second, which intellectual 
sources have informed the mainstream concept of organisation? Third, why does this 
concept of organisation say so little about the body, and how does the body get lost in 
mainstream organisation theory? By investigating some of the intellectual sources of 
organisation theory, I shall try to find out where the disembodied concept of 
organisation and the disembodiment of organisation theory stem from. 
In order to deal with these questions, I shall pursue a historical yet highly selective 
and discontinuous investigation of the concept of organisation - from the intellectual 
precursors to organisation theory in the 1920s to the mainstream of contemporary 
organisation theory. The Harvard Pareto Circle (HPC), which was a powerful and 
elitist group of intellectuals at Harvard University in the 1920s, 1930s and early 
1940s, makes the beginning of my inquiry. Although the HPC preceded the 
emergence of organisation theory with some years and none of its members were 
organisation theorists as such, I shall argue that some (indeed many) of the people 
associated with it have exercised a leading impact on both classical and contemporary 
organisation theory. Here I shall focus my attention on three of those people, whom I 
regard as significant forerunners to organisation theory and its concept of 
organisation. These are the natural scientist and founding leader of the HPC L. J. 
Henderson, the organisational researcher and Human Relations pioneer Elton Mayo, 
and the sociologist Talcott Parsons. Emphasising the influence of these three is not to 
dismiss the significance of people like Max Weber, Frederick Taylor and Henri Fayol, 
who (alongside Mayo) are often identified as the forebears of organisation theory. 
Rather, I have chosen to focus on Henderson, Mayo and Parsons for the following 
four reasons. First, because they constitute a group of friends and colleagues who 
were gathered at one of the world's most prestigious academic institutions at the same 
time. Second, because they share a set of important ideas that were cultivated through 
their joint participation in the HPC. Third, because their ideas are carried forward by 
the mainstream and hegemonic concept of organisation that reduces organisation to a 
matter of organisational entities by drawing a sharp distinction between formal 
organisations and social organisation. And fourth, because their thinking draws upon 
certain conceptions of the system and the organism that have serious implications for 
how one is to think about organisation and the ways in which the body is a problem 
for organisation. 19 Following the discussion of these important precursors to 
19 The third reason given here is particularly interesting with regards to my decision to privilege the 
HPC rather than Weber in this brief history of organisation theory. Although Weber did much through 
his studies of bureaucracy to influence the study of formal organisations (including Parsons' writings 
on this subject matter), his greater and more sociologically significant emphasis on the rationalisation 
of modem society in general also highlighted the notion of social organisation. And as Weber's 
contribution to organisation is an ambivalent one. he has also had a great influence ~po~ more ~ecent 
organisation theorists keen to develop an altemati\e and processual concept of orgamsatlOn. ThIS wIll 
be examined in the next chapter. 
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organisation theory, I shall examme some of the early or classical organisation 
theorists who have been most directly influenced by the thought of Henderson, Mayo 
and especially Parsons. These are Philip Selznick, Peter Blau and W. Richard Scott, 
who, given their keen dedication to central principles of the HPC, may be referred to 
as "systemic" organisation theorists. Like Parsons, the organisation theory pursued by 
these three writers is one concerned with formal organisations rather than social 
organisation. But before examining how Selznick, Blau and Scott think about 
organisation, I shall include an intermezzo on Robert Merton. Although Merton's 
writings were spread across vanous sociological subfields and not primarily 
associated with organisation theory, Selznick's, Blau's and Scott's association with 
Merton is significant here because it provides an important link to the HPC. At 
Columbia University it was very much Merton who steered the research interests of 
Selznick, Blau and Scott in the direction of systemic and structural-functionalist 
sociology. 
Having examined the systemic concept of organisation in classical organisation 
theory, I shall in the final section of this chapter direct my attention to some of the 
ways in which the concept of organisation is thought within contemporary mainstream 
organisation theory. The first part of this section deals with the Australian 
organisation theorist Lex Donaldson. Like the systemic organisation theorists, 
Donaldson (1985) draws a sharp distinction between formal organisations and social 
organisation, and insists that organisation theory can only be successful in 
establishing itself as a distinct discipline if it leaves the latter to other disciplines (e.g. 
sociology and anthropology) and maintains the former as its sole object of research. 
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At the moment, however, Donaldson has little reason to worry. As I shall elaborate in 
the second part of this section, it is this reductive research agenda and its associated 
concept of organisation as organisational entities - be they business companies, 
government agencies or voluntary associations - which has dominated the majority of 
contemporary research in management and organisation theory. This dominant trend 
is less an outcome of explicit conceptualising and theorising and more the result of a 
discursive void in mainstream organisational research. Since the Aston Studies of the 
1960s and 1970s (cf. Pugh and Hickson 1976, Pugh and Hinings 1976, Pugh and 
Payne 1977) and since David Silverman's (1970) rethinking of organisation theory, 
the majority of organisational research has been empirically oriented. Most research 
appearing in high-profile journals on both sides of the Atlantic (e.g. AMR, ASQ, 
Human Relations, Organization Studies and Organization) take the entitative concept 
of organisation for granted in their investigations of banks, hospitals, car 
manufacturers, etc. The dominance of this concept of organisation seems only to be 
explicit III management and organisation theory textbooks, dictionaries, 
encyclopaedias and handbooks. In order to demonstrate the predominance III 
contemporary mainstream organisation theory of the entitative concept of 
organisation, it is therefore to this body of literature that I draw the attention as I bring 
this chapter to a close. 
4.2 The Harvard Pareto Circle 
L. J. Henderson, who held professorial chairs in both the Medical School and the 
Business School at Harvard University, was the founder and undisputed leader of the 
Harvard Pareto Circle (HPC), of which Mayo and Parsons were members in the 1930s 
and early 1940s (cf. Russett 1966; Heyl 1968; Keller 1984). As the name partly 
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suggests, the HPC was a group of Harvard academics from a variety of scholarly 
areas, joined to discuss and investigate the ideas of the Italian aristocrat and engineer-
turned-social scientist, Vilfredo Pareto, a scholar of great merits, sometimes known as 
the "Karl Marx of the bourgeoisie" (Brinton quoted in Hey11968: 317). 
The HPC constituted an intellectual and politically conservative elite at Harvard, and 
included the following prominent names: A. Lawrence Lowell (President of Harvard 
University 1909-1933), the British philosopher and mathematician Alfred North 
Whitehead, the economist Joseph Schumpeter, the historian Crane Brinton, and the 
sociologists Pitirim Sorokin (who became the head of the Sociology Department 
following its foundation in 1931) and George C. Homans. Other people influenced by 
Henderson's "Paretophilia" (Russett's 1966 term) were Wallace Brett Donham (Dean 
of Harvard Graduate School of Business 1919-1942), the industrial researchers F. 1. 
Roethlisberger and W. Loyd Wright, the physiologist Walter B. Cannon, and Chester 
Barnard (President of the Bell Corporation, author of The Functions of the Executive 
and visiting professor at Harvard Graduate School of Business) (cf. Heyl 1968). In 
other words, the highly elitist Pareto Circle included a significant number of 
established scholars of impressive intellectual merit. And even though this clique 
(known amongst its leftist opponents as "the Pareto cult") "never influenced a 
majority of the faculty' at Harvard University, one of its founding members Crane 
Brinton admits that it did have 'fairly wide repercussions' (Brinton quoted in Heyl 
1968: 317). For example Barnard's position in American society at the time should 
not be underestimated. By dominating American telecommunications between the 
1930s and the 1960s, his power may be compared to (and might e\"en haye 
superseded) that of Bill Gates and Microsoft today. Moreover, I would argue that the 
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HPC most likely did influence a majority of the faculty in both the Harvard Sociology 
Department and the Harvard Graduate School of Business. 
The members of the HPC were drawn to Pareto's work for two main reasons. First, 
they found inspiration in his writings to develop a natural science of society. Perhaps 
most famous in welfare economics for inventing what was later to be known as Pareto 
equilibrium and Pareto optimality, Pareto's early training was in mechanical 
engineering. It was however the important relationship between Pareto's early 
research in the natural sciences and his later devotion to sociological theory and the 
study of social systems that preoccupied the members of the HPC (Heyl 1968). For 
example Pareto's notion of the equilibrial nature of social systems and his study of the 
circulation of elites in society was based on physics - particularly his mathematical 
theory of equilibrium in elastic solids - and on his mathematical theory of pure 
economics (Russett 1966).20 I shall return to the use of Pareto's thinking about 
systems in general and social systems in particular in my discussion of Henderson 
below. 
Second, the members of the HPC were fascinated by Pareto's aristocratic and 
conservative politics, which provided this politically conservative membership of the 
Harvard faculty with a defence against Marxism and the very active Marxists during 
the 1930s Great Depression (Russett 1966; Heyl 1968),21 and which was regarded 
20 Pareto's mathematical theory of pure economics had initially been influenced by the work of the 
economist Leon Walras, whom Pareto later replaced as Professor of Economics at the University of 
Lausanne. 
21 George C. Homans (1962: .f) writes the following about P.areto's importance: '~s a Bostonian 
Republican who had not rejected his comparatIvely wealthy famIly, 1 felt dunng the thIrtIes that I was 
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central to the resolution of the problems facing American and Western societies in the 
1930s. At that time, the US was severely troubled by the Great Depression, and the 
Bostonian Republicans of the HPC did not neglect their role in helping the US 
economy recover from this disaster and, in addition, saving American society from 
revolution and disorganisation. 
The Harvard Graduate School of Business was a key institution in this respect 
(O'Connor 1999). Backed and operated by central figures in the HPC (including 
Henderson who set up the Fatigue Laboratory in the Business School), the Business 
School was Harvard University's arm into big business. Through management 
consultancy, the Business School would secure industry funding for the University as 
a whole and make American business successful by teaching and prescribing the 
methods and advantages of Fordist mass production. In other words, US companies 
were to become successful and the American economy was to prosper through 
adopting the Fordist doctrine of "piling 'em high and selling 'em cheap". 
Consequently, a key aspect of early business research at Harvard was that it 
prescribed a specific mode of production that since came to dominate the capitalist 
economy at least for most of the remainder of the twentieth century.22 Already here it 
under personal attack, above all from the Marxists. I was ready to believe Pareto because he provided 
me with a defence. ' 
22 It is somewhat ironic that in their best seller The Second Industrial Divide, Piore and Sabel (19S-l) 
(Sabel also serving as the Ford International Associate Professor of Social Science at MIT at the time 
of publication) pursued the anti-Harvard Busines~ School position that th~ only way the US. could get 
out of its current economic crisis was by replacmg methods of standardIsed mass productIOn with a 
system of flexible specialisation. 
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is possible to identify a sense in which the HPC through its engagement in the 
Business School at Harvard privileges the study of the organisation of production in 
formal organisations. But still, it is difficult to trace an explicit concept of 
organisation amongst the members of the HPC. Instead, some of them are highly 
inspired by Pareto's understanding of the social system. It is to Henderson's Paretan 
writings on the social system, which in turn come to influence the classical and 
mainstream concept of organisation (whereby organisation becomes a matter of 
formal organisations, organisations of productions or organisational entities) that I 
now turn my attention. 
4.3 L. J. Henderson and the Concept of the System 
Henderson (1935) opens his short book Pareto's General Sociology by comparing 
Pareto's (1916) monumental work Trattoria di Sociologia Generale (Treatise on 
General Sociology) to the achievements of Galileo three hundred years earlier. It is 
therefore no secret that Henderson was a great admirer of Pareto, and this has obvious 
consequences for Henderson's own conceptualisation of the social system. Although 
recognising certain limitations with Pareto's proj ect, he does not offer a radically 
different view. Instead, as we shall see, the conceptualisation arising from 
Henderson's text provides an introduction to and elaboration of Pareto's 
conceptualisation. 
Somewhat ironically, Henderson (1935) does not start his discussion with Pareto's 
concept of the social system, but with an outline of Willard Gibbs' generalised 
description of the physico-chemical system. which he holds amongst the most 
important contributions to theoretical science in the last fifty years: 
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A physico-chemical system is an isolated material aggregate. It consists of 
components, which are individual substances, like water or alcohol. These 
substances are found, singly or together, in phases. Phases are physically 
homogeneous solid, liquid, or gaseous parts of the system: for example, ice, or a 
solution of alcohol in water, or air. The system is further characterized by the 
concentrations of the components in the phases, by its temperature, and by its 
pressure (Henderson 1935: 10). 
Further on, Henderson argues that this system is characterised by mutual dependence, 
and that changes in one factor are accompanied by changes in other factors and in the 
system as a whole. This is however not just a characteristic of physico-chemical 
systems. With regards to mutual dependency, 'this system is typical of all systems' 
(Henderson 1935: 12). 
Although Henderson points out that 'Gibbs's system is plainly a fiction' as 'no real 
system can be isolated', he feels no reason to reject the main ideas of Gibbs' concept 
as they provide 'the well chosen simplifications and abstractions that make possible a 
systematic treatment of complex phenomena' (Henderson 1935: 15). Perfectly content 
with Gibbs' conceptualisation, he then turns to Pareto's General Sociology, which he 
claims is 'the construction of a similar conceptual scheme: the social system.' Pareto's 
social system 'possesses many of the same logical advantages and limitations that are 
present in the physico-chemical system' (Henderson 1935: 16). Despite emphasising 
that Pareto was in no way led to his concept of the social system by Gibbs' concept of 
the physico-chemical system, Henderson starts his discussion by identifying the 
analogies between the two. Paradoxically, Henderson does not here make a major 
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point of the fact that Pareto's individuals are heterogeneous when their analogous 
equivalent in Gibbs' system, i.e. Gibbs' phases, are homogeneous: 
Pareto's social system contains individuals; they are roughly analogous to 
Gibbs's components. It is heterogeneous (cf. Gibbs's phases), for the 
individuals are of different families, trades, and professions: they are associated 
with different institutions and are members of different economic and social 
classes. As Gibbs considers temperature, pressure, and concentrations, so Pareto 
considers sentiments in words and deeds, verbal elaborations, and the economic 
interests (Henderson 1935: 16). 
Admitting that Gibbs and Pareto 'exclude many factors that are important in special 
cases', Henderson argues that they both have demonstrated how much can be done 
within those limitations and 'that such limitations are necessary' (Henderson 1935: 
16). And further on, he re-emphasises the point hinted at above, that the main 
characteristic of the social system, as of the physico-chemical one and of 'all [other] 
analogical systems', is that it is 'in a state of mutual dependence.' (Henderson 1935: 
17). Mutual dependency, which refers to the 'mutually dependent variations of [ ... ] 
variables' does actually rule out conceiving of systems in terms of cause and effect 
(Henderson 1935: 18). According to Henderson, Pareto's study of systems is made 
possible by his knowledge of mathematics and of 'the logical principles that are 
involved, but also by exceptional skill in diagnosis, and by wide learning and 
experience' (Henderson 1935: 18). The crux of this, however, is that Pareto's 
sociology is considered applicable to largely all areas in the human and social 
SCIences. 
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In order to understand the functioning of the social system, Henderson turns his 
attention to Pareto's treatment of equilibrium: 
The treatment of equilibrium [ ... J is logically of great significance. Pareto 
observes that the state of the social system is determined by its conditions. 
Therefore, as a small modification in the state of the system is imposed upon it, 
a reaction will take place and this will tend to restore the original state, very 
slightly modified by the experience. [ ... J Thus the disturbances produced by 
short wars, by epidemics that are not too severe, and by all kinds of lesser 
catastrophes ordinarily disappear and leave hardly a trace behind them 
(Henderson 1935: 46). 
Despite recognising the possibilities for equilibrium being disturbed by heterogeneous 
elements, residuals and derivations, and equilibrium being unstable, Henderson does 
on the whole argue that disturbances are not severe. Acknowledging the work of the 
physiologists Claude Bernard, Walter B. Cannon and Joseph Barcroft, his discussion 
is here inspired by the notion of the self-healing organism (vis medicatrix naturae). 
According to this principle, the organism is by and large capable of recovering from 
disturbances and re-attaining equilibrium: 
The case of physiological equilibrium is similar [to that of social equilibrium]. 
In fact it is logically identical. When recovery from disease is in question the 
process is still often referred to as a result of the vis medicatrix naturae. Claude 
Bernard's discussion of the constancy of the milieu interieur bears on the same 
point, and so do Cannon's recent discussion of homeostasis and Barcroft's still 
more recent book (Henderson 1935: 46). 
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With regards to the body, two main conclusions therefore emerge out of Henderson's 
thinking. First, that the body, as an organism or organic system, is like any other 
system. And second, that being a system subject to the same logic as any other 
system, the body does on the whole enjoy stable equilibrium. As such, the body is not 
really much of a problem. With regards to the concept of organisation, Henderson 
gives few explicit clues. But even though he provided no explicit discussion of the 
concept of organisation and was not primarily interested in the workings of 
organisational life, his general preoccupation with systems and the equilibrium of 
systems was a great source of inspiration to his dedicated followers in the HPC. As I 
hope to show in my discussion of Talcott Parsons below, it is possible to see that the 
general theme expressed in Henderson's concept of the social system prefigured 
Parsons' concepts of the social system and organisation, even though Parsons was less 
explicitly concerned with equilibrium than was Henderson. For example, when 
Parsons writes about the boundary processes of sub-systems and describes how sub-
systems such as formal organisations are integrated into and maintain stable 
boundaries towards other units in the social system at large, he adopts Henderson's 
position that on the whole systems enjoy a stable state of equilibrium. 
But before discussing Parsons' thinking on social systems in general and formal 
organisations in particular, I shall direct my attention to Elton Mayo, whose research 
activities were heavily influenced by Henderson. Not only was Henderson 
instrumental in setting up the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory, which was the cradle of the 
Human Relations School of industrial sociology and organisational research and from 
which Mayo did most of his research. Henderson, who secured Mayo a post at the 
Fatigue Laboratory, also collaborated with Mayo on research carried out under the 
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institutional auspices of the Fatigue Laboratory. In 1936, Henderson co-authored an 
article with Mayo entitled 'The Effects of the Social Environment', and before that, 
Henderson's influence on Mayo is evident in Mayo's classic study of 1933, The 
Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (henceforth, Human Problems). 
In both texts, the notion of the organism does at first playa key role in understanding 
the human experience of work, and even in the former, Henderson's understanding of 
the organism influences Mayo's thinking. As I hope to demonstrate below, this 
conception of the organism continues to have a leading impact upon Mayo and upon 
the classical organisation theory that starts to develop in the 1940s and 1950s. First, as 
Mayo privileges the social aspects of work and reduces the organism to a metaphor of 
social and organisational life. And second, as organisation theory comes to exclude 
the body from its disciplinary territory. It is in order to elaborate on that which makes 
possible a particular organism metaphor and the exclusion of the body that I now tum 
my attention to Mayo. 
4.4 Elton Mayo: From the Physiological to the Social Aspects of Work 
Mayo, who in his twenties had embarked upon but never finished his medical 
education, remained strongly committed to a clinical and diagnostic research scheme 
after arriving at Harvard (cf. Smith 1998), and as suggested above, the organism was a 
central and genuine preoccupation in his studies of work and organisational life. For 
Mayo, as for many of his colleagues at the Fatigue Laboratory, knowledge about the 
physiological functioning of the human organism was key to understanding the 
parameters of efficiency in the workplace. This was also very much in line \\'ith 
Henderson's thinking, and Mayo took specific notice of Henderson's (1928) most 
recent physiological treatise Blood, A Studv In General Physiology as well as of 
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Henderson's publications in scientific journals. In the chapter on fatigue in Human 
Problems, one thing that particularly triggers Mayo's (1933) interest is how 
Henderson (1928, 1932), whilst discussing the study of organic processes, proposes 
the use of mathematical mutual dependence analysis instead of the more simplistic 
cause-effect analysis. 
Living organism is best conceived as a number of variables in equilibrium with 
each other in such a fashion that a change in anyone will induce changes 
throughout the whole organization. Biological experiment accordingly should 
not seek to change a factor a while keeping factors b, c, d ... n constant, for this 
is impossible. If factors b, c, d, are put under constraint in a balanced system, 
the constraint will affect a also. For Henderson, scientific control in biological 
experiment means not constraint but measurement. The living organism 
responds to changes as a totality; in order to know the general nature of the 
response, it is necessary to measure simultaneously as many specified variables 
as possible - "as few as we may, as many as we must" (Mayo 1933: 11). 
But in addition to provide Mayo with a method for scientific analysis, this statement 
also shows that Henderson informs Mayo's conception of the organism itself. As 
often is the case, the research method employed to study a particular object is 
dependent upon what one assumes to be the very nature of that object. In the case of 
Henderson and Mayo, mathematical mutual dependence analysis is preferred to cause-
effect analysis because only the former can gain knowledge about the organism as a 
total system constituted by mutually interdependent variables existing in equilibrium. 
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Drawing upon these studies by Henderson and upon work by other researchers at the 
Fatigue Laboratory, Mayo continues to examine the physiological functioning of the 
organism. The first series of experiments carried out at the Laboratory was conducted 
by D. B. Dill (1928) and studied muscular activity in marathon runners. Like 
Henderson, Dill's research views the organism in terms of numerous factors or 
variables that are integrated and co-ordinated so as to constitute a system capable of 
maintaining a stable internal environment. More specifically, Dill highlights the 
advantageous effect of physical training upon the organism by arguing that the athlete 
enjoys a superior capacity to meet the organism's demand for oxygen. Consequently, 
fatigue is not a problem for the athlete. Mayo, who is more explicitly concerned with 
the performance of industrial workers, makes use of Dill's study without hesitation. 
Indeed, Mayo finds the same situation amongst industrial workers, and this leads him 
to insist that the concept of fatigue has little application in industry. This is for two 
reasons. First, because production tasks in industry are increasingly done by 
machines, leaving the human to merely direct the operations of the machine. And 
second, because insofar as industry requires the muscular input of human beings, 
there is a tendency of a division of labour to develop, which only selects those whose 
physique can endure this kind of work 'without any significant disturbance of organic 
balance' (Mayo 1933: 18). 
Although Mayo acknowledges other disturbances to the organic balance than those 
corresponding to the concept of fatigue, he is most committed to demonstrate the 
stable nature of the human organism engaged in industrial work. This is evident in his 
discussion of monotony, where Mayo invokes the concept of homeostasis developed 
by Henderson's interlocutor, the Harvard physiologist Walter B. Cannon: 
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The physiologists have found that work can be performed in a "steady state." 
For them this means that the organism can respond to external effort only as 
long as an inner equilibrium is maintained between a large number of mutually 
dependent variables. Dr. W. B. Cannon speaks of this condition as 
"homeostasis," an equivalence between the "interofective" and "exterofective" 
factors. 23 Given that a steady state is achieved, "the exercise can be carried on 
infinitely" (Mayo 1933: 27). 
But here, Mayo also recognises the possibility that an individual is unable to perform 
work at a steady state, and this opens up for Mayo's shift in emphasis from the 
organic to the social. Although the incapacity to sustain work at a steady state may be 
organically conditioned, it cannot be understood in purely organic terms. Taking 
monotony as an example, Mayo argues that this cannot merely be helped by the 
introduction of rest pauses. Appealing to experimental research by the physiologist 
Whyatt, Mayo argues that any attempt to explain monotony and ease the problems 
arising from it must look to the social. 
It is however in his analysis of The Hawthorne Experiments at the Western Electric 
Company about a thousand miles away that Mayo starts to look more closely into the 
social aspects of work. This is also where probably the most famous aspect of Mayo's 
oeuvre is documented: that the output and efficiency of a work group is seen to be 
23 It is the organism's ability for homeostasis that ensures that it achieves a steady state so as toc,ist in 
harmony with its environment. Since homeostasis is the equivale~ce between exterofectl\c and 
interofective factors, homeostasis is the balance between factors that Influence the orgamsm from Its 
external environment and factors that influcnce it from its internal cm'ironment respectively, 
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relatively unaffected by the physical conditions of work, but not by its social 
conditions. And this is why the degree of illumination in the work-room of a group of 
female telephone operators was seen to have an insignificant effect on efficiency and 
output, and why the attention shown to the same group by the Harvard researchers 
was seen to facilitate both output and efficiency. Mayo does by no means abandon the 
physiological understanding of the organism implied earlier. Instead, this is displaced 
and complemented by an insistence upon the significance of the social dimensions of 
work, which Mayo analyses by means of his famous analogy that invokes an 
organisation with the same general attributes as those possessed by a biological 
organism. Hence, it is not only the human organism of the individual worker that is 
constituted by a number of mutually dependent factors existing in equilibrium. This is 
also the stuff that makes up organisations, or 'the whole organization which is the 
organism', as Mayo (1933: 72) writes.24 Consequently, and similar to the homeostatic 
functioning of the human organism referred to above, the organisation may cancel out 
disturbances to its internal environment insofar as it can consolidate the internal 
equilibrium of its workers. With specific reference to The Western Electric 
experiment, Mayo puts across this point with the following words: 
24 Mayo's follower Roethlisberger brings out the r~le ~f the organism met~phor and the role of 
equilibrium in Mayo's thinking: 'Let's study orgamzatlOns as natural orgamc whol~s o~ systems 
striving to survive and maintain their equilibrium in different e~\·ironments. L.et's .see If t~~s way of 
looking at them will allow us to specify better the many fact~rs m a complex situatlOn and wherever 
the general effect is unsatisfactory to the worker and to mdustry, to dlscov~r the nature of t~c 
disequilibrium and the source of the interference'" (Roethlisberger 1960: XIV: Mayo quoted In 
Roethlisberger 1960: xiv). 
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By strengthening the "temperamental" inner equilibrium of the workers, the 
company enabled them to achieve a mental "steady state" which offered a high 
resistance to a variety of external conditions (Mayo 1933: 72). 
Stability and equilibrium are major themes in Mayo's (1933) thinking, and these are 
developed further in the concluding chapter of Human Problems. Developing an 
argument that starts with the individual biological organism and proceeds via the 
organically assembled work organisation, Mayo ends his discussion by reflecting 
upon the problems prevalent at the macro level of human interaction. Here, Mayo 
invokes Durkheim's (1947, 1951) concept of anomie, which refers to the fundamental 
confusion and social disorganisation characteristic of modem society. With strong 
dislike of the direction in which the world was moving, Mayo was troubled by 
contemporary signs of anomie, which he attributed to excessive openness in social life 
(cf. O'Connor 1999). And although more evident in certain communities, Mayo 
addressed anomie disorganisation and disorder as a universal problem facing the 
entire modem world. In his own words, these sentiments are expressed in the 
following way: 
Modem development, Durkheim claims, has brought to an end this [pre-
modern] life of satisfactory function for the individual and the group. We are 
facing a condition of anomie, of planlessness in living, which is becoming 
characteristic both of individual lives and communities. [ .... ] Durkheim 
contends that individuals increasingly are lapsing into restless movement, 
planless self-development - a method of living which defeats itself because 
achievement has no longer any criterion of value; happiness always lies beyond 
any present achievement. Defeat takes the form of ultimate disillusion - a 
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disgust with the "futility of endless pursuit." I quote from Durkheim in order to 
show that the problems which concern Shaw and Cavan are not peculiar to 
Chicago. It is true that the problem of social disorganization, with its consequent 
anomie, probably exists in a more acute form in Chicago than in other parts of 
the United States. It is probable that it is a more immediate issue in the United 
States than in Europe. But it is a problem of order in social development with 
which the whole world is concerned (Mayo 1933: 125). 
Like Durkheim, we see that Mayo was troubled by the confusion and openness 
penetrating modem society. But whereas Durkheim regarded anomie as a 
consequence of modem organic solidarity (a confusing concept since in Durkheim's 
sociology it is contrasted with premodern mechanical solidarity), Mayo saw in the 
model of the organism a solution to the problems of order and disorder confronting 
modem civilisation. In this context, the organism is however little more than a 
. . 2-; 
metaphor for how one is to understand social systems and social mterachon. -
Although Mayo demonstrates an interest in and argues for the importance of 
understanding all aspects of work, there is no doubt that he privileges the social or the 
sociological. In concluding his joint article with Henderson, for example, Mayo (in 
Henderson and Mayo 1936: 416) starts by acknowledging that 'The environment is at 
once physical, chemical, biological, psychological, economic and sociological', but 
ends with the following statement: 
25 As such it continues, in the Durkheimian spirit. to dissociate the emerging fields of social sciencc 
inquiry fr~m the long-established natural sciences whilst util.ising na.tural science concep~s as 
metaphors for social phenomena and dcvelopmg a SOCIal SCIence \\"Ith strong natural sCIence 
underpinnings. 
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As a rule, we all have the strongest feelings about its sociological properties and 
the least intellectual awareness of them. Often these are the most important 
properties of the environment. Let us study, weigh, modify and use them 
(Henderson and Mayo 1936: 416). 
The privileging of the social above the organic does not in itself pose a problem for an 
organisation theory keen to address the ways in which the body is a problem for 
organisation. But since the organism and the body are typically treated synonymously, 
it is not merely the organism that is reduced to a metaphor of social and organisational 
life. The body as such is given similar treatment, with the consequence that 
organisation theorists are discouraged from addressing the body as a research topic. 
Maintaining an interest in the physiological functioning of the organism, as Mayo 
does in the early chapters of Human Problems, is however not necessarily the way to 
go for organisation theorists keen to re-embody organisation theory. By adopting an 
organic view of the body and by prescribing this as a model for the organisation of 
society, Mayo and his interlocutors did obviously assume the body itself to be 
organised. 
As we shall see in the subsequent section, Parsons shared Mayo's reductive interest in 
the organism as a metaphor of social phenomena and dismissed that social research 
should be interested in the organism beyond the level of metaphor. But before turning 
to this part of Parsons' sociology, I shall first trace Parsons' interest in organisation 
back to his translation of Weber. And further on, I shall use most of the section below 
to comment on Parsons' understanding of the social system and his systemic approach 
to the study of organisations. It is these elements of Parsons's sociology that ha\"e had 
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the most direct influence upon the entitative concept of organisation in both classical 
and contemporary mainstream organisation theory. And it is here that Henderson's 
and Pareto's influence on Parsons is most apparent. On the opening page of The 
Social System, which was Parsons' most serious attempt to provide a systemic 
approach to sociology, and which preceded his systemic approach to the study of 
organisations, he states the following: 
The title [ ... ] goes back, more than any other source, to the insistence of the late 
Professor L. J. Henderson on the extreme importance of the concept of the 
system in scientific theory, and his clear realization that the attempt to delineate 
the social system was the most important contribution of Pareto's great work 
(Parsons 1951: vii). 
And in the concluding chapter of the same book, he says that 'Pareto stands almost 
alone in his clear and explicit conception of the social system' (Parsons 1951: 546). 
4.5 Talcott Parsons: A Systems Approach to the Study of Organisations 
Parsons's first noticeable impact upon organisation theory can be traced back to his 
work with Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Drawing upon earlier efforts made 
by the Englishman A. M. Henderson (of whom we know very little), Parsons edited 
and translated parts of this work, which in 1947 was published under the title The 
Theory of Social and Economic Organization. This was the first time that any of 
Weber's writings were published in English, and Parsons' edition has been so 
influential amongst the English-speaking readership of Weber in organisation theory 
and sociology that certain commentators have deemed it a crucial event in what is 
called the "Parsonisation of Weber" (Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pope 1975; Horowitz 
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1983). Although organisation theorists have paid most attention to Weber's statements 
on authority, we can also detect an interesting bias in how Parsons translated Weber's 
concept of organisation. Influenced by Marshallian economics, Parsons' reference to 
organisation in this volume is based upon Weber's German term das Betrieb, i.e. "the 
firm". Consequently, Weber's own reference to Organisation, which is related to his 
notion of authority (Weber speaks of Herrschaft durch Organisation or "authority 
through organisation"), is not fully appreciated as a matter of organisation (cf. Bittner 
1965). Admittedly, as Weber's concept of organisation as authority is primarily 
concerned with the distribution of the powers of command, there is even in Weber's 
original a predominant emphasis on what goes on inside organisational entities as 
opposed to social organisation. Hence, on an overall level, this does not undermine 
the privileging of organisational entities in organisation theory. Rather, it goes to 
show how strongly ingrained it is in the discipline. 
Parsons' most specific contribution to early organisation theory did however take 
place a few years after his English edition of Wirtschaft und Ges ellsch aft. In a two-
part treatise published in the first ever volume of Administrative Science Quarterl}' 
(ASQ), Parsons (1956a, 1956b) outlines his suggestions for what he calls a 
sociological approach to the theory of organisations. Although Parsons' understanding 
of organisation-as-firm is carried forward in these texts, they are first and foremost 
coloured by Parsons' general sociological project, which is based upon his concept of 
the social system. Before inquiring into Parsons' theorising of organisation, I shall 
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therefore give a brief introduction to the main principles of this systemic sociology, 
first developed in The Social System (1951 ).26 
In this classic of twentieth century sociology, Parsons seeks to study the functioning 
of social systems in terms of social needs and conditions of existence. Taking the 
concept of social systems of action as his starting point, he is specifically interested in 
the interaction of individual actors inside social systems and their orientation to one 
another in particular situations. Parsons' focus is therefore relational and more 
preoccupied with the structures and processes resulting from the interaction of social 
units than the internal structures of these units themselves. On a slightly different 
note, this also means that Parsons' systems theory, which under the influence of 
Radcliffe-Brown's anthropology is named structural-functional, may be said to be so 
only in noma, at least if one reserves that term to Radcliffe-Brown's project and 
projects very much akin to his (cf. Parsons 1951: vii). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) inform us that Parsons invokes a fundamental rewriting of 
Radcliffe-Brown's structural functionalism, which turns Parsons' sociology into a 
case of functional imperativism. Whereas Radcliffe-Brown would first identify a set 
of structures (social morphology), secondly look for the functions performed by these 
structures (social physiology), and finally examine how new structures come into 
existence (social evolution), Parsons takes the existence and performance of functions 
for granted. Inspired by modem biological functionalism, he takes the system as a 
26 I shall return to the concept of the system towards the end of this section and in the early sections of 
the next chapter. 
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whole as his starting point and analyses 'the conditions necessary for its survival, 
functioning, evolution and change' (Rocher 1979: 155). According to Parsons, all 
systems (or structures) can therefore be seen to exhibit the following four functions: 
Adaptation, Goal Attainment, Integration and Latency (AGIL). Blau provides this 
very comprehensive and highly instructive account of AGIL, which is the framework 
developed by Parsons to think about social systems: 
all social systems must solve four basic problems: adaptation to the 
environment, goal achievement, integration of subunits into the larger system, 
and latency, that is maintenance of the value patterns over time (Blau 1968: 
303). 
As Landsberger (1961: 219) points out, there is an underlying antagonism between the 
resolution of A and G (task or instrumental functions) on the one hand, and I and L 
(socio-emotional or expressive functions) on the other. And although maximising 
efforts to resolve one function or problem intensifies other problems, and the progress 
enjoyed by a system depends on its success in jointly resolving all four functions and 
problems, those systems referred to as organisations have a bias towards the 
instrumental functions of Adaptation and Goal Attainment. This bias is brought out in 
Parsons' (l956a, 1956b) ASQ feuilleton, to which I tum my attention in the main part 
of this section. On the opening page, Parsons offers the following definition: 
An organization is defined as a social system oriented to the attainment of a 
relatively specific type of goal, which contributes to a major function of a more 
comprehensive system, usually society (Parsons 1956a: 63). 
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Whilst the emphasis on Goal Attainment in this definition is obvious, the 
organisation's ability to adapt to its environment is a matter of its contribution to the 
goals of society. Moreover, Parsons states that such an organisation is to be analysed 
in terms of (i) 'an institutionalized value system, above all defining and legitimizing 
its goal' (Latency), and (ii) 'the mechanisms by which it is articulated with the rest of 
the society in which it operates' (Integration) (Parsons 1956a: 63). Three primary 
dimensions provide the context for this articulation, which integrates the organisation 
into society at large: 
(1) procurement of the necessary resources, financing, personal [read: 
personnel] services, and "organization" in the economic sense; (2) the operative 
code centering on decisions which are classified as policy decisions, allocative 
decisions, and coordinating decisions; and (3) the institutional structure which 
integrates the organization with others, centering on contract, authority, and the 
institutionalization of universalistic rules (Parsons 1956a: 63). 
The first dimension adheres directly to Adaptation (as the organisation needs a 
minimum set of resources to adapt to and survive in the environment), the second to 
Goal Attainment (as the organisation's ability to attain its goals depends on its ability 
to make the right decisions), and the third is obviously related to Integration and 
Latency. Following this instrumentally oriented definition, Parsons makes it no secret 
that he is primarily interested in the 'broad type of collectivity which has assumed a 
particularly important place in modem industrial societies' (Parsons 1956a: 63), i.e. 
the bureaucratic organisation. Bureaucratic organisations exist in most sectors of 
society, Parsons notes, and he is keen to emphasise the common attributes of all 
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bureaucracies, be it the governmental bureau or department, the business firm, the 
university or the hospital. 
This is also why organisations must be studied from an interdisciplinary angle, and 
Parsons acknowledges three writers who have been particularly significant in shaping 
his own thinking on organisations: Max Weber, Chester Barnard, and Herbert Simon. 
But no matter how interdisciplinary its nature, it is the common elements enjoyed by 
most organisations that makes the study of organisation part of the sociological study 
of social structures or social systems. 27 This is not to say that all social structures are 
organisations, and in the next paragraph, given that they are only partly organisations, 
Parsons firmly excludes families and other kinship groups, local communities, 
regional subsocieties, nations, and indeed society as a whole, from the concept of 
organisation that he has in mind for organisation theory. Similarly, informal work 
groups, cliques of friends, etc., 'are not in this technical sense organizations' because 
it is the 'primacy of orientation to the attainment of a specific goal' (in Barnard's 
terminology the purpose) that makes organisations distinct from other social systems. 
As Parsons admits, 'This criterion has implications for both the external relations and 
the internal structure of the system referred to here as an organization' (Parsons 
1956a: 64). Parsons first elaborates on the nature of these external relations (or 
boundary processes as he also calls them), which involve environmental Adaptation, 
and to which Goal Attainment is a fundamental aspect. On the one hand, the 
organisation's opportunity to maximise its output is relative to the costs and obstacles 
27 Note that at this point. Parsons treats social structure and social systems synonymously. 
invoked upon it by objects or systems in its exterior. And on the other hand, the 
output produced by the organisation's Goal Attainment can be used as input by 
another social system with which the organisation enjoys an external relationship. 
The terms governing this input-output exchange generally follow some contractual 
pattern, which means that all organisations operate within a market of some sort (cf. 
also Landsberger 1961: 228).28 In tum, this market of inputs and outputs. 
consumption and production is a result of the division of labour in society, a 
characteristic lacking in premodern societies constituted by self-sufficient units. 
Given the existence of some division of labour between organisations, or between an 
organisation and other social systems, decisions must be made in order to prioritise 
those processes that most successfully contribute to the organisation's output or Goal 
Attainment. Hence, an organisation's exterior IS not merely engaged with the 
organisation as a consumer of its output and as a supplier of its input. Being 
consumers and suppliers, other social systems and the social system as a whole also 
influence the organisation's internal decision-making processes. First by influencing 
the priorities that the organisation makes to best achieve its goal, and second, by 
influencing the very goal itself, which in tum determines what type of organisation we 
have in front of us. 
Parsons now turns his attention to the internal structure of organisations, identifying 
two different points of view from which an analysis can be made: the cultural-
~R Parsons' stress on contracts or contractual arrangements for the un~erstan.di ng of boundary processes 
of input-output flows between systems ma~ be seen in light of ?IS r~adIng. of Paretian eC?~Omics. 
where the contract cune or the Pareto set Includes all the SItuatIOns In WhIch the market 1~ Pareto 
efficient. 
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institutional perspective and the group or role perspective. The former centres its 
focus on 'the values of the system and their institutionalization in different functional 
contexts' (Latency), and the latter bases its analysis on 'suborganizations and the roles 
of individuals participating in the functioning of the organization' (Integration) 
(Parsons 1956a: 67). Parsons seeks to examine the relations between the two views. 
but admits to give primary emphasis to the former because: 
This defines the basic orientation of the system (in the present case, the 
organization) to the situation in which it operates; hence it guides the activities 
of participant individuals (Parsons 1956a: 67). 
Not forgetting the emphasis already given to the organisation's exterior. the value 
system of the organisation is based on its acceptance of the general values of society. 
Furthermore, the organisation must be capable of legitimising its own place in society 
as a whole. Hence, the organisation's value system must be directed towards 
legitimising the goal or purpose pursued by the organisation. First, 'in terms of the 
functional significance of its attainment' for society, and second, in terms of 'the 
primacy of this goal over other possible interests and values of the organization and 
its members' (Parsons 1956a: 68). This leads Parsons to the following conclusion, 
also known from Barnard (1938) as the "organization purpose": 
The value system of a business firm in our society is a version of "economic 
rationality" which legitimizes the goal of economic production [ ... ]. Devotion 
of the organization [ ... ] to production is legitimized as is the maintenance of the 
primacy of this goal over other functional interests which may arise within the 
organization (Parsons 1956a: 68). 
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As stated above, it is the pursuit of different goals, i.e. the production of different 
goods or services, which defines the organisational type to which a specific 
organisation belongs. But Goal Attainment and the value system working to legitimise 
the organisation's goal or purpose is also the primary factor common to all 
organisations. Beyond this, all organisations, in one way or another, must legitimise a 
set of sub-goals and a set of operations needed to achieve these sub-goals, which in 
tum presumes the organisation's ability to adapt to the superordinate social system of 
society. Whereas Goal Attainment implies the mobilisation of fluid resources (land, 
labour, capital and organisation), Adaptation is achieved through the organisation's 
decision making process or mechanisms of implementation (i.e. policy decisions, 
allocative decisions and coordination decisions). 
Further on, Parsons emphasises the significance of the mechanisms by which the 
organisation is integrated with (but not adapted to) other organisations This is 
fundamentally about the compatibility of the organisation's institutional patterns to 
the institutional patterns of other organisations. Whereas the Adaptation of the 
organisation to its surroundings depends on its capacity to pursue and legitimise its 
goal or purpose, the Integration of the organisation is not simply instrumentally 
driven. Rather, it is a matter of whether the patterns of procedure adopted in one 
particular organisation are generalisable into a wider social system and whether they 
are permissible from a wider social point of view. Hence, it also concerns the degree 
to which Integration between organisations can take place. 
All this amounts to show Parsons' preoccupation with the relations between the 
organisation and its wider surroundings, be it a larger subsystem or the superordinate 
social system known as society. It would therefore be fallacious to accuse Parsons of 
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ignoring the social exterior of organisations. Its need to adapt to and integrate with 
other organisations and society as a whole, whilst pursuing a particular set of goals 
and maintaining a particular set of values, makes the organisation dependent on the 
order prevalent in its outside environment, whether this has to do with authority, 
loyalty or contractual bindings. 
But this does not dispute that Parsons' concept of organisation is one that VIews 
organisations as entities. Moreover, the societal environment within which 
organisations are seen to operate is, according to Parsons' framework, a bounded 
entity (Cooper 1990). And for Parsons it is the larger yet bounded social system 
making up the organisation's exterior that influences the behaviour of the 
organisations located inside its boundaries. 
What is more, Parsons' theory of organisations as social systems focuses on a limited 
set of traits common to all organisations (Landsberger 1961). Although these traits 
may be more strongly embodied in some organisations than in others, my critique is 
not so much directed at the deficient attention paid by Parsons to demonstrate 
exceptions to these traits. Instead, my major concern is that he is more interested in 
the traits per se than in how they come into being and how they might change. When 
told that all organisations pursue goals, adapt to their environment, integrate with 
other units within the social system and maintain a set of values employed to 
legitimate their goals and purposes, we are told what drives organisations to do so. 
However, no answer is given as to why organisations emerge in the first place as 
social units expressing these defining characteristics. Parsons therefore takes the being 
of organisations as given and seems to worry little about how organisations (or indeed 
organisation) might change and become different. Since the processes and 
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mechanisms that Parsons talks about take place within the social unit of the 
organisation, and within the larger subsystem of which organisations are part, they 
both lack the dynamism and potential to change. 
These static underpinnings are also evident in Parsons' concept of power outlined in 
the second ASQ article, which he views as a central aspect of organisations. Asserting 
that 'the development of organizations is the principal mechanism by which [ ... ] it is 
possible to "get things done'" (Parsons 1956b: 225), it is the organisation's capacity 
to mobilise power that makes it possible for the same organisation to attain its goals. 
However action-oriented Parsons' concept of power may seem, its primary reference 
to power in terms of resources makes it quite restrictive: 
power IS the generalized capacity to mobilize resources III the interest of 
attainment of a system goal (Parsons 1956b: 225). 
Parsons continues: 
We may speak of power as a generalized societal resource which is allocated to 
the attainment of a wide range of subgoals and to organizations as the agents of 
the attainment of such subgoals. Power is comparable to wealth, which, as a 
generalized societal resource, is allocated to many different societal subsystems 
for "consumptions" or for "capital" use (Parsons 1956b: 226). 
Different people and different organisations do of course haye different preferences 
and priorities and may wish to pursue a \\'ide range of different goals. And Parsons 
acknowledges the possible frictions and conflicts arising bet\\'een people and 
, t' ns bet\\'een personalitv and role requirements. and so on, Hence, Parsons orgamsa 10 , '.
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wants to avoid turning the concept and state of equilibrium discussed in previous 
works into "an empirical generalization" (Parsons 1951: 481). Further on, 'He deems 
it unlikely that organizations can set up mechanisms which will successfully counter 
(let alone prevent) "an inherent centrifugal tendency [ ... ] deriving from the 
personalities of the participants, from the social adaptive exigencies of their particular 
job situations; and possibly from other sources'" (Parsons quoted in Landsberger 
1961: 225; Landsberger's omission). Nevertheless, the emphasis given to frictions and 
conflicts such as the above merely plays a subservient role in Parsons' thinking. In 
toto, frictions and conflicts are judged incapable of undermining society's value 
system and can therefore not jeopardise the existence of the organisation as an entity. 
As Gouldner (1959) and Landsberger (1961) point out, different goals within and 
across different organisations and within society as a whole does not mean that 
different functions are pursued. On this level, i.e. on the level of functions (i.e. AGIL), 
there is an underlying homogeneity, and this is why Parsons, as Landsberger notes, 
believed that his theory was applicable to all kinds of social systems. Landsberger is 
disappointed that Parsons attacks the problem of organisations from this angle. Rather 
than inductively demonstrating the congruence between his own ideas and already 
existing research in organisation theory step-by-step, Parsons makes a deductive 
attempt to apply his own general theory to organisations. Furthermore, Landsberger is 
disappointed to find Parsons' project lacking in length, elaboration and systematicity. 
Overall, however, he finds little reason to dismiss Parsons' perspective, and is 
generally supportive of his project. 
Writing in the same anthology as Landsberger, William Foote Whyte's (1961) article 
'Parsonian Theory Applied to Organizations' is a more negative response. Though 
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noting that Parsons' writings are coloured by him not being an organisation theorist 
but a sociologist attempting a general theory of society, Whyte's main criticism of 
Parsons is the emphasis given to boundary relations, which in tum leaves little 
concern for what goes on inside the boundaries of organisations. According to Whyte, 
Parsons neither deals with the impact of formal organisational structure upon 
behaviour in organisations, nor with the impact of the spatial location of people in the 
organisational architecture. 
In The Sociological Imagination, C. Wright Mills (1959) launches a more general and 
quite fierce attack on Parsons' (1951) The Social System. Here, Mills criticises 
Parsons for developing what he calls a Grand Theory of sociology, i.e. 'the 
associating and dissociating of concepts' (1959: 26). The consequence of this is a 
theory whose concepts are fetishised and rendered universal, and which itself is seen 
to be universally valid too. Given that Grand Theory is not readily understandable, 
Mills admits that it is less influential than the strand of thought that he calls abstracted 
empiricism. Nevertheless, he argues, its impact cannot be underestimated since there 
are many 'who do not claim to understand it' yet 'like it very much' (1959: 26). The 
obscure style of Parsons' work is central to Mills' critique. Offering examples, Mills 
argues that it is so unintelligible that it needs to be translated into straightforward 
English, and supports this argument by setting out to demonstrate how this may be 
done. 
On a more substantial note, Mills highlights two main problems with Parsons' theory. 
First, and given Parsons' assumption that society is always in equilibrium and 
penetrated by mechanisms of socialisation and control, he argues that Parsons is 
unable to explain how people deviate from the norms of society. And second, Mills 
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argues that Parsons' theory is ahistorical in that it is unable to account for social 
change. In relation to this, one might emphasise that Parsons is incapable of 
accounting for change because he assumes that social systems are always seen to be in 
equilibrium. And social systems are seen to be in equilibrium because they are 
boundary-maintaining systems (i.e. they are capable of maintaining their boundaries 
against their outside environment). This is also related to the entitative flavour in 
Parsons' thought, and it can be argued that social systems are able to remain the same 
exactly because they are entities. The implications of this thinking for organisation 
theory and Parsons' thinking about organisations is tremendous. As long as 
organisations are located within the larger bounded entity known as the social system, 
there should be no surprise that organisations undergo little change and that 
organisation too is conceived and conceptualised in terms of bounded entities. 
Whereas I have much sympathy with Mills' (1959) critique of Parsons, my own 
critique is different, and it is worth emphasising that it comes from an almost opposite 
perspective of that pursued by Whyte (1961), Landsberger (1961) and Gouldner 
(1959). It is beyond doubt that Parsons acknowledges the anthropological and 
sociological concept of social organisation as a way of understanding the less formal 
and sometimes informal patterns around which societies and social relations are 
ordered. It can also not be denied that Parsons' concept of organisation looks beyond 
the boundaries of individual organisations, thus making possible the study of the 
social relations between different organisations and their position in the social system 
at large. In my opinion, however, and as implied by certain critics of Parsons' work 
(e.g. Lockwood 1956; Dahrendorf 1958; Ellis 1971), Parsons still pays too much 
attention to the formal and structural aspects of organisation, even when highlighting 
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inter-organisational relations. And, insofar as the development of organisation theory 
is concerned, he insists on dropping issues of social organisation from the field. Thus, 
he makes the reader acutely aware of his favourable stance towards maintaining a 
division of labour within the social sciences. Based on the ontological assumption that 
organisation exists in terms of entities, Parsons implies that organisation theorists 
should adopt an epistemological strategy privileging the study of formal organisations 
and the relations between them. The topic of social organisation, on the other hand, 
should remain with their colleagues in sociology. The relational theme in Parsons' 
proposal for an organisation theory is therefore quite limited. 
But Parsons' overall interest in social relations is also rather limiting, as it discourages 
organisation theorists from thinking about the body in their own research. Parsons' 
bias towards the "relational" and his exclusion of the body is already expressed in the 
first chapter of The Social System. Here, using the organism as an example, he admits 
an interest in the internal structure of the units only insofar as this has bearings on the 
relational system: 
The frame of reference concerns the "orientation" of one or more actors - in the 
fundamental individual case biological organisms - to a situation, which 
excludes other actors. The scheme [ ... ] is a relational scheme. It analyzes the 
structure and processes of the systems built up by the relations of such units to 
their situations, including other units. It is not as such concerned with the 
internal structure of the units except so far as this bears directly on the relational 
system (Parsons 1951: 4). 
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Referring to the functional prerequisites of the social system, Parsons argues that they 
'may be said to begin with the biological prerequisites of individual life, like nutrition 
and physical safety.' This is however not the focus of Parsons' theory of social 
systems: 
The present task is not to attempt to analyze these borderline problems, but only 
to make clear where they fit in relation to the theory of the social system. 
(Parsons 1951: 28). 
In a similar vein, towards the end of the book, Parsons acknowledges the importance 
of biological factors upon the social system. But more importantly, he still dissociates 
these factors from the theory of social systems of action: 
These [i.e. the biological ones] are the variables which concern the constitution 
of the organism insofar as it is independent of the factors of orientation of 
action, and those which concern the physical environment. It is clear that they 
are logically independent of the theory of action, but equally clear that their 
impingement on concrete systems of action is of the first order of empirical 
significance. [ ... ] It should be quite clear that throughout this work we have 
deliberately refrained from attempting to deal with the influence on concrete 
social phenomena of the variables of genetics or physiology or of the variables 
of the physical aspects of the situation (Parsons 1951: 488). 
Nevertheless, Parsons claims that these aspects have not been excluded from his 
theory and he is concerned that the physical or biological factors that influence the 
social system need to be investigated. He insists that this can only be done 
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successfully within a theory of social systems of action. The problem with this is that 
overall, Parsons devotes little attention to explore these aspects, which remain 
marginalised within his theory. The wider consequence is that these aspects have only 
attracted peripheral attention within the social sciences, and few (if any) sociologists 
and organisation theorists have taken up Parsons' initiative. The closest one might get 
is Social Darwinism, which according to Parsons himself 'attempted to treat the 
development of societies in terms of the application of the law of natural selection' 
and 'climatological explanations of social change' (1951: 489). Also, despite speaking 
of the interdependence between biological and social systems, Parsons is less 
interested in the biological or bodily implications of social arrangements and social 
modes of organisation. His interest seems limited to taking for granted the influence 
of physical and biological factors without examining how they might influence and 
change social systems (cf. Parsons 1951: 490-491). Here, Parsons extends his 
emphasis on boundary-maintenance from the level of systems to the level of academic 
disciplines. It is not only a system's stability and equilibrium that is protected by its 
ability to maintain the boundaries towards the external environment. Parsons' 
avoidance of the biological and the bodily also indicates that the identity and interests 
of sociology as a discipline and the social sciences as a family of disciplines are best 
protected by the maintenance of boundaries that inhibit topics traditionally associated 
with the natural sciences from being researched. 
Some fifty pages later (in this which is the concluding chapter of The Social System), 
Parsons yet again emphasises that he is interested in the social relations between 
organisms insofar as individual organisms are actors within social systems, and not in 
the nature of the organism itself: 
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the concern of the sciences of action is with the relations on a certain level of 
the concrete entities, which in their biological relevance are called organisms, to 
their environments. [ ... ] The individual "actor" is a name for the same concrete 
entity as the organism, but seen as a unit in this relational context. However, 
only a certain aspect of the concrete relations of the organism-actor to the 
environment is [ ... ] of interest to the theory of action; this is the aspect we call 
"action" or "behaviour." [ .... ] Action involves not a biochemical conceptual 
scheme but an "orientational" scheme as this conception has been developed 
here and elsewhere. [ .... ] the physico-chemical interchange of organism and 
environment is change over the boundaries of the organism as itself a system, 
the internal processes and equilibrium of which are of primary interest to the 
scientist. [ ... ] But for the theory of action, the organism is not a system, bllt a 
unit point of reference. The focus of interest for the theory of action is not in the 
internal equilibriating processes of the organism as a system, but in the 
equilibriating processes involved in its relations to an environment or situation 
in which other organisms are of crucial significance. It is this relational system 
H'hich is the ~~vstem of action, not the organism as a system (Parsons 1951: 541-
542). 
Consequently, and even though the biological organism is a boundary-maintaining 
system that Parsons claims is analogous to the social system, he is not interested in the 
internal functioning of the biological organism at all because it does not constitute a 
social system as such. Instead, inspired by Durkheim' s (1982) quest for the sui 
generis, he treats individual organisms as mere reference points existing in a wider 
social context and argues that sociology should preoccupy itself with the social 
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relations between individual organisms. In his concluding chapter, Parsons returns to 
abandon the biological organism as a sociological research object, and critiques 
psychology for reducing their interest in human behaviour to the level of the 
individual organism, thus missing out on how organisms behave and interact inside 
social systems. In so doing, Parsons does by all means offer a valuable critique of 
psychology, at least insofar as psychology aims to present itself as a social science. 
Moreover, psychology could be critiqued for the particular model through which it 
seeks to understand the functioning of the human organism. My critique of Parsons is 
therefore not aimed at his critique of psychology. After all, this goes some way in 
encouraging a healthy scepticism towards the natural sciences and naturalism in the 
social sciences. What I find problematic about Parsons' particular scheme is that it 
discourages sociologists, organisation theorists and other social scientists from 
dealing with any topic traditionally associated with the natural sciences. The troubling 
consequence of this is that studies of the body are deemed irrelevant to any social 
science research. 
In my discussion of Parsons' systemic approach to the study of organisations, three 
main findings have emerged. First, that his concept of the social system preceded, 
complemented and informed the entitative concept of organisation upon which 
classical and mainstream organisation theory has been founded. Second, that he 
envisaged an organisation theory preoccupied with the study of formal organisations 
and their relations to the social system at large, thus excluding the study of social 
organisation. And third, that his concept of the social system excluded the body from 
sociology, organisation theory and social science at large. 
Although Parsons is largely ignored in contemporary textbooks in organisation theory, 
the influence that he has exercised upon early organisation theory should not be 
underestimated. Three decades ago, Landsberger (1961: 217) stated (perhaps with 
some surprise) that 'his influence has been noticeable and growing.' And, as we learn 
from Burrell and Morgan's (1979) inquiry into the role of sociological paradigms in 
organisational analysis, the functionalist scheme dominating mainstream organisation 
theory since the founding years of the discipline is strongly coloured by Parsons' 
thinking. 
Elaborating on the influential role of Harvard sociology after the years of the HPC, 
the sociologist and organisation theorist Alvin Gouldner (1973) enables us to view 
Parsons' influence on sociology and organisation in context. In his discussion of 
"systematic" theory in sociology between 1945 and 1955, Gouldner emphasises that 
this area was largely dominated by Harvard sociologists. As the most central works 
had been published by Sorokin, Znaniecki, Homans and Parsons, 
It is noteworthy that all of the above theorists, with the exception of Znaniecki, 
have done their work at Harvard University and it is quite conceivable that this 
has contributed to the important convergence found in their books (Gouldner 
1973: 173). 
Although Parsons was no organisation theorist, and even if institutional centres of 
organisation theory may be identified at Columbia, Carnegie Mellon, Stanford and 
Cornell Universities, Parsons did continue to have tremendous impact on the 
development of the discipline.29 First, through his important articles in the founding 
volume of ASQ and through his translation of Weber. And second, through former 
students moving elsewhere and students of former students carrying the Parsonian 
ethos forward. 
Parsons' influence is perhaps most obvious in other functionalist writings, such as 
Selznick (1949), Blau (1955), Blau and Scott (1962) and Merton (1949), but can also 
be seen in the socio-technical systems theory of people like Katz and Kahn (1966) and 
in the contingency theory of writers such as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Kast 
and Rosenzweig (1973). Particularly work in the two latter camps has claimed an 
open systems perspective of organisations, modelled upon Parsons' biological 
analogy of the living organism and the natural system. Of primary interest here is 
however the classical writings in organisation theory authored by Selznick Blau and 
Scott. But before turning to these three authors, I shall look at the influence of Robert 
Merton. Despite his own studies on bureaucracy (Merton 1939, 1945) and his 
important role in heading the Columbia editorial team responsible for the classic 
anthology Studies in Bureaucracy (Merton et al. 1952), Merton was, like Parsons, a 
general sociologist more than an organisation theorist. And despite his connection to 
Parsons, what C. Wright Mills (1959) calls Merton's middle-range theory was quite 
different from Parsons' Grand Theory sociology. However, through his early 
connection with Parsons and his significant role in mid-twentieth century American 
:'9 Whereas the first three univerSIties mentioned here all hosted significant names in classical 
organisation theory (Merton and Slau were at Columbia, Simon and March were at Carnegie 1\lcllon, 
and Scott was at Stanford), Cornell hosted the first and still most prestigious organisation theory 
journaL Adminisfrafi\'(' Science Quarfer~\', 
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sociology, Merton was central in shaping the later work of Selznick, Blau and Scott 
along a systemic or structural-functionalist research programme. 
4.6 Systemic Perspectives in Early Organisation Theory 
Head of the American Sociological Association (ASA) in 1957 (eight years after 
Parsons) and commonly regarded as a discipline builder in American sociology, 
Merton's relationship with Parsons started to develop during his time in the Sociology 
Department at Harvard University. First a student of both Henderson and Parsons and 
a member of the HPC, Merton worked as a tutor in the Sociology Department 
between 1936 and 1939. 
After his arrival at Columbia University in 1941, Merton was dedicated to carryon 
Parsons' structural-functionalist sociology by other means, and did so most famously 
in Social Theory and Social Structure (1949). Leaving Parsons' Grand Theory 
sociology, Merton pursued middle-range theory as a means to guide empirical 
investigations. In Merton's own words: 
Middle-range theory is principally used in sociology to guide empirical inquiry. 
It is intermediate to general theories of social systems which are too remote 
from particular classes of social behaviour, organization and change to account 
for what is observed and to those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that 
are not generalized at all. Middle-range theory involves abstractions, of course, 
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but they are close enough to observed data to be incorporated in propositions 
that pennit empirical testing. Middle-range theories deal with delimited aspects 
of social phenomena, as is indicated by their labels. One speaks of a theory of 
reference groups, of social mobility, or role-conflict and of the formation of 
social nonns just as one speaks of a theory of prices, a germ theory of disease, 
or a kinetic theory of gases (Merton quoted in Crothers 1987: 55). 
Further on, Merton was committed to reconcile 'objective social structures with the 
subjective feelings and intentions of social actors' (Crothers 1987: back cover). This 
is for instance evident in Merton's (1939) study of the relationship between 
bureaucratic structure and personality. Here, and without associating one particular 
type of personality with the bureaucratic structure, he emphasises the dysfunctions of 
bureaucracy (e.g. red tape) and indicates some ways in which particular personalities 
may result from and support the bureaucratic structure producing such dysfunctions. 
In the introduction to the Reader in Bureaucracy, Merton et al. (1952) demonstrate a 
closer interest in the study of organisation. Outlining their book as a collection of 
different analyses of bureaucracy - from the ancient bureaucracies of China, Egypt 
and Rome to current types - they also emphasise that the book is 'Intended for the 
convenience of students of organization'. Despite claiming that the book is 
'concerned with the sources of bureaucratization, and [ ... ] its consequences for the 
life of men in bureaucratized society' and regarding bureaucracy as a form of social 
organisation (Merton et al. 1952: 11), most of the texts gathered there deal with the 
internal workings of formal organisations. 
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Merton's sociology of organisations is therefore little more than a refurbishing of 
Weber's classic model of bureaucracy, and this fits nicely with Merton's wider 
sociological project, which had a great influence on organisation theorists at the time. 
As Crothers argues, both Merton's ideas about bureaucracy and his overall sociology 
were carried forward by the pioneering organisation theorists March and Simon 
(1958), who sought to offer a formal model of 'the relationship among the different 
components of an organization' (Crothers 1987: 139). Moreover, it should be 
acknowledged that Merton's Columbia seminar on professions influenced what 
Crothers (1987: 37) calls the 'Columbia commentary by [William] Goode and 
[Amitai] Etzioni on types of occupations, limits to the professionalizing strategies of 
occupations and the characteristics of semi-professions.' But rather than focusing on 
the work of March and Simon (1958) and Goode and Etzioni, I shall tum my attention 
to the influence that Merton exercised upon Selznick, Blau and Scott. According to 
Crothers (1987: 37-38), Merton's Columbia seminar on complex organisations and 
the resulting Reader in Bureaucracy, which was particularly influential upon his 
students Selznick and Blau, was significant in that it led to 'an informal research 
programme that developed a MertonianiColumbian model of the dysfunctions and 
workings of complex organizations. ' 
In his organisation theory classic entitled TVA and the Grassroots, Philip Selznick 
(1949) argues that it was Merton's (1945) article 'The role of the intellectual in public 
bureaucracy' that made him emphasise the impact of social structure upon leadership. 
Further on, Selznick draws attention to the importance that Merton had upon his o\\n 
understanding of unintended consequences (cf. Selznick 1949: 254n 11; cf. also 
Merton 1936) and his understanding of organisational needs, which is one of two key 
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elements in Selznick's study of organisations. In a conversation with Selznick, Merton 
pointed out that organisational needs must be understood in terms of 'stable systems 
of variables which [ ... ] are independent' (cf. Selznick 1949: 252). Similarly, in the 
preface to the first edition of The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, Peter Blau (1955) 
highlights the importance of Merton for his own research: 
My great intellectual obligation to Professor Robert K. Merton, whose teaching 
profoundly influenced my sociological thinking, has been further increased by 
the helpful advice and constructive criticism he furnished for the analysis 
presented here (Blau 1955: v). 
Having drawn a brief but crucial link between Merton on the one hand and his 
students Selznick and Blau on the other, I shall now, beginning with the former, 
examine how the entitative concept of organisation is expressed in the work of 
Selznick (1949) and B1au (1955). 
Also known as the founder of institutionalism and for sharing a pursuit of 
communitarian ethics with his former student at Berkeley, Amitai Etzioni, Selznick' s 
TVA and the Grassroots is a study preoccupied with the formal and the bureaucratic. 
But in addition to draw upon Merton, Selznick reveals that his organisational research 
is inspired and informed by Parsons. Outlining his research object in the introductory 
chapter, Selznick introduces a concept of organisation clearly within the tradition of 
Barnard's organisational thinking and Parsons' and Merton's structural-functionalist 
and systemic sociology. As Selznick writes, he 'is not [interested in the] dams or 
reservoirs or power houses or fertilizer' associated with the TVA (i.e. the Tennessee 
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Valley Authority), 'but [with] the nature of the Authority as an ordered group of 
working individuals, as a living institution' (Selznick 1949: 9). 
In my opmlOn, there is little reason to criticise Selznick for not focusing on the 
concrete aspects of the TVA. But even though he does not restrict his study to the 
formal aspects of organisation, his concern with the ordered relations between the 
people working at the TV A is expressive of a concept of organisation preoccupied 
with formal bounded entities rather than the processes of organisation that stretch 
beyond these same entities. According to Selznick, the TVA is most significantly 'a 
social instrument' and 'It is this role as instrument with which this study is directly 
concerned. Or, to emphasise another word, it is TVA as an organization to which our 
attention is directed' (Selznick 1949: 9). 
On the next page, Selznick highlights two aspects that he holds to be the key to 
studying organisations: organisational needs and organisational structure. Although 
organisations are tools, an organisation also has a high degree of sovereignty and 
autonomy, which means that it 'has a life on its own' (Selznick 1949: 10). 
Consequently, an organisation is directed towards fulfilling the goals and needs of 
those for whom it is a tool as well as fulfilling its own goals and needs. The combined 
effect of the organisation's autonomy and its reliance on the outside social 
environment means that the organisation takes on an internal life that 'tends to 
become, but never achieves, a closed system.' The organisation is a closed system 
only insofar as its own needs 'command the attention and energies of leading 
participants.' More specifically, leading organisational members are commanded to 
serve 'the need for some continuity of policy and leadership, for a homogeneous 
outlook, for the achievement of continuous consent and participation in the part of the 
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ranks.' The result is 'an intricate system of relationships and activities, formal and 
informal, which have primarily an internal relevance' (Selznick 1949: 10). 
But whether formal or informal, the systems referred to as organisations are systems. 
And they continue to exist as and be treated as systems no matter how much 
importance Se1znick claims to attribute to the external environment of one particular 
organisation. Indeed, his recognition that 'no organization subsists in a vacuum' 
grounds his further argument that 'the attention of any bureaucracy must be turned 
outward, in defending the organization against possible encroachment or attack' 
(Selznick 1949: 10-11). In other words, Selznick argues that the organisation must 
look outward in order to maintain its own boundaries against the outside environment 
and remain separate from that environment. 
A similar understanding of organisation IS maintained by Blau (1955) in The 
Dynamics of Bureaucracy. Given this title, it is no surprise that Blau is concerned 
with bureaucracies, and in the pursuit of a Mertonian structural-functional and 
systemic research programme, he offers the following definition of bureaucracies: 
Bureaucracies are complex systems of co-ordinated human activities. The 
understanding of these social structures requires a knowledge of the patterns of 
social interaction within them. The goal of this study is to contribute to this 
knowledge on the basis of an intense investigation of small groups of officials in 
two government agencies. The inquiry focuses upon these interpersonal 
relations that developed in these two formal organizations and upon the ways in 
which these relations influenced operations. This examination of the processes 
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of social interaction reveals the dynamic character of bureaucratic structure - its 
mutability (Blau 1955: v). 
Although Blau recognIses and is interested in what he calls the dynamics of 
bureaucracy and emphasises that 'organizations do not statically remain as they had 
been conceived but always develop into new forms of organization' (Blau 1955: 3), it 
is beyond doubt that his study aligns with an entitative and formalistic understanding 
of organisation. The research object of Blau's study is bureaucratic structure and how 
people inside the two bureaucracies under investigation relate to and influence these 
structures. Moreover, the processes he is concerned with are not general processes of 
social organisation, but fundamentally about what goes on inside these organisations. 
And despite Blau's point that 'informal organizations are necessary to the operation of 
formal organizations [ ... J' (Barnard quoted in Blau 1955: 2), 'they are [nevertheless] 
part of the bureaucratic organization' (Blau 1955: 3). 
Developing an explicitly functional approach to the study of organisations, Blau 
makes certain references to Merton's (1949) Social Theory and Social Structure. 
Formal organisations such as bureaucracies are particularly adequate for functional 
analysis, he argues, as 'the main organizational objectives in these agencies were 
clearly defined' (Blau 1955: 7). In tum, this enables a critical examination of 
bureaucratic organisations and an opportunity to reveal their dysfunctions, i.e. 'those 
observed consequences which lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system' 
(Merton quoted in Blau 1955: 8). It is dysfunction that enables structural change. But 
whether intended or unintended, formal or informal, functional or dysfunctional, as 
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long as change is seen to be spurred from within the organisation itself, it is limited 
how much change will or can take place. 
Blau maintains this bias towards organisational entities seven years later in Formal 
Organizations, which was the first textbook devoted exclusively to organisation 
theory and which was co-authored with W. Richard Scott, Blau's PhD student at the 
University of Chicago in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Here, Blau and Scott seek to 
distinguish their subject matter, i.e. formal organisations, from issues of social 
organisation, and on the opening pages they provide the following, somewhat 
tautological definition of social organisation: 
"Social organization" refers to the ways in which human conduct becomes 
socially organised, that is, to the observed regularities in the behaviour of people 
that are due to the social conditions in which they find themselves rather than to 
their physiological or psychological characteristics as individuals (Blau and 
Scott 1962: 2). 
Further on, they identify two main types of social conditions: social structure and 
culture. Social structure is 'the structure of social relations in a group or larger 
collectivity of people', whilst culture is 'the shared beliefs and orientations that unite 
the members of the collectivity and guide their conduct' (Blau and Scott 1962: 2). 
Formal organisations, on the other hand, have been 'formally established', and it is 
'this formal establishment for explicit purpose', Blau and Scott write, which 
'distinguishes our subject matter from the study of social organization in general' 
(Blau and Scott 1962: 3). 
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However, making this choice in favour of formal organisation does not lead Blau and 
Scott to ignorantly dismiss studies of social organisation. Instead, they make the 
rather blunt and perhaps naive statement that the study of formal organisations can 
make great contributions to 'the advancement of systematic sociology.' Since formal 
'Organizations are, on the average, smaller and less complex than communities or 
entire societies,' they can more easily be subjected to controlled experiments (Blau 
and Scott 1962: 14). Blau and Scott elaborate: 
Since the most serious problem in the investigation of social life is to establish 
causal relations by disentangling the interplay among a large number of social 
forces, the fact that some of these are relatively fixed in a formal organization 
and only others vary simplifies the analysis (Blau and Scott 1962: 14). 
And this is why they argue that: 
By controlling in this fashion some of the conditions in the situation, the formal 
organization provides an anchoring point that facilitates deriving and testing 
generalizations about social organization. In sum, the comparative study of 
formal organizations offers great promise for advancing systematic knowledge 
about the organization of social life (Blau and Scott 1962: 14). 
This does however not lead them to actually study social organisation, and I have 
serious doubts as to how much relevance and efficacy the controlled organisational 
experiment has for our ability to understand the organisational aspects of social life. 
Not only are there fundamental problems associated with employing experimental and 
generalising methods in social science research. It is also deeply problematic to 
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reduce the social to a reified systemic entity, not alone to sayan entity that is merely 
seen as a larger and more complex version of formal organisations. These elements of 
Blau and Scott's (1962) research agenda are quite unique. But as we have seen - on a 
more general level - their concept of organisation and privileging of fonnal 
organisations are not; the preoccupation with organisational entities and the lack of 
interest in social organisation is rather typical in mainstream organisation theory. 
Twenty odd years after Formal Organizations, Scott (1981), by now a prominent 
veteran in organisation theory based at Stanford University, publishes a study where 
he tries to combine three different perspectives to the study of organisations: the 
rational systems perspective, the natural systems perspective and the open systems 
perspective. But despite Scott's strong commitment to emphasise the importance of 
organisation-environment relations, his focus on the environment remains secondary 
to the organisation itself. Whilst the rational systems view emphasises that 
'Organizations are social units (or human groupings) deliberately constructed and 
reconstructed to seek specific goals' (Etzioni quoted in Scott 1981: 20), the natural 
systems view argues that organsations are 'systems imbued with a strong drive to 
survive, to maintain themselves as a system' (Scott 1981: 22). According to the open 
systems view, 'an organization is a coalition of shifting interest groups that develop 
goals by negotiation' and that 'the structure of the coalition, its activities, and its 
outcomes are strongly influenced by environmental factors' (Scott 1981: 22-23). 
Despite significant differences between all three perspectives, Scott pursues a concept 
of organisation that highlights how organisations on the one hand are 'tools for 
achieving goals' and on the other are 'actors in their own right' with goals on their 
own (Scott 1981: 6). Although the open systems view emphasises the temporal nature 
of organisational arrangements and the influence exercised by the environment upon 
the organisation, this does not contradict the overall sense in which organisations are 
to be viewed as distinct systems. The open systems view does not ignore the 
importance of organisations being able to maintain their boundaries against the 
environment. 'At one and the same time, organizations must be open to their 
environments and attentive to their boundaries' (Scott 1981: 206). As with Selznick's 
(1949) TVA and the Grassroots, this is a central argument in Scott, and goes to 
reaffirm rather than displace the organisational entity as the subject matter of 
organisation theory. 
Scott remains one of few people in organisation theory to explicitly pursue this kind 
of systemic approach in the study of organisations. However, the privileging of 
organisational entities is by no means brought to an end. In the final part of this 
chapter I shall therefore investigate some of the more recent attempts to conceptualise 
organisation in mainstream organisation theory. Starting with the Australian 
organisation theorist Lex Donaldson, who is one of few mainstream researchers to 
give the concept of organisation any serious thought, the lack of contemporary 
mainstream commentary means that in the latter half of this section I have to engage 
with the rather sporadic and brief traces of a concept of organisation found in 
management and organisation textbooks and encyclopaedia. 
4.7 The Contemporary Mainstream in Organisation Theory 
Making explicit reference to the American pioneer in organisational thinking Chester 
Barnard, Lex Donaldson (1985) puts forward an apparently open concept of 
organisation. Focusing on the goal-directed nature of behaviour in organisations, 
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Donaldson's conceptualisation includes families, criminal gangs and revolutionary 
guerrilla bands: 
An organization may be understood as a set of roles oriented towards securing a 
goal (Barnard 1938). It is any social system which comprises the coordinated 
action of two or more people towards attaining an objective. Organizations are 
purposeful systems. Most commonly they are corporations, schools, 
universities, armies, hospitals and like formal organizations. But they could also 
be families arranging a picnic, or two neighbours helping each other fix a 
common fence, or a criminal gang making a robbery, or a band of guerrillas 
making a revolution. While organizations of the former type usually have a 
legal existence, formal organization and formal boundaries, these characteristics 
are not necessary for the social system to be an organization (Donaldson 1985: 
7). 
Further on, however, whilst referring to some of the most prestigious figures in 
organisation theory, any conceptual openness implied earlier is undennined as 
Donaldson excludes informal and illegitimate organisations from the subject area of 
the organisation theorist by emphasising a quite extensive list of phenomena that are 
characteristic of research in organisation theory: 
What seems to be distinctive of organizational studies is the phenomena of goal-
oriented behaviour, coordination amongst individuals and other properties such 
as degree of differentiation, integration mechanisms, extent of concentration of 
power, authority, communication, legitimation, conflict and so on. This is what 
forms the subject matter. Contemporary statements of Organization Theory 
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reemphasize these common underlying abstract variables (Mintzberg 1979, 
Rage 1980). These are what the writings on organization of Weber, Durkheim, 
March and Simon, Mintzberg, Child, Galbraith and Rage have in common 
(Donaldson 1985: 7-8). 
A similarly exclusive attitude to organisational phenomena is evident in Donaldson's 
discussion of levels of analysis in organisation theory. Although Donaldson (1985: 8) 
cherishes' Abstraction in the definition of organization' for enabling us 'to study more 
than one level simultaneously', he is only concerned with a limited range of levels: 
i.e. the levels of individuals' roles, sections, departments, divisions, subsidiaries and 
whole organisations. What goes on beyond those levels, for instance in society as a 
whole, or inside or on the surface of the body of an individual employee, is of no 
interest. This is made clear later in Donaldson's book, where he rejects the level of 
society or social organisation as a research topic for organisation theory. Discussing 
the Marxist macro-approach of Celia Davies (1979), in which an appeal is made to see 
the organisation of health care in terms of broader societal phenomena, Donaldson 
argues that this is an all too wide perspective to be suitable for application within 
organisation theory. And what Davies does, according to Donaldson (1985: 119), is 
'not an exercise in broadening Organization Theory', but in 'supplanting it by the 
framework of sociological theory.' Donaldson continues: 
There are issues and problems appropriate to Organization Theory, and there are 
concerns and concepts appropriate to societal analysis. But in moving from one 
to another, it is misleading to describe this as if it is a widening of Organization 
Theory, when it is an abandonment, not only of the framework, but of the 
objects of study of that theory (Donaldson 1985: 119-120). 
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According to Donaldson, academics directing their attention to the level of societal 
analysis are therefore not to be considered as organisation theorists: 
Issues to do with the different social groups, their perception of their self-
interest, their mobilization and manoeuvrings for power - these are 
conventionally the province of the general sociologist. The organization theorist 
lay no claim to expertise in the study of such phenomena. Those sociologists 
who wish to study such societal issues, and who naturally adopt a macro 
framework, are, whatever their previous origins and interests, no longer acting 
as organization theorists. To describe such people and their activities as within 
Organization Theory stretches the meaning of the term beyond any real utility 
(Donaldson 1985: 120). 
This does not mean that Donaldson is totally against a broadening of and development 
ofa more interdisciplinary organisation theory. Mentioning the work of Hirsch (1975) 
and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), he welcomes the pursuit and conduct of 
organisational research that goes beyond the typical field of organisation theory to 
appreciate the importance of issues such as the relationship between organisations and 
their environments. These authors have for example studied 'the structures and 
processes employed by organizations to influence governments, competitors and other 
external parties' (Donaldson 1985: 121). Appreciating these contributions, Donaldson 
does however emphasise that more can be gained from leaving the detailed studies of 
such issues to the fields where they have traditionally been conducted. This includes 
political science, economics, law and consumer behaviour, and Donaldson (1985: 
121) adds that 'Specialists with disciplinary backgrounds other than sociology or 
organizational studies have much to contribute here.' In other words, Donaldson's 
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perspective implies that organization theorists should not forget that they are 
organization theorists: 
While there is much to commend in scholars drawing upon the work of 
colleagues from other disciplines there would seem little merit in organization 
theorists attempting to duplicate the work of others who have distinctive 
competence. A sounder approach would be for organizational students to pursue 
enquiries based upon their special expertise and which draw upon their 
particular frameworks. The way forward for research in organizational 
behaviour may well include a fuller study of the environment but it would seem 
sensible to retain as a central reference point the organization within that 
environing field (Donaldson 1985: 121). 
Consequently, and even though he recognIses the importance of studying the 
relationship between organisations and their environments, Donaldson proposes a 
research agenda for organisation theory where the former is always more important 
than the latter. Anything else, it is indicated, will undermine the status of organisation 
theory as a distinct academic discipline designed to improve organisations: 
The field of organizational studies needs to study more fully the interaction of 
the organization with its environment. [ ... ] Likewise, the impact of the 
organization on society in terms of perpetuation, change, social stratification, 
innovation and other outcomes, and the mechanisms by which these are attained 
require further investigation. This will no doubt lead to an enhancement of the 
current theoretical framework in organizational studies. However, some 
continued differentiation between organizational studies and the rest of the 
189 
social sciences seems prudent. Complete assimilation into more general or more 
macroscopic-societal schema to the point that phenomena such as organizational 
structure, which are distinctive of organizations and which traditionally form 
core elements in the subject area, are no longer studied, is to be avoided. 
Considerations of the academic specialization of labour suggest that would be 
unwise (Donaldson 1985: 121). 
In conclusion, 
Moves to widen conventional frameworks are to be applauded, moves to 
eradicate traditional concepts and objects of study are to be resisted (Donaldson 
1985: 122). 
Although few organisation theorists have argued this kind of research agenda in as 
assertive terms as Donaldson (1985), his concept of organisation theory is without 
doubt echoed in more recent accounts in organisation theory (and related areas of 
organisational studies). It is therefore interesting to highlight two textbook accounts of 
the concept of organisation, Huczynski and Buchanan's (1991) Organizational 
Behaviour and Thompson and McHugh's (1990) Work Organisations. Writing from 
very different academico-political viewpoints (the latter from a Marxist perspective 
and the former from a more conservative perspective), it is noteworthy that both are 
best selling textbooks and that both rely upon rather similar concepts of organisation. 
Thompson and McHugh (1990: 13) define organisations 'as consciously created 
arrangements to achieve goals by collective means', whereas Huczynski and 
Buchanan (1991: 7) almost synonymously define organisations as 'social 
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arrangements for the controlled performance of collective goals.' And, as the latter 
continue, it is 'The preoccupation with performance and the need for control [that] 
distinguish organizations from other social arrangements' (Huczynski and Buchanan 
1991:9). 
In a more recent account in the International Encyclopedia of Business and 
Management, Arndt Sorge (1996), the previous editor of Organization Studies, 
highlights two major concerns that are carried forward with the mainstream concept 
of organisation dominant in contemporary organisation theory. The first concerns the 
view that organisation theory should study organisations as opposed to more general 
issues of how people go about organising their everyday lives. And the second 
concerns the view that organisation theory should not impinge upon the territory of 
natural science and extend the concept of organisation to encompass the organisation 
of inert objects and living beings in nature. 
According to Sorge, it is important that organisation theory makes a distinction 
between the concept of organisation in organisation theory on the one hand, and the 
natural science and everyday concepts of organisation on the other. In Sorge's words, 
The distinction is important in order to understand further notions and 
propositions of organization theory (Sorge 1996: 3793). 
This is despite, or rather because of the metaphorical relationship between the natural 
science and everyday concepts of organisation and the concept of organisation in 
organisation theory. Although 'metaphorical relations [make] the understanding of 
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meanings much easier', 'metaphor is also a danger because it can make meanings 
exchangeable which, under rigorous scrutiny, should not be so' (Sorge 1996: 3794). 
Having deemed broader understandings of organisation inadequate because of the 
danger of metaphor, Sorge offers a narrow conceptualisation of organisation that 
refers to 'a particular social unit or collectivity [ ... ] which can be demarcated on the 
basis of the people who belong to them.' This concept does not refer to just any social 
unit. 'Not all social units and collectivities are organizations', and Sorge argues that 
'neither a tribe, nor a family, nor a complete society can be depicted as such.' Instead, 
'organizations may include the Methodist Church, a multinational enterprise, a local 
construction firm, a hospital, and a tank battalion' (1996: 3794). In conclusion, Sorge 
offers a conception that not only distinguishes the concept of organisation in 
organisation theory from uses of the same term used in other contexts. Maintaining 
the distinction between formal organisations and social organisation, he defines 
organisations as units or bounded entities to be separated from other phenomena in the 
social world. The body is one such phenomenon. 
4.8 The Absent Body in Organisation Theory 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, Sorge is not unique in excluding the body 
from organisation theory. On the whole, mainstream organisation theory says very 
little about the body, and in the above I have tried to analyse how the body gets lost 
within this area of research. Among other things, it is by being reduced to an 
organismic metaphor of organisation that organisation theory gets rid of the body. But 
in order to understand how the body gets lost from mainstream organisation theory, it 
is also necessary to say something about why mainstream organisation theory says so 
little about the body. In my introductory chapter, I presented a very concrete and 
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physical body of flesh and blood, bones and tissue, pains and pleasures, habits and 
desires, which has been investigated by a number of feminist authors (e.g. Kristeva 
1982; Irigaray 1985; Grosz 1994) and which gives rise to a range of issues that some 
people might find problematic, including gender, race and sexuality, illness, 
cleanliness and emotionality. If invoked within the Cartesian mind/body dichotomy, 
this is most certainly a messy body that poses a fundamental problem of regulation, 
control and governance to the rational mind of the modem individual and the 
rationalistic discourses and institutions of modem society (cf. Leder 1986; Shilling 
1993; Williams and Bendelow 1998). 
Though I am necessarily speculating here, it may be possible to understand the 
absence of embodiment in mainstream organisation theory exactly in relation to the 
prevalence of Cartesianism in this same disciplinary field of knowledge production. 
Since (and even before) the days of the HPC, there has been a strong sense in which 
organisation theorists and other organisational researchers have praised and privileged 
the rationalistic and the cerebral. Frederick Taylor's (1947) Scientific Management, 
for example, prescribes a strong hierarchical division of labour between executive 
"thinking tasks" to be performed by an "intelligent" managerial elite, and manual 
"doing tasks" to be performed by "unintelligent" muscle-strong workers. Though the 
privileging of the rationalistic and the cerebral may be less explicit in the work of the 
HPC, there is for example in Mayo's (1933) writings on the Hawthorne Experiments a 
rather patronising attitude against the manual body-workers studied: that, following 
some kind of placebo effect, their work effort is more influenced by the mere presence 
of a group of white-coated Harvard researchers than by "real" changes in the physical 
work environment. Not only does this confirm the power of management practitioners 
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and researchers to manipulate the workforce. It also shows a degrading attitude 
towards everything bodily, including the working body. A similar attitude is evident 
in the contemporary mainstream of management and organisation theory. Here, a 
number of authors have pursued the relatively recent areas of knowledge management 
and e-business almost as if they - at least implicitly - offer the very final solution to 
get rid of the body from organisational life (cf. e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995: 
Boisot 1998; Cortada 1998; Davenport and Prusak 1998; Amor 1999: Brewer and 
Hewitt-Boorman 2000; Liautaud with Hammond 2000; Willcocks et al. 2000). In a 
business environment where commercial trade is seen to occur through completely 
disembodied computer networks and services are seen to be produced by the 
disembodied and rational mind alone - a mind that lives and exists independently of 
any carnal body - one is no longer chased by the problems of the body. It is almost as 
if one can eliminate illness, stress and absenteeism, the irritable and upsetting odours 
of the near-by colleague, the need for cigarette and coffee breaks and visits to the 
lavatory, and the need to rest, eat and sleep. In conclusion, it seems that the body is 
absent from organisation theory because of all the problems and disruptions that are 
seen to emerge in its presence. 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a brief and selective history of the concept of organisation 
in twentieth century and contemporary organisation theory. Taking as my staring 
point a group of people and a body of research preceding organisation theory as a 
distinct academic discipline, I have tried to demonstrate that the Harvard Pareto Circle 
(HPC) provided the pre-disciplinary roots from which the classical and contemporary 
mainstream concept of organisation as organisational entities developed. As such, the 
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HPC not only steered the focus of students of organisation towards problems 
associated with the organisation of production. It also provided an important 
intellectual context from which the concept of organisation - understood as the 
organisation of production - was produced. Further on, and despite early interest in 
the biomedical organism (particularly evident in the research of Henderson (1928, 
1935) and Mayo (1933)), writers associated with the HPC began to privilege the 
social above the organismic to such an extent that later organisation theorists and 
other social scientists were discouraged from exploring issues of embodiment, 
including ways in which the body poses a problem for organisation. Somewhat 
paradoxically given Henderson's interest in the biomedical organism and his impact 
on the HPC membership, Mayo and Parsons were particularly influential in this 
respect. Overall, it may be argued that the influence of the HPC - and particularly that 
of Henderson, Mayo and Parsons - lasted right throughout the 1960s, and dominated 
the work of leading organisation theorists such as Selznick, Blau and Scott. Since 
their writings, a very similar concept of organisation has been maintained explicitly 
by the isolated efforts of people such as the mainstream theorist Lex Donaldson. 
Moreover, it continues to be reiterated in recent textbooks and encyclopaedias. In 
common for all these conceptualisations is an emphasis on boundaries and an absence 
of the body. And less explicitly, but just as importantly, this disembodied and 
entitative concept of organisation is maintained by organisational researchers who 
typically take organisation for granted in their empirically oriented studies of the 
organisation of production, whether involving banks, car manufacturers, hospitals or 
oil companies. Seemingly, mainstream organisation theory deals with the problem of 
the body by not dealing with it at all. It is as if the problems associated with the body 
go away or at least become less problematic if ignored and left alone. 
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To some extent, and even if in a much more simplistic fashion than has been 
examined here, the disembodiment of organisation through entitative thinking also 
comes across in certain subject-specific dictionaries for the business and management 
field. In their Dictionary of Management, French and Saward (1983: 309) argue that 
organisation is 'a set of definitions and positions which are intended to enable the 
position holders to work together to carry out certain tasks.' Moreover, organisation is 
seen to be about 'the group of people holding positions in an organisation' associated 
with 'The act or process of organizing' or 'A result of organizing'. 
Thus far, not even the brief reference to the 'process of organizing' departs 
significantly from the conceptualisations considered throughout this chapter because 
any such process seems confined within the boundaries of a formal organisation. But 
if consulting The Oxford Dictionary for the Business World (1993), the subject matter 
becomes more complicated and more open-ended. Here, "organisation" as such is 
defined as 'organizing or being organized' or as an 'organized body, system or 
society'. And if one looks up the same term in the second edition of the Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED), one finds no direct reference to what organisation theorists 
tend to speak of as an organisation, i.e. a formal organisational entity such as a 
business enterprise, a government agency or a voluntary association. Instead, in rather 
general terms, organisation is defined as 'The action of organizing or putting into 
systematic form' and 'the arranging and co-ordinating of parts into a systematic 
whole.' Further on, organisation is associated with the concept of social organisation 
in sociology and anthropology. Most importantly, however, the definitions offered in 
the OED indicate that the word has strong connotations to issues of biology, medicine 
and embodiment. Organisation is defined as the condition of being organised as a 
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living being or the fact or process of becoming organised or organic. In rather 
concrete terms, one is informed that an organisation is an organised structure, body or 
being, i.e. an organism. 
These somewhat paradoxical definitions of organisation found in conventional 
dictionaries within and outside the fields of management and organisation theory are 
not simply evidence of errors easily committed by non-specialist encyclopaedists. 
Rather, they illustrate a strong connotation between organisation and the body and a 
preoccupation with organising the body. But as I hope to demonstrate in the next 
chapter, the tradition springing out of the HPC is not total in its domination of the 
concept of organisation within organisation theory either. In parallel to recent 
mainstream research on organisations, the concept of organisation has been thought 
by different bodies of research. For example, springing out of a strand of thought 
occupying an institutional realm outside the business school and taking inspiration 
from the Frankfurt School and thinkers such as C. Wright Mills and Ralf Dahrendorf, 
Marxist and leftist Weberian organisation theorists have approached organisation as a 
phenomenon manifest and supportive of the class and value structures in society as a 
whole (e.g. Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). But it is not to this thinking I shall direct my 
attention in the following chapter. Instead, I shall deal with a group of scholars that, 
bearing on the ideas of twentieth century social theory and French philosophy inter 
alia, writes from a different periphery of organisation theory. This group, which 
includes names such as Robert Cooper, Haridimos Tsoukas and Robert Chia (all of 
whom will be examined below), and which views organisation as a processual matter 
of the production of organisation, may be seen to open up the concept of organisation 
in organisation theory. What primarily interests me, howeyer. is the following. How 
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does this strand of thought deal with the problem of the body? And when it comes to 
thinking about the body, is this strand of thought much different from the mainstream 
work examined thus far? 
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Chapter 5 
Organisation Theory and the Production of Organisation 
5.1 Introduction 
Having examined some key texts in classical and mainstream organisation theory, it is 
possible to see that the concept of organisation maintained in this body of thought, 
which is heavily informed by the concepts of the system and the organism, leads to 
the epistemic privileging of formal organisational entities and the exclusion from 
organisation theory of issues of social organisation and embodiment. Departing from 
Burrell et al. 's (1994: 6) position that 'the concept of "organization" and the practice 
of "organizational analysis" have always been contested intellectual and institutional 
terrains', I shall in this chapter investigate some of the attempts to think about 
organisation in terms of processes rather than entities. Whereas the majority of the 
literature examined in chapter 4 constitutes quite a particular yet dominant strand of 
thought in organisation theory, it should be noted that the thinkers and ideas that I 
now tum my attention to - with one major exception - are all part of a very different 
tradition in social science and organisational research. Not only do most of them write 
from an institutional base in the UK, but they are concerned with organizational issues 
beyond the confined sphere of formal organisational entities, and they also draw upon 
a different body of literature and pursue a different research agenda from their 
mainstream counterparts. This focal difference is perhaps best summed up by Cooper 
and Burrell (1988: 106), who draw our attention to the polarisation between these two 
ways of thinking about organisation. Whereas the former is preoccupied with the 
organisation of production within organisational entities, the latter argues for an 
approach by which the production of organisation within and without organisational 
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entities is highlighted and becomes a key dimension in its own right. Since I examined 
the former in the previous chapter and since I am primarily concerned with the latter 
in this chapter, I shall ask the following two questions. First, what concept of 
organisation emerges from this alternative stream of thought? And second, how does 
this strand of organisation theory deal with the problem of the body? 
In light of these two questions this chapter focuses on four organisation theorists: Karl 
Weick, Robert Cooper, Haridimos Tsoukas and Robert Chia - in that order. Although 
Weick stands out in more than one respect from the other three (inter alia he is an 
American scholar who, as former ASQ editor and long time Professor at the 
University of Michigan, occupies a central position in mainstream organisation 
theory), his writings are among the first to suggest a break from the concept of 
organisation examined in the previous chapter. 30 And in some interesting ways, which 
should become clearer in a moment, his thinking precedes the alternative concept of 
organisation developed later by Cooper, Tsoukas and Chiao But because Weick 
precedes, complements and contradicts rather than develops this alternative concept of 
organisation, it is the ideas of the other three that constitutes my main focus. Although 
Weick emphasises the importance of studying organisational processes and activities 
and prefers to speak in terms of organising rather than organisations, the 
organisational processes and activities examined in his work are typically confined 
within the boundaries of organisational entities. Cooper's, T soukas' and Chia' s main 
30 Although most readers now rely upon the second edition of Wei~~'s The Social ,~sycho'og)' of 
Organizing, which was published in 1979, ten years after the first edltlOn. the two edlttons are,l,lttk 
different in conceptual terms, It is on this basis that I argue that Weick preceded the processuaI \\ntmgs 
of Cooper, which were first published in 1976, 
contribution to organisation theory is significantly different from Weick's in the sense 
that they are amongst the strongest advocates of an organisation theory committed to 
the study of organisational processes and activities that stretch beyond the boundaries 
of organisational entities. 
Before movIng on to discuss Weick's (1969, 1979) concept of organisation it is 
necessary to dwell upon the intellectual background that informs processual thinking 
in organisation theory. Somewhat ironically, Max Weber, who is frequently honoured 
in mainstream textbooks and commentary as the founder of organisation theory (e.g. 
in Huczynski and Buchanan 1991), figures prominently in the works of organisation 
theorists outside the mainstream keen to rethink the concept of organisation beyond 
the epistemic construct of organisational entities. But whereas mainstream thinkers 
typically focus on quite a limited dimension of Weber's thinking, especially on his 
model of the modern bureaucratic organisation and its formal structure, the group of 
thinkers that I am concerned with here are preoccupied with the broadest aspects of 
Weber's sociological project. This is brought out by Cooper and Burrell (1988), who 
elaborate on the relevance of Weber for their own research agenda by emphasising 
how Weber's thinking serves as an important starting point for conceptualising 
organisation as a process: 
Weber made us see modern organization as a process which emblemized the 
rationalization and obj ectification of social life [ ... ]. [ ... ] the obj ect of his 
analysis was modern bureaucratic organization as a process in the continuing 
mastery of the social and physical environment rather than organizations per se 
(Cooper and Burrell 1988: 92-93). 
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Cooper and Burrell then contrast Weber's perspective with that of 'contemporary 
modes of organizational analysis', which they claim views 'the organization as a 
discrete system which subordinates bureaucratic logic to its hypostatized needs.' For 
Weber, however, 'the very concept of organization was placed in question as an 
uneasy fabrication' (Cooper and Burrell 1988: 93). 
Ten years later the leading impact of Weber upon this strand of thought is 
reconfirmed by Chia (1998: 5), who in his Festschrift to Cooper alongside Weber lists 
Durkheim and Foucault as significant in thinking organisation as a 'generic ordering 
process'. In an interview appearing in the same Festschrift, Cooper again emphasises 
the importance of Weber for thinking about organisation as a 'general force' (cf. Chia 
and Kallinikos 1998: 154). It is therefore beyond doubt that Weber is central to the 
alternative conceptualisation of organisation attempted by processual thinkers in 
organisation theory. 
5.2 Karl Weick and the Social Psychology of Organising 
Although Karl Weick presents a concept of organisation different from the 
mainstream view discussed in chapter 4, his intellectual starting point also differs 
from that of Cooper, Chia and other writers associated with a processual or generic 
research agenda. Unlike this stream of thought, Weick, who is a social psychologist 
by training pays no attention to Weber's ideas, for example. His concept of 
organisation or organising emphasises those activities that seek to reduce uncertainty 
and achieve what he calls 'a consensually validated grammar': 
orgalli::ing [ ... ] is defined as a consensually validated grammar for reducing 
equivocality by means of sensible interlocked behaviors (\\' eick 1979: 3). 
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In a similar vein, he argues that to organise is: 
to assemble ongOIng interdependent actions into sensible sequences that 
generate sensible outcomes (Weick 1979: 3). 
Weick clarifies these definitions by first contrasting them to two more traditional 
conceptualisations - one by Vickers and one by Hunt - and then by elaborating on his 
own. Taking an obvious structuralist starting point, Vickers argues that organisations 
are characterised by structures of mutual role expectancy (what you expect from 
others and what others expect from you). Given this structural emphasis, it is fairly 
limited how much change the pattern of roles that constitutes an organisation 
undergoes. Hunt's structuralism is perhaps more obvious and more in line with the 
perspective discussed in the previous chapter because he views an organisation as 'an 
identifiable social entity pursuing multiple objectives through the coordinated 
activities and relations among members and objects' (Hunt quoted in Weick 1979: 3). 
What makes Weick's concept different from these two is that he is preoccupied with 
that which is necessary to establish the kind of structures that Vickers and Hunt are 
interested in. More specifically, the reduction of uncertainty requires the achievement 
of consensus through the reduction of disparate perceptions. This is known as 
consensual validation: 
Organizing is first of all grounded in agreements concerning what is real and 
illusory, a grounding that is called consensual .... alidation. [ ... J The important 
issues of consensus in organizing concern rules for building social processes out 
of behaviors and interpretations that can be imposed on the puzzling inputs to 
these processes. 
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Here, he also returns to the notion of organising as grammar, effectively making a 
point central in the mainstream literature, that organisation is about "getting things 
done": 
Organizing is like a grammar in the sense that it is a systematic account of some 
rules and conventions by which sets of interlocked behaviors are assembled to 
form social processes that are intelligible to actors. It is also a grammar in the 
sense that it consists of rules for forming variables and causal linkages into 
meaningful structures [ ... ] that summarize the recent experience of the people 
who are organized. The grammar consists of recipes for getting things done [ ... ] 
(Weick 1979: 3-4). 
Further on, information becomes a central problem III Weick's conceptualisation. 
Information is typically ambiguous, uncertain and equivocaL and although full 
certainty is rarely required and different industries and organisations require different 
levels of certainty, Weick (1979: 6) argues that organising is about achieving 'a 
workable level of certainty.' What this boils down to is that grammar is the solution to 
the problem of equivocal information and uncertainty. And as such, applying a 
particular grammar is the key activity of organising. Weick's emphasis on grammar, 
information and "organising" as opposed to "organisation" underlines the processual 
theme in his work. But in contrast to the work of Cooper (1976, 1990) and other 
students of the production of organisation, Weick's (1969, 1979) concept of 
organisation is overly focused towards the organisation of production. 
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5.3 Robert Cooper, the Open Field and Organisation/Disorganisation 
Less than a decade after Karl Weick's (1969) first emphasis on activities of organising 
as opposed to the dominant concern amongst organisation theorists with the formal 
structures of organisations, Robert Cooper (1976), who also is a social psychologist 
by training, published a piece in Human Relations entitled 'The Open Field'. 
Although some of Weick's concepts recur in Cooper's article, such as grammar and 
infonnation, Cooper's interest in these concepts takes quite a different form, both in 
terms of style, the use of intellectual sources31 and the research objectives pursued. 
Whereas Weick writes for both academic, student and practitioner audiences, 
Cooper's advanced and sometimes obscure style makes his ideas less accessible to the 
latter two audiences. Cooper may share Weick's view that organisation is about 
reducing uncertainty, but he avoids turning this into a normative prescription. Being 
far more critical of organisation than Weick, he also manages to pay more attention to 
those processes that undennine organisation (e.g. creativity). And despite 
acknowledging that organisational practices and processes often take place within so-
called organisations, he does not, unlike Weick, limit his inquiry to such processes: 
first, by studying disorganisational or nonorganisational processes that exceed and 
disrupt the boundaries of organisation, and second, by studying organisational 
processes that take place outside the boundaries of organisational entities. It is to these 
two dimensions in Cooper's work that my inquiry here will attend. First, by 
31 Although Weick (1979) imokes som~ of the same thi~kers as Cooper (e.g. Gregor:- Bateson and 
William James), he does so in a way that IS far more eclectIC and superfiCIal than Cooper. 
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investigating Cooper's (1976) article 'The Open Field', and second, by investigating 
his article 'Organization/Disorganization' (1990). 
Before turning to 'The Open Field', it might be interesting to make a brief comment 
on Cooper's relationship to organisation theory. Whereas the worst discourtesy 
amongst philosophers involves accusing one's colleague of not doing philosophy, 
similar accusations do not seem to have the same effect in organisation theory. With 
regards to Cooper, who very rarely associates himself with organisation theory and 
much rather would like to be associated with social theory and social philosophy, such 
accusations are likely to have the opposite effect. Partly due to Cooper's uneasiness 
with the narrow research agenda of mainstream organisation theory, it is likely that 
Cooper would be more offended to see his own work categorised as organisation 
theory than not. However, given Cooper's important contribution to organisation 
theory, and given that his readership consists largely of organisation theorists, I am 
willing to take this risk here. 
Though inscribed in a highly gendered and male-centred language, Cooper's 'The 
Open Field' is an unusually creative piece of work. Creativity is not, however, a 
guarantee for clarity and rigour, and Cooper's argument is sometimes opaque and 
under-developed. Perhaps this is the inevitable result of five years of thinking during 
which Cooper enjoyed a Baxi Fellowship at Liverpool University and at the end of 
which he published 'The Open Field,.32 
32 In order to appreciate Cooper's early work. it is also. wort~ noting that he in 19~-l publishc~ the fairly 
standard textbook Job Motivation and Job Design wnttcn In a style and expressmg a set ot Ideas that 
stand in rather stark contrast to his later publications. Moreo\cr. the kind of ideas that Cooper \\ as 
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With 'The Open Field', which is not explicitly concerned with the concept of 
organisation, Cooper not only becomes the first writer within organisation theory to 
think radically differently about human action, but in doing so, he also comes to mark 
the beginning of a whole new trend in organisational theorising which is to 
complement, but more importantly contradict mainstream organisation theory. 
Although Cooper makes no explicit reference to Weber in this article, he does in the 
interview with Chia and Kallinikos conducted more than twenty years later confirm 
the influence that Weber's thinking had upon the theme developed in 'The Open 
Field' : 
The concerns addressed by 'The Open Field' were [ ... J related, I felt, to Max 
Weber's critique of the modem world's pre-occupation with rationality and 
purging of magic from the world' (Cooper in Chia and Kallinikos 1998: 153). 
More generally, however, what Cooper tried to do with 'The Open Field' was 'to 
open up social science to neglected and excluded possibilities, to draw attention to its 
dereliction of intellectual duty, to its lack of vision, to its limiting positivism and its 
squeamish obeisance to the mundane' (Cooper in Chia and Kallinikos 1998: 152). 
Although his social psychology background is reflected in 'The Open Field', this 
concern led Cooper to study intellectual developments in the humanities and the 
engaged with at that time were not exposed (to my knowledge) in any publications prior to 'The Open 
Fidd'. 
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natural sciences, including controversial ideas within philosophy, poetry, physics and 
mathematics. 
It is what Cooper calls 'the wavering balance between structure and process' that 
marks the starting point for his analysis of human action in 'The Open Field'. This, he 
argues, is something that' As social scientists, we are probably less attentive [to] than 
we should be'. Whereas 'Structure is the invariant pattern of relationships among 
functional points in a system, [ ... ] process is the continuous emergence of new 
elements from those already existing.' And as becomes clearer throughout the paper, 
it is the privileging of structure (qua stability) above process (qua change) that 
typically leads social scientists to pay insufficient attention to the balance between the 
two. The problem according to Cooper is that 'Though seemingly in contrast, 
structure and process complement each other both as concepts and in the real world' 
(Cooper 1976: 999). 
From this starting point, Cooper proceeds first by pointing to the limitations of 
structuralist approaches to human action and perspectives showing a structuralist bias 
in understanding process, and second by developing a more genuinely processual 
perspective of human action. Dissatisfied with the initially interesting but teleological 
conceptualisation of process in systems theory, Cooper (1976: 100 I) decides to break 
out of "social science proper" in search for 'a conceptualization appropriate to the 
process view of man.' This involves two things. First, adopting the Whiteheadian 
view that 'man and environment [are] mutually immanent in a unitary field.' In other 
words, recognising that humans are neither passive reflectors nor dominating actors 
but a node in a larger network of "to-and-fro influences". And second, adopting 
Heidegger's concept of Dasein, which implies that the human is e\"er open and 
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unfinished. That is to say, as humans we experience ourselves and our world as an 
"open field". But since concepts pin down and freeze processes, simply defining the 
open field is insufficient. The really important task is to enact the open field. In the 
main part of this paper he is therefore concerned with (i) discussing the conditions of 
process that enable the open field, and (ii) outlining a methodology for how process 
can be used on a personal level for the creation of an open field. Cooper identifies five 
such conditions: unstructured action, chance, projectability, the situation and the 
abstract field. 
First, Cooper exammes unstructured action or "the pnmacy of action", which 
involves the creation of "pure action", that is the liberation or independence of action 
from some guiding image or purpose that would normally put certain constraints and 
requirements upon action. Here, he highlights three "mechanisms of change" through 
which action intervenes into the social world. These are (i) the open model form of 
planned change, (ii) crisis, and (iii) rupture. Exemplified by action research and 
broad-aim programmes in community development, the open model form of planned 
change is a type of change programme that starts from a broad conception of what 
change is desired and avoids privileging specific strategies and solutions from the 
outset. Crisis is an externally generated experience that 'destroys or radically 
questions' core values in ways that human actors lose control and leaves humans with 
no ready means of coping. And rupture, which Cooper relates to Surrealism and the 
May 1968 French Revolution is 'a self-generated break with established structures' 
whereby the human actor may be liberated from oppressive living and working 
conditions (Cooper 1976: 1003). This emphasis on rupture places Cooper in relation 
to the coupurism of twentieth century French philosophy described in chapter 3 and as 
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exemplified in the works of Bachelard (1984, 2000), Canguilhem (1989, 1994) and 
Foucault (1970, 1972, 1979). But like Canguilhem, whose support towards the events 
of May 1968 was limited - after all, Canguilhem had worked to consolidate the very 
institutions under attack (Macey 1998) - Cooper's prescription of rupture is in some 
contrast to his own personal attitude towards May 1968; Cooper is rather 
uncomfortable with the activities of student protesters. 
Second, Cooper (1976: 1003) discusses the nature and importance of chance, i.e. 
'when the unexpected coincide.' Since it is through chance that human actors start 
interacting with possibilities, it is chance that augments our capacity for "spontaneous 
growth". According to Cooper, the experience of chance and the capacity for 
spontaneous growth can be realised through two strategies: (i) suspended purpose and 
(ii) induced disorder. Suspended purpose, which is a matter of enhancing the mind's 
awareness of the world, means that the mind must give up its right to control. Induced 
disorder is the way in which the human actor can challenge herself through self-
imposed chaos - either by disordering herself or the outside world. This may in tum 
enable her to enter into another beginning of creative renewal. These are however 
private acts, and even though they enable humans to remake themselves, they must be 
developed into "a principle of social design" if human beings are to remake each 
other. For Cooper, this is similar to Richard Sennett's (1971) 'vision of urban life 
where the "brute chance" of spontaneous social intrusions becomes a major means of 
personal and interpersonal growth' (Cooper 1976: 1005). 
Third, Cooper directs his focus on projectability, which he defines as (i) 'the power of 
men to project their unconscious forces into the external world', and (ii) 'the power of 
external forms to draw out and give substance to the unconscious content.' As such, 
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'Projectability is [ ... ] a quality that pervades the total field' (Cooper 1976: 1005). 
Cooper establishes the project, or 'that which is "thrown forward" to modify the 
future', as the instrument for projectability. As a process moves between projection 
(i.e. the 'coming into being of [oo.J inner content') and construction (i.e. 'the form 
taken by the projection in the external world'), the project may either move 
"naturally" from projection to construction or "epigenetically" from construction to 
projection. The management of individual products and the relations between 
individual products are central to the former type because the relations between 
products and the continuous emergence of new products necessitates an ongoing 
redefinition of any individual product. The latter type of project, which is 'impatient 
to be realized' (Cooper 1976: 1006), realises a form in the outside world before 
having a content with which to fill that form. Consequently, it is the elaboration and 
expansion of the project's repertoire of structures that enables it to change. 
Unfortunately, Cooper does not confirm whether in this context structure is a matter 
of form or content or both. However, attacking him for reintroducing a structuralist 
bias here would be to misunderstand his intentions. As I noted above, Cooper does not 
want to replace structure with process. In an attempt to move away from the 
structuralist bias, he shows how structure and process contradict and complement one 
another. Rather than reaffirming the stability of structure, his emphasis on process in 
the context of the project undermines any such stability. 
Fourth, Cooper examines the situation, which is 'the immediately perceived field of 
actualities ( objects, events), i.e. the concrete context in which we carry out our lives' 
(Cooper 1976: 1006). Concreteness is a key dimension here because the situation 'is 
full of definite objects and events which strike our perception in definite ways' and 
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give us power to act as well as a target at which action can be directed. Further on, 
since the situation is a matter of difference and autonomy, it necessitates 'a theory of 
discontinuous and heterogeneous experience' (Cooper 1976: 1007). It is this that 
enables us to view as individually active the multiple parts constituting the situation. 
And it is this that enables us to understand that it is its local and variable nature that 
makes the situation unique. The situation is about the here-and-now. Avoiding 
viewing the thing in terms of abstracted images, Cooper insists that situational 
experience must focus on the things themselves and their interactions. Indeed, the 
thing must neither be separated from itself nor from activity. This leads Cooper to two 
conclusions. First, the somewhat confusing point that the situation follows "the logic 
of discursive action" rather than "the logic of linear structure", which is his way of 
saying that 'things can and do happen according to their own impulse and action.' 
Appreciating Cooper's point about impulsiveness and self-direction, what I find 
confusing here is simply Cooper's use of the term "discursive action", as there is not 
necessarily anything about the "discursive" which is nonlinear. If it were, Cooper 
would have to explain what it is about the "discursive" that makes it nonlinear. 
Second, Cooper concludes that things are both cause and effect. They both act and are 
acted upon, and as a result, the human cannot merely be understood as a creative 
being. Whatever is created by a human being 'turns back and creates him' (Cooper 
1976: 1008). This is a particularly interesting point, as it decentres the human subject 
and undermines the anthropocentrism of conventional social science and philosophy. 
Fifth, Cooper discusses what he terms the abstract field, or what Whitehead would 
call an "extensive continuum" and Bergson and Deleuze would refer to as "the 
virtual". As it stretches beyond the situation, it is through the abstract field that 
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process is given a larger meaning, "the many become one", and the world becomes 
one big and united cosmic Whole. Relationship is the central dimension of the 
abstract field. Relationship as connection is the basis of meaning; relationship is what 
unites the many into one; and "the combinatorics of relationship" is what enables the 
many to combine in an infinite number of various ways, thus producing "a unity of 
difference" (Cooper 1976: 1008). Moreover, it is through the processual cosmology of 
the abstract field that the development of individuals is connected to the evolution of 
the world as a Whole. This world is however both noumenal and phenomenal, both 
abstract and literal, and Cooper insists that it is only through the latter that the human 
can grasp the former. That is, the human can only make sense of the noumenal 
abstract field insofar as s/he is firmly grounded in the phenomenal literal field of 
spatially and temporally discrete and denotable things and events. This is because the 
abstract field is a continuity of not-yet-realised forms. But sense-making and the 
search for facts and reason is not really what is at stake here. First and foremost, what 
Cooper seeks to show here, is that the abstract field enables the human to live 
amongst uncertainties and in a condition of indeterminacy that expands and diversifies 
the area in which human action can take place. 
In the final section of his paper, drawing upon ideas from the structuralist 
anthropologist Gregory Bateson, the American poet Charles Olson and yet again 
Whitehead (whom we know as an affiliate of the HPC), Cooper seeks to envisage how 
the open field, being the condition of process, can be used rather than just analysed. 
Use involves two endeavours: "to find out" and "to make". "To find" out means to 
acquire knowledge or information about a process. This is achieved by placing oneself 
within and experiencing the process, and by carefully drawing upon other people's 
213 
expenences of the process. Information in this respect is (i) difference (in the 
cybernetic sense, which means that one piece of data is compared and contrasted with 
another piece of data) and (ii) 'what goes into form, i.e., [that which] in-forms' 
(Cooper 1976: 1012; emphasis omitted). In other words, 'difference is the key to 
form' and 'to find out is to be in form' (Cooper 1976: 1012). In conclusion, knowing 
oneself more fully requires knowing oneself in the world and not as separate from the 
world. "To make", on the other hand, is to present the content you have found within 
an adequate form that enables you to express the diverse nature of process (Cooper 
1976: 1012). But as well as enabling expression, "to make" is a moral act of 
impression that has an effect upon the outside world. Consequently, it is clear that "to 
find out" is also a moral act: 'the more you find out, the more you can make' (Cooper 
1976: 1012). 
Finally, Cooper discusses the challenge of inventing a set of practical mechanisms 
that may enable people to actually make use of the open field and suggests four 
starting points from which a practice of process can be developed and activated: force, 
medium,form and meaning. Force is central to all processes because process involves 
the transfer of force from an agent to an object, and because force - being the energy 
of process - is what makes action possible. Force can be applied in two main ways, 
either as a means to resolve, complete and bring a process to an end (by which one 
finally loses force), or (and this is the approach suggested by Cooper), it can be 
applied continuously as a means to get involved with and stay in a process without 
terminating it. The human is her own medium for process. For process to be possible, 
however, the human must perceive through her senses rather than through her ego. It 
is this decentralised kind of perception that enables the human to open up towards the 
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rest of the world and become attentive to difference. Form refers back to Cooper's 
notions of the abstract field and information discussed above. Rather than forcing 
content into a categorical form, one must enable form to contain difference and 
recognise that form is a unity of difference and not unity as such. Consequently, form 
is an "unfinished business" that continuously changes with the content that dwells 
inside it. Finally, Cooper argues that meaning resides in individuated wholeness, i.e. 
the process by which the psyche realises itself. The paradox is that whereas 
individuation means separation, wholeness means integration. The challenge here is 
therefore to remain united and differentiated at the same time. 
What this boils down to is the self-management of all our activities. In order to 
develop a processual practice for the open field, one must start with oneself, change 
how one uses oneself and from there move into and change the outside world. Since 
they work through institutions, Cooper argues that Marxism and democracy do not 
allow sufficient space for our "real selves". 'Democracy is not enough' (Cooper 1976: 
1 0 16). Instead, we are encouraged to recreate everyday life. One might ask what 
audience it is that Cooper invites and encourages to recreate everyday life. It is 
unlikely that just anyone and everyone would be attracted by his invitation. First, 
given the theoretical bias, density and complexity of his argument, it runs the risk of 
becoming an appeal confined to a small intellectual elite. Second, given his 
malestream language, it is more likely to appeal to a male readership than a female 
one. And third, one might question the politics implied by Cooper in 'The Open 
Field'. Cooper's (almost one-sided) emphasis on process leaves little feel for the 
J 1 -
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permanency of social relationships and the boundaries that obstruct resistance and 
prevent things from changing.33 
Having sought 'to define an epistemology of process as a basis for the development of 
expressive and creative action' within a world that he understands as an open field 
(Cooper 1976: 999), Cooper (1990) returns to the problem of process in his article 
entitled 'Organization/Disorganization'. But whereas 'The Open Field' seeks 
primarily to develop a processual understanding of the world and a processual 
strategy for creative human action, 'Organization/Disorganization' applies processual 
thinking to a rather different problem, which is more strongly related to the concerns 
of organisation theory and the concept of organisation. Here, Cooper emphasises the 
point that organisational processes order social life within and more importantly 
without organisational entities. 
The starting point of this text is the concept of organisation in mainstream, or more 
specifically structural-functionalist organisation theory, which according to Cooper is 
biased towards the formal-functional aspects of organisation. More specifically, this 
means that this conceptualisation of organisation, if not exclusively, is at least 
primarily concerned with organisational entities. This bias amongst organisation 
theorists is specifically due to their preoccupation with systems. When seeking to 
understand the relationship between systems (such as an organisation) and their 
33 It is these problems inter alia that have been the focus of much work in labour process theory. 
exemplified by the joint writings of Knights and Willmott (1985, 1989, 1999). 
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environments, the main focus remains with the system. Little attention is given to the 
drawing of boundaries that makes the system possible in the first place. 
Taking systemic boundaries for granted has important consequences for how we 
understand systems and environments and the relationship between the two. First, this 
leads to the privileging of systems above environments and the viewing of the 
boundary as an attribute of the system rather than of the environment. Consequently, 
the boundary is not imposed upon the system from the outside, but is instituted by the 
system to separate it from its environment. Separation is made possible because the 
boundary instituted by the system is stable and complete. The stable and complete 
nature of the boundary also means that the system is regarded as a stable entity 
enjoying a unity and order that stands in stark contrast to the disorder associated with 
its outside environment. The trouble with this position, Cooper explains, is that a 
boundary is neither stable, complete nor simply an attribute of the system. Instead, 
boundaries serve the dual function of both separating and joining systems and 
environments. They are an attribute of system and environment. And as such, a 
boundary is a complex and ambiguous structure 'around which are focused both the 
formal and informal organizing processes of social life' (Cooper 1990: 169). In other 
words, organisation is not just a matter of formal entities, but also a matter of 
processes residing at the boundaries by which systems are joined with and separated 
from their environments. In order to understand organisation, we should therefore not 
limit our inquiry to systems such as formal organisations, but pay more attention to 
the role of boundaries. Cooper does not say it here, but I would like to add that by 
taking "boundary" as our centre of attention, it is possible to understand how 
organisation operates both within fonnal organisations and as processes of ordering in 
the environment outside organisational entities. 
Cooper elaborates on the role of boundaries, both by problematising the way in which 
studies of social and other systems subsume boundaries to systems, and by offering an 
alternative understanding of boundaries. As in previous paragraphs, what Cooper 
finds particularly problematic about social science research is that it tends to 
understand the social world in tenns of reified objects and artefacts without showing 
much appreciation for the medium that actually constitute them. Social scientists do 
not know the world directly, but typically acquire knowledge about it by 
distinguishing and differentiating between phenomena. Whereas certain phenomena 
are selected and included into a particular concept and seen to belong to a particular 
object, other phenomena are excluded. Consequently, the concepts and objects that 
emerge are largely homogeneous; when studying systems, one finds unity. In the 
words of Cooper, 'Systernness relies singularly on a conception of unity' (1990: 169). 
This means that typically, what lies inside a system's boundaries is assumed to be 
orderly and organised whilst what lies outside is assumed to be less orderly, less 
unitary and less organised. And insofar as social scientists privilege the study of 
systems, what does not belong to a particular system is devalued. 
Further on, Cooper argues that boundary-maintenance is seen as a key dimension in 
the study of systems. In order to maintain its order, a system needs to protect itself 
from the outside and maintain its boundaries against the environment. Again, Cooper 
shows that systems are privileged above boundaries and environment. Boundary-
maintenance is an activity of the system and not of the enyironment. In the same 
paragraph, he deals briefly with the notion of boundaries and boundary maintenance 
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in relation to the now common distinction between closed and open systems. Despite 
the general recognition that boundaries are more or less perforated and that systems 
are more or less closed or more or less open, this has done little to remove the binary 
distinction between system and environment and systems are still privileged above 
environments and above the actual boundaries that join and separate systems and 
environments. The implications of this are somewhat paradoxical. Whereas 'the social 
system', Cooper explains, 'is defined as a pattern of relationships, the concept of 
relationship is its least systematically analyzed feature' (Cooper 1990: 170). Since the 
relationship between system and environment is constituted by a frame or a boundary, 
the lacking attention to boundaries inhibits an adequate understanding of this 
rela ti onshi p. 
Cooper's alternative is to VIew boundary as an attribute of both system and 
environment. Since this view acknowledges that boundaries perform a function on 
behalf of systems and environments, it allows a non-static understanding of boundary. 
But before outlining this alternative in further detail, Cooper critiques a social systems 
view typical of and influential in organisation theory: that of Parsons and Blau. 
According to Cooper (1990: 171), Parsons (1951), whom he claims to represent the 
traditional systems view within the social sciences, understands the system boundary 
as a 'container which holds the system parts together and thus prevents their 
dispersal.' Furthermore, Parsons not only conceives of systems as bounded entities. 
By viewing systems as ordered structures, he also imposes a boundary upon how the 
system is to be understood. Cooper directs a similar critique on Blau's (1974) work on 
formal organisation, which shares Parsons' structural-functionalist foundations. More 
specifically, Cooper argues that Blau's concept of differentiation in organisational 
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structure, which merely refers to the internal divisions of labour and authority in 
organisations, presents a static view of differentiation. Preoccupied with the 
instrumental order of static differences in role and status, Blau ignores the very 
process of differentiation that makes such differences and such an order come about in 
the first place. And consequently, he regards the social organisation within which 
formal organisations are seen to exist as 'already formed' (Cooper 1990: 172). 
If one were to focus on boundary and conceive of differentiation in processual terms, 
one would end up with a fundamentally different understanding of organisation; 
neither as bounded entities characterised by a static internal order nor as an already 
formed division of social life, but as a process of differentiation that works to 
transform 'an intrinsically ambiguous condition into one that is ordered' (Cooper 
1990: 172). And since organisation is not about already established differentiation and 
order, organisation is always caught up with its disorderly and contrary state, which 
Cooper calls disorganisation. Cooper seeks to demonstrate that this constant 
opposition between organisation and disorganisation has serious implications for how 
one is to understand social organisation and social action. 
Given Cooper's emphasis on process, it may seem ironic and confusing to find that 
the term structure figures centrally in his definition of social organisation: 
Social organization may be defined as a structure which relates people to each 
other in the general process of managing nature and themselves (Cooper 1990: 
172). 
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But even though some emphasis is removed from the way in which social 
organisation works as a process and put on the way in which it has the consequence of 
involving people in "the general process of managing", Cooper's reference to 
structure has not become less dynamic than it was in 'The Open Field'. His somewhat 
unfortunate wording does not lead him to reaffirm the static concept of organisation 
presented by structural-functionalism. Like information, which Cooper also defines as 
both a process and a structure that makes form out of non-form by dividing matter 
into sets of binary terms, organisation creates order by drawing boundaries between 
elements in social life such as social actors. Furthermore, the binary division that 
Cooper associates with information and organisation is not a simple binary structure 
that limits focus to the parts lying on each side of the binary divide. Instead, it directs 
focus on the division itself, which puts simultaneous attention on the parts and the 
whole that these two parts constitute. In conclusion, the binary divide or boundary that 
Cooper talks about not only separates, but also joins, and it cannot be subsumed to 
one part. 
Cooper then discusses the undecidable nature of boundary, first in light of Saussure' s 
structuralist linguistics and Bateson's structuralist anthropology (focusing on 
Saussure's system of signs and on Bateson's system of difference), and then in light 
of Derrida' s poststructuralist concept of difJerance. Cooper invokes Saussure' s (1974) 
Course in General Linguistics to show that on the level of semiotic systems (i.e. 
systems of signifiers and signifieds) the signifier is not simply a static carrier of 
meaning. Meaning is never given by a particular signifier, but is an outcome of 
differences between various signifiers. Semiotic systems are constantly caught up in 
processes of signification by which different meanings are attributed to a certain 
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signifier depending on the semantic context in which it finds itself. In other words, 
since the meaning of a signifier depends on which other signifiers it is surrounded by, 
and since signifiers are constantly moving between different semantic contexts. the 
meaning of a signifier is always deferred and unfinished and the process of 
signification is never brought to an end. 
In Bateson's (1972) Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Cooper finds ammunition to the 
view that the world is not experienced in terms of reified objects and events, but in 
terms of differences: 
To talk about things in the mind is to commit the intellectual sin of reification. 
There is even a problem talking about the mind since this gives the impression 
of a localable place, a thing which contains other things (Cooper 1990: 175). 
Difference, on the other hand, is not 'localable' because 'it is dimensionless' (Cooper 
1990: 175). That is to say, difference cannot be localised because unlike reified 
objects it has no spatial dimensions such as length, height, width and depth. Instead, 
following Bateson, Cooper views difference as some kind of process that guides how 
we experience the world. Earlier on, Cooper (1990: 170) referred to the boundary as a 
frame that includes certain phenomena and excludes others. With Bateson's term 
"framing", the processual nature of frames and boundaries is more clearly recognised. 
Derrida's (1982) concept of dzjJerance, which is influenced by Saussure's thinking on 
language as a system of differences, can be seen as an even more explicit attempt at 
thinking about the undecidability of boundary. But dij!erance is not simply about 
differing in space. It is also about deference or deferral, i.e. the postponement of 
something in time. More specifically, this means that a word or concept that is 
invoked to represent a thing currently absent from us can never do so. Not only does 
the word differ in space from the thing (the word is present, the thing is absent). Since 
the word succeeds the thing, the word is also a presence deferred in time. Moreover, 
Derrida's concept of dijferance implies that the meaning of a word is deferred, just as 
in Saussure's conception of difference, Cooper argues. Consequently, dijferance is the 
'ever-active play' of differences that 'cannot be located in any particular place' 
(Cooper 1990: 179). This heterogeneous nature is obvious with regards to the concept 
of dijferance itself, which can refer to two different things but never at the same time. 
But it is also how other words must be understood, according to Derrida, who 
demonstrates this by de constructing the Greek word pharmakon in his text 'Plato's 
Pharmacy'. Deconstructing or subjecting pharmakon to a process of dijferance, he 
shows that the word entails two different and deferred meanings (remedy and poison) 
that both cannot be grasped at the same time or in the same place. And it is this that 
not only invests any and every word or phenomenon with undecidability, but also 
underlines the undecidability of dijferance, difference and boundary. 
According to Cooper, all three ways of thinking difference bring out the undecidable 
nature of boundary. And as such, they bring out the undecidable nature of the 
relationship between social systems and environments as well as the undecidable 
nature of social systems per se. In other words, social systems are not as unitary, 
ordered and organised as one is led to think by conventional ways of thinking. 
Instead, as results of ambiguous processes of framing, boundary drawing and 
differentiation, they 'reveal their essentially precarious foundation', a foundation that 
223 
is constantly resisted by what Cooper calls processes of disorganisation or the "zero 
degree of organization" (Cooper 1990: 182). 
Cooper (1990: 182) defines the zero degree of organisation as 'a process of 
undecidability that pervades all social organization.' Having no specific order, 
organisation or direction, the zero degree of organisation can be understood as 'an 
excess to order or meaning'. Drawing on Derrida, Cooper (1990: 184) argues that the 
zero degree of organisation is that which falls outside of and has 'no founding source 
or centre'. And similarly, drawing upon Simmel's inside/outside distinction, he argues 
that the zero degree of organisation is the outside that is excluded from the inside and 
therefore lacks what that which is included on the inside has. In conclusion, 'Zero-
degree is [ ... ] a theoretical condition of no meaning, no form, of absolute disorder 
which one might call the primary source of form or organization' (Cooper 1990: 187). 
This does not mean, Cooper insists, that zero-degree is 'an absolute origin which [is] 
itself organized', but simply that it is 'The disorder of zero degree [ ... ] which 
energizes and motivates the call to order or organization' (Cooper 1990: 187). 
From this discussion, Cooper moves on to consider organisation itself, arguing that 'If 
zero degree is an excess [ ... ], then order and organization must necessarily be a 
reduction' (Cooper 1990: 187). In a quest for order and organisation, social systems 
seek 'to deny the existence of undecidability by erecting systems of "logical" and 
"rational" action' (Cooper 1990: 187). Utilising Marcuse's (1964) reading of Weber, 
Cooper adopts the view that rationality is not simply a matter of calculable efficiency, 
but 'a form of unacknowledged political domination which serves to privilege the 
interests of particular groups' (Cooper 1990: 187-188). This means that rationalisation 
depends upon the ability to controL master and dominate the excess of disorganisation 
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or zero-degree that roams all social systems. According to Cooper, such control is 
specifically aimed at what he calls the "metastructure" and the "metalanguage", and 
without explaining these terms, he turns to discuss the issue of communicational 
domination in an example from Herman Melville's (1970) novel Billy Budd, Sailor. 
From this discussion, however, Cooper concludes with Marcuse (1964) that the 
management of language, the elimination of undecidability and the solidification of 
boundaries is 'a significant process in the creation of systems of technical rationality' 
and 'formally organized systems' (Cooper 1990: 191). In other words, if one is to 
create formal systems of rational organisation, one needs to reaffirm the boundary 
between disorganisation and organisation. 
In the final section of the paper, invoking Canguilhem's (1978) analysis of the 
concept of organisation, Cooper deals with what he calls 'the normalising function' of 
organisation (Cooper 1990: 193). Canguilhem's study, Cooper argues, 'showed how 
the concept of organization developed in the nineteenth century through the normal-
abnormal opposition' (Cooper 1990: 195). Requiring the elimination of the abnormal 
or the pathological across all fields (the social, the biological, the psychological, the 
linguistic, etc.), organisation was a matter of normalisation. More specifically, the 
deVelopment of normalisation was based upon the institution, formalisation and 
following of rules and norms. In nineteenth century France this did for example take 
place through the establishment of a new grammar conveying formal rules for the 
correct use of language and the institution of the metric system. According to Cooper, 
the norm had two functions: first, to restore normality by eliminating deviance, and 
second, by 'providing an order of knowledge' that enable particular systems to 
conceptualise themselves. Although Cooper does not say this, I would like to add that 
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such an order of knowledge is exactly what gives self-reflexivity to systems, thus 
enabling them to adjust when necessary and make possible the normative order that 
they seek to institute. 
Canguilhem's conceptualisation has senous implications for the concept of 
organisation, even for what one might choose to refer to as formal organisation. The 
component features of formal organisation - be they a hierarchical division of labour, 
administrative centralisation, standardisation or rational planning - are not simply the 
innocent inventions of modem administration. Instead, Cooper insists, they must be 
understood as 'instruments of a process of technological normalization motivated by a 
therapy of power' (Cooper 1990: 196; emphasis omitted).34 
What, then, can we take with us from this highly dense text by Robert Cooper? The 
emphasis on boundary and process is obvious. Cooper pursues the challenging idea 
that boundary, i.e. that which differentiates between a system - such as an 
organisation - and the environment does not finalise or stabilise the relationship 
between the two. As they separate and join organisations and environments, 
boundaries are continuously engaged in processes of differentiation. Hence. they 
define and redefine not only organisations and environments, but also the 
relationships between them. In other words, boundaries produce and reproduce 
organisations and environments, becoming processes of organisation and 
.1-1 Though not straightforward, Cooper's reference to "therapy of power" simply underlines the point 
that therapies (of normalisation) are not just concerned with the solving of problems, but always 
embedded in the politics of what is normal and what is not. 
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disorganisation themselves, and turning organisation as well as disorganisation - as 
the zero degree of organisation - into processual rather than static matters. And as 
such, the notion of disorganisation developed by Cooper is to some extent capable of 
recognising the ways in which the boundaries of organisation are disrupted and 
destabilised. 
Cooper's final point concerns the social SCIences and organisation theory more 
specifically. Formal organisations do not merely produce objects for consumption. 
Organisations are produced and reproduced by processes of organisation. But for 
Cooper, the production of organisation is not merely an ordering process that inscribes 
itself onto the social world. As a research object, formal organisation is also the result 
of intensive processes of knowledge production taking place within organisation 
theory. And by constructing organisation in a particular way through a particular 
concept of organisation (that of formal organisation), organisation theory also 
organises organisation, thus 'making it impossible to disentangle the content of 
organization studies from the theory or methodology that frames it' (Cooper 1990: 
197). Although Cooper does not spell this out explicitly, the consequence is that the 
production of the concept of organisation is not only the result of political decisions 
about the constitution of organisation as a research object. As the concept of 
organisation is constituted and used in a particular way by the majority of organisation 
theorists, it will also have certain implications for the events and people who are and 
are not studied by this organisation theory. Cooper's contribution here lies not only in 
his problematisation of the concept of organisation. Having complexified and 
disrupted the boundary relations between organisation and environment by replacing 
stasis with process, he has also upset the boundary relations between organisation 
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theory and its neighbouring fields. Not simply by drawing heavily on thinking about 
organisation from other disciplines, but more importantly by re-producing and re-
organising the concept of organisation into a research object that, with its precarious 
and processual nature, is fundamentally different from the concept of organisation 
implied by classical and mainstream organisation theory. 
Despite the title of his paper, Cooper does not place as much emphasis on the concept 
of organisation as one might expect, but does instead coin at least the first part of his 
discussion around the concepts of system and environment. Moreover, given that 
Cooper attempts a processual understanding of organisation, it may seem ironic that 
so much of his discussion revolves around the terms system and structure. Dismissing 
his argument on such grounds would however be to read it in highly dualistic terms, 
and it is exactly such dualism that Cooper seeks to avoid. Cooper neither argues for 
the stability of system, structure and organisation, nor does he argue that systems, 
structures and formal organisations do not exist. Instead, he seeks to undermine any 
static underpinnings of these terms and rid them of the stable reified nature so 
typically attributed to them by mainstream organisation theory and social science. 
5.4 Haridimos Tsoukas, Chaos and Organisation 
As I showed towards the end of the previous section, disorganisation is a central 
aspect of Cooper's attempt to rethink organisation. Though offering a level of insights 
into organisation and disorganisation that is rare in organisation theory, he is not alone 
in using these two notions in conjunction. The distinction between organisation and 
disorganisation is also discussed by Haridimos Tsoukas (l998a) in his editorial 
introduction to a themed section in the journal Organi::ation on chaos, complexity and 
organisation theory. Here, Tsoukas notes that certain organisation theorists might find 
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little relevance in the study of chaos or disorganisation - the absence of organisation -
given that organisation is the very raison d'etre of organisation theory. Tsoukas, 
however, rejects such reasoning as unconvincing. First, as argued by Cooper (1990), 
disorganisation cannot be seen as absolutely separate from and opposite to 
organisation.35 And second, invoking the Greek twentieth century philosopher 
Cornelius Castoriadis, he privileges epistemology over ontology and argues that 'the 
concept of disorganization [ ... ] does not make much sense' (Tsoukas 1998a: 292). 
According to Castoriadis: 
What is, is not or cannot be, absolutely disordered chaos - a term to which, 
moreover, no signification can be assigned: a random ensemble still represents 
as random a formidable organization, the description of which fills the volumes 
expounding the theory of probabilities. If this were the case, it could not lend 
itself to any organization at all; in both cases, all coherent discourse and all 
action would be impossible (Castoriadis quoted in Tsoukas 1998a: 309). 
From this statement, Tsoukas infers that disorganisation is not so much the absence of 
organisation as the presence of some mode of organisation that is typically deemed 
undesirable. The traffic of cities like Cairo, Athens and Rome is neither disorderly nor 
disorganised, but exemplifies a self-regulating system with a different kind of order 
35 In a sense, modem versions of chaos and complexity theory in the natural sciences precede Cooper in 
making this point, that disorganisation or chaos is not the opposite of organisation and order. For 
natural scientists, chaotic systems do indeed possess an order, albeit different from, unpredictable and 
more complex than the order \vith which one is usually faced. Systems or phenomena completely void 
of order are those systems that cannot be studied at all, known to natural scientists as "noise" (cf. e.g. 
Stewart 1989; Cohen and Stewart 1994). As I will argue in a moment, this is of course a highly 
problematic assumption by which natural science i~ this case devalues, disregards and ignores what it 
cannot understand and reduces chaos to order and dIfference to sameness. 
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and organisation to that of the more formalised traffic systems of cities in Northern 
Europe. Similarly, the crime-infested areas of Los Angeles, Moscow and Manchester. 
as they are governed and maintained by the felonious underworld, are no more 
dissociated from order and organisation than the world of the Western metropolitan 
stock exchange. And they are no less worlds than the latter. Their organisation and 
order is simply of a different kind, and their world is simply a different world from 
that which most people regard as desirable, as it is seen to use the wrong means to 
pursue the wrong ends.36 According to Tsoukas, ethnomethodology, following 
Gadamer, has always insisted on this fundamentally organised nature of sociallife:37 
social life is de facto organized: we, as sentient beings, have no choice but to 
organize our world and our actions in it. The interesting questions are how we 
do it; what we do it for? (Tsoukas 1998a: 292). 
36 In a similar fashion, realist theories of international relations (e.g. Hedley Bull 1977) speak of the 
international system (i.e. the system of external relations between sovereign states) as possessing an 
anarchic order different from the system of government regulating the internal affairs of sovereign 
states. 
37 Tsoukas does not explicate the various links between Gadamer and ethnomethodology. but I would 
like to point out that ethnomethodology, as represented in Garfinkel's (1967) work not only was 
inspired by Schutz's (e.g. 1967) phenomenology and Winch's (1958) post-Wittgensteinian philosoph) 
of ordinary language (cf. Burrell and Morgan 1979; Giddens 1993). Through Wittgenstein and Winch, 
who shared with Heidegger and Gadamer the point that 'self-understanding is held to be only possible 
through the appropriation by the subject of publicly available linguistic forms' (Giddens 1993: 58), it is 
possible to see an important (though largely indirect) connection between Garfinkel's 
ethnomethodology and Gadamer's (1989) phenomenology; that both emphasised the role of language 
in the human's ability to make sense of. order, and h\e in the world. 
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The strict distinction between organisation and order on the one hand, and 
disorganisation, chaos and disorder on the other, Tsoukas argues, has to do with the 
tradition in both lay discourse and social science research of associating the fonner 
with classification, generalisability and predictability. Moreover, all these notions 
imply the existence of a subject: 'someone who classifies, generalizes, predicts' 
(l998a: 292). This is an undertaking most typically executed by a managerial elite 
within fonnal organisations. And on an international or global level, this activity is 
preoccupied with describing and judging non-Western practices through the lens of a 
hegemonic Western value-system, which largely deems non-Western practices 
disorderly and disorganised, chaotic and disturbing. 
Despite this all too common separation between organisation and disorganisation, 
Tsoukas notes an expanding albeit recent interest in "chaos". Since the dissemination 
of the writings of people like Bateson, Castoriadis and Cooper, organisation has 
increasingly been juxtaposed with surprise: 'that unpredictability does not imply the 
absence of order; that recurrence does not exclude novelty' (1998: 292). Even at the 
centre of organisation theory, prominent figures such as Karl Weick (1979) and James 
March and Johan P. Olsen (1976) have made important contributions challenging the 
binary opposition between organisation and disorganisation. Mainstream organisation 
theory, however ('at least the kind taught in most OB/OT textboooks'), has paid little 
attention to 'this new thinking' (1998a: 293). Tsoukas then goes on to describe the 
role of complexity theory and chaos theory in the natural sciences, whereupon he 
claims a great potential for such thinking in the social sciences, since the latter is 
preoccupied with a research object at least as complex and unpredictable as, and at 
least as far from stable equilibrium as that of the fonner. Recognising the sources 
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Tsoukas is drawing upon, it is worth noticing that complex thinking in organisation 
theory and the social sciences is not simply about adopting natural science research 
from physics, mathematics and biology into the realm of the social and the 
organisational. Tsoukas seems much to prefer work by philosophers and social 
scientists such as Bateson, Castoriadis and Cooper, and this is a strategy he shares 
with his former colleague at Essex University, Robert Chia (1998b). But rather than 
elaborating on this, I shall see what implications Tsoukas' conceptualisation may have 
upon the nature and status of organisation. 
As noted above, Tsoukas (with Castoriadis and Cooper) renders the concept of 
"disorganisation" meaningless because of the diverse nature of organisation. Just that 
something operates by self-regulation and pursues unusual ends by unusual means 
does not mean that it is in any way disorganised and void of organisation. Its 
organisation is simply different, and it is our habitual mode of dialectical thought that 
so easily reduces that which is different and unorthodox to something best 
characterised in terms of absence and lack. However, the problem with Tsoukas' 
reasoning is that it reduces all aspects of social life to organisation and runs the risk of 
ridding the world of disorganisation altogether. Cooper (1990) avoided this in his 
notion of disorganisation as zero-degree organisation, which recognises the excessive 
and disruptive nature of disorganisation. Tsoukas fails to recognise those elements of 
the world that operate independently of organisation, and against which organisation 
must always negotiate itself.38 Not that I do, but even if one accepts that life becomes 
3S Following Deleuze and Guattari's (1988: 86) reading of the Stoics. my understanding of 
independence is not about that which is completely separate from or in absolute opposition to 
something else. Independence is about affection and influence and assumes a strong element of 
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social only insofar as it is organised, life is not simply a matter of organisation 
because in any case there is also life beyond the social. And since disorganisation is 
reduced to organisation it is almost as meaningless to speak in terms of 
disorganisation as it is to only speak in terms of organisation. Not least because if 
organisation is all there is, any attempt to organise the world would be redundant and 
obsolete. This is why I prefer the term nonorganisation, which not merely indicates 
bizarre and unusual versions of organisation, but is entirely different from and 
disrupts, undermines and escapes the boundaries of organisation. 
For me, organisation - whether a matter of organisational entities or processes - is 
about the goal-directed institution and maintenance of boundaries that confine and 
differentiate between people, bodies and other objects in space and time. Hence, 
organisation produces divisions, hierarchies and value scales that seek to order and 
regulate the world and how we live in the world. The term disorganisation has come 
to contain little more than "negative" connotations, normatively speaking. In everyday 
usage and in organisation theory (esp. Mayo 1933), disorganisation is typically 
associated with "anarchy", "chaos" and "disorder", not in any "positive" sense, but in 
the sense of "mayhem", "havoc" and "ragnarokk". Though in a slightly different 
way, Tsoukas (1998a) does also dissociate the term from anything "positive" by 
relating it to "bizarre", "unusual" and for many people "undesirable" versions of 
organisation - the criminal underworld seeming a favourite example. Tsoukas' 
reciprocity. That which is independent is that \\·hich. as \\ell as being affected by something else. has 
the power to affect that by which it is affected. 
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reductive attitude confuses "disorganisation" with "organisation" and removes any 
uniqueness from the term. Nonorganisation is different from organisation and 
disorganisation altogether and it is beyond the "negative/positive" distinction that 
follows from the reduction of disorganisation to organisation. Whereas organisation is 
reactive, nonorganisation is active and creative, though not in terms of an ability to 
reach a set goal or purpose. Whereas organisation is characterised by its inclination to 
react and defend itself against nonorganisation, nonorganisation is characterised by its 
ability to create powerful forces of excess that are beyond purpose, that disrupt the 
boundaries of organisation, and whose full force or potential we can never know. It is 
by viewing organisation in the larger context of nonorganisation that we might be able 
to recognise the limitations of organisation. The main characteristics of the concepts 
of organisation, disorganisation and nonorganisation are summed up in table 5.1 
below, where all three concepts are viewed in terms of their "form" of expression and 
their relationship to "purpose" and boundaries. For lack of a better term, I use the 
notion of a concept's "form" of expression here in order to tease out the ways in 
which a concept is materialised: 
Concept "'Form" of expression Relationship to "purpose" and 
boundaries 
Organisation Entities and processes Purpose-dri ven and goal-
directed; institutes and maintains 
boundaries 
Disorganisation Bizarre, unusual and "un- Purpose-driven and goal-
desirable" forms of organisation directed; institutes and maintains 
unusual boundaries 
Nonorganisation Active, creative and exceSSIve Beyond purpose; disrupts 
forces of desire boundaries 
(Table 5.1: Organisation. Disorganisation and Nonorganisation) 
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To be fair, Tsoukas, agam drawing on Castoriadis and Gadamer, does actually 
recognise the limitations of organisation, and supplements the organised nature of the 
social with the never fully organised nature of the political. Whilst organisations are 
political entities, the political is never completely organised: 
the fact that actors are possessed by history (rather than the other way round): 
that they lack comprehensive knowledge of their own initial conditions; and, 
thus, that they cannot base their knowledge and action on transhistorical 
epistemic foundations, makes organisations (and, social systems in general) 
inherently political entities. Politics is possible only to the extent that the human 
world is not fully ordered and our knowledge of it is never complete. "If a full 
and certain knowledge (episteme) of the human domain were possible", 
observes Castoriadis [ ... ], "politics would immediately come to an end". It is 
because we do not - we cannot - obtain an Archimedes' point from which to 
view the world and our position in it, that we need to collectively deliberate and, 
thus, to engage in political activity in order to settle our differences and decide 
on the course of action to be taken (Tsoukas 1998a: 300). 
Whereas the social may inhabit various yet agreed upon types of organisation in 
different contexts, it is the political, with its conflicting modes of organising, which 
inhibits one sole kind of organisation from seizing sovereign power. In that sense, the 
political IS neither fully organisational nor, m my terminology, fully 
nonorganisational. On the one hand, the political has a will to organise. But this is a 
will that, due to its own internal diversity, cannot be fully accomplished. The problem 
is that Tsoukas is only concerned with the inherent conflicts between different 
organisational forces. He does not deal with the nonorganisational forces that are 
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outside yet in conflict with organisation. He subsumes the political within the 
organisational and fails to speak in terms of those dimensions and forces that not only 
precede and exceed, but also disrupt, undermine and exist independently of 
organisation. Unlike the political (and the disorganisational qua the diversity of 
organisation), nonorganisation is not simply a different, controversial or bizarre 
version of organisation. Nonorganisation, which is beyond boundary and purpose, is 
of a different world altogether, and it interacts, communicates and negotiates with 
organisation on a level where neither is fully at home. Nonorganisation is about 
bodies and matters that openly express desires and forces that charge, discharge and 
recharge each other by plugging themselves into and unplugging themselves from one 
another in fashions so multiple that the very concept of organisation all of a sudden 
seems out of place. But as always, it is in the margins, in the interface between 
organisation and nonorganisation that the most interesting things happen. This is the 
unhomely and uncanny borderlands where organisation and nonorganisation meet, 
where they negotiate with, challenge and affect each other, where the 
nonorganisational is subjected to the forces of organisation, where new forms of 
organisation are instituted, and where organisation is disrupted by nonorganisation 
and sometimes dissolved altogether. Rather than giving organisation the upper hand, 
this move recognises nonorganisation as a power in itself that cannot simply be 
defined in terms of absence and lack. Nonorganisation is not a matter of restriction, 
constraint and inferiority. It does not inhibit things from happening. It is an excess 
force that is creative and makes things happen, even if these things are unusual, 
unrecognisable and for some people undesirable. And it is a force whose potential is 
beyond knowledge. 
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In sum, Tsoukas' (1998a) text is problematic in that it reduces the social, the political, 
disorganisation and the world at large to organisation. But given these problems, 
what does Tsoukas' understanding of disorganisation as organisation do? Clearly, it is 
another attempt at endowing organisation with a stronger sense of process that 
undermines its static and entitative aspects. It is obvious from his article that 
organisation not only takes place inside formal organisational entities, but also under 
more bizarre circumstances. What Tsoukas does not do, is to deal with the problem of 
the body - whether as an organisational matter or not. In the next section, I shall 
investigate Robert Chia' s understanding of organisation, which shares much of the 
processual concerns raised by Cooper and Tsoukas. 
5.5 Robert Chia's Process Perspective of Organisation 
Robert Chia, a former student of Cooper's in the Department of Behaviour in 
Organisations at Lancaster University and in some ways Cooper's protege continues 
the processual programme of organisation theory. In an Organization Studies article 
entitled 'From Modem to Postmodern Organizational Analysis', Chia (1995) argues 
for a more postmodern or processual approach to organisation, framing his discussion 
of processual organisation in terms of an ontology of becoming. As opposed to a 
typically modem ontology of being that 'privileges thinking in terms of discrete 
phenomenal "states", static "attributes" and sequential "events"', an ontology of 
becoming draws our attention to 'a transient, ephemeral and emergent reality' (Chia 
1995: 579). Further on, a postmodern style of thought is more concerned with the 
'micro-logics of social organizing practices' or processes than with their 'stabilized 
"effects" such as "individuals, "organizations" and "society'" (Chia 1995: 580). 
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Chia notes that processes have become commonplace even in mainstream social 
science and organisation theory, for example in the sociology of Talcott Parsons. But 
with Norbert Elias (1978) and Cooper and Law (1995), Chia objects that Parsons and 
other social scientists reduce social processes to social states, and that they reduce 
'complex heterogeneous phenomena to simpler, seemingly homogeneous 
components' (Elias quoted in Chia 1995: 581). More specifically, Chia (1995: 587) 
argues that Parsons and likeminded people reduce process to stasis because 'they can 
only conceive of process in discrete, linear, static and sequential terms.' These kinds 
of studies are concerned with 'processes occurring within or between social entities 
(e.g., "decision-making" processes in organizations, interactions between an 
organization and its environment etc.)' and not like Chia, concerned with 'the micro-
organizing processes which enact and re-enact these social entities into existence' 
(Chia 1995: 587; emphasis omitted). This is also the case, he says, with Karl Weick's 
concept of equivocality and enactment and Gareth Morgan's (1986) 'image of 
organization as "flux and transformation'" (Chia 1995: 587). Although they both 
emphasise the 'processual aspects of organizing', they still express the processual in 
static terms of control (Chia 1995: 587). 
Following Cooper and Law (1995), Chia's alternative is to VIew organisational 
processes as 'assemblages of organizings' (Cooper and Law quoted in Chia 1995: 
589) 'in which evolving circuits of mediating networks of action remain in continuous 
contact and motion' (Chia 1995: 589). Behind this dense and unusual term lies the 
recognition that organisational processes involve various networked acts of organising 
that are constantly in motion and constantly related to one another. Chia now leaves 
the explicit discussion of organisational processes until the later sections of his paper 
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and does little to elaborate on why organisational processes can be seen as 
"assemblages of organizings". Anyway~ to think organisation in processual terms is. 
Chia (1995: 594) argues~ to make 'the very idea of organization itself the 
problematic.' And if I may add~ this is the case because it enables us to ask, as Chia 
(1995: 595) does~ how organisation comes 'to acquire its apparently concrete status', 
and 'What primary organizing process allows [organization] to take on the semblance 
of an "already constituted entity'''? 
Chi a invokes Law's (1992) conceptualisation, which argues that orgamsmg IS a 
'process of heterogeneous engineering' (Chia 1995: 595; emphasis omitted). In this 
process~ 
bits and pieces from the social, the technical~ the conceptual and the textual are 
fitted together and so converted (or "translated") into a set of equally 
heterogeneous scientific products (Law quoted in Chia 1995: 595). 
In other words, organisational processes assemble and transform different bits and 
pieces into heterogeneous products or assemblages~ such as organisations. But in 
order to understand what an organisation is~ there is no use assuming what it is. 
Instead~ Chia' s and Law's point is that we need to study the organisational processes 
that make possible the emergence and temporary solidity and unity of organisational 
entities. For Law and Chia this includes what Chia calls the micro-practices and 
micro-logics of organising that according to Law borrow and bend, shape and 
reshape, displace and replace, rebuild~ steal and misrepresent heterogeneous materials 
so as to generate organisational entities with an appearance of unity, identity and 
permanence. This means that one needs to study the organisational micro-processes 
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that precede and exceed organisational entities. These processes are significant in that 
they involve the 'emergent and precarious ontological act of bringing forth an ordered 
world' (Chia 1995: 596). More specifically, Chia's project here is not about 'the 
"facts" of organization as fait accompli states', and it is also not specifically 
concerned with the organisation of work. Instead, Chia views organisation as the 
activities, practices and processes that work as to organise thought. 
From this cognitivist and rationalist bias, Chia argues that it is these organisings that 
'produce the phenomena of organization' (Chia 1995: 597). Reading Cooper (1989), 
Chia finds that organisation can be conceptualised as writing, which in the most 
general sense is 'the process by which human agents inscribe organization and order 
on their environment' (Cooper quoted in Chia 1995: 597). As a technology of the 
taxonomic urge, writing seeks to 'fix the flux and flow of the world in temporal and 
spatial terms', and it does so by 'classifying, listing, formulating, routinizing, 
prescribing, etc.' (Chia 1995: 597), which are all key functions of administration in 
formal organisations. 
Even if Chia's concept of organisation seems to begin with the organisation of 
thought, it might still be argued that this is not where it ends. Briefly appealing to 
Foucault's (1 977b ) Discipline and Punish, he does actually note that organisation is 
written on the body. As the body is organised by means of disciplinary micro-
practices, both the body and the human subject associated with that body become 
'more manageable for administrative purposes' (Chia 1995: 599). And studying such 
micro-practices is, according to the research agenda that Chia puts up here, not just 
key to understanding the emergence of organisational entities. Whereas mainstream 
organisation theory typically reduces such practices to epiphenomena of 
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organisational entities, it is according to Chia these effects or products that should be 
viewed as epiphenomena of organisational processes. But Chia (1995), who does not 
go into detail as to how disciplinary micro-practices actually organise the body, does 
little to tum the body into an actual phenomenon to be investigated by organisation 
theorists. 
In his introductory note to the second volume of his Festschrift to Robert Cooper, 
which I investigated in chapter 2, Chia (1998a) continues his devotion to a processual 
organisation theory by arguing for a social theory of organisations.39 If one is to 
compare this text to his 1995 text examined above, one finds two main differences. 
First, that Chia's (1995) explicit emphasis on the micro-practices of organisation is 
replaced by a broader commitment to demonstrate how organisational processes cut 
across all levels of social life, and second, that he puts stronger, though not primary 
focus on the organisation of the body. Both themes seem best summed up in one and 
the same example given by Chia (1998a: 2). This concerns the disciplining of the 
body for the pursuit of an orderly society in Victorian Britain. Drawing upon the 
nineteenth century historian Richard Schoenwald, Chia argues that: 
The systematic spatial fixing and conceptual location of social habits and 
attitudes became a founding touchstone of modernity and the concept of the 
disciplined body in an orderly society grew to be a fundamental but largely 
unconscious imperative of an increasingly industrialized world (Chia 1998a: 2). 
39 Chia 's processual understanding of organisation is not, however, limited to social theory, and like his 
mentor Robert Cooper, he turns to the processual philosophies of Whitehead, Bergson, and Deleuze 
and Guattari. 
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Chia's emphasis on the organisation of the body also puts his earlier bias towards the 
organisation of thought in a wider perspective. He still acknowledges how thought is 
central to organisational processes and practices and how organisation is a result of 
the taxonomic urge to organise thought. But at the same time, he draws stronger 
attention to the ways in which rational thought may be a central tool in the 
organisation of the body. From the point of view of someone concerned with how 
organisation theory deals with the problem of the body, it is therefore a promising, if 
not entirely satisfactory move that takes place in Chia's writing between 1995 and 
1998. Moreover, Chia highlights more strongly how the taxonomic urge and the 
organisation of thought operate through taxonomic technologies that organise people 
on a grand scale. As I pointed out in chapter 2, statistics is one such taxonomic 
technology, which in the nineteenth century became a most central means for 
understanding and knowing, managing and organising the masses. More specifically, 
New conceptual terms such as "population densities", "death rate", "birth rate", 
"cycles of scarcity", provided the formal mechanisms through which the 
otherwise unwieldy masses could be re-presented and brought under 
administrative control (Chia 1998a: 3). 
In elaborating on what a social theory of organisation might look like Chia first 
highlights Weber and Foucault as central figures in the study of the organisation of 
social life. He then asserts (as I do in chapter 4) that mainstream organisation theory 
typically confines itself to the study of formal organisations, i.e. 'the organization of 
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productive effort' (Chia 1998a: 5).40 Consequently, it reifies '''organizations'' as 
discrete, bounded, economic-administrative entities' and neglects 'the wider question 
of the organizational character of modem life' (Chia 1998a: 6), which in the 
sociological and anthropological literature is referred to as social organisation. More 
specifically, Chia explains that it is 'the rigorous reflection on the underlying social, 
cultural and historical forces that shape and organize the ways we see, think and act in 
the institutionalized structures of the modem world' that is neglected by conventional 
studies of organisation. 
But rather than returning to Weber and Foucault, Chia draws attention to two previous 
attempts made by somewhat marginal figures in organisation theory to pursue a social 
theory of organisation. These are Rapoport and Horvath (1968) and Alfred Kuhn 
(1982). Chia is intrigued by the distinction that Rapoport and Horvath make between 
a generalised or generic organisation theory and a theory of organisations. Whereas 
the latter refers to a mainstream organisation theory preoccupied with the study of 
economic-administrative systems, the former, which is favoured by Rapoport and 
Horvath (and Chia too), is concerned with 'the study of the primary organisational 
processes underpinning any system exhibiting [ ... ] "organized complexity'" (Chia 
1998a: 6). Chia elaborates on the two versions of organisation theory: 
In contrast to the theory of organisations which confines itself to the study of 
formal "organizations" as taken-for-granted social entities with identifiable 
40 Chia continues by saying that this tradition of organisation theory is also concerned with 'the 
organization of control within and without organizations', but I find little e\'idence that mainstream 
organisation theorists ha\e concerned themselves with anything that goes on outside organisational 
entities. 
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boundaries and purposes, organization theory, in this expanded understanding, 
addresses the question of organization as a general logic applicable to the 
ordering and representation of all forms of social phenomena (Chia 1998a: 6). 
Succeeding Rapoport and Horvath by almost a decade and a half, Kuhn argues that 
organisation theory should construct itself as a proper social science, as opposed to 
being a mere sub-discipline of business administration picking up the pieces left by 
sociology, political science, economics and social psychology. Again, this necessitates 
a broad understanding of organisation as systemness. Organisation theory should 
therefore be concerned with 'the logic of information, representation, organization, 
and the technologies they create', and not reduce organisation to a matter of 'self-
contained, purposeful social structures which are all ready (and already) presented to 
us for study' (Chia 1998a: 7). 
As Chia's text is very much written in honour of Robert Cooper, he highlights that it 
is exactly the study of systemness that characterises Cooper's thought and even 
proclaims Cooper as 'a philosopher of systemness' preoccupied with 'rationality, 
representation and organization as distinctive features of modernity' (Chia 1998: 7). 
This is an interest that Cooper shares with Weber and Foucault, Chia says, and 
although Chia does not explicitly rank Cooper amongst the likes of Weber and 
Foucault, there is at least an implicit sense in which Cooper is given such status. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
No matter what status Cooper enjoys as a philosopher of systemness, there is little 
doubt that he has had a leading impact on recent thinking in the outskirts of 
organisation theory. Most importantly, his epistemic privileging of organisational 
process above organisational entity has produced a discontinuity in organisation 
theory - between the conventional mainstream and the more radical periphery. Whilst 
the mainstream takes for granted a concept of organisation limited to formal 
organisational entities and problems having to do with the organisation of production, 
the radical periphery inspired by Cooper's thinking problematises the concept of 
organisation by studying the processes that organise our acting and thinking and 
social life as a whole - within and without formal organisations. Organisation 
theorists whose work - more or less easily - seems to fall within this tradition include 
Gibson Burrell (1984, 1988, 1997), Barbara Czamiawska (1996), Jannis Kallinikos 
(1995,1998; cf. also Cooper and Kallinikos 1996), John Law (1994a, 1994b, 1998; cf. 
also Cooper and Law 1995; Law and Mol 1998), Rolland Munro (2001; cf. also 
Hetherington and Munro 1998), Martin Parker (1992, 1998; cf. also Parker and 
Cooper 1998), Richard Sotto (1998), and as we have seen, Haridimos Tsoukas 
(1998a) and Robert Chia (1995, 1998a). It would be to overemphasise Cooper's 
influence to say that these organisation theorists, who are all notable figures 
themselves, are simply followers of a "Cooperian" paradigm in organisation theory. It 
seems fair, however, to say that Cooper has inspired and/or provoked these and others 
to adopt a processual or generic focus in the study of organisation and to do so 
through serious engagement with thinkers outside organisation theory (e.g. Foucault, 
Derrida, the Frankfurt School, Whitehead and Bergson). In my opinion, it is this that 
is Cooper's main contribution to organisation theory. Beyond this, Cooper - through 
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'The Open Field' and 'Organization/Disorganization' - has also gone beyond 
organisation to an extent that few organisation theorists have realised. His appeal for 
creative action and his concept of disorganisation are both exercises in the disruption 
of boundaries. 
The efforts made by Cooper and followers such as Tsoukas and Chia in making the 
body a central problem in organisation theory are more limited and might be related to 
the meagre attention paid to the power relations that operate upon the body and inhibit 
us from developing processes of creative action. As noted above, Chia (l998a) pays 
some attention to the organisation of the body in his introductory note to the Cooper 
Festschrift. Cooper also gives some very minor attention to this subject matter in an 
essay appearing in the same Festschrift (cf. Cooper 1998). Tsoukas does not deal with 
the problem of the body at all in the text examined here (cf. Tsoukas 1998a), and 
neither does he seem to do so elsewhere. His main research interest, in addition to 
complexity, seems to rest with the use of discourse analysis in organisation theory 
(e.g. Tsoukas 1998b). On the whole, therefore, Cooper, Tsoukas and Chia pay very 
little attention to issues of embodiment, and Cooper for one does not extend his ideas 
about creative action (Cooper 1976) and disorganisation (Cooper 1990) to the study of 
embodiment. Insofar as Cooper has had any influence on the embodiment of 
organisation theory at alL it seems more accurate to say that this has been merely 
indirect, indeed very indirect. However, by putting organisation theory in touch with 
poststructuralism - where issues of power figure centrally - Cooper has opened up 
organisation theory to a stream of thought in which the body figures as a key 
dimension. And second, by conceptualising organisation in terms of processes rather 
than entities, Cooper has developed a way to think about organisation that later 
organisation theorists concerned with the body have taken on board (e.g. Brewis and 
Sinclair 2000; Dale and Burrell 2000; Dale 2001).41 
The absence of embodiment is not necessarily a fundamental problem with Cooper's, 
Tsoukas' and Chia's work, and the reader might question why the body should be 
brought into the realm of processua1 organisation theory in the first place. In my 
opinion, inattentiveness to issues of embodiment means that one misses out on an 
important opportunity to think critically about how the production of organisation 
operates throughout social life. It is necessary for example to introduce the body if 
wanting to study the ways in which an organisational regime such as public health 
seeks to organise how we live our lives on an everyday basis. Constructions and 
experiences of health and wellbeing, disease and illness are most certainly embodied. 
And it is at least problematic to dissociate the activities preoccupying public health -
such as eating, drinking, sex and exercise - from the organisation and conduct of the 
body within and without formal organisations. On a more general level, one should 
also note that the organisation of thought to which Chia (1995), for example, pays so 
much attention covers only a part of how social life is organised - through discursive 
arrangements such as language, statistics and accounting. Whilst it is possible to see 
how such discourses might organise the body indirectly, it is also necessary to study 
how the body is actually organised in social life - according to dress codes, 
expectations about body language, medical notions of what a body is and what a body 
41 Cooper's (1998) notion of raw matter and his discussion of the ways in which raw matter is turned 
into distinct, reified and manageable things by processes of information and organisation does not 
directly deal with the body and has not, as far as I know, been utilised by organisation theorists 
interested in the body (cf. Cooper 1998). 
can do, and socio-cultural nonns of how particular bodies should behave and move in 
particular contexts - at work, at home and in public space. Finally, and insofar as the 
body is an unruly and messy matter of flesh and blood, bones and tissue, pains and 
pleasure, habits and desires, it also poses a fundamental problem for the production of 
organisation in a way that underlines the processual, dynamic and unfinished nature of 
organisation. Because the body disrupts, undennines and escapes the purposive and 
boundary-drawing processes of organisation, these processes are never brought to an 
end in a complete state of affairs. Chia (1998a), who, as we know, pays some (albeit 
scarce) attention to the organisation of the body, pays no attention at all to these 
aspects of embodiment that resist and destabilise organisation. And even if it might be 
possible to study the disruption of organisation through more general terms such as 
Cooper's (1990) concept of disorganisation as the "zero degree of organisation", the 
carnal body described above gives a very concrete insight into the forces that disrupt 
the boundaries of organisation. These are three reasons why it is important to bring 
the body into a processual organisation theory keen to study the production of 
organisation across modem social life, within and without fonnal organisational 
entities. More specific strategies as to how the body can be brought into an 
organisation theory concerned with the production of organisation will be addressed 
in the next chapter. In the first two sections, I shall examine two strands of thought 
that may have been more significant than Cooper in directing organisational research 
towards the body. These two fields are feminism and the sociology of the body. In the 
third section, I shall deal with some of the work within organisation theory that has 
studied ways in which the production of organisation seeks to write itself on the body_ 
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Chapter 6 
The Body in Feminism, Sociology and Organisation Theory 
6.1 Introduction 
Despite its significance III developing a processual concept of organisation, the 
organisation theory pursued by Robert Cooper and many of his followers is neglectful 
of how the body is a problem for organisation. It is also consciously neglectful of 
feminist research,42 which means that it is unaffected by the stream of thought that has 
been most significant in turning the body into a research object in the social sciences 
and humanities. In my continued effort to investigate how organisation theory deals 
with the problem of the body, I shall in this chapter, therefore, first examine how 
some writers within the feminist tradition - outside and inside organisation theory -
contribute to this project. Since the mid-1980s, sociologists and social theorists within 
and without feminist research agendas have also started to show an increasing interest 
in the body. Typically known as the sociology of the body, I shall examine in the 
second section of this chapter how useful this field is in addressing the ways in which 
the body is a problem for organisation. Since the late 1990s, organisation theory has 
also experienced the somewhat late arrival of the body theme into its own disciplinary 
terrain. In the final section of this chapter I shall examine how this still peripheral 
field within organisation theory deals with the problem of the body. In this 
-Ie I am arguing that it is "consciously neglectful" because Cooper and many of his followers are very 
well aware that there is a long tradition of feminist research in both philosophy, social theory and 
organisation theory. Hence, they are not merely neglectful of this literature, but they have chosen to 
neglect it in their own work. 
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investigation, and in relation to all three streams of thought, I shall focus on three 
themes: (i) the organisation of the body (what organisation does to the body); (ii) the 
embodiment of organisation (the ways in which bodies make organisation possible); 
and (iii) nonorganisational embodiment (the ways in which bodies disrupt, undermine 
and escape the boundaries of organisation, and the ways in which bodies live and 
work independently of organisation). 
6.2 Feminism and the Body 
Any man inquiring into feminist research is at a loss as he is necessarily reduced to 
approach this field from an outsider's position. And a man who in passing invokes the 
work of a small sample of feminist writers is at an even greater loss, as there is no 
way in which he only in a few pages can do justice to the massive and diverse body of 
feminist literature. Feminism is however all too important to be ignored, as many 
male researchers have chosen to do, and the problems and limitations facing the male 
student of feminism is no valid excuse for not dealing with feminism and what it has 
to offer students of organisation and the body. 
Whereas malestream social science has traditionally ignored or at least marginalised 
the body, feminism is the first stream of thought within the social sciences to bring 
attention to the body and tum issues of embodiment into a most central research 
object. It should be no surprise that this is so. Within a patriarchal society and within a 
patriarchal community such as academia, the body rarely poses much of a problem for 
the male researcher. But for female researchers the body has been and still is perhaps 
the most central site of difference and discrimination in a world dominated by men, 
and the female body in particular continues to be objectified and pacified by male-
dominated science. Inspired and encouraged by feminism, other streams of thought 
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such as queer theory, black studies and postcolonialism have later directed their focus 
on the body for reasons similar to those that have made it such an important issue in 
feminist research. 
Addressing bodily difference in terms of sex and gender, the main line of division 
within feminism has traditionally been an ontological one. Early feminists tended to 
explain the oppression of women with reference to the biological nature of the female 
body. But as Karen Dale (2001) notes, this essentialist or foundationalist biologism 
started to be seriously challenged in the 1970s by second wave feminism seeking to 
explain women's subordination through social factors. One significant result of this 
stream of thought is the division between biological sex and social gender. 
Unfortunately, this division has resulted in some feminist researchers, much like 
traditional male social scientists, being exclusively preoccupied with social structures 
and cultural values, thus failing to question biomedical understandings of the body 
and reserving the investigation of the female body to malestream natural science. 
Since the 1980s, feminists, writing from a largely social constructivist perspective, 
have challenged the biomedical understanding of the body that for some time 
underpinned earlier versions of social constructivist research within feminism. Not 
only has this line of work challenged popular and scientific assumptions about the 
objectivity of natural science by drawing attention to the ways in which biomedical 
research is itself socially constructed. It has also enabled us to see how bodies change 
and are changed by socio-cultural and material forces in ways that biomedicine is 
unable to account for. 
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In Bodies that Matter, the American Judith Butler (1993) outlines her constructivist 
point of view dismissing the idea that constructivism is simply a matter of being able 
to choose one's body from one day to the next: 'there is no body that decides its 
gender' (Butler 1993: x). Butler's idea of constructivism is rather that bodies are 
formed, constituted and inscribed with sex and gender by processes that put normative 
constraints on what bodies should and should not do. 
Butler's book is a response to commentators who critiqued her prevlOUS work 
(especially Gender Trouble 1990) for not dealing with the materiality of the body in 
general and the materiality of sex in particular. Here, Butler argues that 'the 
materiality of sex is constructed through a ritualized repetition of norms' (1993: x). 
This necessitates a rethinking of construction itself. Construction does not mean that 
material experiences such as eating, sleeping, pain, pleasure, illness, violence, life and 
death are mere constructions. Rather, it means that construction is what enables us to 
make sense of and live these experiences in the first place. But it also means that 
construction is a matter of constitutive constraint. As certain constructions make 
certain bodies intelligible and liveable, they equally make other bodies unthinkable, 
abject and unliveable. This does not, however, mean that liveable and unliveable 
bodies are engaged in some dualistic relationship. Since dualism is itself part of 
intelligibility, Butler rejects any such thinking and does instead argue that unliveable 
bodies are part of 'the excluded and illegible domain that haunts the former domain as 
the spectre of its own impossibility' (1993: xi). The challenge, then. is one of 
rethinking the domain of intelligibility in such a way that unthinkable and unliveable 
bodies are made thinkable and liveable. More specifically, Butler does this through 
her concept of gender performativity, which refers to the ways in which discourse 
constructs bodies so as to make bodies perfonn gender in certain ways. Consequently, 
bodies are not prior to discourse, but effects of discourse, even in tenns of the 
materiality that they live. And in order to rethink the domain of intelligibility, it is 
bodily materiality that feminist inquiry should take as its research object. 
Obviously, Butler's notion of bodily materiality is not one that can be seen 
independently of discourse. According to Butler, even those who in one way or the 
other deviate from discursively instituted norms are defined and constructed by that 
very same discourse (as if having a lack compared to those who conform to the same 
nonns). Although certain forms of embodiment may be constructed only as negations 
of discursive norms and therefore can benefit from the construction of discursive 
positivity, Butler's perspective is not unproblematic. As it becomes the responsibility 
of discourse to yet again invest bodies with a sense of performative positivity, such a 
positivity will always be limited. Confined to the territory of language, thought and 
consciousness, any discursive project remains an exclusive one in that the extent to 
which unliveable bodies can be made liveable is limited by the extent to which the 
unthinkable can be made thinkable. Two things easily go missing here. First, the 
actual lived conditions of painful and suffering bodies that many people rather not 
think about (e.g. the bodies of the slave, the child labourer, the rape victim and the 
victim of domestic violence). And second, the genuine and more general materiality 
of bodies that are liveable and might indeed become lived despite our inability to 
conceive of them in thought (Grosz 1994). 
Susan Bordo, another American who was one of the most prominent critics of 
Butler's (1990) discursive feminism, offers a more materialistic perspective on the 
oppression of the female body. Although Bordo is no organisation theorist but a 
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philosopher, she has a lot to offer organisation theorists committed to understand the 
organisation of bodies in everyday life. Bordo does not conceptualise organisation as 
such, but she makes frequent references to organisation and to the organisation of 
bodies beyond the confined space of formal organisations. And by so doing, she gives 
organisation theorists a wider frame of reference from which organisation can be 
thought in processual terms. Drawing on Foucault's idea of the docile body and 
Bourdieu's idea of habitus, Bordo (1993) highlights the different material (rather than 
purely discursive) practices and processes that organise bodies into habituating a 
fundamentally docile existence. In the words of Bordo: 
through the organization and regulation of the time, space and movements of 
our daily lives, our bodies are trained, shaped, and impressed with the stamp of 
prevailing historical forms of selfhood, desire, masculinity, femininity (1993: 
165-166). 
These organisational practices and processes affect female bodies in particular: 
Through the pursuit of an everchanging, homogenizing, elusive ideal of 
femininity [ ... ] female bodies become docile bodies - bodies whose forces and 
energies are habituated to external regulation, subjection, transformation, 
"improvement" (Bordo 1993: 166). 
More specifically, the various organisational habits have serious consequences for 
how women live in the world: 
Through the exacting and normalizing disciplines of diet, make-up, and dress -
central organizing principles of time and space in the day of many women - we 
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are rendered less socially oriented and more centripetally focused on self-
modification (Bordo 1993: 166). 
Continuing in a Foucauldian line of thought, Bordo argues that power is not 
repressive, but constitutive in that the mechanisms that organise bodies do not 
prevent, eliminate and destroy, but instead generate, increase and shape bodily forces. 
On the whole, Bordo is interested in how female bodies take part in 'the 
symbolisation and reproduction of gender' (1993: 168). Less attention is directed at 
how female bodies subvert traditional gender patterns and reproduce gender along 
lines that disrupt and subvert stereotypical gender roles. This is not to say that Bordo 
views the organisation of the female body as total. She deals extensively with 
disorders such as hysteria, agoraphobia and anorexia, which most certainly pose a 
fundamental problem for organisation. Whilst being the target of organisational 
practices such as medical and psychiatric treatment, these conditions escape the 
organisational forms that such therapeutic practices seek to impose upon female 
bodies. The problem with these examples is that, albeit important in their own right, 
they all seen to exemplify what happens when cultural, social and clinical pressures to 
organise the female body are taken to their extreme. Although escaping organisation 
to some extent, disorders are not simply the free expression of bodily forces and 
desires, but are always in some way related to and often caused by organisation. 
Indeed, they may be seen as the unintended consequences of organisation. 
Like Bordo, Susan Lee Bartky (1988) (yet another American) takes as her starting 
point Foucault's (1977b) idea of docile bodies. But unlike Bordo, Bartky mounts a 
significant critique of Foucault by arguing that he neglects those disciplinary 
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mechanisms that operate specifically upon the female body. Consequently, Foucault's 
project has sexist implications in that it reaffirms the silence and powerlessness of 
those who are subjected to these mechanisms of control. Bartky is concerned with 
how certain practices seek to discipline (i) body shape and size (e.g. eating, dieting 
and fitness regimes), (ii) bodily gestures, postures and movements (e.g. facial 
expressions and styles of sitting and walking), and (iii) what she refers to as the body-
as-ornamented-surface (e.g. make-up, clothes, plastic surgery). Overall, these 
disciplinary practices seek to construct a feminine body out of a female body, and the 
ways in which different women participate in these practices is dependent upon 
economic wealth. Further on, the success with which different women achieve the 
ideals of bodily femininity may influence their likelihood of success in working life. 
Despite this emphasis on the ways in which the female body is disciplined, Bartky 
adds that female embodiment needs also to be understood as a site of resistance. 
Referring to the British philosopher Peter Dews, who critiques Foucault for ignoring 
the libidinal body of free desire, Bartky argues that women's libidinal bodies do rebel 
against the various regimes of disciplinary practice. But according to Bartky, 
resistance against a patriarchal culture does not have its origin in the so-called 
libidinal body. Instead, resistance, or what Bartky calls "pockets of resistance" (1988: 
83), can only emerge from the paradoxical or contradictory relationship between 
women's growing independence on the one hand and the following intensification of 
disciplinary practices on the other. Although Bartky, like Foucault, clearly recognises 
the microphysical nature of power and resistance, her understanding of power and 
resistance is different from Foucault's in that she operates within a fundamentally 
dialectic frame of reference. Consequently, she fails to recognise the non-oppositional 
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yet subversive modes of resistance identified by Foucault in his later works 
(especially in the three volumes of The History of Sexuality). And, whilst 
acknowledging how lesbians may struggle to pursue a female aesthetic in 
contradiction to "hegemonic images of femininity" (1988: 83), Bartky does not 
recognise that the construction of the lesbian body needs not relate to this patriarchal 
hegemony at all, but might exceed the butch/femme dichotomy completely (cf. Case 
1989).43 
The French philosopher and practising psychologist Luce lrigaray (1985) avoids the 
problem arising from Bordo's and Bartky's texts by conceptualising female sexuality 
independently of male sexuality. This does not mean that lrigaray argues that women 
and men should live in separate communities. It means that unlike male sexuality and 
male stream modes of understanding sexuality, female sexuality is not phallogocentric 
and cannot be reduced to some singularity where all pleasure is seen to be located and 
from which all pleasure is seen to originate. Women's sexual pleasure may include, 
but is certainly not confined to the clitoris or the vulva. This understanding of female 
sexuality has serious implications for how lrigaray thinks about female embodiment 
and womanhood. As the very essence of female sexuality is diverse, plural and 
several, so is the essence of womanhood. This sense of diversity means that 
womanhood is non-centred and distributed in such a way that it becomes a matter of 
nearness and otherness. Since woman is never one, but several, she is always near to 
the other. And it is in this nearness and otherness, which is irreducible to and escapes 
-11 In addition to recognising the subversive aspects of the butch/femme dichotomy, it is also important 
to note that, as it is formulated in some relation to patriarchal stereotypes of embodiment, it may 
restrict lesbian embodiment so as to being pursued within the frames ofthe either butch or femme. 
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any patriarchal organisation, that women can experiment with different processes of 
female embodiment and construct autonomous forms of womanhood. Recognising 
that Irigaray's authorship is a sophisticated one deserving more in-depth analysis than 
I can offer here, I shall return to a similar discussion in chapter 7, as I examine 
Deleuze's attempt to think embodiment in processual and nonorganisational terms. 
Having briefly examined some parts of the feminist literature on the body outside 
organisation theory, I shall now tum to some of the feminist literature in organisation 
theory and see how far this has gone in examining the ways in which the body is a 
problem for organisation. 
In organisation theory, feminist researchers have more implicitly than explicitly 
drawn some attention to the consequences that discourse has upon bodies. Although 
Arlie Russell Hochschild (1983) refrains from spelling out a feminist research agenda 
and makes few references to feminist research, her study of female flight attendants in 
Delta Airlines is significant in that it demonstrates how crucial emotional constraint 
and stress control is to work performance. According to Hochschild, emotions are 
'socially engineered and transformed into emotional labor for a wage' (1983: x). 
Particularly important is the manufacture of the smile, and flight attendants are trained 
to 'RealZy lay it on' (Hochschild 1983: 4). 'In the case of the flight attendant, the 
emotional style of offering the service is part of the service itself, Hochschild 
continues, and 'Seeming to "love the job" becomes part of the job' (Hochschild 1983: 
5-6; emphasis omitted). 
Hochschild is however more concerned with emotionality than with bodies. Despite 
the obvious ways in which emotion is a bodily response in and of itself and emotions 
are channelled and communicated through bodily expressions and appearances such 
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as the smile and bodily postures, Hochschild pays little attention to bodily experience 
and to the oppressive and somatic implications that emotional labour has upon female 
bodies. As Dale (2001) argues, Hochschild's analysis remains largely cognitive in its 
discussion of identity, and whereas emotional labour is seen to contradict with a 
person's "real" identity and feelings, the ways in which emotional labour interferes 
with any sense of private or personal embodiment remain unexplored. 
Since the relatively early research of Hochschild, there has been an expanding interest 
amongst organisational researchers in issues of sex and gender, often (but far from 
always) informed by a feminist perspective. Important events in this respect include 
the founding of the journal Gender, Work and Organization in 1994 and the gender 
streams organised at recent conferences of the European Group of Organization 
Studies (EGOS) and the Academy of Management (AOM). 
Feminist articles in Gender, Work and Organization typically fall within a feminist 
tradition of organisational and industrial sociology, where the primary focus remains 
with issues of gender difference within organisational entities. Examining the year 
2000 volume of the journal, for example, one finds that the vast majority of articles 
uncritically adopts this narrow and formalistic conceptualisation of organisation 
whilst examining gender in a characteristically disembodied fashion. Evett (2000) and 
Greed (2000) are archetypical examples in this respect and more disappointing than 
most contributions, given the obvious opportunities that their research topics lend to 
examine the bodily aspects of gender difference in the workplace. In analysing change 
in women's careers, Evett examines the dimensions of culture, structure and action 
without paying any attention to the ways in which female embodiment impacts upon 
the career paths open to women, addressed as we know, by Susan Lee Bartky (1988). 
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Similarly, in studying women in the construction professions and the possibility for 
cultural change in the construction industry, Greed points out that women are 
typically discouraged from entering building sites but offers no discussion of the 
bodily dimensions that might help explain this phenomenon. Note that I am not 
arguing here that Evett (2000) and Greed (2000) should have dealt with issues of 
embodiment in their research. But I am saying that readers looking for discussions of 
embodiment in relation to women's experience of work need to look elsewhere. 
In comparison to the articles by Evett (2000) and Greed (2000), Heather Haptl (2000), 
utilising the thought of Julia Kristeva, goes a long way in offering a move towards an 
embodied study of gender and organisation. As Haptl draws little on other 
organisational research, her text - at least thematically - bears a stronger resemblance 
to feminist writings outside organisation theory such as those examined above. And 
even though she makes sparing references to "the organization", her primary concern 
is the more general construction of female and feminine identity resulting from the 
phallogocentric symbolic orders of language and Christianity. In these orders, women 
are constructed not in terms of flesh and blood, as bodies, but in terms of the abstract 
- and rather disembodied - male stream representations of the Virgin, the Mother and 
the Whore. As they broaden and embody our understanding of organisation, these 
insights are interesting in their own right and far more interesting than the somewhat 
scarce and underdeveloped references that Hapfl makes to women in organisations. 
Unfortunately, the latter turns out rather obsolete in this context and takes attention 
away from Haptl's general conceptualisation of organisation and her understanding of 
the symbolic ordering of gender, which after all is the underlying theme of her article. 
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The recent work of Karen Dale (200 l) provides a more rigorous, systematic and 
sophisticated discussion of the organisation of female embodiment than does Hopfl's 
short essay (2000). Dale's contribution is particularly interesting in two respects. 
First, in that she demonstrates how the mainstream concept of organisation is based 
upon fundamentally malestream and masculinist assumptions about what the body is. 
More specifically, referring to what she calls "the anatomising urge" of organisation 
theory, Dale shows that organisation theory has created and protected, dissected and 
analysed its own research object of formal organisations in a rationalistic fashion 
similar to how male anatomists since the Renaissance have studied the body as an 
organism. Anatomy has taken life and embodiment out of the body by turning it into 
an abstract and typically male organism constituted by a set of detailed yet simplistic 
structures and functions. In a similar vein, organisation theory has constructed a 
narrow concept of organisation void of life and bodies, largely to be studied in terms 
of bounded entities characterised by a hierarchical division of labour that is 
manifested in solidified structures as well as in the predictable working of functions. 
Moreover, in order to successfully maintain itself as a distinct academic discipline 
devoted to the study of bounded organisational entities, organisation theory seeks, by 
including certain bodies of knowledge and excluding others from its epistemic 
territory, to maintain its own boundaries against the myriad of other disciplines. 
Second, whilst utilising a processual concept of organisation inspired by - and adding 
to - the intellectual endeavours of Robert Cooper, Dale offers an important analysis of 
the ways in which female bodies and feminine embodiment in particular is organised 
beyond the borders of organisational entities. Not only does Dale view the masculinist 
epistemic construction of the organism in anatomy and the organisation in 
261 
organisation theory as an organisational process. She also shows how (i) the 
anatomical dissection of largely female bodies in previous eras, (ii) the contemporary 
regimes of bodily training and discipline largely aimed at women (e.g. fitness and 
dieting schemes and dress codes), and (iii) contemporary medical technologies such 
as ultrasound can be studied as organisational processes. Doing so, her work also 
bears a stronger affinity to the kind of feminist studies that I examined in the first part 
of this section, and which is typically conducted in epistemic terrains well outside 
organisation theory. As this strand of thought may help us view organisation in a 
greater perspective than that rendered possible by mainstream studies of formal and 
largely disembodied organisational entities, this is certainly an area that ought to 
concern a larger number of organisation theorists, both feminists and others, than it 
does at the present. However, like some of the feminist literature outside organisation 
theory examined above, what Dale does not do is to analyse the ways in which bodies 
disrupt, escape and live independently of organisation. As pointed out above, both 
Irigaray and Deleuze do this. 
Although feminist studies of organisation such as Hochschild (1983) have on the 
whole been important in bringing out the various everyday experiences of women in 
work organisations, the majority of such studies, like the majority of organisation 
theory in general, is largely empirical and has made few efforts to rethink the concept 
of organisation. If feminist studies of organisation are to extend beyond already 
existing areas of research and become able to examine ways in which organisation 
seeks to regulate and control female bodies inside and outside of organisational 
entities, more theoretical work along the lines of Dale (2001) is needed. 
262 
On a wider scale, feminist research can make a more general and highly significant 
contribution to the development of an organisation theory of the body. As we know, 
feminist research is primarily concerned with sex and gender as matters of bodily 
difference, and this focus often directs how other bodily dimensions such as age, race 
and illness are examined from a feminist perspective. Feminist studies of health and 
illness may for example be primarily concerned with medical problems typically 
suffered by women. However, since women's experiences of bodily difference is what 
feminism is and should be about, it would be naive, short-handed and inappropriate to 
tum this bias into the target of a critique against feminism. Instead, what has already 
been achieved in feminist studies should be taken as a reminder by any effort to 
conduct more general studies of the body, be it within sociology or social theory, or 
within organisation theory. Thus, scholars working from a position outside feminism 
may be able to recognise the significance of bodily difference - not just in terms of 
gender and sexuality, but in terms of other bodily dimensions too - and avoid the kind 
of white malestream bias that has characterised and still characterises both social 
science at large and even later research within the sociology of the body.44 It is to the 
latter stream of thought that I now tum my attention. 
6.3 The Sociology of the Body 
The absent presence of the body in the social sciences in general - and in social 
theory and sociology in particular - marks the starting point of much research in the 
-1-1 By emphasising the whiteness and maleness of the social sciences. I do not want to dismiss the 
significance of the able-bodied. middle-class. heterosexual. etc. biases that also influence this famil y of 
academic disciplines. However. the former aspects are emphasised because they seem to be the most 
significant sources of pri\ilege. discrimination. domination and intellectual orientation in the social 
sCIences. 
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new field of sociological research known as the sociology of the body. In order to 
explain the absent presence of the body and the privileging of rational and conscious 
human action in the study of the social, a lot of this literature points to the Cartesian 
mind/body dualism (e.g. Shilling 1993, Turner 1996, Williams and Bendelow 1998). 
Seeking to rid sociology of this dualism, sociologists of the body have insisted upon 
the location of the mind in the body and upon the bodily basis of human action. The 
theme subjected to most analysis, however, concerns the social control and 
organisation of bodies, which bears strong affinity to the Cartesian view that the mind 
should and does control the body. This is for example the case with Bryan Turner's 
sociology of the body. 
Turner, now a sociology professor at Cambridge University and editor of the journal 
Body and Society since its founding in 1995, is a central figure in this field of 
research. In 1984 he published the path-breaking book The Body and Socie(~', which is 
the first systematic attempt to develop a sociology of the body. The book was revised 
and republished in 1996. In the introduction to the first edition (republished in the 
second edition), Turner reveals that it is the question "what is the body?" which 
guides his inquiry. Seeking to answer this question more thoroughly in a later chapter, 
Turner draws upon Marx and Nietzsche, arguing that they both, despite 
idiosyncrasies, provide an "ontology of difference". Although Turner does not spell 
out directly what he means by an ontology of difference, it seems that he uses this 
notion to underline the sense in which human society is constructed differently in 
different contexts. According to Turner, Marx offers a universalistic view of human 
nature and the body, as all bodies in all societies 'labour collectively on nature to 
satisfy their needs' (1996: 40). Doing so, they 'transform themselves into sensuous, 
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practical, conscious agents' and they transfonn nature. This means that nature both 
has an independent existence and is a matter of transfonnative processes of social 
construction. Turner contrasts Nietzsche with Marx, and claims that Nietzsche offers a 
relativistic view of the body. In Turner's view, a Marxist version of social 
constructivism views the body and bodily difference as a result of human agency 
whilst a Nietzschean social constructivism views the body and bodily difference as a 
product of language and knowledge. 'In Nietzsche, our corporeal existence does not 
predate our classificatory systems of knowledge and thus the body is nothing more 
and nothing less than a social construct' (Turner 1996: 40). This is highly 
problematic. Turner ends up with this interpretation by reading Nietzsche only in light 
of Foucault's early works (Madness and Civilization and The Birth of the Clinic). 
Although Foucault was highly inspired by Nietzsche, Turner is naive, at best, in 
reducing Nietzsche to a social constructivist. As Deleuze (1983) shows in Nietzsche 
and Philosophy, Nietzsche's ontology is one of material or non-spiritual forces 
irreducible to socio-linguistic constructions. A body is therefore the random and 
astonishing combination of reactive and active forces, the operation of active forces 
meaning that no body can be fully grasped by consciousness and language. 
Turner's misreading of Nietzsche is indicative of the more general theme running 
through his book and his authorship. As Dale (2001) demonstrates, he is primarily 
interested in the body as a problem of social order and regulation. The task of society 
is to regulate the body, and Turner seeks to demonstrate the ways in which this is 
attempted by examining topics such as patriarchy, religion, discipline, government 
and discourse. The active forces of embodiment that preoccupied Nietzsche escape 
Turner's inquiry. He does little to aid this one-sided appreciation of the body in the 
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second edition of The Body and Society, which succeeds the publication of his book 
Regulating Bodies by four years. Despite his recognition that studies of the body give 
rise to two main themes - what the body does and what is done to the body - and 
argues for the resolution of the dichotomy between the two, Turner is strongly biased 
in favour of the latter. What the body does is seen as a set of social practices always 
organised by training, discipline and socialisation. And even though Turner 
acknowledges the relevance of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology for understanding 
what the body does to social relations, he does not follow this up in his own research. 
An attempt in this direction is made by Nick Crossley (1995), who critiques Turner's 
early research for not examining what the body does. Distinguishing between the 
sociology of the body and what he calls carnal sociology, Crossley (1995: 43) argues 
that by pursuing the latter, one can address 'the active role of the body in social life.' 
According to Crossley, it is the body that creates sociological concepts such as self, 
society and symbolic order. Furthermore, it is the body that experiences the world, 
and it is the body that relates to things, objects and people in a meaningful way. By 
acting, the body also creates a social world in which it can be acted upon. It is through 
this recognition that Crossley tries to resolve the dichotomy between what the body 
does and what is done to the body. This is in itself a significant and interesting 
proposition. It is limited, however, in that Crossley's sense of what a body does is 
bound up with his emphasis on meaningfulness and habit. By arguing that the body 
acts in meaningful ways and maintaining that the body can do little outside the field of 
cultural habits, Crossley ends up with a cognitivistic and undynamic perspective of 
the body. My point would be that bodies may act in contradiction to habit and the 
meaningfuL and thus escape our attempts to make sense out of what bodies do. 
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Despite differences in focus, it can be argued that Turner's sociology of the body and 
Crossley's carnal sociology both fall short in embodying sociology. Although Turner, 
who has a background in medical sociology and the sociology of religion identifies a 
myriad of sociological topics (consumption, religion, health, gender, sport, etc.) that 
all give rise to issues of embodiment, his sociology of the body becomes little more 
than one of many sociological sub-fields. Although the sociology of the body studies 
the body, it does so in what Williams and Bendelow (1998) call a disembodied way 
which is not dissimilar to how other sociological sub-fields study other objects of 
knowledge. Given his cognitivist bias, Crossley's carnal sociology is in this respect 
not fundamentally different from Turner's sociology of the body. The consequence of 
the sociology of the body being little more than a sub-discipline of sociology at large 
may be severe. As a sociological sub-field, the sociology of the body faces fierce 
competition from sub-fields such as social stratification, political sociology, the 
sociology of the family and the sociology of work, which have a longer history and 
enjoy a far more prestigious position within sociology as a whole. 
In contrast to these two perspectives, Williams and Bendelow argue for an embodied 
sociology which takes much inspiration from feminist studies of the body. Rather than 
analysing the body from the outside in a typically disembodied and malestream way, 
they seek to develop a sociology or social theory that thinks from the perspective of 
lived bodies. In other words, sociologists should not simply study bodies, but write 
their own bodies and bodily experience into their understanding of the body. And with 
regards to sociology as a whole, the recognition of the sociologist's own body should 
not only concern sociologists of the body, but all sociologists, regardless of 
specialisation. According to Williams and Bendelow (1998: 3), this is the only basis 
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upon which 'a truly embodied sociology have any real hope of putting minds back 
into bodies, bodies back into society and society back into the body.' Insofar as one 
seeks to bring the body into the field of sociology and into the wider territory 
occupied by the social sciences, this may certainly constitute a preferable research 
strategy. Unfortunately, it seems rather unlikely that a majority of sociologists and 
social scientists will gather around an approach that undermines the distanced and 
allegedly objective position of the researcher that so many take for granted. 
Organisation theory may be even further away from realising Williams and 
Bendelow's programme for an embodied sociology. But even though the body theme 
is marginalised in organisation theory, it has attracted some attention by a small 
number of scholars within this discipline. It is to this body of research that I now tum. 
6.4 The Body and Organisation 
Gibson Burrell was one of the first writers in organisation theory to open up the field 
to studies of embodiment. In 'Sex and Organizational Analysis', Burrell (1984) 
focuses on what he calls 'the process of organizational desexualization' and the 
resistance to desexualization amongst organisational subordinates, a phenomenon he 
claims has been ignored by organisation theorists for too long. This dual process of 
the control of sex and sexualised resistance has been a feature of organisational life 
for a long historical period, and Burrell seeks to demonstrate the significance of 
organisational desexualisation and sexual resistance by utilising a number of historical 
examples from both pre-industrial and industrial organisations. Examples include the 
treatment of sex in the Catholic Church, amongst the Quaker industrialists. in the 
British Navy and in the Ford Motor Company. In addition, Burrell draws some 
attention to sexual phenomena in contemporary organisations that are less confinable 
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to the duality between managerial control and subordinate resistance. But even though 
it is problematic to conceptualise sexual harassment and rape as expressions of 
resistance amongst organisational subordinates, they are tragic and violent phenomena 
of a sexual nature that often occur within the context of organisations. 
Although Burrell is primarily concerned with sex and sexuality, he also makes sure to 
relate sexuality to embodiment. Drawing attention to eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Europe, Burrell argues with Foucault's concept of bio-power that the control 
of sex became a crucial element in the wider control of individual bodies and 
populations. This was manifested in several discourses at the time, including Puritan 
accountancy, demography and psychotherapy. Taking Puritan accountancy as an 
example, it was held at the time that sexual activity exhausted energy from the body 
that rather should be utilised for the purpose of economic production. Productive and 
efficient work organisation therefore necessitated the keeping of sexual activity at a 
minimum. In demography and population control, sex and sexuality also became 
crucial criteria for differentiating between and classifying bodies into taxonomic 
groups and categories. Those found to be sexually deviant from ideal norms (the 
hysterical woman, the Malthusian couple, the masturbating child and the perverse 
adult in particular) became the targets of medical, punitive and in later years 
psychological treatment. 
But despite Burrell's interesting discussion of sex as a major arena for controlling 
bodies it is obvious that he is more concerned with sex and sexuality than , 
embodiment in general. In his concluding note Burrell complains that despite the 
significance of sex and sexuality in organisational life, and despite those 
organisational discourses that thrive on the production of sex and sexuality as social 
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phenomena and objects of knowledge (e.g. medicine, psychology and sexology), 
organisation theory contains no discourse of this subject matter. There is no 
"eroticized" organisation theory, Burrell (1984: 115) argues, and speculates that this 
has to do with lacking resistance to desexualisation. But rather than developing a 
proper research agenda for an "eroticized" organisation theory and discussing the role 
of feminist research in such a project, Burrell merely notes that this is a task that 
organisational analysts undoubtedly should soon return to. Unfortunately, he has not 
himself made any systematic attempts in this direction. Had he done so, we might 
have had some grounding for what an embodied organisation theory a La Williams and 
Bendelow's (1998) embodied sociology could look like. 
When Cooper and Burrell (1988: 105) deal very briefly (and almost without prior 
announcement) with the body four years later (in an article largely written by 
Cooper), they do actually seek to evaluate the implications that a conceptualisation of 
'the "body" as material flow' has upon organisational analysis. First, they argue that 
the notion of flow underlines the instability of the human environment and the human 
body itself, adding, with Foucault, that this instability inhibits the human subject from 
self-recognition or from understanding others. This is an epistemological point that 
challenges the stable position of the organisation theorist and any other human being 
as a knowing subject. Second, they problematise the stability of the human being as a 
knowable object. This is an ontological and epistemological point that recognises the 
limits of knowledge and the excess of materiality. The idea of the body as material 
flow means that human subjects cannot be reduced to one category, be it manager or 
worker. Instead, the body is the result of its own processes of production that 
according to Cooper and Burrell 'place the subject at the origin of the organizing 
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process instead of seeing it as an adjunct' (1988: 105). In other words. the body or the 
embodied human subject is not just that which is organised, but also that which 
organises. Consequently, organisation cannot be taken for granted as organisational 
entities, but should rather be seen as a process occurring within society at large. And 
as such, it is not only less capable of constructing stable objects of knowledge. It is 
also concerned with a much wider range of objects, including health. emotions, labour 
and disease. As it is very brief and in need of further analytical elaboration, Cooper 
and Burrell's discussion of the relationship between the body and organisational 
anal ysis comes nowhere near providing a research agenda for an embodied 
organisation theory or even an organisation theory of the body. Though pointing us in 
the right direction by arguing for a processual understanding of both body and 
organisation, they do not offer a thorough discussion of the former. This would be 
necessary if we were to gain a more adequate understanding of how bodies influence 
organisation. Not only does this lead to some inaccurate terminology where the body 
is located at the origin of organisation. It also gives inadequate attention to the 
nonorganisational aspects of embodiment that precede and exceed, disrupt, undermine 
and escape organisation. 
I was hoping that the essay collection BocZ\' and Organization, published a decade and 
a half after Burrell's (1984) first discussion of sex and organisational analysis, would 
deal more rigorously with the body and how it poses a problem for organisation. The 
central endeavour in what is the final section of this chapter is therefore to analyse 
what, if any, conceptualisation of the body and organisation that emerges from Bod..v 
and Organi=ation. That is, how is the body dealt with in this anthology whose 
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contributors draw upon a wide variety of theoretical sources, especially feminism and 
pos tsruc turali sm? 
Body and Organization is a diverse book, most obviously for the wide array of 
empirical topics covered. But as it is organised into four different sections -
'Functions and Flows', 'Discourse and Representation', 'Performance and 
Regulation', and 'Self and Identity' - the book also shows a diverse range of 
theoretical interests, both in terms of the problems investigated and in terms of the 
intellectual sources used. Not only is this what one would normally expect from an 
essay collection based upon papers from an academic conference in a young field of 
research. In the interest of intellectual freedom and movement, perhaps this is also 
what one should want. 
The editors John Hassard, Ruth Holliday and Hugh Willmott state two main motives 
for doing this book. First, that they want to 'redress a tendency for analyses of 
organization to be disembodied in ways that marginalize the body as a medium of 
organizing practices.' And second, that they want to 'counteract a marginalization of 
the realm of employment and work organization within contemporary analyses of the 
body' (Hassard et al. 2000: 2). In other words, they want to do something about the 
absent presence of the body in organisation theory, and they want to do something 
about the estrangement of work and employment in the study of the body.4:' The study 
45 Since I seek to expand the concept of "organisation" beyond the sphere of work organisation and 
employment, and since I write within the field of organisation theory where the neglect of work 
organisation and employment has never been much of a problem, it is the first of Hassard et al. 's 
concerns that is of primary interest to me. Moreover, despite the importance of understanding the body 
in relation to organisation, it can be argued that this is more the responsibility of organisation theory 
than the responsibility of the study of the body in general. 
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of ergonomics, concerned as it is with perfecting the fit or integration between human 
beings, job tasks and machines, is of a different kind altogether, and should not be 
taken as a model for how organisation theory should deal with the problem of the 
body. Reducing human bodies to mere extensions of tools and machines, it does not 
study bodies in their own right (cf. e.g. Pulat 1992; Bridger 1995; Kroemer 1997). 
Two main themes are identified in the editors' introduction: (i) organising practices 
and embodiment, and (ii) gender and sexuality in organisation studies. It is however 
difficult to identify in any straightforward manner what either of these themes 
amounts to. 
Outlining the first theme, the editors focus upon the absent presence of the body in 
social science research, arguing that social scientists rarely examine how social 
practices are embodied and thus ignore how social and organisational practices can 
only be accomplished through embodied action. Further on, though in unnecessarily 
cryptic language, they argue that bodies are themselves organised - both as objects of 
knowledge and as objects of organisational practices. There are three problems with 
this discussion. First, that the editors merely acknowledge how bodies are organised 
within organisational entities and fail to see how bodies might be organised outside 
the boundaries of such entities. Second, the related problem that the editors 
underestimate (but do not ignore) those incidences when bodies disrupt, escape and 
exist independently of organisational practices altogether. And third, instead of 
elaborating their argument with examples of embodied organising practices, they 
invoke examples that simply highlight the role of emotions in working life. If this 
were to be successful, a link between embodiment and emotionality (and I do not 
dispute that such a link exists) would have to be demonstrated and not simply 
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assumed. To be fair, however, Hassard et al. take a step in the right direction here. 
Continuing the focus on emotions, they do not only make the point that Frederick 
Taylor's (1947) scientific management was largely inconsiderate of managers' and 
workers' feelings, but also that the scientific management of job design was very 
much about controlling the bodily movements of manual workers. Further on, in a 
sub-section entitled 'Managing Hearts As Well As Minds', they argue that corporate 
culture initiatives not only seek to organise the emotions of employees, but also the 
bodily aesthetics such as eye contact that may communicate emotions. 
Outlining the next theme, 'gender and sexuality in organisation studies', Hassard et al. 
(2000: 9) return to the problem of emotions, asking 'whether the harnessing and 
selective expression of emotions within work organizations reflects a distinctively 
gendered process that privileges a patriarchal and "masculinist" mode of organizing.' 
Bureaucracy may act as one example of masculine organisation, driven by malestream 
discourses and practices of rationalisation where stereotypically female emotions are 
undermined. Fortunately, the editors also draw attention to the role of gendered 
embodiment per se, arguing that women may find that their bodies put them at a 
disadvantage in the work environment. Not only may women experience that 'few 
allowances are made for dealing with such body processes as "menstruation, lactation 
and [ ... ] pre-menstrual tension'" (Hassard et al. 2000: 9; Halford et al. quoted in 
Hassard et al.). They may also find that the only way to successfully cope - especially 
career-wise - with a male-dominated working environment is 'by flirting or otherwise 
playing upon physical attractiveness to highlight femininity' (Hassard et al. 2000: 10). 
This is not however the only way in which the workplace may be eroticised. There is 
also the alternative of 'celebrating sexuality in ways that are not colonized bv 
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masculinist desires to conquer and control', but recognise women as a subject of 
pleasure. 
Outlining this theme, Hassard et al. also emphasise the intertwining of gender and 
sexuality. More specifically, they do so by invoking an example from Halford et al. 
(1997) concerning an openly lesbian woman. Not only did her obvious lack of sexual 
interest in men make her male colleagues completely inept in relating to her. She also 
experienced that a heterosexual female colleague flirted with her as if she was a man. 
From this, Hassard et al. make the interesting point that sexuality and gender identity 
have a great influence on how we interact with other people, and that many people 
find it problematic to relate to people whose sexuality and/or gender identity is 
ambiguous or contrary to what is assumed. From this, Hassard et al. outline three 
alternatives of how one is to deal discursively with sexual and gender diversity. First, 
one can construct a discourse by which people can be located to fixed categories of 
gender and sexuality. Second, one can construct a discourse by which sexual and 
gender differences and complexities are erased, which simply is to ignore the role of 
sexuality and gender altogether. Finding both of these alternatives untenable, Hassard 
et al. argue for a third alternative, which is to construct a "postmodern" discourse that 
allows for the kind of diversity and complexity found in the example above: 
In what might be described as a postmodern tum, fluidity, diversity and 
playfulness are encouraged and celebrated within a discourse of queerness 
(Hassard et al. 2000: 12). 
Although dissatisfied with the lack of rigour with which this alternative is outlined 
and privileged, I have no reason to oppose such a discursive strategy for dealing with 
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Issues of gender and sexuality. And on the whole, Hassard et al. do well in 
highlighting the themes of emotions, sexuality and gender, which all are related to 
embodiment. The reason for this bias may be that these dimensions have already been 
the focus of high quality scholarship in organisation theory, most notably by feminist 
researchers (e.g. Ferguson 1984; Halford et al. 1997). An unfortunate consequence of 
this bias, however, is that Hassard et al. are less than satisfactory in dealing with the 
body per se. I do not dispute the importance of any of these dimensions (i.e. emotions, 
and gender and sexuality), but they are not the only dimensions relevant to the study 
of the body. By largely examining the body through these two empirical dimensions 
they are incapable of recognising other empirical dimensions of embodiment such as 
race and ethnicity, age, health and illness. And they fail to satisfactorily flesh out the 
two crucial dimensions - theoretical and empirical - that in addition to the 
appreciation for the embodied nature of organisational practices should preoccupy any 
investigation of body and organisation. These dimensions are (i) the organisation of 
bodies (what organisation does to bodies), and (ii) the nonorganisational aspects of 
embodiment (what bodies can do to organisation and independently of organisation). 
Admittedly, the first dimension is examined in some of the articles in Body and 
Organization, for example in the one by Dale and Burrell (2000). The second 
dimension is to some extent acknowledged through the empirical text by Richardson 
(2000) on sexual harassment as well as in Dale and Burrell's (2000) and in Linstead's 
(2000) more theoretical articles. Dale and Burrell (2000) and Linstead (2000) do not 
take the organisation of the body for granted, but inquire into the processes by which 
embodiment becomes the target of organisation and through which embodiment 
comes to be organised. Doing so, they certainly recognise that there is embodiment 
beyond organisation. But they do not deal thoroughly with the ways in which 
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embodiment exceeds organisation because they do not provide a detailed account of 
nonorganisational embodiment. This problem seems more apparent when returning to 
Hassard et al. 's (2000) editorial introduction and the book as a whole. Insufficient 
theoretical discussion of the two dimensions - the organisation of bodies and 
nonorganisationai embodiment - means that the editors (and the volume as a whole) 
fail to offer a proper conceptualisation of the body and organisation per se. And they 
do not provide a systematic discussion of how organisation theory should deal with 
the ways in which the body is a problem for organisation. Embodiment seems reduced 
to emotions, sexuality and gender, whilst organisation is not recognised beyond the 
boundaries of organisational entities. Consequently, the anthology is of little help in 
identifying the power of the body and the power of organisation as well as the ways in 
which bodies make organisation less stable and powerful and more dynamic, 
processual and fragile. 
A third theme given some attention in Body and Organization, especially in Lennie's 
(2000) article, concerns the embodied aspects of organising practices. Similar to the 
Merleau-Pontian argument of Crossley's (1995) carnal sociology, embodiment is seen 
as an active force that produces or makes organisation possible. In other words, there 
is no organisation without embodiment. The successful management of organisations 
is embodied, and in order to understand the nature of successful management and how 
we manage organisations, Lennie argues that we need to understand how management 
and organisation is embodied. Examples given include the "gut feeling" behind 
certain managerial decisions and the "buzzing excitement" sometimes helping the 
performance of daily routines. As such, Lennie goes some way in acknowledging the 
unpredictable nature of these bodily forces. Moreover, this notion seeks to emphasise 
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what bodies do rather than what is done to bodies. The problem is that it provides a 
limited appreciation of what bodies can do in that the significance of embodiment is 
only recognised to the extent that bodies inside an organisation are capable of actions 
that aid the fulfilment of the rational goals of the same organisation. And in principle. 
this is because the embodiment that is seen to embody organisation is not simply 
embodiment. Rather, this is a form of embodiment that is already - to some extent -
organised, and Lennie would perhaps have realised this if he had theorised his 
argument more thoroughly. This is not just because embodiment is confined within 
the boundaries of organisational entities. This is also because the embodiment 
concerned is more deeply organised by the rational human mind, by the biomedical 
and biophilosophical discourse by which embodiment is rendered knowable only in 
terms of the organised body of the organism, and by the norms and expectations of 
society as a whole. In conclusion, the "gut feeling" and "buzzing excitement" Lennie 
is talking about is not very far away from the impression management and dress codes 
of corporate manuals. And the notion of embodied organisation is not as different 
from the notion of organised embodiment as we are led to think by Lennie's account. 
In excuse of the shortcomings identified in Hassard et al. 's (2000) anthology, it must 
be noted that the body theme in organisation theory is a young field of inquiry yet to 
achieve the sense of coherence characteristic of subfields that have been longer 
established within this discipline. And perhaps this explains, as Munro (forthcoming) 
suggests in his review article, the lack of a coherent theme in the first essay collection 
on the subject matter, Body and Organi=ation. What joins these articles is simply their 
mutual interest in the body and its role in organisational life. 
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Karen Dale's (2001) research monograph is more interesting with regards to how one, 
as an organisation theorist, is to deal with the problem of the body. Although her 
agenda is different from mine in that she is primarily concerned with how the 
development of organisation theory as a distinct discipline is influenced by the 
organismic conception of the body, some of the issues she raises are highly relevant to 
my own inquiry into how organisation theory does and should deal with the problem 
of the body. As I showed in the introductory chapter, Dale draws attention to the 
constructed nature of the body itself as well as the constructed nature of our 
knowledge about the body by pursuing a terminology that privileges "embodiment" 
above "the body". As a common sense term, the body is typically underwritten by a 
Western biomedical discourse that subsumes embodiment within the workings of the 
organism. This has serious implications for both our understanding of the body, 
organisation, and the relationship between the body and organisation. Viewing the 
body as an organism (i.e. as an object of natural science) we forget that like any object 
of knowledge it is constructed as such. And by accepting the notion of the organism 
we take for granted that the body is already organised. Although Dale could have spelt 
this out more explicitly, two things are lost in this naturalist conceptualisation. First, 
the processual nature of the body, which questions the assumption that bodies are 
already organised as entities systemically functioning in a particular way according to 
certain expectations, and second, that insofar as bodies are organised, they are 
subjected to organisational processes by which they can never be fully organised into 
organisational entities. Rather, the processual nature of organisation implies that 
organisation is always engaged in an intense and unsettled relationship with bodily 
processes of a nonorganisational kind. It is this recognition that informs my 
investigation in the next and penultimate chapter of this thesis, where I shall examine 
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some of the attempts by Deleuze at developing a conception of embodiment that 
shatters the organismic assumption that bodies are organised. This is not simply 
relevant for philosophers who have little reason to care about what goes on in 
organisation theory. Deleuze's understanding of the body may also prove useful to 
organisation theorists concerned with how their own field should deal with the 
problem of the body. 
6.S Conclusion: Towards an Organisation Theory of the Body? 
In conclusion, this chapter has argued that feminist studies, particularly outside 
organisation theory, have played and can playa crucial role in the development of an 
organisation theory of the body. Specifically, by drawing attention to the construction, 
organisation and experience of bodily difference, feminism can help organisation 
theory more readily recognise not only the organisation of the body within and 
without formal organisations. It can also help organisation theorists recognise and 
deal with the ways in which bodily difference is constructed by organisational 
processes inside and outside of formal organisations. And it can help organisation 
theorists recognise and deal with the ways in which bodily difference disrupts, 
undermines and escapes such organisational processes and constructions. 
The sociology of the body, which pays far less attention to bodily difference and the 
transgressive powers of embodiment also provides important analyses of the 
construction, regulation and organisation of the body. But more importantly, the 
perspective developed by Williams and Bendelow (1998), which is heavily inspired 
by feminism, can embody organisation theory so that an eventual organisation theory 
of the body avoids becoming just another subfield in organisation theory. 
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The already existing work in organisation theory on issues of embodiment is of course 
important for the future development of an organisation theory of the body. It is 
however in need of further theoretical and conceptual work. And whilst most existing 
research focuses on the organisation of the body and the embodiment of organisation, 
an organisation theory of the body also needs to pay more attention to the 
nonorganisational aspects of embodiment that disrupt the boundaries of organisation 
and organised embodiment. Turning to Deleuze's writings on the body, I attempt to 
examine the nonorganisational aspects of embodiment in the next and penultimate 
chapter. In the concluding chapter, I shall bring things together by considering what 
concept of organisation and what organisation theory that might result when paying 
attention to the nonorganisational aspects of embodiment that disrupt the boundaries 
of organisation. 
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Chapter 7 
Nonorganisational Embodiment in Deleuze's Philosophy 
7.1 Introduction 
In the second chapter of this thesis, I tried to show that public health takes the body as 
its problem, a problem to be resolved by organisation; from certain criteria of health 
and wellbeing, public health seeks to organise bodies. From a completely different 
angle, it is possible to argue that the body has been examined by researchers who find 
their own bodies problematic. As I hinted at the beginning of my discussion of 
feminism in chapter 6, and as I shall elaborate below, the body is problematised by 
people for whom it may be seen as giving rise to a set of problems. More specifically, 
it might be that certain academics have taken the body as a research object because 
they find their own bodies either to be different from the normalised body of the 
population average or to be different from the body-images communicated in 
biomedical discourse and in popular culture; or because they find their own bodies to 
be under severe pressure from and to be discriminated by dominant cultures, 
institutions and discourses in society. As their bodies in one way or the other fall 
outside the narrow boundaries of the normalised, disciplined and organised body, it 
may be that a significant number of writers have sought to open up the understanding 
of the body and what it means to be a body. 
It is therefore significant to acknowledge, if not to explore in any depth, the biography 
and sometimes the somatic history of writers whose research on the body we examine. 
Feminism, black studies and queer theory are perhaps the areas of thought where one 
finds the most obvious examples of academics whose experience of their own body is 
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a particularly problematic one. For women, blacks and gays and lesbians, the body 
continues to be a primary site of discrimination and suffering. A number of feminist 
researchers become concerned with the body as a research topic as they recognise 
how the female body is the object of control and victim of discrimination and violence 
in a fundamentally patriarchal society. A number of black researchers focus on the 
body because of the ways in which the black body is the object of control and victim 
of discrimination and violence in societies dominated by white culture and white 
political institutions. And a number of lesbian and gay researchers pay attention to the 
body as they recognise how the queer body is the object of control and victim of 
discrimination, violence and stigmatisation in a largely hetero-normative society. 
Though Foucault wrote from a starting point prior to the expansion of queer theory, 
his intellectual project has influenced many of the later developments in queer theory 
and it might, as does Foucault biographer James Miller (1995), be seen in relation to 
the ways in which he found his own gay body problematic. 
A less obvious example of the relationship between a problematic expenence of 
personal embodiment and the pursuit of research activities may be the sociologist of 
the body, Chris Shilling, who as a result of his many years as an active long-distance 
runner supposedly suffers from severe arthritis. Another example of particular 
relevance here may be Gilles Deleuze, whose interest in the body is perhaps most 
obvious in the notion of the body without organs that he developed with Felix 
Guattari, and which may be seen in relation to his own suffering of chronic respiratory 
illness late in life. On Guattari's part, his interest in embodiment may be seen in 
relation to his own struggle to come to terms with his own sexuality, childhood and 
the deaths that he experienced in his immediate family as a young child. Guattari's 
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father committed suicide, and he himself experienced his grandfather dying from a 
stroke whilst sitting on the toilet with the door open listening to the radio (Guattari 
1984). In order to see how the body can be thought independently of organisation. it is 
to some of Deleuze's attempts to open up and rethink the body that I tum my attention 
in this chapter. 
In short, I will argue that Deleuze proposes a perspective that not only enables us to 
recognise the limitations faced by organisational regimes such as public health in its 
quest to organise bodies, populations and the conditions under which people live. 
Deleuze's philosophy redefines the human condition itself, challenges and contradicts 
the biomedical concept of the organism, and gives way to a nonorganic or 
nonorganisational appreciation of embodiment that changes our understanding of 
what it means to be a body. This is not to say that Deleuze rejects the idea of the 
organism altogether, and that the organic understanding of embodiment pursued in the 
biomedical discourse is wrong. In fact, Deleuze helps us recognise that the biomedical 
concept of the organism, which reduces bodies to organisation, can say a great deal 
about what a body is, both in terms of what a body can and cannot do. But as there is 
no way in which this concept of the organism can say all there is to say about bodies 
and embodiment, Deleuze's nonorganic analysis offers a necessary supplement to 
biomedical perspectives on the body. 
Deleuze's attempts to philosophise the nonorganic aspects of embodiment must be 
read in light of his more general philosophical project, which often is characterised as 
a philosophy of becoming opposed to more conventional philosophies of being. 
Although Deleuze never positions himself explicitly as a philosopher of becoming, 
the concept of "becoming" keeps recurring throughout many of his works, from 
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Nietzsche and Philosophy (his first book published in English), via his collaborative 
writings with Guattari, to his latest published book, the anthology Essays Critical and 
Clinical. Throughout his philosophical career, Deleuze employed the concept of 
becoming as a means to think through issues of ontology. First and foremost, this 
amounted to think beyond the human condition by thinking about the non-human 
becomings of the human, and it is the central attention given to this task in particular 
that may explain why a number of commentators have characterised Deleuze as no 
less than a philosopher of becoming (e.g. Braidotti 1993~ Holland 1999b; Olkowski 
1999). Consequently, if we are to locate Deleuze's attempts to think embodiment in 
nonorganic terms within the context of a philosophy of becoming, we must recognise 
that these same attempts are bound up with his more general attempt to think beyond 
the human condition. 
In this chapter, I shall deal with four main areas that all play a central part in 
Deleuze's endeavour to think beyond the human condition, think non-human 
becomings of the human, and conceptualise embodiment in nonorganic terms, as 
nonorganisational embodiment. Hopefully, this discussion can be used as a platform 
for how organisation theory should develop new strategies for dealing with the 
problem of the body. The specific areas examined are~ (i) the virtual, (ii) the Spinozist 
body, (iii) creative involution and becoming-other, and (iv) the body H,ithout organs. 
In parts, but not in all of this investigation, I shall draw upon the work of Keith Ansell 
Pearson (1999). I find his account more useful than many other accounts (e.g. Bogue 
1989; Goodchild 1996; Holland 1999a; Olkowski 1999; Buchanan 2000; Rajchman 
2000). Perhaps because Ansell Pearson is a philosopher reading Deleuze as a 
philosopher, he is able to offer an account of Deleuze's philosophical project - or 
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projects - that is more rigorous than that offered by non-philosophers such as Bogue 
(1989), Goodchild (1996), Buchanan (2000) and Rajchman (2000). More specifically, 
Ansell Pearson provides a systematic reading of Deleuze that locates the whole of his 
work in relation, juxtaposition and opposition to the Western philosophical tradition. 
And rather than simply applying terms and concepts, he cuts through the jargon in 
Deleuze's sole-authored works and in Deleuze's works with Guattari by fleshing out 
and problematising terms. 
7.2 The Virtual 
As pointed out in the introduction, the concept of the virtual, which problematises 
conventional notions of temporality and spatiality, marks a central starting point in 
Deleuze's philosophy of becoming and I would argue that it opens up for his later 
discussions of nonorganic embodiment. It should therefore not be confused with the 
popular references to virtual organisations and virtual reality that simply confine the 
virtual to recent developments in information technology. Deleuze takes the concept 
from one of his main sources of inspiration, the French early twentieth century 
philosopher Henri Bergson, and it appears centrally in Bergsonism, his 1966 study of 
the same philosophical figure. Two years later, in Difference and Repetition (1968), 
which is his first attempt to develop his own philosophical project without solely 
focusing on one particular figure in the history of philosophy, Deleuze expands on the 
concept of the virtual. Whilst guided by certain secondary texts, my investigation here 
draws upon Bergsonism as well as Difference and Repetition. But before examining 
the concept of the virtual in more detail, I shall tum to the concept of the event, which 
Deleuze developed in relation to the concept of the virtual. 
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I am interested in the event here because this is the concept that enables us to extract 
specific considerations from Deleuze's philosophy of becoming and apply the general 
premises of this project to issues such as embodiment and organisation. However, 
typically of Deleuze, his concept of the event is more open yet more specific than that 
implied by straightforward dictionary definitions. An event is not simply something 
that happens, such as an organised social occasion, a public lecture, a concert or an 
item in a sports programme. What makes something an event is none of the above, but 
the capacity of that something to open up the future and make things happen. As the 
event is different from that which already exists and as it sticks out from the mundane 
and the regular, it marks a rupture or discontinuity in history. But by opening up the 
future, the event also takes its differential nature beyond the moment of its own 
realisation, thus promising further differentiation. The event is therefore a matter of 
continuity as well as discontinuity. Deleuze largely inherits this point from Bergson's 
philosophy of "duration", duration being Bergson's term for becoming. Bergson's 
emphasis on continuity was actually the main target of Bachelard's attack on him 
around fifty years ago (cf. Bachelard 2000). And interestingly, Deleuze's emphasis on 
the continuous nature of the event has been critiqued in more recent years by the 
French mathematician and Marxist philosopher Alain Badiou (1999, 2000). Badiou, 
who thinks in terms of set theory, shares Deleuze's view that an event must open up 
the future, but accuses Deleuze of placing too much emphasis on continuity. 
However, in doing so, Badiou fails to appreciate the full scope of Deleuze's 
perspective, which by no means dissociates the event from incidences of rupture and 
discontinuity. The emphasis given to both discontinuity and the moment on the one 
hand, and continuity and eternity on the other is brought out in this passage by the 
philosopher and Deleuze commentator Keith Ansell Pearson: 
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The event is the event of time (the moment) that both happens to us and which 
lives beyond us (eternity): "The event is not what occurs (an accident), it is 
rather inside what occurs, the purely expressed. It signals and awaits us." [ ... J 
Every event can be said to have a double structure. On the one hand, there is 
necessarily the present moment of its actualization: the event "happens" and 
gets embodied in a state of affairs and in an individual ("the moment has 
come"). Here the time of the event, its past and future, are evaluated from the 
perspective of this definitive present and actual embodiment. On the other hand, 
the event continues to "live on", enjoying its own past and future, haunting each 
present, making the present return as a question of the present, and free of the 
limits placed upon it by any given state of affairs (Ansell Pearson 1999: 123-
124; Deleuze quoted in Ansell Pearson). 
In order to understand the role of continuity in Deleuze's thinking of the event it is 
necessary to introduce another set of concepts: that of the virtual, the actual, the real 
and the possible. Conventional philosophies of being to which Deleuze provides an 
alternative tend to think in terms of the real and the possible, where the real is that 
which really exists, and the possible is that which can exist. In this frame of thought 
the possible is always determined by the real in such a way that what can exist always 
depends on what already exists. The possible events that are to be realised in the 
future therefore depend on the events that are realised in the present. A simple 
illustration might be helpfu1.46 Imagine a pendulum which, given time, moves from 
46 I am grateful to Martin Brigham for this example. 
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one end of a continuum to another. Whereas the pendulum can occupy a whole series 
of spatial points along this continuum, it only occupies one particular point at one 
particular point in time. This is the real point of occupation, i.e. the point at which the 
pendulum is realised here and now. All the other points that the pendulum can, given 
time, occupy, are possible points to be realised in the future. If the pendulum occupies 
point s 1 of the continuum at time t 1, it will occupy point s2 at time t2 and so on. So if 
the pendulum occupies the extreme point at the left-hand side of the continuum at one 
point in time, it will move down the continuum at the next point in time, steadily 
getting closer and closer to the extreme point at the opposite side of the same 
continuum. By knowing the current and previous positions of the pendulum we can 
predict its next position. In conclusion, by knowing what event is real here and now, 
we can predict what possible events will be realised in the future. Conventional 
thinking therefore progresses from the real (a real state of affairs) towards the 
realisation of the possible. But as we shall see below, Deleuze moves in the opposite 
direction, from the virtual to the actual and the actualisation of the virtual. 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze abandons the framework of the real and the 
possible and replaces it with the idea of the virtual and the actual. Whereas the 
possible is opposed to the real and 'the process undergone by the possible is [ ... ] a 
"realisation"', the virtual is not even engaged in a relationship with the real (Deleuze 
1994: 211). Contrary to most dictionaries, which tend to define the virtual as that 
which is almost existing or almost real, Deleuze' s conceptualisation of the virtual 
implies no sense of inferiority. The virtual, for Deleuze, is in no respect less than the 
real, but more, and 'possesses a full reality by itself (Deleuze 1994: 211). Put simply, 
this reality possessed by the virtual is the Universe, the One and the All, which means 
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that the virtual is everything and that the virtual is in everything. This extended and 
undivided world of the virtual is then related to the actual, and the process undergone 
by the virtual is not one of realisation, but one of actualisation. 
But before proceeding to analyse the process of actualisation, it is necessary to 
examine the concept of difference, which albeit complex, plays a crucial part III 
Deleuze's understanding of the virtual, the actual and the actualisation of the virtual. 
Drawing on Leibniz, Deleuze argues that the virtual is populated by Ideas. As Paul 
Patton (1994: xii) notes in his 'Translator's Preface' to Difference and Repetition, 
most English texts would translate Deleuze' s concept of Ideas as Form if it was to be 
subsumed within the philosophical framework established by Plato. Deleuze's project, 
however, is very different from Plato's. Whereas the Idea or the Form in Plato is that 
which gives identity to the thing, the Deleuzian Idea is a matter of difference 
permeated by the differential. Here it is important to note the distinction that Deleuze 
makes between differentiation and differenciation, and as Constantin Boundas (1996: 
91) emphasises in his instructive and critical essay, differentiation always comes 
before differenciation. The former refers to the mathematical operation of making 
something progressively determinate, whilst the latter concerns the more familiar and 
general sense (normally referred to as differentiation in English) of becoming 
different or making something different. Being virtual Ideas, the Ideas referred to by 
Deleuze are differentiated in the former sense of being differential and becoming 
progressively determinate. Following Bergson, Deleuze refers to this notion of 
difference enjoyed by the virtual as internal difference. This does not mean that the 
virtual is constituted by different things, but that it is embodied by different 
tendencies that enable it to differ from itself. It is only by being actualised - i.e. 
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differenciated - that these tendencies of the virtual are invested with what Deleuze 
refers to as external difference, and it is only following actualisation that these 
tendencies can be presented (but only presented) as different things differing from one 
another. It is not completely accurate, and rather essentialist, to say, like Boundas, that 
internal difference and differentiation comes before external difference and 
differenciation and that the virtual comes before the actual. Deleuze' s ambiguous 
notion of differentiationldifferenciation does actually problematise this notion of a 
"pure and superior before" and an "inferior after". It is not only the virtual that 
continues to exist in the actual, as I shall elaborate below. Through the notion of 
tendencies, which constitutes the internal difference of the virtual Whole, it is possible 
to see how the actual also already exists in the virtual. 
In Bergsonism, Deleuze argues that it is the elan vital which enables the actualisation 
of the virtual. Boundas (1996: 91) emphasises that the 'Elan vital is not an occult 
power, but rather the name of the force(s) at work each time that a virtuality is being 
actualized [ ... J', and as one reads Deleuze's Bergsonism, it is confirmed that 'The 
elan vital [ ... ] designates the actualization of this virtual [ ... J' (1988a: 113). Further 
on, in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze (1994: 279) argues that 'Ideas are actualised 
by differenciation. For Ideas, to be actualized is to be differenciated.' As noted above, 
as the virtual undergoes the processes of actualization and differenciation, it is 
manifested as different things that differ from one another. But since these things are 
actualities (rather than things as such), they are not established with stable boundaries 
and fixed identities and they do not enjoy the same status as they would have within a 
philosophy concerned with the real state of affairs. This is because the virtual, \\"ith its 
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undivided nature, continues to exist in the actual. In order to understand how the 
virtual continues to exist in the actual, we need to re-invoke the concept of the event. 
Deleuze does not speak of the actualisation of the virtual in terms of the thing, but in 
terms of the event. Consequently, every actualisation of the virtual is an event. And 
the concept of the event (as opposed to the thing) goes to highlight that the actual does 
not fix and determine that which has undergone actualisation by offering any definite 
end point. This is because the event that takes place with the actualisation of the 
virtual never terminates its connection to the extended and indeterminate world of the 
virtual Whole. As well as recognising movements from the virtual to the actual, we 
must therefore equally recognise movement in the opposite direction (i.e. from the 
actual to the virtual). Within every actualised event there is a virtual pure event, which 
maintains the connection between the actual and the extended world of the virtual. As 
James Williams (2000: 215) writes, 'the indication of the extended world of the 
virtual is the pure event in any event.' Hence, the actualisation of the virtual is not a 
matter of closure, but openness, because 'events bring together differentiated objects 
and intensities with the undifferentiated virtual world that they express.' 
Consequently, the actual is subjected to continuous change and modification and can 
only enjoy a temporary and momentary existence. Anything can happen to the actual. 
The pages onto which this text is written, for example, can catch fire, blow away with 
the wind, disappear at the bottom of some shelf, be used to support a broken leg on a 
desk, or rot and dematerialise. And a body or an organisation can undergo equally 
radical changes that open up completely what it means to be a body or an 
organisation. In more general terms, the relationship between the actual and the 
virtual means that new events are actualised so as to change already existing 
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actualities. Sometimes just moderately, other times into something totally different, 
previously unknown to both thought and experience. 
Given that the actual springs out of the virtual, it is never pre-formed. The kind of 
actualisation undergone by the virtual in order to become actual is therefore far from 
obvious. Unlike the real, which is 'the image and likeness of the possible that it 
realizes, the actual [ ... ] does not resemble the virtuality that it embodies', Deleuze 
states in Bergsonism (l988a: 97). Hence, 'actualization, differentiation [here Deleuze 
refers to what he in Difference and Repetition specifies as differenciation], are a 
genuine creation. The Whole must create the divergent lines according to which it is 
actualized and the dissimilar means that it utilizes on each line' (Deleuze 1988a: 106). 
As a consequence, actualisation is a matter of creation, which means that the virtual 
'must create its own terms of actualisation' (Hardt 1993: 18). Following Bergson, 
Deleuze (l988a) argues that this creative act, which also creates bodies and 
embodiment, takes the form of creative evolution. Deleuze first deals with Bergson's 
concept of creative evolution in an essay from 1956 (cf. Deleuze 2000), and returns to 
this project in Bergsonism ten years later. Deleuze's most important contribution in 
these works was to investigate creative evolution in relation to the virtual and to show 
how the creative evolution of the Bergsonian organism was due to the connection 
between the actual organism and the incorporeal virtual Whole. 
This point plays an important role in Ansell Pearson's (1999) Deleuze commentary, 
where he insists that Deleuze' s Bergsonism and the concept of the virtual underpins 
Deleuze's philosophical project throughout. Whilst appreciating the importance of the 
virtual and recognising the Bergsonian influence on Deleuze, it is however important 
to notice that the choice made by Ansell Pearson has crucial implications for how one 
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is to read Deleuze. If advocating a Bergsonian reading of Deleuze that privileges the 
concept of the virtual - and the virtual as incorporeal - to the extent that Ansell 
Pearson does, it becomes difficult to fully appreciate the ways in which Deleuze 
actually deals with the more concrete issues of embodiment. Although Ansell 
Pearson's study deals in depth with the body without organs for example, and even 
though this concept with benefit can be read against the conceptual background of the 
virtual, my emphasis on Deleuze's engagement with the body has the effect of 
downplaying the significance of the incorporeal virtual somewhat. I appreciate that 
this may not be entirely in line with how Deleuze himself reflected about his own 
philosophical projects. I also appreciate, as has been suggested to me by Ansell 
Pearson, that the virtual is not merely a Bergsonian theme in Deleuze's larger project 
but rather at the very centre of Deleuze's "Deleuzism". Deleuze does not merely 
adopt Bergson's understanding of the virtual, but develops it further. This is not a 
huge problem, though. As we know from my discussion of Deleuze in chapter 3, 
Deleuze's histories of philosophy - which he characterised as buggery - did not 
always follow the intentions of the author with which he was grappling at one 
particular time. And in A Thousand Plateaus, one is encouraged by Deleuze and 
Guattari (1988) to use their writings for one's own particular purpose. This is exactly 
what I am doing here when I take elements of Deleuze' s philosophical proj ect - not to 
focus on the incorporeal virtual per se - but to investigate the ways in which the 
virtual makes Deleuze deal with the problem of the body. 
Returning to the issue of creative evolution, it should also be noted that there is a key 
difference between Bergson and Deleuze on this matter. This is most strongly 
articulated in Deleuze and Guattari's (1988) discussion of symbiosis and transversal 
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communication, which makes them replace the concept of creative evolution with the 
concept of creative involution. As the concept of creative evolution is primarily about 
the connection between the human organism and the virtual, it is a concept in which 
bodies and embodiment largely figure implicitly. Rather than focusing on the process 
of creative evolution here, I shall therefore tum to the creative aspects of embodiment 
in relation to the concept of creative involution, which even though written in a 
Bergsonian spirit, comes to replace the concept of creative evolution. First, however, I 
shall examine what Deleuze has to say about the Spinozist body, where he up to a 
point seems to pursue the superhumanism embarked upon in Bergsonism. More 
specifically, I shall do so by drawing on Deleuze's (1988b, 1992) own texts and on 
Michael Hardt's (1993) discussion of Deleuze' s reading of Spinoza. 
7.3 Deleuze's Spinozism: An Ethological Ethic of Affective Bodies 
Spinoza turned his attention to the body in order to develop an understanding of 
ethical practice, which in tum was related to political practice and power. And despite 
the fact that Spinoza's, like Deleuze's, reference to the body is a general one that goes 
beyond the notion of the human body, it does by no means exclude the sense of 
embodiment that is the prime concern of my investigation.47 As Deleuze (1992: 212) 
reminds us, Spinoza starts with an empirical study aimed to investigate the relations 
and composition of bodies, and according to the Deleuze commentator Michael Hardt, 
Spinoza does so in order to 'try to determine the laws of the interaction of bodies' 
(1993: 91). More specifically, Spinoza tries to identify the encounters of bodies, their 
47 Deleuze (1988b: 126) argues in his second reading of Spinoza that' A body can be anything; it can be 
an animaL a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity.' 
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composition and decomposition, their compatibility or composability, and their 
conflict, and it is this endeavour that makes Spinoza move from the level of bodily 
physics to the level of bodily ethics. Hardt, who makes this comment in a chapter 
devoted to Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, gives the following description of the 
Spinozist body and the interactive encounters between bodies: 
A body is not a fixed unit with a stable or static internal structure. On the 
contrary, a body is a dynamic relationship whose internal structure and external 
limits are subject to change. What we identify as a body is merely a temporarily 
stable relationship [ ... ]. This proposition of the dynamic nature of bodies, of the 
continual flux of their internal dynamic, allows Spinoza a rich understanding of 
the interaction among bodies. When two bodies meet, there is an encounter 
between two dynamic relationships: Either they are indifferent to each other, or 
they are compatible and together compose a new relationship, a new body; or, 
rather they are incompatible and one body decomposes the relationship of the 
other, destroying it, just as a poison decomposes the blood [ ... J (Hardt 1993: 
92). 
Further on, Hardt shows how this conception of the body enables Spinoza - and 
thereby De1euze - to investigate power: 
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This physical universe of bodies at motion and rest, in union and conflict, will 
provide the context in which we can delve deeper into the functioning and 
structure of power: "In order to really think in terms of power, one must first 
pose the question in relation to the body" (Hardt 1992: 92; Deleuze quoted in 
Hardt). 
The question of power, which most certainly is a question about the body, concerns 
nothing less than what a body can do. Reading Spinoza's Ethics, it is therefore one 
statement in particular that attracts Deleuze' s interest: 
No one has yet determined what the body can do [ ... ]. For no one has yet come 
to know the structure of the body (Spinoza quoted in Deleuze 1992: 383; 
Deleuze's omission). 
This emphasis on revealing the internal structures of the body does not lead Spinoza 
to conduct detailed anatomical dissections or physiological experiments that are to 
reveal bodily structure in full. His empirical method is not that of the systematic 
anatomist or physiologist, but that of the speculative and experimental philosopher. 
Hence, it is only by experimenting with what a body can do that we can understand (i) 
the structure of the body, (ii) power in general, and (iii) the power of the body in 
particular. According to Spinoza, the structure of the body is not constituted by 
organs, but by affective forces, and it is these forces that make the body what it is and 
determine what a body can do. This position is also put forward in Deleuze' s reading 
ofSpinoza: 
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A body's structure is the composition of its relation. What a body can do is the 
nature and the limits of its power to be affected (Deleuze 1992: 218). 
In order to know the structure of the body and what a body can do we therefore have 
to investigate these affective forces. More specifically, affectivity, or the power to be 
affected is filled by affections of two kinds: active affections and passive affections. 
Active affections have to do with our power to act, whilst passive affections have 
merely to do with our power to feel or suffer (puissance de patir). Since affectivity 
(both active and passive) has to do with expression and production, passive affections 
signify our lack of power. De1euze provides the following summary of this aspect of 
Spinoza's philosophy: 
We suffer external things, distinct from ourselves; we thus ourselves have a 
distinct force of passion and action. But our force of suffering is simply the 
imperfection, the finitude, the limitation of our force of acting itself. Our force 
of suffering asserts nothing, because it expresses nothing at all: it "involves" 
only our impotence, our servitude, that is to say, the lowest degree of our power 
of acting [ ... ] (Deleuze 1992: 224). 
These aspects do however go missing in a purely physical appreciation, which simply 
affinns the plenitude of affectivity and inhibits us from identifying what a body can 
do, what affections we are capable of and the extent of our power. An ethical 
evaluation, on the other hand, is capable of revealing the complexity of affectivity by 
examining how the power to be affected is actually composed. Hardt (1993: 93) 
elaborates: 
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To the extent that it is filled with passIve affections, it is reduced to its 
minimum, and to the extent that it is filled with active affections, it is increased 
to its maximum. 
According to Spinoza, affectivity is however dominated by passive affects, which are 
not just a matter of chance. As Hardt notes, it is by necessity that 
our power to be affected is largely filled with active affections. God, or Nature, 
is completely filled with active affections, because there is no external cause to 
it. However, "the force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and 
infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes" (Hardt 1993: 93; Spinoza 
quoted in Hardt). 
This is no straightforward matter, and the consequences for bodies and relations 
between bodies thus need to be examined in closer detail. Since they are not caused 
by us, passive affections are matters of chance encounters between our body and other 
bodies. The complexity of such encounters is further reinforced by the dynamic nature 
of the body, which does not exist in terms of a fixed entity, but is characterised by 
flux and flexibility. In the words of Hardt (1993: 94): 
one body itself is not a fixed unit with a static structure, but rather a dynamic 
relationship whose internal structure and external limits are open and 
continually subject to change. [ ... ] what Spinoza identifies as a body or an 
individual is simply a temporarily stable assemblage of coordinated elements 
[ ... ]. 
299 
This dynamic VIew of individual bodies then enables us to consider encounters 
between two different bodies. Depending on the traits of each one of the two bodies, a 
relationship between them is either composable or incomposable. Whereas the fonner 
results in joyful passive affections and enhances your power to act, the latter results in 
sad passive affections. This is because in the fonner type of encounter two bodies 
meet whose internal structures are compatible with one another, whilst in the latter, 
the internal structures or relations of the two bodies are incompatible because one 
body does not agree with the nature of the other. The consequence is that 'one body 
will decompose the relationship of the other or both bodies will be decomposed'. 
Most importantly, there will be no increase in power (in fact there will be a decrease) 
because 'a body cannot gain power from something that does not agree with it' (Hardt 
1993: 94). 
However, the trouble of attempting a radical extension of the activities open to the 
body is not only that passive affections come more frequently than active affections. 
According to Spinoza, sad passive affections also come more frequently than joyful 
passive affections because it is only in principle, or in the abstract that humans agree 
in nature. Consequently, humans agree very little with one another. At this stage, one 
can dismiss Spinoza as a fundamental pessimist with regards to what bodies can do. 
After all, Spinoza's view of passive affections is one of forces entirely negative that 
affinn nothing and simply cut us off from what a body can do. But as Hardt (1993) 
points out, this would be to miss the whole point of his project. What may appear as 
pessimism in Spinoza's appraisal is simply the speculative basis for further ethical 
practice. Similar to Nietzsche's genealogy, Spinoza seeks to go beyond a human 
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condition dominated by sad passive affections and enter into a condition in which the 
human becomes active. As Deleuze (1992: 246) remarks in his reading, 
The ethical question falls then, in Spinoza, into two parts: How can we come to 
produce active affections? But first of all: How can we come to experience a 
maximum of joyful passions? 
What, then, does Deleuze's Spinoza say about how we are to move from joyful 
passive affections to active affections? 
The move from joyful passive affections to active affections takes place via what 
Spinoza calls common notions, which signify the extent to which two bodies agree 
with one another. But if a move from joyful passive affections to active affections can 
only take place to the extent that two bodies do agree with one another, it is difficult 
to see how Spinoza can help us open up the field of embodiment. Difficult, yes, but 
not impossible, even if this highlights a problem of invoking Spinoza to think 
differently about the body. According to Spinoza, despite the fact that active 
affections come into being from the fact that one body finds a commonality with 
another body, this does not mean that the two bodies are or are to become the same. 
Whereas joyful passive affections or joyful passions are caused by some external 
force, they become active affections whence that same body comprehends, 
incorporates and internalises them. The result is not that one body is sucked into and 
colonised by another. As Hardt (1993: 118) rightly points out, 'The joy of the 
encounter is precisely the composition of the two bodies in a new, more powerful 
body.' In Deleuzian terms, this new and more powerful body (which has a greater 
capacity to be affected) is not based upon the homogeneity or sameness of what 
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initially were two or several bodies. Instead, it is based upon the fact that they both 
have openly internalised those elements that made them (i.e. the two bodies) different 
in the first place. As we shall see in the next section, this combination of different 
bodies resembles Deleuze and Guattari's (1988) notion of the heterogeneous machinic 
assemblage. And insofar as two bodies constitute an assemblage, this assemblage is 
more open, has a greater capacity to be affected, and is therefore stronger than one 
body on its own. 
Having discussed the notion of affective bodies in relation to power, it is now 
necessary to discuss the same notion in relation to ethics. In other words, what is it 
that makes the movement to a more powerful body assembled by two heterogeneous 
bodies a matter of ethics? 
As Deleuze reminds us, the affectivity of bodies is about ethics because in Spinoza, 
ethics is about ethology rather than morality: 
Spinoza's ethics has nothing to do with a morality; he conceIves it as an 
ethology, that is, as a composition of fast and slow speeds, of capacities for 
affecting and being affected [ ... ]. That is why Spinoza calls out to us in the way 
he does: you do not know beforehand what good or bad you are capable of; you 
do not know beforehand what a body or a mind can do, in a given encounter, a 
given arrangement, a given combination (Deleuze 1988b: 125). 
Deleuze's passage provides quite an obscure understanding of ethology, and before 
moving on, it might be helpful to see how Deleuze's understanding contrasts with 
how ethology is defined in other contexts. The Oxford English Dictionary, which 
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offers a definition of ethology based on contemporary scientific usage of the term. 
writes that ethology is the science of animal behaviour or the study of human 
behaviour and social organisation from a biological perspective. Similarly, the 
WordNet (1997) service at Princeton University defines ethology as a brand of 
zoology that studies the behaviour of animals in their natural habitats. In contrast to 
these definitions, the Webster Unabridged Dictionary (1913) provides one that is far 
more ethically oriented, arguing that ethology is the study of ethos or ethics, i.e. of 
characteristic spirits, beliefs and customs of a community. Whereas the first two 
definitions reduce ethology to a naturalistic term, the latter runs the risk of conflating 
ethology with morality. But as we shall see, Deleuze's understanding comes 
somewhere between - and beyond - these two perspectives. Deleuze tends to think in 
non-naturalistic and non-moralistic terms about ethology, as the study of habits. 
Developing an ethological ethic, Spinoza is not concerned with right and wrong, good 
and evil, but with what a body can do in a particular relationship with other bodies. 
Encounter and relationship are key terms in Deleuze' s understanding of an ethological 
ethics, and Deleuze adds that 'ethology studies the compositions of relations or 
capacities between different things' (Deleuze 1988b: 126). This may seem an abstract 
statement, but the ethical challenge that it poses is one of forming 'sociabilities and 
communities'. More specifically, this involves the following problem: 
How do individuals enter into composition with one another in order to form a 
higher individual, ad infinitum? How can a being take another being into its 
world, but while preserving or respecting the other's own relations and world? 
(Deleuze 1988b: 126). 
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This is by all means an important task, but it is not just a matter of different 
individuals living together in social harmony. In order to form what Deleuze 
rhetorically describes as "a higher individual", bodies must open themselves up to 
form relationships with other bodies that make us question, change and express our 
range of bodily habits and ways of living. In other words, we have to learn to become 
more than we already are. 
But Deleuze's investigation into Spinoza's ethology is not the only place where he 
develops an ethical proj ect. According to Ansell Pearson (1999), Deleuze' s entire 
philosophy may be characterised as an ethics of Being. Of course, Being must not be 
interpreted in the conventional sense. The ethics of Being characteristic of Deleuze' s 
endeavour is an ethics of becoming, which emphasises the heterogeneous, dynamic 
and open-ended nature of life itself and the bodily habits emerging out of it. This 
theme is expressed in a variety of ways throughout Deleuze's philosophy. In 
Nietzsche and Philosophy and in Difference and Repetition, for example, he develops 
an ethics of the eternal return. In The Logic of Sense (1990) and in What Is 
Philosophy? (with Guattari 1994) he conceptualises an ethics of the event, and in A 
Thousand Plateaus (with Guattari 1988) he returns to the ethological ethics first 
embarked upon in the two Spinoza books (Deleuze 1988b, 1992). 
In Bergsonism, Deleuze (1988a) takes up Bergson's ethical challenge of learning to 
exist in duration, which in Deleuzian jargon means to learn to exist in becoming. 
Deleuze's Spinozist project is highly coloured by his previous Bergsonism. More 
specifically, this implies that within an ethics of becoming what a body can do is not 
fixed and determined, but a matter of creative evolution. As Ansell Pearson (1999: 12) 
reminds us, Deleuze's Bergsonism views life as a 'play between two creative 
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dimensions, that of nonorganic life and that of the organism.' These creative 
dimensions are then channelled into bodies in ways such that no body is either one or 
the other, but a matter of ceaseless invention and reinvention where both put their 
mark upon the body without fixing it within the boundaries of either one. The ethical 
challenge for bodies is then to equip themselves with the necessary self-knowledge 
that enables them to handle these dynamic and evolutionary conditions of existence. 
Bodies must learn how to develop a sense of affectivity that both expands their joyful 
passions and enhances their relations with other bodies. In other words, bodies must 
extend their repertoire of habits beyond the current conditions that govern what they 
can do. 
The ethical project which Deleuze (1988a) first embarks upon in Bergsonism, and 
then in the two Spinoza books, is not much different from Bergson's own attempt at a 
superior humanism. As he argues in Bergsonism, the becoming of the human is a 
result of how the actualised human body is connected with the virtual Whole, and 
Bergson, as does Deleuze in his earlier works, refers to this durational process as 
creative evolution. In his first Spinoza book, however, Deleuze (1992) not only quotes 
Spinoza by asking what the body can do; at another point, in his own words, he also 
asks what a body can do. Although the significance of replacing the definite article 
with the indefinite article should not be exaggerated, it may signify that already then, 
Deleuze was becoming more interested in different bodies, whilst Spinoza (despite an 
initially general concept of the body) was mostly interested in the human body. In A 
Thousand Plateaus, however, Deleuze - and Guattari (1988) - employ Spinoza's 
ethological ethics to think the non-human becomings of the human, and this is why 
they introduce the concept of creative involution. Although the challenge brought 
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upon us here remains one of developing active affects that enable bodies to enter into 
relationships with other bodies, it does not include just any kinds of relationships. 
What we are asked to do is to get involved in assemblages that place us on a line of 
flight through which we can escape with our own bodies and destinations and develop 
other habits and other ways of life (Malabou 1996: 126). The habits envisaged by 
Deleuze and Guattari in his later project are therefore quite different from the habits 
envisaged by Deleuze earlier. The non-human becoming of the human is a machinic 
becoming where the human becomes a component coupled into a heterogeneous 
assemblage with other bodies. This is not about abandoning the body as such through 
some computer-based technophile project, but about living differently with the body, 
also in terms of how it relates to other bodies. The objective of an ethological ethics is 
therefore to open up what a body can do. And as ethology is about openness, it is 
about enabling and encouraging the body to go beyond its own limits. 
It can also be argued that it is exactly this ethical challenge posed by Deleuze' s 
Spinozist ethology that is expressed in Deleuze and Guattari's (1988) discussion of 
the body without organs (sometimes referred to as the BwO). Not because ethology 
means the total rejection of the organism in favour of the body without organs, but 
because the body without organs carries many of the same premises that Deleuze 
expressed in his attempt at an ethological ethic of affective bodies. 'After all', as 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 153) wrote in A Thousand Plateaus, "is not Spinoza's 
Ethics the great book of the BwO?' 
But before turning to the body without organs, I shall discuss Deleuze and Guattari's 
(1988) concept of creati\"e involution. Although this is less explicitly linked to 
Deleuze's Spinozist theme than is the notion of the body without organs, the emphasis 
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on heterogeneous assemblages and the machinic and non-human becoming of the 
human is in affinity with the Spinozian notion of bodily encounters, and it leads 
Deleuze and Guattari to explore what they refer to as becoming-other. This has some 
interesting implications for our later understanding of the body without organs. In this 
section I shall therefore examine two main issues. First, the transversal 
communication between the wasp and the orchid, which is not only about bodily 
interaction and development, but also Deleuze and Guattari' s prime example of 
creative involution. And second, the notion of becoming-other, which is an extension 
of Deleuze and Guattari' s discussion of the wasp-orchid relationship and an extension 
into the body without organs. 
7.4 Creative Involution and Becoming-Other 
According to Ansell Pearson (1999), the later Deleuze does not abandon the concept 
of the virtual, but returns to this project in the two Cinema books, for example 
(Deleuze 1986, 1989). However, it is difficult to see whether the concept of creative 
involution maintains any affinity to the concept of the virtual. Of course, when 
discussing the constructed nature of species, it may be argued that the virtual is that 
which precedes and exceeds these categories, as it is pre-anatomical, pre-
morphological, nonorganisational and trans-categorical. But rather than making the 
virtual the key dimension of creative involution, I shall regard it as the more general 
background against which a phenomenon and concept such as creative involution can 
be read. 
According to habit, common sense and mainstream science, we not only tend to think 
of the wasp and the orchid as constituting two different species. In fact, there are 
between fifteen thousand and thirty-five thousand different species of orchids and 
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more than one thousand different species of wasps. We also tend to think of them as 
belonging to two completely different kingdoms - the former to the insect phylum 
within the animal kingdom and the latter to the plant kingdom. It is unusual to think 
that the wasp and the orchid would ever be engaged in a symbiotic and sympathetic 
relationship with one another. But by examining the interaction between the wasp and 
the orchid in terms of transversal communication, this is exactly what Deleuze and 
Guattari try to demonstrate. As they often do, Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 10) adopt a 
style that makes their language opaque and obscure, but that should not prevent us 
from taking an interest in what they are trying to tell us: 
The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the 
wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, 
becoming a piece in the orchid's reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes 
the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous 
elements, form a rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 10). 
Although three concepts in particular make this statement inaccessible to readers 
unfamiliar with Deleuze and Guattari's authorship ("deterritorialization", 
"reterritorialization", and "rhizome"), I will not try to explain these concepts in detail 
here. Instead, I shall elaborate on the more general message that Deleuze and Guattari 
are trying to get across. When 'The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a 
tracing of the wasp', it frees itself from the elements with which it is typically 
associated and becomes something else whilst remaining the same. And when 'the 
wasp reterritorializes on that image', it relates differently to the orchid than it would 
have done if the orchid had not first deterritorialised itself by forming an image of the 
wasp. In other words, the wasp behaves like an orchid, and the orchid behaves in such 
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a way that the wasp thinks the orchid is a wasp. Consequently, and without engaging 
in intra-species sexual relations, the wasp and the orchid become part of each others' 
reproductive systems. The relationship between the wasp and the orchid is one of 
transversal communication because it cuts across the boundaries of species and 
kingdoms, zoological phyla and botanical divisions, and it is symbiotic because it 
enables us to see that the wasp depends just as much on the orchid as the orchid 
depends on the wasp. More specifically, the life of the wasp is as much related to its 
possibilities to extract nectar from the orchid, as the life of the orchid is linked to its 
possibilities to contaminate the wasp with its pollen and to be contaminated by pollen 
transported by wasps from one orchid to the next. 
Further on, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the relationship between the wasp and the 
orchid can be seen in terms of what they call a machinic assemblage. Their reference 
to the machine must neither be confused with the Freudian view of the machine as a 
desiring-machine, nor with the Marxist view of the machine, which, being a complex 
version of the tool, is simply an extension of the human. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
both these conceptions are flawed with an anthropocentrism that by all means must be 
avoided. The machinic assemblage therefore refers to the monstrous and 
heterogeneous couplings between different forms of life, such as those between an 
orchid and a wasp, a human and her clothes: 
We think the material or machinic aspect of an assemblage relates not to the 
production of goods but rather to a precise state of intermingling of bodies in a 
society, including all the attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipathies, 
alterations, amalgations, penetrations, and expansions that affect bodies of all 
kinds in their relations to one another (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 90). 
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Humans are therefore part of machines or machinic assemblages insofar as they 
combine with other forms of life, whether tools, technical apparatuses. other humans, 
animals, or the natural environment. Ansell Pearson (1999: 142) deals with this issue 
in Germinal Life: 
Humans are both component parts of a machine and combine with other forms 
of organic and nonorganic life to constitute a machine (or, better, machinic 
assemblage since there exists no isolated or monadic machine). 
But according to Ansell Pearson, this does not mean that Deleuze and Guattari's 
machinic assemblage resembles the concept of the hybrid referred to by other 
commentators (e.g. Haraway 1991). Unlike assemblages, 'hybrids simply require a 
connection of points and do not facilitate a passing between them' (Ansell Pearson 
1999: 197). Consequently, the concept of the hybrid such as a "wasp-orchid" still 
maintains that the two parties involved can be identified as separate beings. The 
symbiotic relationship of transversal communication, on the other hand, undermines 
the distinct nature of different forms of life and 'challenges the boundaries of the 
organism' (Ansell Pearson 1997: 132), and scrambles genealogical and physiological 
lineages. 
By drawing attention to the ways in which the boundaries that separate between 
different bodies are disturbed, the concept of creative involution also make us realise 
that the categories of knowledge that define different bodies according to species, 
phyla, divisions and kingdoms are not naturally given, but the result of powerful 
processes of discursive construction. Dale (2001) helps us understand why species are 
usually viewed as distinct. It is when it is dead that a body can be cut open, fully 
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morphologised and identified in terms of an organic structure and assigned to the 
bounded categories of different species. This point is even better illustrated with 
Dale's reference to entomology. In order to categorise an insect, the entomologist 
literally pins it down by running a pin through it. As soon as the insect is dead, it can 
be fixed and stabilised so that it can engage in no more processes of transversal 
communication with members of other species. 
As Deleuze and Guattari reject the distinct purity of speCIes, they VIew the 
development of bodies in terms of becoming rather than being. Returning to the 
earlier example about the wasp and the orchid, the heterogeneous interaction between 
the two means that instead of evolving into a pure wasp perfectly differentiated from 
its environment, the wasp is becoming-orchid. Similarly, the orchid is becoming-
wasp. This aspect is central both to the notion of creativity, and to the notion of 
involution. First, as the orchid deterritorialises by forming an image of a wasp, it 
influences the wasp to reterritorialise on that image. The wasp is therefore becoming-
orchid because the orchid acts creatively by influencing something beyond itself, and 
the orchid is becoming-wasp for the exact same reason. Second, it is because the wasp 
is becoming-orchid and the orchid is becoming-wasp that Deleuze and Guattari (1988) 
replace the concept of creative evolution with their own concept of creative 
involution. 
Involution should not be interpreted in the Freudian sense, where it would be reduced 
to a matter of regression. Instead, it should be understood in the mathematical sense 
where something is folded, caught up, involved and rolled into its introvert. As 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 238-239) emphasise, regression is about something 
moving 'in the direction of something less differentiated.' Creative involution, on the 
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other hand, is about something that, whilst engaged in non-filiative, non-sexual and 
symbiotic relationships with something else, cuts across organic and phyletic 
boundaries in such a way that it becomes more differentiated. Furthermore, Deleuze 
and Guattari employ the term involution in order to dissociate their own analysis from 
a belief in evolutionary progression. Since different forms of life creatively influence 
one another, they are engaged in an open-ended process of becoming, which means 
that there will be no end to the wasp's process of becoming-orchid, for example. In 
other words, neither the wasp nor the orchid will achieve a predetermined model of 
what it means to be a wasp or an orchid. Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 238) elaborate: 
becoming is not an evolution, at least not an evolution by descent and filiation. 
[ ... J If evolution includes any veritable becomings, it is in the domain of 
symbioses that bring into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms, 
with no possible filiation. 
But Deleuze and Guattari do not replace the Bergsonian concept of creative evolution 
with their own concept of creative involution because the former puts forward an 
evolutionism such as the one above. Bergsonian creative evolution should under no 
circumstances be confused with this kind of conventional evolutionism. The main 
difference is that the Bergsonian concept of creative evolution views the change and 
development of the human organism in terms of the connection between the actual 
organism and the extended and undivided virtual Whole. Although this does not imply 
an evolutionary progression towards the achievement of a predetermined model, it 
focuses on the human organism to such an extent that it runs the risk of an 
anthropocentrism that ignores the machinic and symbiotic couplings between 
heterogeneous forms of life. 
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In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari's (1988) concept of creative involution focuses on 
the heterogeneous and machinic couplings between different bodies that take place 
through the symbiotic and sympathetic processes of transversal communication across 
the (taxonomical) boundaries of the species, the phylum and the kingdom. Through 
the new concept of creative involution, Deleuze and Guattari therefore avoid the 
anthropocentric superhumanism that characterises the thinking of Bergson and the 
early Deleuze. They do so, however, without cutting actual organisms off from the 
virtual Whole. With reference to the constructed nature of species, phyla, etc., it may 
be argued that the virtual, which is pre-anatomical, pre-morphological and trans-
categorical, is that which precedes and exceeds these categories. 
Having focused on creative involution with specific reference to wasp-orchid 
symbiosis, it should be recognised that the way in which Deleuze and Guattari (1988) 
theorise the becoming-orchid of the wasp and vice versa is also part of a more general 
preoccupation with the concept of becoming-other and the non-human becomings of 
the human. On the whole, this indicates an open-ended process whereby clear-cut 
identities and subjectivities are undermined and dissolved. More specifically, 
becoming-other includes the concepts of becoming-woman (which is the most central 
one in Deleuze and Guattari's discussion), becoming-child, becoming-animal and 
becoming imperceptible. In her commentary, which is both a critique of Deleuze and 
Guattari and an attempt to identify what their thought might have to offer feminist 
research, Elizabeth Grosz (1994) elaborates on becoming-woman, becoming-child 
and becoming-animal: 
Becoming-woman desediments the masculinity of identity; becoming-child, the 
modes of cohesion and control of the adult; becoming-animal, the 
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anthropocentrism of philosophical thought; and becoming-imperceptible 
replaces, dismantles, problematizes the most elementary notions of entity, 
thingness (Grosz 1994: 178-179). 
But as Grosz (1994) notes, the extension of Deleuze's concept of becoming into these 
concepts is problematic too, and it has been severely critiqued by certain feminist 
writers, including Alice Jardine, Luce lrigaray and Rosi Braidotti. Assessing some of 
these commentaries, which are particularly critical of Deleluze and Guattari' s concept 
of becoming-woman, Grosz identifies four key issues that are problematic to a 
feminist research agenda: 
First, the metaphor of "becoming-woman" is a male appropriation of women's 
politics, struggles, theories, knowledges, insofar as it "borrows" from them 
while depoliticizing their radicality. [ .... ] Second, these metaphors not only 
neutralize women's sexual specificity, but, more insidiously, they also 
neutralize and thereby mask men's specificities, interests, and perspectives. 
[ .... ] Third, [ ... ] Deleuze and Guattari invest in a romantic elevation of 
psychoses, schizophrenia, becoming, which on one hand ignores the very real 
torment of suffering individuals and, on the other hand, positions it as an 
unliveable ideal for others. Moreover, in making becoming-woman the 
privileged site of all becomings, Deleuze and Guattari confirm a long historical 
association between femininity and madness which ignores the sexually specific 
forms that madness takes. Fourth, in invoking metaphors of machinic 
functioning, in utilizing the terminology of the technocratic order, Deleuze and 
Guattari [ ... ] utilize tropes and terms made possible only through women's 
exclusion and denigration [ ... ] (Grosz 1994: 163). 
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As Grosz points out, however, the problem with these critiques, which of course are 
very serious, is that they can be raised against 'virtually any male philosopher' and 
against many female philosophers too. But rather than examining Grosz' very 
constructive critique of Deleuze and Guattari in any further detail, I shall tum to some 
of the basic problems that I find with their notion of becoming-other. 
Although Deleuze and Guattari seek to question the conventional metaphysic of being 
and masculinist anthropomorphism, they run the risk of reaffirming what they try to 
question. This is not because Deleuze and Guattari view women, children and animals 
in an Aristotelian fashion in which they are reducible to incomplete matters yet having 
to reach full maturity. The problem is that they never think explicitly of becoming-
man, and this means that they always start from a man's perspective. Even though 
men are seen to become something else, the focus is always on men who maintain 
their foundational identity as men even after entering into a process of becoming (-
woman, -child, -animal, etc.). This is a weak point in Deleuze and Guattari's theory, 
and it cannot be easily resolved. However, their concept of animal becoming (as 
opposed to becoming-animal) might still give us a hint as to how the problem might 
be tackled. 
Animal becoming is not about an animal becoming something else, but highlights the 
sense in which animals never develop a complete and finite identity - be it on the 
species level or on the level of individuals. This was even illustrated in the case of the 
wasp becoming-orchid. Animals will always be subject to a process of becoming, 
which does not define their identity, not even in terms of identity transformations 
from one identity to another, but simply underlines the point that an identity as such 
can never be determined or fulfilled. Animal becoming means that the animal 
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maintains its animality, whilst continuously sUbjectivating a different animality. In 
other words, it is animal, but never in exactly the same way. Moreover, animal 
becoming, as opposed to becoming animal, starts with the animal rather than with 
man. Given this shift of attention I think a similar perspective with benefit could be 
developed to study women, men and children, where for example a woman's 
womanhood is retained but never in the same way. Similarly, a man's or a child's 
"manhood" or "childhood" is retained but never in the same way. I would however 
not dismiss the concept of becoming-woman, becoming-animal and becoming-child, 
etc. What is needed is a turn in focus away from a male starting point, such as man 
becoming-woman, and towards other starting points, such as animal becoming-man, 
child becoming-woman, woman becoming-man, and so on. This last example may 
certainly include drag kings and female-to-male transvestites, which go beyond the 
rather temporary and more superficial transgendered performances of the carnival, the 
Dionysean Bacchae and the Shakespearean theatre. 
Having discussed embodiment, becoming and the non-human becoming of the human 
in relation to the Spinozist body, creative involution and becoming-other, I will now 
tum my attention to the oft-cited, yet often misunderstood, concept in Deleuze and 
Guattari of the "body without organs".48 As we shall see, the body without organs 
aligns with both the Spinozist ethological ethic of affective bodies, and with the 
concept of creative involution. First, I would argue that the body without organs 
48 For example the sociologist Simon Williams (1998), who rightly points out some fair criticisms of 
the body without organs. takes it out of context and critiques Deleuze and Guattari for wanting to 
abandon all limits and boundaries. But as we shall see. Deleuze and Guattari (1988) are hT) concerned 
that making oneself a body without organs is always a task to be approached with care and moderation. 
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carries forward the challenge raised by Spinozist ethology in that it encourages people 
to experiment with and change their habits and ways of life. And second, I would 
argue that it carries forward the emphasis on dynamism and heterogeneity stressed in 
the concept of creative involution in that it encourages people to open up towards and 
relate differently to other bodies than they would normally do. The body without 
organs is perhaps more dangerous than the other concepts and notions we encounter in 
Deleuze and in Deleuze's writings with Guattari. This is first because of its rhetorical 
style and language; second because it speaks very directly to the reader; and third 
because it can easily be taken on face value and misunderstood as a utopian resolution 
of the problems of life. The body without organs must therefore be used with caution. 
But having said this, the body without organs is also more adequate than many of the 
other notions encountered when reading De1euze and Deleuze and Guattari, exactly 
because it speaks so directly and seductively to the reader. What is needed is therefore 
a reading of the body without organs that recognises its premises, its implications and 
the philosophical context within which it is launched. And it is such recognition that 
the other conceptualisations discussed above may help us achieve. 
7.5 The Body without Organs 
The body without organs first appeared in Deleuze's The Logic of Sense from 1969, 
then in De1euze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus from 1972, and then in Deleuze and 
Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus from 1980. The term was first coined by Antonin 
Artaud in the 1940s, and Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 150) suggest that Artaud made 
himself a body without organs when committing suicide on the 28th of November 
1947. In order to pursue the affinity between an ethological ethics and the body 
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without organs, I will however invoke the conceptualisation developed in A Thollsand 
Plateaus. 
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari associate the body without organs with 
Freudian psychoanalysis, schizophrenia and capitalism (capitalism is given as the 
cardinal example), and view the body without organs as a non-productive entity that 
interrupts flows, arrests desire and aims at stasis (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 10). 
In A Thousand Plateaus, on the other hand, the body without organs is depicted as a 
force productive in its own right - independent of the purposive and unequivocally 
goal-directed workings of the capitalist political economy, and irreducible to the 
Freudian mommy-daddy-me triangle. Invoking the body without organs, Deleuze and 
Guattari (1988) offer a different way of thinking about the body that contrasts with the 
biomedically founded notion of the organism. According to the Deleuze and Guattari 
commentator Ronald Bogue (1989), the Spinozist body is literally a body without 
organs because it consists not of organs but of affects. However, this is not why I 
want to invoke a Spinozist reading of the body without organs here. In A Thousand 
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari are less opposed to the organs than they are to the 
orgamsm: 
A body without organs is not an empty body stripped of organs, but a body 
upon which that which serves as organs [ ... J is distributed according to crowd 
phenomena [ ... J in the form of molecular multiplicities. [ ... J Thus the body 
without organs is opposed less to organs as such than to the organization of the 
organs insofar as it composes an organism (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 30). 
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Furthennore, Deleuze and Guattari insist that being opposed to the organism does not 
make the body without organs a dead body: 
The body without organs is not a dead body but a living body all the more aliye 
and teeming once it has blown apart the organism and its organization. Lice 
hopping on the beach. Skin colonies. The full body without organs is a body 
populated by multiplicities (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 30). 
Deleuze and Guattari introduce the chapter wholly devoted to the body without organs 
by emphasising its dynamic, experimental and practical nature. The body without 
organs is not a matter of being reducible to a finished object of metaphysics, but a 
matter of endless becoming. It is also not a concept, but an experimental practice into 
which desire must be continuously invested. The body without organs cannot be taken 
for granted, but needs to be created. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 149-
150): 
At any rate, you have one (or several). It's not so much that it preexists or 
comes ready-made [ ... ]. At any rate, you make one, you can't desire without 
making one. And it awaits you; it is an inevitable exercise or experimentation, 
already accomplished the moment you undertake it, unaccomplished as long as 
you don't. [ ... ] It is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a set of 
practices. You never reach the Body without Organs, you can't reach it, you are 
forever attaining it, it is a limit (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 149-150). 
As one can see, a lot is going on at the same time in Deleuze and Guattari 's treatise of 
the body without organs, and usually a lot more than in Deleuze's sole-authored 
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works. It therefore does not take long before they both undermine the orgamc 
functioning of the body with organs and challenge the psychoanalyst's search for 
unitary selfhood by emphasising that there is no end to the process of creating a body 
without organs: 
Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, 
breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your 
tongue, thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, head and legs? 
Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, 
breathe with your belly [ ... ]. Where psychoanalysis says, "Stop, find yourself 
again," we should say instead, "Let's go further still, we haven't found our BwO 
yet, we haven't sufficiently dismantled our self." [ ... ] Find your Body without 
Organs. Find out how to make it. It's a question of life and death [ ... ], sadness 
and joy. It is where everything is played out (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 150-
151 ). 
Some pages later, they also re-emphasise the opposition between the organism and the 
body without organs: 
The organs are not the enemies of the BwO. The enemy is the organism. The 
BwO is opposed not to the organs but to the organization of the organs called 
the organism (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 158). 
As hinted at the beginning of their chapter, this statement takes much inspiration from 
Antonin Artaud: 
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Artaud wages a struggle against the organs, but at the same time what he is 
going after, what he has it in for, is the organism: The body is the body. Alone it 
stands. And in no need of organs. Organism it never is. Organisms are the 
enemies of the body. The BwO is not opposed to the organs; rather. the BwO 
and its "true organs," which must be composed and positioned, are opposed to 
the organism, the organic organization of the organs (Deleuze and Guattari 
1988: 158). 
This highly polemic statement should however not be taken too literally. This 
becomes clear after Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 159) on the next page ask 'What 
does it mean [ ... J to cease to be an organism?' In other words, and as the title of their 
chapter asks, "how do you make yourself a body without organs?" First, they claim 
that this is an easy task. But it is also a task that must be attacked with caution, 'since 
overdose is a danger. You don't do it with a sledgehammer, you use a very fine file' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 160). Further on, having first invoked Artaud, Deleuze 
and Guattari dissociate the task of destratifying the organism and creating a body 
without organs from committing suicide: 
You invent self-destructions that have nothing to do with the death-drive. 
Dismantling the organism never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the 
body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage [ ... ]. [ .... J You have 
to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn [ ... ]. [ ... J You don't 
reach the BwO [ ... J by wildly de strati fying. [ .... J If you free it with too violent 
an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then [ ... J you 
will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe. 
Staying stratified - organized, signified, subjected - is not the worst that can 
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happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or 
suicidal collapse, which bring them back down on us heavier than ever (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1988: 160-161). 
Creating a body without organs is therefore a matter of cautious, patient 
experimentation. This may however easily be forgotten, as readers become so taken 
aback by the DeleuzoGuattarian rhetoric that they ignore Deleuze and Guattari' sown 
warnings, warnings that admittedly might work just as much as encouragement to 
proceed. Although there is a danger that the nonorganic is ignored and the organism is 
taken for granted, there is also a danger, when reading Deleuze and Guattari, of 
adopting the body without organs as some utopian solution to all problems of life. I 
share this scepticism with Ansell Pearson, who rightly points out that Deleuze and 
Guattari never attributed such a status to the body without organs - most notably 
because they construed no binary opposition between the body without organs and the 
organism. In his words: 
no abstract opposition is to be set up between the strata and the body without 
organs. [ .... J The aim is not, therefore, to negate the organism but to arrive at a 
more comprehensive understanding of it by situating it within the wider field of 
forces, intensities, and durations that give rise to it and which do not cease to 
involve a play between nonorganic and stratified life. Creative processes inform 
both the body without organs and processes of stratification (Ansell Pearson 
1999: 154). 
This means that the organism as well as the body without organs can be seen in terms 
of creative involution. The becoming of the body without organs, then, is 'the 
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"powerful nonorganic life" that escapes the strata and is implicated in transversal 
modes of communication, which are modes that cut across the evolution of distinct 
phyletic lineages' (Ansell Pearson 1999: 154). Furthermore, the organism that is 
involved in such creative processes is another organism than the one Deleuze and 
Guattari are attacking. According to Ansell Pearson (1999: 154), 
The organism that Deleuze and Guattari are attacking [ ... ] is not a neutral entity 
but rather the organism construed as a given hierarchized and transcendent 
organization.49 
Since the body without organs is not the total negation of the organism or the suicidal 
solution to life, Ansell Pearson (1999: 154) says that treating this question from the 
angle of Spinozist ethics is the only way to avoid these traps: 
On my reading the ethical question is the only way to make sense of Deleuze 
and Guattari's statement that "dismantling the organism has never meant killing 
yourself'. [ ... ] The ethical question concerns the theory and praxis of opening 
up the body to connections and relations "that presuppose an entire assemblage" 
[ ... ] (Ansell Pearson 1999: 154; my omissions). 
As we have seen, there is always a danger with opening up too much. Nevertheless, 
what Deleuze and Guattari encourage us to do when posing to us this Spinozist ethical 
49 This notion of the organism is explicitly adopted by Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 159): 'The 
organism [ ... J is a substratum on the BwO, in other words, a phenomenon of accumulation. 
coagUlation, and sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labor from the BwO. imposes upon it 
forms, functions. bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations. organized transcendences.' 
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challenge of creating a body without organs, is to openly experiment with new and 
different bodily habits and ways of life. That is, they encourage us to experiment with 
what a body can do. In conclusion, the body without organs may enable us to use our 
bodies and express corporeality in unpredictable ways that disturb and upset the 
boundaries laid down by the organism and by the guardians of biomedical discipline 
and social normality. 
Having discussed some of the different ways in which Deleuze (sometimes with 
Guattari) thinks through what I have chosen to call nonorganisational or nonorganic 
embodiment - i.e. the Spinozist body; creative involution and becoming-other; and 
the body without organs - I shall in this final section of the chapter bring out the more 
general relationship between these forms of embodiment and organic embodiment. 
7.6 The Nonorganic and the Organic 
It is often confusing to read Deleuze with regards to questions of the body, especially 
if examining his sole-authored texts in relation to his collaborative work with 
Guattari. Sometimes, and especially when writing with Guattari, Deleuze seems to 
reject the organism as that which limits life, whilst at other times he seems to speak of 
the organism in quite different and more favourable terms. As we have seen in A 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari's (1988) discussion of the body without 
organs depicts the organism as the very enemy of the body. But as it also has been 
argued, it is a particular organism, one that is particularly hierarchical and 
transcendental, which is the target of Deleuze and Guattari's attack in that book. In 
Difference and Repetition, on the other hand, Deleuze (1994) seems to adopt the 
organism as a nominal term to present a view of the body that hardly fits the 
hierarchical and transcendental concept of the organism invoked in A Thousand 
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Plateaus. Instead, the concept employed in Difference and Repetition seems to 
prefigure in Bergsonism, where not surprisingly Deleuze (l988a) develops a 
Bergsonian view of the organism. 
According to Ansell Pearson (1999), the task that Bergson announces for philosophy 
is to "reconcile inorganic and organic life". Here, I do not think that the inorganic 
should be confused with the chemical or mechanical term, according to which the 
inorganic is that which is not organic in the sense of not being carbon-based. The 
inorganic is not necessarily a matter of synthetic substances or technical apparatuses. 
Instead, I will argue that the inorganic is equivalent to my previous reference to the 
nonorganic, which is not organic exactly because it is not organised. This also 
includes Bergson's term, by which the inorganic is understood as inert matter. 
Bergson is therefore not concerned with the coupling between humans and machines, 
fashionably (and somewhat repetitively) referred to as cyborgs (e.g. Haraway 1991). 
For Bergson, the task of philosophy is to reconcile the organic with inert matter, 
which in Bergsonian and Deleuzian jargon is also known as the undivided incorporeal 
virtual Whole. In other words, Bergson - and thereby Deleuze - is concerned with 
putting the actual organism back in touch with the virtual. 50 Ansell Pearson argues 
that this reconciliation is at the centre of philosophy because it changes the very 
foundations upon which philosophy is to be done as metaphysics. It is by recognising 
that 'the division of unorganized matter into separate bodies is relative to our senses 
and intellect (our tendency to spatialize)' and by recognising that matter is an 
50 As Deleuze (1988a: 105) argues in Bergsonism. 'it is not the whole that clos~s like an organism. it IS 
the organism that opens onto a whole. like this virtual whole.' 
undivided virtual Whole, that Bergson proposes a philosophy of duration or becoming 
(Ansell Pearson 1999: 56). By putting the actual world as we perceive it in touch with 
the undivided world of the virtual that escapes our sensory perception and knowledge, 
the result is a dynamic perspective of life as flux rather than as a number of concrete 
things. 
This has important implications for how Bergson understands the organism. Although 
Bergson, pretty much like the biomedical school of organismic homeostasis 
emphasises that 'The "animality" of a higher organism consists in the capacities it 
enjoys for self-regulation' (Ansell Pearson 1999: 49), this is only one side of the 
story. Whereas the organism plays a significant role in the creative evolution, 
invention and reinvention of life, the key idea that makes Bergson differ from 
ordinary biomedical perspectives on the self-organising organism is that the 
Bergsonian organism is embedded within a virtual undivided Whole. And this 
completely changes what it means to be an organism: 
from the perspective of the virtual whole, life can be conceived as a ceaseless 
play between the limited inventions of complex living systems, such as 
organisms and species, and the desire of the impulse of life for ever renewed 
vitality. Life requires organisms in its very inventiveness; that is, it requires 
their limits, since left to its devices it would fail to do all at once and proceed in 
a straight line (Ansell Pearson 1999: 49). 
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Although organisms are actual (i.e. actualisations of the \-irtual) they are only actual 
insofar as we recognise that the actual is underwritten by the virtual. Consequently, 
they are only organic insofar as we recognise that they are underwritten by the 
nonorganic. Hence, the organism is not one that just negatively limits and restricts, 
constrains and denies life. As Ansell Pearson (1999: 62) emphasises, Bergson's 
(1960) Creative Evolution suggests the opposite: 'in imposing this limit the organism 
is what makes "life" possible (life as invention and duration).' This is because the 
limits and boundaries imposed by the Bergsonian organism are not eternally fixed and 
absolutely static. Instead, they are porous, penetrable and temporary ones subject to 
change. Consequently, it would be difficult to maintain any opposition between the 
Bergsonian organism and a Deleuzian (or even DeleuzoGuattarian) conception of 
embodiment. 
It may also, albeit in a less straightforward manner, be argued that Deleuze and 
Guattari continue to advocate this Bergsonian position in A Thousand Plateaus. 
Although maintaining that 'the organism is merely an expedient invention by which 
life opposes itself in order to limit and reinvent itself and that 'The truly intense and 
powerful life remains anorganic', they do by no means write off the organism from 
their understanding of life. Instead, they recognise, like Bergson, 'the play between 
the nonorganic and the organismic as one of co-implication [ ... ]' (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988: 503). As argued earlier, their proposal for a body without organs is 
therefore not to be interpreted as a rejection of the organism. That would make the 
evolution of life completely accidental. Instead, the body without organs of 
nonorganic life and the organised life of the organism must be seen to co-exist. which 
means that the eyolution of life is creative and 'proceeds by indetennination' (Ansell 
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Pearson 1999: 43). The role of the body without organs is therefore to offer a way of 
disassembling already existing limits to what a body can do by inventing new habitual 
lines of divergence that are just as open to disruption and change as the limits and 
boundaries of the Bergsonian organism described above. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Having first examined Deleuze' s concept of the virtual as the fundamental openness 
by which everything in the world is underwritten, the rest of the chapter discussed the 
particular areas in which Deleuze thinks about the openness of bodies and 
embodiment. These were creative evolution and the Spinozist body, which Deleuze 
developed in the late 1960s, and creative involution, becoming-other and the bod.:v 
'l-t'ithout organs, which Deleuze developed about a decade later in collaboration with 
Guattari. Whereas the earlier Deleuze focuses on the human organism and how the 
openness of the actualised human organism is due to its connection into the virtual 
Whole, the later Deleuze - with Guattari - is more interested in different actualised 
bodies and how the openness of these bodies is due to the symbiotic and assemblatic 
relations that connect them. Although Ansell Pearson (1999) is making an important 
effort in emphasising the influence of Bergson and Bergson's concept of the virtual 
upon Deleuze, we should be cautious not to tum Deleuze's entire philosophical 
project into a Bergsonism. This is particularly if one is, as I am, primarily interested in 
Deleuze's and Deleuze and Guattari's thinking about the body. Bearing in mind that 
Bergson (and especially his philosophical project of "reconciling the organic and the 
inorganic") provides some important lessons for how we are to read Deleuze's 
thinking about the body, we also need to recognise the limitations of Bergson's 
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superhumanism and that Deleuze and Guattari make a serious attempt to go beyond 
this superhumanism. 
Bergson and the Bergsonian Deleuze make it clear that openness is not all there is. If 
it were, there would be no such things as bodies at all. The main point that I take from 
the Bergsonian Deleuze to my understanding of bodies, embodiment and organisation 
is therefore not one of dualism where organic closure is to be eliminated in the 
advance of total nonorganic openness. And it is most certainly not a dualism where 
the organic and the nonorganic are to be neutralised in a new synthesis marking the 
end of their vital and sometimes violent co-existence. Instead, we are reminded that 
the world is underwritten by a fundamental openness that disrupts the boundaries that 
we tend to associate with and continuously assign to bodies and organisations. 
However, in Deleuze' s writings with Guattari, this openness is not just a matter of the 
human organism opening itself up to the virtual undivided Whole and the virtual 
being extended into the actual human organism. It is also a matter of the symbiotic 
and assemblatic relations between different actual bodies. This means that different 
bodies in general cannot be separated in the ways that we often do. And for us human 
bodies in particular, this means that we can openly experiment with new bodily habits 
and express corporeality in unpredictable ways that put us in touch with different 
bodies. And by so doing, this means that we can disrupt and upset the boundaries that 
are imposed upon us by the guardians of biomedical discipline and social normality. 
As I now approach the end of this thesis, I shall in the next and final chapter assess the 
implications that this thinking about the body may have upon organisation theory and 
how we, as organisation theorists, should deal with the problem of the body. As we 
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shall see, this may also have some serious and very interesting consequences for how 
we might think about organisation. 51 
51 Again, invoking the term "we" may seem problematic here because many organisation theorists may 
not be interested in dealing with the problem of the body, or, they may choose not to view the body as a 
problem of organisation or as a problem to be dealt with within organisation theory. But even though 
my target group consists primarily of organisation theorists interested in issues of embodiment I also 
seek to address organisation theory at large. The "we" employed here therefore includes organisation 
theorists who do not specialise in issues of embodiment. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
Monstrous Organisation Theory: 
Nonorganisation and Embodiment in the Philosophy of Organisation 
This final chapter of the thesis is an attempt to bring together the main arguments 
made so far and to sketch out the main elements of what I choose to call a monstrous 
organisation theory. Using the example of the ammoniapolis, I opened the thesis by 
arguing that the body is a problem for organisation - both the organisation of 
production and the production of organisation. Throughout, I have tried to show that 
this is the case because the body disrupts the boundaries of organisation in ways that-
as we shall see - may be regarded as monstrous. The notion of the monstrous that I 
evoke here should not be understood in a derogatory sense, but rather as an analytical 
term; the monstrous is that which disrupts boundaries; it is that which inhabits the 
space of boundaries; and it is that through which no clear boundary can be drawn. 
A major part of the thesis has also been to discuss the ways in which organisation 
theory does - or does not - deal with this problem. Despite finding considerable 
inspiration and guidance in much of the organisation theory literature, this in-depth 
engagement has also led me to identify some serious shortcomings with how various 
streams of thought within the discipline deal with the body. For one, the entitative 
concept of organisation encountered in mainstream organisation theory, by which the 
body is rendered completely absent (e.g. Sorge 1996) or at best reduced to a metaphor 
(e.g. Morgan 1986), does not at all recognise the body as a problem for organisation. 
Indeed, the existence of formal organisations of production is taken for granted and it 
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is difficult to appreciate how they come into being in the first place, how they might 
genuinely change, and how they might cease to exist. Unlike this hegemonic tradition, 
the processual concept of organisation, which pays far more attention to the 
production processes of organisation that precede and exceed the boundaries of formal 
organisational entities, makes organisation less static (if not less stable) and more 
dynamic. However, the literature that has given rise to this concept does not deal with 
the body, and overall, it seems to render organisation more powerful; we are not 
simply organised whilst at work in formal organisations; life is further organised to 
the extent that discourses and institutions manage to organise what we do outside the 
boundaries of these organisations (e.g. Cooper 1990; Chia 1995, 1998a; Tsoukas 
1998a). This is also the case when this processual concept is utilised to study how 
bodies are organised within and, more notably, without formal organisations in the 
field that has come closest to constitute an organisation theory of the body (e.g. 
Brewis and Sinclair 2000). Although it is crucial to recognise what is done to bodies 
by investigating how bodies are organised, this approach runs the risk of pacifying the 
body and turning organisation into an omnipotent force that dominates any and every 
body in the whole world unless it is complemented with a view that recognises the 
monstrosity of bodies - that is, the active, creative and powerful nature of bodies that 
enables them to disrupt the boundaries of organisation. The few attempts made within 
organisation theory to study what bodies can do (e.g. Lennie 2000) have typically 
been limited to recognise the embodiment of management and organisation; that the 
actions enabling the successful management of formal organisations necessarily are 
embodied actions carried out by already organised bodies. Table 8.l sums up the 
different ways in which different streams of thought within organisation theory deal 
with the problem of the body. The bottom row of the table sketches out the position 
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that will be developed further in this chapter; that bodies are inhabited by 
nonorganisational forces that disrupt the boundaries of organisation. 
Strand of Thought Concept of Organisation View of the Bodv 
Mainstream Organisation is a matter of formal organi- The body is absent; no explicit 
Organisation Theory I sational entities (the organisation of view of the body 
production) 
Mainstream Formal organisational entities are like The body as organism; the body 
Organisation Theory II biological organisms is reduced to a metaphor of 
(organismic organi- formal organisational entities 
sation theory) 
Processual Organisation is a matter of organisational The body is largely absent; no 
Organisation Theory processes that precede and exceed the explicit view of the body 
boundaries of formal organisational 
entities (the production of organisation) 
Organisation Theory of Same as Processual Organisation Theory The body is organised by 
the Body I (the organi- organisational processes 
sation of the body) 
Organisation Theory of Similar to Mainstream Organisation The body is already organised 
the Body II (the em- Theory I and enables the successful 
bodiment of organi- management of formal 
sation) organisations 
Organisation Theory of Similar to Processual Organisation The body is a matter of actiyc. 
the Body III Theory, but organisation is also disrupted creative and excessive forces of 
(monstrous nonorgani- by nonorganisation and nonorganisational desire 
sational embodiment) embodiment 
(Table 8.1: Organisation Theory and the Problem of the Bod)~ 
The body disrupts the boundaries of organisation in a number of different ways. 
Specifically, the body disrupts the boundaries that separate formal organisational 
entities from their external environments; it disrupts the organisational processes that 
produce these bounded entities in the first place; and it disrupts the more general 
organisational processes that seek to institute and maintain those boundaries that 
separate people without formal organisations and produce order on a societal level. It 
is even capable of disrupting the organisational boundaries that we seek to impose 
upon the body itself. This is why I have drawn so much attention to the 
nonorganisational aspects of embodiment, and this is why I in this chapter choose to 
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highlight the monstrous. From this perspective, which takes much inspiration from 
Deleuze and Guattari and Deleuze' s readings of Spinoza, Bergson and Nietzsche, the 
body emerges as an unbounded, excess and monstrous force that cannot merely be 
understood in terms of organisation. The body is not simply a passive objectified 
entity and it conforms neither to the organisational regime of the biomedical organism 
nor to the everyday organisation of sociocultural normality. Consequently, it is not 
sufficient to ask what is done to the body or, more precisely. what organisation does 
to the body. In addition, it is necessary to ask what a body can do to organisation and 
irrespective of organisation. Such an understanding of embodiment not only disrupts 
organisation, but also disrupts the ways in which we as organisation theorists tend to 
think about organisation and the body. 
Of course, boundary-disruption is not easy. It is both difficult and problematic to 
actually disrupt the boundaries of how we think about organisation and the body 
whilst simultaneously trying to submit to the conventional format of the social science 
doctoral thesis. Accepting certain topics and arguments to be legitimate and 
permissible whilst deeming others illegitimate and impermissible, the format of the 
doctoral thesis puts certain restrictions upon the kind of topics and arguments that can 
be pursued within its boundaries. In particular, the notion of the subject-specific 
thesis, which requires the organisation theorist to submit to the disciplinary norms of 
organisation theory and pretty much keep herself within the boundaries of the 
discipline's literature, discourages the pursuit of any topic that forces one to engage in 
depth and at length with literature outside of what is normally regarded as the territory 
of organisation theory and the social sciences. This thesis format also puts certain 
restrictions on the style of exposition that can be adopted. The structuring of the thesis 
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argument in terms of individual chapters and subsections within chapters constitutes a 
boundary or a set of boundaries that not only enables the systematic, clear and 
coherent exposition of ideas, but also makes it a strenuous task to draw links between 
different ideas. Indeed, it seems that the concluding chapter is the only place where 
these rules can be bypassed. The advantage (or blessing) of the concluding chapter, 
then, is that it can allow itself to be monstrous. Instead of repeating what has already 
been said and effectively keep boundaries in place, it may transgress the boundaries 
between different chapters and bring together ideas and arguments that previously 
have been kept apart. 
Before moving on, it may however be useful to reflect upon some of the apparent 
contradictions in this thesis, which draw attention to my own shortcomings in 
disrupting boundaries. First, and as recognised in section 3.10, I have drawn very 
narrow boundaries around organisation theory as a discipline whilst investigating how 
this academic field deals with the problem of the body. Even though this has been 
necessary in order to develop a manageable research project, it stands in some 
contrast to my own attempt at disrupting the disciplinary boundaries of organisation 
theory and opening up the field towards philosophy. But whereas the keeping and 
reinforcement of organisation theory's boundaries against organisational behaviour 
and industrial sociology is part of an attempt to avoid further de-theoretisation, 
disrupting the boundaries of organisation theory towards philosophy is an attempt to 
open up the discipline to new methodologies, new issues and concerns, and new 
movements in thought that may enable organisation theorists to reflect more openly 
about their discipline's explicit and implicit assumptions. 
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Second, whilst talking of the body, the thesis is highly cognitive. Whereas the focus is 
on concepts that give rather abstract insights into embodiment, there are few detailed 
accounts of the everyday and extraordinary activities of living and working bodies. 
This is because the thesis is theoretical rather than empirical. Instead of contributing 
to the increasing amount of empirical descriptions of bodies in and out of the 
workplace, I felt it was more important - at least for my own sake - to provide some 
systematic overview of how various strands of organisation theory deal with the body. 
This is not least because it enables one to identify gaps in the existing literature and 
develop new ways of dealing with the body in future theoretical as well as empirical 
work. 
Third, whilst talking of breaking conventional sexual and gender boundaries, the 
thesis is written in a very masculinist and highly impersonal style. I have not said 
anything about my own personal interest in disrupting sexual and gender boundaries. 
Though having much respect and admiration for people who are open about their own 
unconventional experiences of sexuality and gender, the silence on my behalf is not 
only related to the fact that this is a primarily theoretical thesis. It also has to do with 
the politics of research. I feel that the academic profession shows less appreciation for 
junior academics bein~an established academics being perso~~ye 
following sentiment seems to dominate across several academic fields: "why should 
one be interested in the personal life of a junior academic whose academic work one 
knows so little about?" Moreover, it is more risky for the junior academic seeking to 
position herself within the labour market and the institutional environment of the field 
to show signs of sexual and gender deviance, as sexuality and gender still are obvious 
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grounds of discrimination, stigmatisation and exclusion in society at large and in a 
conservative discipline like organisation theory. 
Finally, whilst obeying the conventions of the doctoral thesis, this thesis is void of 
stylistic experimentation and emotional outbursts, and its argument is put fOl,xard in a 
linear manner. This is because I felt it is was important to adopt a prudent style of 
writing in order to communicate my argument as effectively as possible and in order 
to avoid moving the attention away from the key ideas argued in the thesis. 
Furthermore, this has provided a practical solution to the problem of actually getting 
the thesis written. And it has provided a political solution (i) to the constraints 
imposed by the format of the doctoral thesis (which I have not dared violate) and (ii) 
to my interest in communicating with both mainstream and more radical organisation 
theorists. Nevertheless, in spite of my many shortcomings in disrupting boundaries, 
one may argue that the inconsistency between the style and argument of this thesis, in 
itself, constitutes a boundary-disrupting monstrosity. 
The monstrosity of the conclusion takes us back to Robert Cooper's (1990) emphasis 
on the ambiguous and unstable nature of boundaries, which I discussed in chapter 5. 
Boundaries not only keep things apart. They are also interstices that bring things 
together. In this sense, a boundary is a bound or a bind that actually disrupts the 
distinctions it is supposed to maintain. In addition to help us dis-tinguish between 
things, it ex-tinguishes and makes distinctions extinct. Although the capacity of State 
borders to keep people separate may have been obvious in the cases of the Berlin wall 
and the border running across the Korean peninsula, it is also not difficult to see how 
these borders have been contested and disrupted, not least by the people they were -
or, in the case of the latter, still are - intended to separate. As targets of disruption, 
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borders become places to which people are drawn, at least from one side and at least 
on a temporary basis. And when disrupted, borders become monstrous meeting places 
for the worlds they are meant to keep apart. However, this is not the only reason why 
people are attracted to boundaries such as State borders. Being a monstrous place 
where two worlds meet, a State border may become a still monstrous interface where 
various activities are played out in the longer term. For example, several towns on the 
Swedish side of the border between Norway and Sweden, which still is subject to 
considerable customs control, have, because of increasing price margins in popular 
consumables such as alcoholic beverages, meat, tobacco and petrol, experienced 
notable economic growth following the moment of Sweden's agreement to join and 
Norway's refusal to join the European Union in 1994 (cf. Ericsson 2001). Similarly, 
the borderlands between Mexico and the US, which are subject to strict border 
controls, have for the past decade or so also been host to an expanding textile industry 
(cf. US Department of Commerce 2000). And the county of Scania, which is located 
on the Swedish side of the rather open border between Denmark and Sweden in the 
Oresund region and which since July 2000 has been connected to Copenhagen and 
Continental Europe through the world's longest road and railway bridge, has during 
the past decade undergone vast industrial expansion, especially in the pharmaceutical 
sector (cf. Statistiska Centralbyrfm 2000a). Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
seaport Malmo, which is Scania's main city and the third largest city in Sweden, has 
one of the most vibrant and fast-expanding communities in Scandinavia of first and 
second generation immigrants from Europe and other countries (Statistiska 
Centralbyran 2000b). My own equivalent of these examples from the monstrous 
borderlands is at least twofold. My intention is (i) that the thesis constitutes a 
monstrous borderland where organisation theory meets philosophy, and (ii) that the 
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body~ as theorised in both organisation theory and philosophy~ provides a particular 
bridge that enables organisation theory and philosophy to meet in the first place. 
The thesis is therefore not solely an attempt to disrupt the boundaries of ho\v we as 
organisation theorists tend to think about the body and organisation. More fluidity in 
the discipline is not an end in itself - in fact~ such an approach might easily be turned 
into a cul-de-sac where little new may be created in place of previous concepts and 
bodies of knowledge. Moreover, the disruption of boundaries may itself accentuate 
and reinforce the same boundaries as there can be no disruption if there are no 
boundaries to be disrupted in the first place. Nevertheless~ drawing attention to, 
problematising and disrupting conceptual and disciplinary boundaries that often make 
sure to keep ideas and topics separate is part of a constructive and creative project. 
Like the examples sketched out above, I want to exploit boundaries as monstrous 
meeting places or interfaces where different discourses clash, where monstrous 
movements in thought can be made~ and where new - and monstrous - concepts can 
be created. 
The notion of the monstrous meeting is also the crux of the conceptualist and caesurist 
methodology employed in this thesis. That is, with a basis in the works of 
Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze, to show contradictions and ruptures between 
different schools of thought and their conceptualisations of organisation and 
embodiment~ and to invent new conceptualisations at the end of these empires that 
relate to~ communicate with and disrupt their conceptualisations. This is what I am 
trying to do when putting organisation theory in contact with other disciplines -
philosophy in particular - and when putting different schools of thought from within 
organisation theory in contact with each other. And this is what I am trying to do 
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through the monstrous concepts of nonorganisation and nonorganisational 
embodiment, which disrupt the boundaries of the body, of organisation and of 
organisation theory. 
Of course, one might argue against the novelty of this project. It might be argued that 
the boundaries of organisation theory have always been unstable and permeable, and 
that doing interdisciplinary - and monstrous - research represents little new within 
this field that initially sprung out of several disciplines, of which sociology, 
psychology, political science and economics have been the most significant. 
Moreover, in the UK in particular (but also in other European countries), there has for 
some years been a growing community of scholars who have broadened the lexical 
archive of organisation theory to include research in cultural studies, literary theory, 
and philosophy (e.g. Burrell 1984, 1988, 1997; Czarniawska-loerges 1995; 
Czarniawska 1997, 1998; Chia 1995, 1998a; Linstead 1997). This thesis, which draws 
heavily on philosophy, is therefore no separate or isolate attempt but continues in a 
tradition increasingly popular amongst the growing number of organisation theorists 
who might identify with the area of critical management studies (cf. Alvesson and 
Willmott 1992, 1996). However, at the same time, it tries to go further than much of 
this work by rethinking the body and organisation. Putting organisation theory in 
touch with other disciplines and bringing process into our thinking about the body and 
organisation, two concepts which still are heavily underpinned by structuralist 
thought, does not provide an end point or final resolution for this monstrous project. 
Processual and interdisciplinary moves can only provide starting points from which 
new monstrous beginnings can be embarked upon. 
3.+0 
The notion of "nonorganisation" may provide a monstrous beginning where our 
thinking about the body and organisation can be taken beyond existing boundaries and 
towards new "frontiers". In addition to recognising how bodies are organised, through 
discursive and institutional practices such as corporate dress codes, public health 
campaigns and the biomedical understanding of the body as an organism, the notion 
of nonorganisation makes it possible to see how bodies disrupt these regimes by 
exercising more or less common habits and lifestyles. In chapter 2, I drew attention to 
some of the ways in which the organisational and lifestyle-oriented regime of the New 
Public Health is disrupted and subverted by everyday habits and socio-corporeal 
relations that might be seen as nonorganisational~ smoking amongst teenage girls, 
excessive sunbathing amongst people born pale, and bare-backing amongst gay men. 
A related example might include the anorexic, who defies the dietary requirements of 
nutritionary scientists and health officials and clashes with the criteria of beauty and 
attractiveness commonly held in Western societies. Furthermore, the notion of 
nonorganisation may enable us to see how bodies disrupt, undermine and escape other 
organisational regimes too by enacting more unusual, unpredictable and monstrous 
habits, behaviours and ways of life. And it may enable us to analyse the dynamic and 
monstrous nature of embodiment, i.e. how bodies change and how bodies encounter 
and engage with other bodies in complex relationships that disturb and transgress the 
taxonomical orders through which we normally seek to make sense of bodies and 
bodily relationships. 
Once again, the wasp-orchid assemblage from Deleuze and Guattari' s (1988) book A 
Thousand Plateaus returns as an obvious, illuminating and relevant example. Rather 
than keeping the wasp and the orchid apart, species boundaries become grotesque and 
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monstrous meeting places of non-sexual yet reproductive activities between 
heterogeneous bodies whose very own alliance also becomes grotesque and 
monstrous. But this is not the only example from Deleuze and Guattari that is relevant 
to this discussion of monstrous nonorganisational embodiment. Read through 
Deleuze's (l988b, 1992) Spinozist and ethological ethic of affective bodies, the "body 
without organs" provides another and more general example from the same book by 
Deleuze and Guattari. Encouraging people to experiment with and invent new bodily 
habits that may take us into unusual and dynamic, grotesque and monstrous 
encounters with other bodies, the body without organs disrupts the boundaries often 
imposed upon what a body can do as well as the boundaries that govern relationships 
between bodies. Hence, it may give rise to heterogeneous relationships and alliances 
other than that of the wasp-orchid assemblage. Yet other examples that can be 
theorised along these lines include transgendered bodies that disrupt the boundaries 
between the female and the male and extend the boundaries of what it may mean to be 
a woman or a man. Another example may be the sadomasochistic body, which 
disrupts and operates on the boundaries between pleasure and pain; or the lesbian or 
gay parent couple who disrupt the boundaries of the traditional parent role and 
redefine the make-up of the modem nuclear family; or the health freak whose diet and 
fitness regime pushes her body to such an extent that she operates on the borderline 
between what is generally regarded as healthy and unhealthy. In addition, and even 
though one might easily exaggerate the radical significance of the rather 
commonplace couplings and interactions between humans and machines. cyborg 
characters from the science fiction literature and cinema may constitute examples of 
complex, grotesque and monstrous forms of life whose nature it is difficult to define 
as either human or machine - not just because such bodies may be seen as both and 
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(and therefore as neither), but also because the difficulty of identifying the boundary 
where one aspect ends and the other begins means that such bodies are themselves 
monstrous borderlands ( cf. Wood 1998). 
Interestingly, the monstrous organisation theory that springs out of this concern with 
boundary-disruption can also be seen as a body without organs. Instead of following 
the mainstream logic of unilinear, causality-based and/or teleological arguments, and 
instead of relying on concepts already established within the boundaries of the 
mainstream hegemony, it seriously engages with other disciplines and their 
intellectual heritage, makes unusual and unexpected twists and turns towards bizarre 
problematiques, and creates new concepts by means of experimentation. The concepts 
of this organisation theory "without organs", which are created in the liminal, are 
necessarily grotesque and monstrous "matters out of place". Of course, the grotesque 
and the monstrous carries different connotations for different people, and it is likely 
that those whose interests and values are served and protected by maintaining the 
status quo of organisation theory as a discipline will further deem these concepts, 
which challenge already existing concepts, both threatening and dangerous to the 
future of organisation theory. Mainstream scholars may argue quite strongly that these 
concepts are nothing but the nonsensical works of irrelevant theorisation that will lead 
organisation theory into "chaos" and despair (cf. e.g. Donaldson 1985). Insofar as this 
grotesque and monstrous organisation theory is met by little more than a cold shoulder 
of discouragement from the majority of organisation theorists, those who contemplate 
to pursue it should foresee a lonely and peripheral existence containing much pain, 
strain and poverty. Nevertheless, scholars who seek to be different from the 
mainstream norm and choose to inhabit these peripheral borderlands of organisation 
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theory may also find that it can be a very fertile and habitable place for serious and 
indeed very important academic work. It is exactly in the liminal borderlands - or 
frontier worlds - that it may be possible to claim some sort of intellectual 
independence, be inventive and create some very powerful ideas that challenge both 
previous and current orthodoxies. 
Both on the level of organisation theory as a discipline and on the level of the 
concepts akin to it, this pursuit of the grotesque and the monstrous complicates the 
relationship - and boundary - between the inside and the outside. 52 What traditionally 
is considered to lie outside one single body is incorporated to become part of that 
same body. And what is traditionally considered to belong to the inside of a body is 
brought out and expressed in social encounters with other bodies. For example, the 
male-to-female transvestite body, who is initially regarded as male, incorporates from 
the outside characteristics typically associated with the female and the feminine. And, 
whilst these characteristics are combined with other characteristics and emotions of 
the inside, the male-to-female transvestite expresses a new sense of corporeality that 
is both female and male yet neither. Of course, the same is the case with the female-
to-male transvestite, though in the opposite direction. On a more theoretical issue akin 
to this thesis, it is possible to see how a complication of the inside/outside relationship 
may affect thinking about organisation and the body in organisation theory. When 
)C This is much like Deleuze's (1988c) take on the inside/outside relationship. Here, Deleuze develops a 
complex notion of the inside and the outside as a means to analyse how Foucault understands the ways 
in which discursive, institutional and "subjective" regimes change, are discontinued and replaced with 
new regimes. Similar problematisations have also been de\(~loped by Merleau-Ponty (1973) and 
Derrida (e.g. 1981). Using the term "invagination", they both take the female body as the model of the 
inside/outside relationship. 
organisation theory, which may be thought of as a single discipline with a set of 
clearly defined problematiques, concepts, methods and literatures is put into contact 
with and made to incorporate problematiques, concepts, methods and literature from 
outside disciplines, it may rethink and express these initially outside elements in new 
monstrous ways. The body, which in traditional and conventional organisation theory 
is regarded as having very little to do with organisation at all, may, when brought in 
from the outside of organisation theory give rise to new monstrous ways of thinking 
about organisation. 
The emphasis on the liminal and nonorganisational forces of embodiment that disrupt, 
undermine and escape the boundaries of organisation does exactly this. It presses for a 
new monstrous way of thinking about organisation. At its centre is an ability to 
recognise the limitations of organisation; both fonnal organisational entities and the 
organisational processes that precede and exceed these entities become less stable and 
less powerful, more fragile and more ephemeral than we tend to think. Organisation is 
not all there is and all there can be. Bodies - which in this thesis have been conceived 
in very concrete and carnal tenns of flesh and blood, bones and tissue, pains and 
pleasures, habits and desires - are capable of doing things that are unexpected, 
unpredictable, and sometimes unappreciated by the guardians of order and normality, 
things that have nothing to do with organisation whatsoever. This means that bringing 
embodiment into the organisational discourse leaves less space for organisation. 
The monstrous concept of organisation that I propose, and from which a philosophy 
of organisation can be developed, is a concept that somewhat ironically talks less 
about organisation and more about nonorganisation. It is a concept that recognises 
both the boundaries and purposive nature of organisation and the bounded energy of 
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organisation. It is the latter recognition - that the energy of organisation is bounded _ 
which is most crucial here. It is this that enables us to recognise the ways in which 
organisational boundaries and the purposive drive behind any organisational project 
are disrupted by nonorganisation. As I discussed at some length in chapter 5, the 
concept of disorganisation does not enable us to draw this radical conclusion because 
it is itself little more than another - albeit bizarre, unusual and often deemed 
undesirable - version of organisation. If wanting to recognise the limitations and 
fragility of organisation, it is indeed necessary to put the concept of organisation in 
contact with a concept of nonorganisation which is unbound and independent of any 
clear sense of a set purpose or final goal. For clarification, I reproduce the table from 
chapter 5: 
Concept "Form" of expression Relationship to "purpose" and 
boundaries 
Organi sati on Entities and processes Purpose-dri yen and goal-
directed; institutes and maintains 
boundaries 
Disorganisation Bizarre, unusual and "un- Purpose-driven and goal-
desirable" forms of organisation directed; institutes and maintains 
unusual boundaries 
Nonorganisation Active, creative and exceSSIve Beyond purpose; disrupts 
forces of desire boundaries 
(Table 8.2: Organisation, Disorganisation and Nonorganisation) 
There are two particular dangers with this monstrous and nonorganisational concept 
of organisation. First, that it might make the organisers of this world try to tighten the 
grip in an attempt to avoid organisation slipping through their hands and melting into 
air. In my view, however, any attempt to tighten the grip is futile because bodies have 
a number of ways to respond to such initiatives, of which passive submission is not 
the only one. Second, there is the danger that this concept of organisation - and the 
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concept of nonorganisation with it - will be colonised and co-opted by mainstream 
organisation theory and by organisational practitioners keen to expand their own 
organisational projects within a political economy supposedly characterised by speed 
and openness, freedom and flexibility. But the danger of co-optation is a danger 
affecting any concept - not just the one I have tried to develop here. 53 Moreover, 
attempts to co-opt and capitalise on new and radical concepts such as this one face a 
fundamental problem. When introduced into a mainstream setting - for example 
managerialist organisation theory or management consultancy - radical concepts may 
become more subversive and more powerful as they turn upside down and disrupt - in 
unexpected ways - what their colonisers try to make them do. Some times, the tighter 
the grip, the more easily a concept may slip through the hands of its colonisers, 
disappearing from reach. This is also the case with the concept of organisation 
proposed here. Insofar as organisation is continuously caught up with and disrupted 
by nonorganisation, which is beyond boundaries and beyond purpose, this concept of 
organisation cannot be employed in a quest for more organisation. In other words, 
nonorganisation means that this concept of organisation, as long as it is taken on its 
own monstrous terms and not conflated with something else, is out of bounds for the 
colonisers in mainstream organisation theory and management consultancy because it 
resists and escapes co-optation. 
Attempts to colonise, co-opt and capitalise on the monstrous have a long history in the 
circuses, side shows and freak shows touring the towns and villages of Western 
53 Cf. e.g. Burrell and Morgan's (1979) discussion of the Marxist concept of alienation being co-opted 
by functionalist organisation theory and management to be turned into a seemingly innocent matter of 
job design. 
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countries. The popularity of these events is related to a strong fascination with 
monstrous and grotesque bodies, which, found both disturbing and attractive, 
constitute a mysterium tremendum et fascinosum. Fred Wilson from Somerville, 
Massachusetts, who was known as "Lobster Boy Fred Wilson", remains one of the 
most famous examples of the monstrous body (see fig. 8.1). In his classic film Freaks 
(1932), the gay Hollywood director Tod Browning (whose fascination with monstrous 
and grotesque bodies is also evident in his making of the movies Dracula (1931) and 
Mark of the Vampire (1935)) portrays for a mainstream audience a number of people 
regarded as having monstrous bodies. Browning's movie is not, however, simply an 
attempt to make money on or contribute to the further ridicule and stigmatisation of 
these people. Rather, Browning sought to make a sympathetic portrayal of them 
where we see famous "freaks" such as the opera-singing Siamese twins Daisy and 
Violet Hilton and "The Bearded Lady" Olga Roderick in everyday situations (see 
figures 8.2 and 8.3). Tami Gold's movie Juggling Gender (1992), which is a loving 
portrait of Jennifer Miller (a lesbian performer who lives her life with a full beard), 
does in some way continue Browning's tradition. The movie, which portrays Miller 
both in the everyday and during stage performances, explores the fluidity of gender, 
raises important questions about the construction of sexual and gender identity, and 
draws attention to the difficulty of defining anyone as either masculine or feminine. 
Moreover, it shows that Miller, who often is mistaken for a man, handles these 
experiences with the wit and intelligence that characterise her stage performances (see 
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fig. 8.4) . I take much inspiration from Browning, Gold and Miller in my o\vn attempt 
to develop a monstrous organisation theory with a monstrous concept of organi sation. 
Rather than lending the notions of nonorganisation and nonorganisational 
embodiment to managerialist projects of colonisation, co-optation and capitalisation, I 
seek to maximise their very monstrosity as a means to do something new and radical 
at the frontiers of organisation theory. 
(Figure 8. 1: "Lobster Boy Fred Wilson from Somerville, Massachusetts, as a young 
man in the 1890s) 
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(Figure 8. 2: The opera-singing Siamese twins Daisy and Violet Hilton on stage) 
(Figure 8.3: "The Bearded Lady" Olga Roderick) 
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(Figure 8.4: Jennifer Miller performing on stage) 
A third criticism of this monstrous and nonorganisational concept of organisation 
would be to consider it dualistic , as it construes organisation and nonorganisation as 
extremities along a continuum. Similar criticism could be raised aga inst the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988) , where they for example oppose the "body without 
organs" to the "organism", the "nomad" to the "State", "Go! " to "chess", the 
"rhizome" to the "tree", and against Deleuze 's (1994) sole-authored works, where he 
for example differentiates between "differentiation" and "differenciation" and 
between the "real-possible" and the "virtual -actual ". But insofar as these 
constellations are dualistic, they are not so in a Hegelian sense. No attempt is made to 
synthesise them and no attempt is made to keep them absolutely separate . Rather, 
these "ideal" tenns are employed in order to enable new and monstrous movements in 
thought; such movement might make it possible to take things to their extremes and 
show how much things differ from one another, and they might enable us to see how 
different things (such as organisation, nonorganisation and embodiment) interact 
without being reduced to one another. If this monstrosity is dualism, I do not have any 
problem with my conceptualisation of organisation, nonorganisation and embodiment 
being called dualistic. 
The monstrous and nonorganisational concept of organisation therefore has much to 
offer. And what it has to offer is more significant than the dangers attributed to its use. 
Moreover, it is not just a concept. As I argued in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari's 
(1994) understanding of philosophy as the creation and invention of concepts does not 
mean that concepts are to be created in isolation from the rest of the world, just for the 
sake of creating concepts. Deleuze and Guattari' s understanding of philosophy puts 
philosophy in close contact with non-philosophy and it puts concepts in close contact 
with pre-conceptual and post-conceptual problems. With regards to the Deleuzian or 
DeleuzoGuattarian philosophy of organisation proposed here, which is an attempt to 
work with and redevelop organisation theory as a monstrous organisation theory, this 
means that any new concept of organisation must be created in relation to empirical 
problems. Simply philosophising about the ways in which nonorganisation and 
nonorganisational embodiment disrupt the boundaries of organisation is insufficient. 
It is most crucial that one also pursues empirical studies of how nonorganisation and 
nonorganisational embodiment disrupt the boundaries of organisation. This might 
include, among other things, studies of subcultures, gender and sexuality, disease and 
illness, age, fitness and disability, be it through the examples of the transgendered, 
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sadomasochistic, lesbigay, anoreXiC and health freak bodies referred to above, or 
through other monstrous examples. In any case, more in-depth studies of these and 
other activities would provide a non-philosophical account of how nonorganisational 
bodies disrupt the boundaries that organisational regimes - such as the New Public 
Health - seek to impose on people's lifestyles. 
The spectrum of non-philosophical research akin to this monstrous philosophy of 
organisation is broad. Other non-philosophical studies to be pursued might include 
inquiries into how sexually different and deviant bodies disrupt the organisational 
boundaries, not only of public health, but also of the legal system, religious 
institutions and the dominant norms of society as a whole. Yet other non-
philosophical studies might inquire into how youth subcultures might disrupt the 
organisational purpose and boundaries of the tube station, the shopping mall and the 
public square, for example by hanging around rather than purchasing a ticket, 
shopping or passing through on their way to work or school. Of course, such studies 
must be carried out in relation to a serious concern with the actual regimes that seek to 
organise the bodies and movements, thoughts and actions of the people in question. 
And they must be carried out in relation to some theoretical concern with the 
monstrous and nonorganisational concept of organisation, concerns that might take us 
beyond Deleuze and Guattari and the other writers used here. There is for example a 
strong sense of nonorganisation in ancient Greek, Norse and other mythologies, where 
boundary-disruptions are identified in the relations between women and men, humans 
and plants, gods and animals, so as to construct fascinating and unusual monstrosities. 
Similar monstrosities might also be identified in Actor-Network Theory, science 
fiction, the Great European Novel, cinema, queer theory and feminism, and these can 
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certainly infonn a future monstrous philosophy of organisation, nonorganisation and 
embodiment. 
All this means that the task of this monstrous organisation theory or philosophy of 
organisation is a complex one. In order for it to be able to deal with non-philosophical 
problems of everyday life and embodiment, problems whose nonorganisational 
character disrupt the boundaries of organisation, it must also pursue empirical studies 
such as the ones sketched out above. It is never a question of either philosophy or 
non-philosophy, either organisation or nonorganisation. For this organisation theory 
and philosophy of organisation to deal with the problem of the body, it must be a 
question of philosophy and non-philosophy, organisation and nonorganisation. It is 
from this monstrous starting point that it becomes possible to recognise the limitations 
of organisation and the power of embodiment. 
This monstrous organisation theory also carries a practical message for the practice of 
everyday life. Albeit developed in tenns of a philosophy of organisation, it 
encourages us to live differently - and in monstrosity - in and out of the workplace. It 
encourages us to change our habits and open up and experiment with our own bodies 
so as to pursue unusual, heterogeneous and monstrous relationships with other bodies 
that are not governed by organisation. 
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